

THOUGHTS

OF

CICERO,

Selections.

ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS,

I. RELIGION.

II. MAN.

III. CONSCIENCE.

IV. THE PASSIONS.

V. WISDOM.

VI. PROBITY.

VII. ELOQUENCE.

VIII. FRIENDSHIP.

IX. OLD AGE.

X. DEATH.

XI. SCIPIO'S DREAM.

AND

XII. MISCELLANEOUS
SUBJECTS.

Published in LATIN and FRENCH

BY THE

Abbé D'OLIVET;

To which is added,

An ENGLISH TRANSLATION with NOTES,

By the Revd. ALEX'. WISHART.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED.

LONDON:

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MDCCLXXIII.

THOUGHTS

OF

THE

THE FRIENDSHIP

IN OLD AGE

X. B. D. D.

MR. SCHNITZ'S DREAM

AND

MR. MISCELLANEOUS

SUBJECTS

FRINCH



AND B. OLIVER

THE

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH NOTES

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P R E F A C E

T O T H E

E N G L I S H T R A N S L A T I O N .

WHERE there is, in the nature of a work, a manifest utility, even the want of a preface might be excused; or, at least, the shortness of one ought to pass for a mark of just respect to the reader. A book calculated to inspire virtuous and manly sentiments, must be a seasonable present to youth, and not unacceptable to the public in general: and that such is the tendency of the following collection of Cicero's thoughts, cannot be denied.

The world is sufficiently acquainted with the Abbé d'Olivet's ability to make a proper choice: and, indeed, his translation is as much a master-piece in the French language, as the original is in the Latin. What his reasons were for this undertaking, appear from his preface. There too may be seen a very plain and obvious demand for an English translation.

For it is there observed, that in order to learn the French, the way of teaching it in some schools was by means of the Latin. Now, as nothing is more generally allowed, than that children cannot be put too young to learn languages, while their memory is most flexible and apt to take charge of words; so there are few, in so tender an age as that wherein it would be expedient to put them to learn French, so

iv TRANSLATOR's PREFACE.

far advanced in their Latin, as by means thereof to come at the French translation. But this objection, and we appeal to the public if it is not a just one, is effectually removed by this addition of an English translation; which will carry with it the advantage of a double key, as being accommodated to promote the knowledge both of the Latin and French; so that ladies, and others who have no design upon the Latin, may, by the help of the English translation, learn, or improve, their French.

Here they will meet with precepts of the most exalted piety, benevolence, and virtue, recommended to them by the name of an Author, of whom there are few ladies who have not heard enough to raise their curiosity to be acquainted with his sentiments. It must likewise be an additional satisfaction, to find these represented in the greatest purity of the French language; which, without detracting in the least from the merits of their native one, has, though not greater, yet different, beauties to recommend it; to say nothing of its being in such general use and request, as to be now ranked among the branches of polite education.

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Foreigners too, who are learning English, will reap great advantage from this treatise: for the learned may, by means of the Latin, come at the English translation; and the ladies and others who do not understand Latin, may make use of the French for the same purpose.

We shall say nothing more of the English translation, which is submitted to the judgment of the public, but that all imaginable care has been taken to render it answerable to all the ends proposed; and we flatter ourselves, its beauties will be found nothing inferior, at least, to those of the other two languages.

T H E

Abbé *d'O L I V E T*'s

P R E F A C E.

I COULD never forget what happened to me once, as I was engaged in a party for a walk, about twelve or fifteen miles from London: for being obliged, by bad weather, to take shelter in the first house that presented itself, I was agreeably surprized to find it inhabited by a Frenchman, whom I had known in my youth; and who, after various adventures, had procured himself this retreat, where he made a livelihood by boarding children, to whom he taught the French language. Being curious to learn the method followed in this sort of schools, which are common enough in England, I found that they read *Quintus Curtius*, with *Vaugelas's* translation; and that by the help of the Latin, the rudiments of which the children must previously be acquainted with, the

master endeavoured to make them understand the French; which served, at once, to exercise them in both languages. In the midst of our conversation, the father of one of the boarders joined us; when some words, which in the way of discourse he directed to me, gave me occasion to tell him, that I should be glad to hear his son explain a page or two, at dipping into the book. And where should the book open, but just at the battle of Arbella? But, far the boy's explanation had not proceeded, before the English gentleman, the father, interrupted it, by reflections that gave rise to this little collection. After all, says he, What reason is there that my son should have his head filled with all these wars? I have no thoughts of making him a general. But was that his destination, are these books fit to teach him his trade? Why not have some other translation, that should contain useful maxims, and principles proper to form a man of honour?

Nothing could be more judicious than this reflection: And from that instant, I formed a resolution to set about such a work, but know not how I came to delay so long the execution of a design, so agreeable to me on more than one account. First, it could not be indifferent to me, considered as a member of our academy, to contribute to the spreading our language through foreign nations. Another motive, still more engaging, was, that

that a work of this nature, if tolerably executed, might become the most important of all reading to young people, and the properest to inspire them with a taste for virtue; without which, it is impossible for a man to be happy in himself, or useful to society.

Some translation then was to be thought of for attaining the double end I proposed to myself; and there was no room to hesitate upon the choice of the original. Where could I have found the beauties of the Latin tongue, and the most refined morals, better united than in Cicero? But as most of his works include several things, which either exceed the comprehension of children, or are not all alike useful, I thought it would be best to make a choice out of them, and confine myself almost wholly to collect detached thoughts. And indeed, children are hardly capable of taking in the whole chain of a long argument. Neither is it my opinion, that sentences delivered in a laconic way, are fit for them. A thought, unless explained, and put in a certain light, appears obscure to them: Or, granting that perspicuity should accompany such a concise method, there is too much room to fear, that what is called sentences, would pass too quickly to fix their desultory imaginations. For this reason alone, was there no other, I should have preferred Cicero to Seneca. But besides, there was a

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much

much finer harvest to be reaped in the one than in the other: For as the cardinal du Peron very justly observes, *there is more in two pages of Cicero*, who thinks a great deal, and whose sentiments always move forward, *than in ten pages of Seneca*, who eternally dwells on a thought, and treats the same thing over and over again.

It may be objected, that Cicero loses infinitely, by being thus retailed in scraps. Since the superiority of his merit, and what raises him, perhaps, above all who ever wrote before, or since, is not only an uninterrupted series of true, solid, and shining thoughts; nor the secret only of expressing those thoughts with graces peculiar to himself: But it is chiefly the art of marshalling, connecting, and forming them into one chain. To this I answer, that the point here is to make Cicero subservient to our profit, without being solicitous about his reputation as a writer, which will subsist independent of any liberty we may take with him.

I should, however, do him wrong, with those who know no more of him than by what they will see here, if I neglected to acquaint them, that this volume, so far from comprehending all that he has said worthy of notice, contains only a very small part thereof. It was my business to proportion the work to the
wants

wants of children. Quintilian compares their understandings to vessels, into which no liquor can be poured, but drop by drop. Whence, though little reading be necessary for this age, yet that little should be well chosen, and frequently repeated.

I have taken almost nothing out of the Offices, because they ought to be read, and seriously considered, from one end to the other. To give them in remnants, would be inexcusable. They are all connected together, all equally beautiful and necessary. One principle infers another, and has often occasion for a third to prove itself, in order to make us sensible, that morality composes only one entire body; whose parts are so coherent, so inseparable, that, on examining well the nature of our duties, and that of the human heart, if one is not an honest man in every thing, it follows that he is so in nothing.

I own, however, that Cicero's system of morals, though it may be looked on as an abstract of the most solid, and judicious, sentiments of the heathens, wants nevertheless to be sometimes corrected, and at other times supported, by the morality of the gospel. Where human reason seems to leave us in a sort of uncertainty, there divine revelation steps in to our assistance. This is what a judicious master will make his pupils sensible of. When, for example, Cicero uses the expression
of

of Gods : A word thrown in, will make them perceive that this plural offends, not against religion only, but common sense too. When they shall see the judgment that mere heathens have passed on pleasures, the passions, riches, real good, and real evil, it will be well to join to their admirable maxims, the great motives which a christian has before his eyes. When they come to read the Dream of Scipio, how naturally will the occasion offer to explain to them, what the christian faith teaches of another life ?

To form a christian then, it will be necessary to supplement often, and much, to Cicero's ethics. These very morals, however, at the same time that they contribute to form the man of honour, dispose likewise a child to receive, and preserve in his heart, the precepts of religion. You cannot too often repeat to him, that he has a soul, and a conscience ; that there is a law of nature, whence result indispenfible duties ; and that independently of all revealed religion, if he wants probity, he becomes in the eyes of all who make use of their reason, an object of horror and contempt. Certainly, the virtues of a Socrates cannot alone suffice us ; but let us begin with having them. Every edifice built without this foundation, will not be a lasting one. Whereas it is rare for religion to lose its ground, in a man sincerely virtuous ;
and

and rarer yet, for it not to recover its rights, sooner or later, should they happen to be lost.

Though, once more, my design was to be serviceable to such foreigners, as, by the help of the Latin, study the French; it appears to me, that my labour might even be of some service in our own schools, where Latin is studied by the help of the French *. I do not mean our colleges; they are governed by able heads, who know better than me, which method is best. I speak of those little schools, which daily multiply round Paris, as well as in the country. Instead of reading treatises in them, which require an acquaintance with the disputes of the Athenian portico and lyceum †, that are little known in our days; would it not be as advantageous for the student, and no less convenient for the master, to keep to instructive passages, and such as are accommodated to every capacity, either by the help of a translation alone, or a few short remarks?

This

* This holds equally good of an English translation, designed for the use of our schools; by the help of which, both the Latin, and French, language may be learned at once.

† Zeno had the appellation Stoic given him from *στοα*, a *portico*, the place where he taught his disciples; who from him were called Stoics. The Lyceum was a place on the banks of the river Ilissus, where Aristotle used to walk, as he taught his philosophy; whence he and his followers had the name of Peripatetics, from *περιπατεῖν*, to walk.

This would be to teach things as well as words; to cultivate reason and memory at the same time; and to make instruction at once useful, and easy. For the great principles of morality have this peculiar property, that, being naturally impressed, or at least traced out, on the hearts of all mankind; when they are pointed out to a child, he thinks he discerns only what he knew before: And thus he becomes his own best interpreter, as finding an excellent commentary in his own heart.

But let us not confine ourselves to the times of study in our public schools. During the breaking-up season, it is common for children to follow their parents into the country; and it is there that a work of this sort might be of signal service. What duty can a father hold more sacred, what obligation more indispensable, than that of instructing his own child himself? Besides, where is there a more sensible, more lively, or more attracting pleasure, when the bowels of the parent are, what they ought always to be presumed? I am fond to figure to myself a man engrossed by the public throughout the year, excepting for a while in autumn, when restored to himself, and removed at a distance from the noise and impertinence of the world; I am fond, I say, to figure to myself such a man in the bosom of his family, with a Cicero in his hand, reading some remarkable passage of antiquity, and
taking

taking a pleasure to reason upon it, more, as it were, by chance, than in the form of advice. It is thus the precious seed penetrates into the yet tender soul; whence, in due time, shall spring up the honest and great man, the good magistrate, and the virtuous patriot. All the lessons of a tutor, however learned and diligent, are of little avail, compared with what a father properly inculcates; because a child knows, and knows it so as not to be mistaken, that his father's only aim is to endeavour to make him happy, and deserving to be so.

I conclude with a passage, that has often presented itself to my memory, but which I will not translate, for fear of offending the age we live in. It is well known, what were the consequences of an ill distributed opulence, an unbounded luxury, too general an impunity, but especially a contempt of all order and decency; which never gains footing, till the duties of morality are quite forgot; and which puts, as it were, the last hand to the depravation of manners. I will not say, that we are come to such a length. All I shall observe is, that whatever measures are taken, in order to prevent the like degeneracy, should neither proceed from a panic terror, nor a premature zeal. But, however that may be, here follows the Latin quotation, that I meant to speak of. [*Less scrupulous than*
the

xiv The Abbé d'OLIVET's, &c.

the French translator, we give here in lieu of the Latin, the English translation.]

“ What greater, what better service, can
“ we do the commonwealth, than present-
“ ing it with any thing towards the instruc-
“ tion and tutorage of youth? Especially
“ whilst the manners, and the times, are at
“ such a pass of degeneracy and dissoluteness,
“ that no less than the united endeavours of
“ all *who love their Country*, is necessary to
“ restrain and keep our youth within bounds.”

CICERO, de Div. II. 2.

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THE
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M. TULLII
CICERONIS
ECLOGÆ.

PENSEES
DE
CICERON.

I.

De RELIGIONE.

QUID potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur?

Quod qui dubitet, haud sanè intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum seculis ætatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. Etenim videmus, cæteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse. Quis enim hippocentaurum fuisse, aut chimæram putat? quæve anus tam
excors

I.

Sur la RELIGION.

PEUt-ON regarder le ciel, et contempler tout ce qui s'y passe, sans voir avec toute l'évidence possible, qu'il est gouverné par une suprême, par une divine Intelligence?

Quiconque auroit quelque doute là-dessus, je crois qu'il pourroit aussitôt douter s'il y a un soleil. L'un est-il plus visible que l'autre? Cette persuasion, sans l'évidence qui l'accompagne, n'auroit pas été si ferme et si durable; elle n'auroit pas acquis de nouvelles forces en vieillissant; elle n'auroit pu résister au torrent des années, et passer de siècle en siècle jusqu'à nous. Tout ce qui n'étoit que fiction, que fausseté, nous voyons que cela s'est dissipé à la longue. Personne croit-il encore aujourd'hui, qu'il y eut
jamais

THOUGHTS

OF

CICERO.

I.

On RELIGION.

WHEN * we view the heavens, and contemplate the celestial bodies, can any thing be more plain, or appear with clearer evidence, than that there is a deity of most consummate wisdom, by whom they are governed?

He that entertains any doubt of this, may, in my opinion, with equal reason, doubt of the existence of the sun. For, wherein is the one more evident than the other? Had not mankind been thoroughly convinced of the truth of this opinion, it could never have acquired so firm a footing, never have been able to make its way through so many ages and generations, nor have gained new confirmation by length of time: For we see, that all other vain and fictitious notions are at length quite exploded. Who now believes, that there ever was an

* De Nat. Deor. l. b II. cap. 2.

excors inveniri potest, quæ illa, quæ quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? Opinión enim commenta delet diés: naturæ judicia confirmat. Itaque et in nostro populo, et in cæteris, deorum cultus religionumque sanctitates existunt in diés majores, atque meliores.

jamais un hippocentaure, une chimère? Les monstres horribles qu'on se figuroit anciennement dans les enfers, font-ils encore peur à la vieille la plus imbécille du monde? Avec le temps les opinions des hommes s'évanouissent, mais les jugemens de la nature se fortifient. De là il arrive parmi nous et parmi les autres peuples, que le culte divin et les pratiques de religion s'augmentent, et s'épurent de jour en jour.

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Præclarè Aristoteles, Si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper habitavissent, bonis et illustribus domiciliis, quæ essent ornata signis atque picturis, instructaque rebus iis omnibus, quibus abundant ii qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram: acceperissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen, et vim deorum: deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis terræ faucibus, ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in hæc loca quæ nos incolimus, atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram, et maria, cælumque vidissent: nubium magnitudinem, ventorumque vim cognovissent, aspexissentque solem, ejusque tum magnitudinem, pulchritudinemque, tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret, toto cælo luce diffusâ: cum autem terras
nox

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Aristote dit très-bien: Supposons des hommes qui eussent toujours habité sous terre dans de belles et grandes maisons, ornées de statues et de tableaux, fournies de tout ce qui abonde chez ceux que l'on croit heureux. Supposons, que sans être jamais sortis de là, ils eussent pourtant entendu parler des dieux; et que tout d'un coup la terre venant à s'ouvrir, ils quitassent leur séjour ténébreux pour venir demeurer avec nous. Que penseroient ils, en découvrant la terre, les mers, le ciel? En considérant l'étendue des nuées, la violence des vents? En jetant les yeux sur le soleil? En observant sa grandeur, sa beauté, l'effusion de sa lumière qui éclaire tout? Et quand la nuit auroit obscurci la terre: que diroient

hippocentaur *, or chimera †? Or where is the old wife so stupidly silly, as to dread the infernal monsters ‡, that were believed to exist heretofore? For time, which effaces all feigned hypotheses, establishes and confirms opinions that are agreeable to nature: and hence it is, that the veneration paid the divine beings, and the sacred rites of religion, both with us, and among other nations, daily gain ground and improve.



It is || an excellent supposition of Aristotle, that if there were men who had always lived under ground, in splendid and magnificent apartments, ornamented with pictures and statues, and well furnished with whatever abounds with those who are commonly esteemed opulent and happy; and that without ever making their appearance on the surface of our globe, these men had, by fame or instruction, been informed that there was a deity, and divine powers: then, that after some time, a chasm of the earth should open, and make way for them to leave their buried habitations, and mount up to the world which we inhabit. When the earth, the sea, and the heavens, rushed upon their sight; when they observed the

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extent

* Hippocentaur is a fabulous animal, half man half horse. The Thessalians are said to have been the inventors of the art of breaking horses; and being the first that were seen on horseback, they appeared to make but one body with the horses; which gave rise to the fable of the hippocentaur.

† Chimera, according to the poets, was a monster, that had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a dragon. Bellerophon, mounted upon pegasus, defeated the chimera. For the different explanations of this, consult the authors who have treated of antient fables.

‡ Such as cerberus, the parcae or sister-fates, the eumenides or furies, &c.

|| De Nat. Deor. II. 37, 38.

nox opacasset, tum cælum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum, lunæ que luminum varietatem tum crescentis, tum senescentis, eorumque omnium ortus et occasus, atque in omni æternitate ratos immutabilesque cursus : hæc cum viderent, profecto et esse deos, et hæc tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur.

Atque hæc quidem ille. Nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas, quantæ quondam eruptione Ætnæorum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per biduum nemo hominem homo agnosceret : cum autem tertio die sol illuxisset, tum ut revixisset sibi viderentur. Quod si hoc idem ex æternis tenebris contingeret, ut subito lucem aspiceremus : quænam species cæli videretur ? Sed assiduitate quotidiana, et consuetudine oculorum, assuescunt animi : neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper vident : proinde quasi novitas nos magis, quam magnitudo rerum, debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare.

Quis enim hunc hominem dixerit, qui cum tam certos cæli motus, tam ra-
tos

diroient ils en contemplant le ciel tout parsemé d'astres différens ? En remarquant les variétez surprenantes de la lune, son croissant, son décours ? En observant enfin le lever et le coucher de tous ces astres, et la régularité inviolable de leurs mouvemens ? Pourroient-ils douter qu'il n'y eût en effet des dieux, et qui ce ne fût là leur ouvrage ?

Ainsi parle Aristote. Figurons nous pareillement d'épaisses ténèbres, semblables à celles dont le mont Etna, par l'irruption de ses flâmes, couvrit tellement ses environs, que l'on fut deux jours, dit-on, sans pouvoir se connaître ; et que le troisième jour, le soleil ayant reparu, on se croyoit ressuscité. Figurons-nous, dis-je, qu'au sortir d'une éternelle nuit, il nous arrive de voir la lumière pour la première fois : quelle impression feroit sur nous la vûe de ciel ? Mais parce que nous sommes faits à le voir, nos esprits n'en sont plus frappés, et ne s'embarassent point de rechercher les principes de ce que nous avons toujours devant les yeux. Comme si c'étoit la nouveauté, plutôt que la grandeur même des choses, qui dût exciter notre curiosité.

Est-ce donc être homme, que d'attribuer, non à une cause intelligente, mais au hasard,

extent of the clouds, and felt the force of the winds; when they had cast their eyes on the sun, viewed its magnitude and splendor, and had been told of its great influence, and how, by diffusing light through the heavens, it causes day. When, on night's overshadowing the earth, they beheld the firmament bespangled with stars; when they had been made acquainted with the still varying phases of the moon, both in its increase and wane; also with the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, and their stated and unvaried revolutions from all eternity. Certainly, on such a prospect, they would be convinced that there were gods, and that the great things they had seen were their works.

Thus far Aristotle. Let us now make another supposition, and imagine such a darkness as prevailed once at an eruption of mount *Ætna*, when, for the space of two days, the adjacent countries were so benighted, that it was impossible for one man to distinguish another; so that on the third day, when the sun appeared with his usual splendor, they seemed risen, as it were, from the dead. But should it happen, that, after being enveloped in eternal darkness, the light suddenly broke out upon us with full glare, how amazing would the prospect of the heavens appear? The daily returns of the same objects to our view, render them familiar to us; nor are men inclined to admire or search into the causes of what they are always conversant with; as if the novelty, rather than the greatness and excellence of things, ought to excite us to investigate their causes.

Does he merit the name of MAN, who, after

tos astrorum ordines, tamque omnia inter se connexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem, eaque casu fieri dicat, quæ quanto consilio gerantur, nullo consilio assequi possumus? An cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphaeram, ut horas, ut alia permulta: non dubitamus quin illa opera sint rationis: cum autem impetum cœli admirabili cum celeritate moveri vertique videamus, constantissimè conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias, cum summa salute et cōservatione rerum omnium: dubitamus, quin ea non solum ratione fiant, sed etiam excellenti quadam divinaque ratione? Licet enim jam, remotâ subtilitate disputandi, oculis quodammodo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum quas divinâ providentiâ dicimus constitutas.



Cum videmus speciem primum candoremque cœli; deinde conversionis celeritatem tantam, quantam cogitare non possumus; tum vicissitudines dierum atque noctium, commutationesque temporum quadripartitas, ad maturitatem frugum et ad temperationem corporum aptas; eorumque omnium

hasard, les mouvemens du ciel si certains, le cours des astres si régulier, toutes choses si bien liées ensemble, si bien proportionnées, et conduites avec tant de raison, que notre raison s'y perd elle-même? Quand nous voyons des machines qui se meuvent artificiellement, une sphère, une horloge, et autres semblables; nous ne doutons pas que l'esprit n'ait eu part à ce travail. Douterons-nous que le monde soit dirigé, je ne dis pas simplement par une intelligence, mais par une excellente, par une divine intelligence, quand nous voyons le ciel se mouvoir avec une prodigieuse vîtesse, et faire succéder annuellement l'une à l'autre les diverses saisons, qui vivifient, qui conservent tout? Car enfin, il n'est plus besoin ici de preuves recherchées: il n'y a qu'à examiner des yeux la beauté des choses, dont nous rapportons l'établissement à une providence divine.



Quand nous regardons la beauté et la splendeur du ciel; la célérité de son roulement, qui est si grande qu'on ne sauroit la concevoir; la vicissitude des jours et des nuits; le changement des quatre saisons, qui servent à mûrir les fruits, et à fortifier le corps; le soleil, qui est le modérateur et le chef de

having viewed the stated and invariable motions of the heavens, the regular arrangements and disposition of the stars, and the nice connection and harmony which reign throughout the universe, shall notwithstanding maintain, that all this is the effect of blind chance, and not the work of reason; though the wisdom, by which they are conducted, far exceeds the power of the human understanding to comprehend? When we see a sphere, a curious dial, or any other piece of machinery moving artificially, it is never questioned that they are the effects of design: and can we then contemplate that mighty power, whereby the heavens perform their revolutions with such amazing velocity, whence arise the regular vicissitudes of the seasons, so admirably contrived for promoting the happiness and preservation of the whole system; and yet doubt that the world is directed, I will not say simply by intelligence, but by the most consummate and divine wisdom? Away then with the subtilties of sophistry; for here we have ocular demonstration of the beauty of those things we attribute to divine providence.



When * we behold the bright appearance of the heavens, and consider the great, the amazing velocity of their revolution; the vicissitudes of day and night; the successive change of the seasons, so aptly calculated for ripening the fruits of the earth, and preserving a just temperature in all bodies; the sun which presides over, and regulates all these phenomena; then the moon, whose augmentation and dimi-

B 4

nution

* Tuscul. I. 28, 29.

nium moderatorem et ducem solem ; lunamque accretione et diminutione luminis, quasi fastorum notantem et significantem dies ; tum in eodem orbe, in XII partes distributo, quinque stellas ferri, eosdem cursus constantissimè servantem, disparibus inter se motibus ; nocturnamque cœli formam undique sideribus ornatam ; tum globum terræ eminentem è mari, fixum in medio mundi universi loco, duabus oris distantibus habitabilem et cultum : quarum altera, quam nos incolimus, sub axe posita ad stellas septem, unde

Horriser
Aquilonis stridor gelidas molitur nives :

altera australis, ignota nobis, quam vocant Græci *αὐλιχθονα* : cæteras partes incultas, quod aut frigore rigent, aut urantur calore : hic autem, ubi habitamus, non intermittit suo tempore

*Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere,
Vites lætificæ pampinis pubescere,
Rami baccarum ubertate incurvescere,
Segetes largiri fruges, florere omnia,
Fontes scatere, herbis præta sonvestirier :*

de tous les mouvemens célestes ; la lune, dont le croissant et le décroissant semblent faits pour nous marquer les fastes ; les planètes, qui, avec des mouvemens inégaux, fournissent également la même carrière, sur un même cercle divisé en douze parties ; cette prodigieuse quantité d'étoiles, qui durant la nuit décorent le ciel de toutes parts.

Quand nous jetons ensuite les yeux sur le globe de la terre, élevé au dessus de la mer, placé dans le centre du monde, et divisé en quatre parties, deux desquelles sont cultivées, la septentrionale qui nous habitons, l'australe qui nous est inconnue, et le reste inculte, parce que le froid ou le chaud y domine avec excès.

Quand nous observons que dans la partie où nous sommes, on voit toujours au temps marqué,

Une clarté plus pure
Embellir la nature ;
Les arbres reverdir ;
Les fontaines bondir ;
L'herbe tendre renaître ;
Le pampre reparoître ;
Les présens de Cérès em-
plir nos magasins ;
Et les tributs de Flore en-
richir nos jardins.

nutation of light seems so well adapted to mark out our calendar *; the five planets likewise revolving through the twelve signs of the zodiac, and all of them with the greatest regularity performing their respective revolutions, though with different motions: to this add the nightly prospect of the firmament, studded and ornamented with stars; then the terrestrial globe, raised above the sea, and fixed in the center of the universe †; which in two regions ‡, distinct from each other, is habitable and cultivated. One of these is that we inhabit, situated towards the north pole, whence

The blust'ring north wind brings the gelid snows.

The other lies towards the south, and is called by the Greeks *Αἰλίχθων*. Whilst the remaining parts, by reason of the excessive heats and colds which prevail there, are entirely waste and depopulated. But here, in our happier situation, all in due season,

The sky grows clear, the trees their foliage shoot,
The joyous vines luxuriant branches spread,
The boughs sway down beneath their fruitful load,
The fertile soil a copious harvest yields.
All nature blooms. Up spring refreshing streams,
And the gay herbage crowns th' enamel'd fields.

B 5

When

* By the *fasti*, we must understand the days of the month in general. For working-days were, by the Romans, called *fastidies*, and holidays *nefasti*.

† It is evident, from the expressions here used, that Cicero followed the Ptolemaic system of the world; which places the earth in the center of the universe, and makes the heavenly bodies to revolve round it: But this opinion is now given up as erroneous, all the phenomena being accounted for in a much more simple and rational way, by supposing the sun to occupy the center, and all the planets to revolve round him, *viz.* our earth once a year, and at the same time to turn once every day round its own axis.

‡ The earth is divided, both by ancients and moderns, into five regions or zones; that in the middle of the earth was called the *torrid*

zone,

tum multitudinem pecudum, partim ad vescendum, partim ad cultus agrorum, partim ad vehendum, partim ad corpora vestienda; hominemque ipsum, quasi contemplatorem cœli, ac deorum, ipsorumque cultorem; atque hominis utilitati agros omnes et maria parentia.

Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur: vel, si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris?



Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam, qui sibi persuadeat, corpora quædam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri, mundumque effici ornatissimum, et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuitâ? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo, cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formæ literarum vel aureæ, vel quales libet, aliquo concijiantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Isti autem

Quand nous voyons que la terre est peuplée d'animaux, les uns pour nous nourrir, les autres pour nous vêtir; ceux-ci pour traîner nos fardeaux, ceux-là pour labourer nos champs: que l'homme y est comme pour contempler le ciel, et pour honorer les dieux: que toutes les campagnes, toutes les mers obéissent à ses besoins.

Pouvons nous à la vue de ce spectacle, douter qu'il y ait un être, ou qui ait formé le monde, supposé que, suivant l'opinion de Platon, il ait été, formé; ou qui le conduise et le gouverne, supposé que, suivant le sentiment d'Aristote, il soit de toute éternité?



Ici ne dois-je pas m'étonner qu'il y ait un homme qui se persuade, que de certains corps solides et indivisibles se meuvent d'eux-mêmes par leur poids naturel; et que, de leur concours fortuit, s'est fait un monde d'une si grande beauté? Quiconque croit cela possible, pourquoi ne croiroit-il pas que si l'on jetoit à terre quantité de caractères d'or, ou de quelque matière que ce fût, qui représentassent les vingt et une lettres, ils pourroient tomber arrangez dans un tel ordre, qu'ils formeroient lisiblement les annales d'Ennius? Je doute si le hasard rencontreroit

When we consider again the multitude of cattle ; designed, some for our nourishment, and others to supply us with cloathing ; one part, for the convenience of carriage ; another, for the purposes of agriculture : again, when we reflect on man himself, formed to contemplate the heavens, and pay his devotion to the divine beings ; and, lastly, when we observe how the whole earth, and the wide extensive seas, are subservient to his accommodation.

When we consider all these, and the other innumerable objects of the universe, can we entertain a doubt, but that, if they were created, as is the opinion of Plato, there presides over them some efficient cause ; or if, as Aristotle holds, they existed from all eternity, that there is a being, who directs and superintends the mighty fabric ?



Is it not astonishing *, that ever there was a man who could persuade himself, that the beautiful, and every way complete system of the world could be produced by the fortuitous concourse of certain solid and indivisible bodies, necessarily moved by the force of their natural gravity ! He that can bring himself to think in this train, may with equal reason believe,

B 6

that

zone, as being directly under the sun, and therefore supposed by the antients to be uninhabitable for heat ; the two zones under the poles were called *frigid*, because not habitable for cold ; and the two remaining zones, lying between the two frigid zones and the torrid zone, were called *temperate*, on account of the clemency of their air : And though this opinion of the antients, both with regard to the torrid and frigid zones, has long since been found to be erroneous ; yet it cannot be denied, but the inhabitants of the temperate zones live much more comfortably than those of the other three do.

* De Nat. Deor. II. 37. He means Epicurus, the chief of a well known sect of philosophers.

autem quemadmodum asse-
verant, ex corpusculis non
colore, non qualitate ali-
quâ, quam ~~avide~~ Græci
vocant, non sensu præditis,
sed concurrentibus temerè
atque casu, mundum esse
perfectum? vel innumera-
biles potius in omni puncto
temporis alios nasci, alios
interire? Quod si mundum
efficere potest concursus ato-
morum, cur porticum, cur
templum, cur domum, cur
urbem non potest? quæ sunt
minùs operosa, et multo
quidem faciliora.

roit assez juste pour en faire
un seul vers. Mais ces gens-
là, comment assurent-ils que
des corpuscules qui n'ont point
de couleur, point de qualité,
point de sentiment, qui ne
font que voltiger au gré du
hasard, ont fait ce monde-ci :
ou plustôt, en font à tout mo-
ment d'innombrables, qui en
remplacent d'autres? Quoi,
si le concours des atomes peut
faire un monde, ne pourroit-
il pas faire des choses plus
aisées, un portique, un temple,
une maison, une ville?

Firmissimum hoc asserri
videtur, cur deos esse cre-
damus, quod nulla gens
tam fera, nemo omnium
tam sit immanis, cujus men-
tem non imbuerit deorum
opinio. Multi de diis prava
fentiunt: id enim vitioso
more effici solet: omnes
tamen esse vim et naturam
divinam arbitrantur. Nec
verò id collocutio homi-
num, aut consensus efficit:
non institutis opinio est con-
firmata, non legibus. Om-
ni autem in re consensio
omnium gentium, lex na-
turæ putanda est.

Une très-forte preuve de
l'existence des dieux, c'est qu'il
n'y a point de peuple assez bar-
bare, point d'homme assez
farouche, pour n'avoir pas
l'esprit imbu de cette opinion.
Plusieurs peuples, à la vérité,
n'ont pas une idée juste des
dieux: ils se laissent tromper
à des coutumes erronées: mais
enfin ils s'entendent tous à
croire une puissance divine,
un être suprême. Et ce n'est
point une croyance qui ait été
concertée; les hommes ne se
sont point donné le mot pour
l'établir: leurs loix n'y ont
point de part. Or, dans
quelque matière que ce soit, le
consentement de toutes les na-
tions doit se prendre pour loi
de la nature.

that if a very large number of types, (whether of gold or any other substance) representing the letters of the alphabet *, be thrown any where on the ground, they would form the annals of Ennius, so as to make them legible: whereas I very much doubt, whether the power of chance could reach even so far as to produce one single verse. How then can these men affirm, that corpuscles without colour, without any of that quality † which the Greeks call *ποικίλστα*, i. e. plaitic, or composing faculty, and without intelligence, should, by only floating about at random, accidentally concur to the formation of the world; nay, of an infinite number of worlds, continually to supply the place of perishing ones? But if this concurrence of atoms can make a world, why does it never form a portico, a temple, a house, or a city; which are certainly much easier to be effected?



Another ‡ invincible argument to prove the existence of superior beings is, that there is no nation so barbarous, no man so savage, whose mind is not imbued with this persuasion. It must be confessed, indeed, that many people entertain very unworthy ideas concerning the gods; which is owing to their bad morals, and the prejudices of education; but all unite in acknowledging a divine and supreme nature. Neither is this persuasion the result of any conference,

or

* Some have imagined that this passage of Cicero gave the first hint towards inventing the art of printing. In the original, it is *unius et viginti formæ literarum*, i. e. types of the one and twenty letters, which was the number contained in their alphabet.

† Colour, heat, and such other qualities, according to the Epicureans, belong only to compound bodies. Their atoms have naturally no other property but their size, weight, and what necessarily results from their configuration, smoothness, or roughness.

‡ Tuscul. I. 13.



Roges me, quid aut quale sit Deus? Auctore utar Simonide: de quo cum quævisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causâ sibi unum diem postulavit. Cum idem ex eo postridie quæreret, biduum petivit. Cum sæpius duplicaret numerum dierum, admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret: *Quia, quanto, inquit, diutiùs confidero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior.* Sed Simonidem arbitror, (non enim poëta solùm suavis, verùm etiam cæteroqui doctus, sapiensque traditur) quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitantem, quid eorum esset verissimum, desperasse omnem veritatem.



Nec verò Deus ipse, qui intelligitur à nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno.

Ex



Vous me demanderez ce que c'est que Dieu? Je ferai avec vous, comme Simonide avec le tyran Hiéron, qui lui proposoit la même question. D'abord il demanda un jour pour y penser: le lendemain, deux autres jours: et comme chaque fois il doubloit le nombre des jours qu'il demandoit, Hiéron voulut en savoir la cause. Parce que, dit-il, plus j'y fais réflexion, plus la chose me paroît obscure. Ce qui me fait juger que Simonide, qui n'étoit pas seulement un poëte délicat, mais qui d'ailleurs ne manquoit ni d'érudition, ni de bon sens, perdit à la fin toute espérance de trouver la vérité; après que son esprit se fut promené d'opinions en opinions, les unes plus subtiles que les autres, sans pouvoir trouver la véritable.



On ne peut concevoir Dieu, que sous l'idée d'un esprit pur, sans mélange, dégagé de toute matière corruptible; qui connoît tout, qui meut tout, et qui a de lui-même un mouvement éternel.

Par

or concert of mankind; nor does it derive its authority from the power of custom, or the sanction of laws. Now, the common consent of mankind is, in every case, to be esteemed a law of nature.



Should * you ask me to define what God is, I would adopt the procedure of Simonides, who, when the same task was imposed on him by Hiero, king of Syracuse, desired one day to consider of it: next day, the same question being again put to him, he requested two days more; then four, and so on for a considerable time, doubling always his demand. At last, when the king with surprise asked the reason of this, he replied, 'That the more he meditated on it, the more incomprehensible it appeared to him.' For I suppose that Simonides (who was not only an excellent poet, but otherwise a man of extensive knowledge and wisdom) was bewildered in a variety of opinions, each more subtle and abstracted than the other; and being uncertain which of them came nearest to truth, he despaired of finding it †.



Now ‡ we can entertain no other idea of God, so far as his nature is comprehensible by us, than that
of

* De Nat. Deor. I. 22.

† None but Jews and Christians can form a just idea of the divine being: for the antient philosophers, unapprized of the true system of the creation, and believing the eternity of matter, could not but draw false inferences from so false a principle.

‡ Tuscul. I. 27. Several moderns have maintained, that the notion of *pure spirit* was not to be found in the writings of the ancients. I would be glad to ask them, if to express that notion, they themselves have terms less equivocal, or more decisive and clear than those we see here?



Ex ipsa hominum solertia esse aliquam mentem, et eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. Unde enim hanc homo arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. Quin et humorem, et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore, et terrenam ipsam viscerum soliditatem, animum denique illum spirabilem si quis quærat unde habemus, apparet: quod aliud à terra sumpsimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab igne, aliud ab aëre eo, quem spiritu ducimus. Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus?



Esse præstantem aliquam, æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam, admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri. Quamobrem, ut religio propaganda e-

tiam



Par l'esprit humain, tel qu'il est, nous devons juger qu'il y a quelque autre intelligence, qui ait plus de vivacité, et qui soit divine. Car d'où viendrait à l'homme, dit Socrate dans Xénophon, l'entendement dont il est doué? On voit que c'est à un peu de terre, d'eau, de feu, et d'air, que nous devons les parties solides de notre corps, la chaleur et l'humidité qui y sont répandues, le souffle même qui nous anime. Mais ce qui est bien au dessus de tout cela, j'entens la raison, et pour le dire en plusieurs termes, l'esprit, le jugement, la pensée, la prudence, où l'avons-nous pris?



Qu'il y ait un être supérieur, qui subsistera toujours, et qui mérite le respect et l'admiration des hommes, c'est de quoi la beauté de l'univers et la régularité des astres nous force de convenir. On doit par conséquent nour-

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of a pure and free intelligence, or spirit, entirely distinct from all corruptible matter, perceiving and moving all things, and possessed of self-motion from eternity.



From * the consideration of the powers of the human mind, it is reasonable, and we ought to infer, that there must exist a divine mind, far surpassing the activity of ours: for as Socrates asks in Xenophon, ‘ Whence hath man derived his spiritual nature?’ As to the constituent parts of the body, the humours, the heat diffused through it, the solids, and the breath we respire, it is easy tracing each of them to their respective elements: thus one proceeds from water, another from fire, a third from earth, and a fourth from air. But what far excels all bodily accomplishments, our reason, I mean, or in other words our understanding, judgment, thought, prudence, where have we found it? From what source is it derived?



That † there exists an excellent, perfect, and eternal being, worthy of the most exalted respect and admiration of mankind, the beauty of the universe, and the harmony of the heavenly bodies, compel us to confess. Wherefore, as religion, which is intimately connected with the knowledge of nature, ought to be propagated, so every root of superstition

* De Natura Deorum, II. 6, 7.

† De Divinat. II. 72.

tiam est, quæ est juncta cum cognitione naturæ, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendæ. Inflat enim et urget, et, quo te cunque verteris, persequitur; sive tu vatem, sive tu omen audieris; sive immolaris, sive avem aspexeris; si Chaldaum, si haruspice videaris; si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de cælo, si ostenti simile natum, factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat: ut nunquam liceat quietâ mente consistere.



Deos et venerari, et colere debemus. Cultus autem deorum est optimus, idemque castissimus, atque sanctissimus, plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper purâ, integrâ, incorruptâ, et mente, et voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam majores nostri superstitionem à religione separaverunt.



Sit igitur jam hoc à principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum, ac moderatores deos: eaque, quæ gerantur, eorum geri ditione, ac numine, eisdemque optimè de genere hominum mereri: et, qualis

rir et répandre une religion éclairée, mais en même temps extirper toute superstition. Vous ne sauriez faire un pas, que celle-ci ne vous poursuive, et ne se présente à vous. Un devin, un présage, un sacrifice, le vol de quelque oiseau, la rencontre d'un Chaldéen, ou d'un haruspice, un éclair, le bruit du tonnerre, la foudre tombée du ciel, quelque production de la terre, ou quelque événement, qui paroît tenir du prodige, tout suffit au superstitieux pour s'alarmer; et nécessairement il en trouvera des occasions si fréquentes, que son esprit ne sera jamais tranquille.



On doit aux dieux un culte plein de respect. Culte très-bon, très-saint, qui exige beaucoup d'innocence et de piété, une inviolable pureté de cœur et de bouche; mais qui n'a rien de commun avec la superstition, dont nos pères, aussi-bien que les philosophes, ont entièrement séparé la religion.



Que des hommes qui vivent en société, commencent donc par croire fermement, qu'il y a des dieux maîtres de tout, et qui gouvernent tout; qui disposent de tous les événemens; qui ne cessent de faire du bien au genre

perstition should be extirpated. Turn you to which hand you will, the follies of superstition are sure to strike your observation; whether you listen to a diviner, or attend to an omen; whether you sacrifice, or observe the flight of a bird; whether you meet a Chaldean *, or soothsayer; nay, does it but thunder or lighten, is something thunder-struck, or should any monstrous production, or extraordinary accident occur! Now, as incidents of this kind must, in the course of things, frequently happen, the superstitious person is thereby alarmed, and never enjoys one unruffled hour.



To † worship the gods, is our indispensable duty: and that worship is best performed, most pure and perfect, and most deserves the name of piety, when it is offered with true sincerity and purity of mind: for not only the philosophers, but likewise our ancestors, have carefully distinguished between religion and superstition.



Let ‡ this therefore be a fundamental principle in all societies, That the gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things, that all events are directed by their influence and wisdom, and that they are kind and benevolent to mankind; likewise that they know what every person really is, observe his actions

* A Chaldean, among the Romans, was the same with what the French call a *Bobemian*, and we a *Gipsy*; that is to say, a fortune-teller.

† De Nat. Deor. II. 28.

‡ De Legibus, II. 7.

36 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate colat religiones, intueri: piorumque et impiorum habere rationem.

Utiles esse autem opinioniones has, quis neget, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando; quantæ salutis sint foederum religiones; quam multos divini supplicii metus à scelere revocarit; quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos, diis immortalibus interpositis tum iudiciis, tum testibus?

✱✱✱
In specie fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita pietas inesse non potest: cum qua simul et sanctitatem, et religionem tolli necesse est: quibus sublati perturbatio vitæ sequitur, et magna confusio. Atque haud scio, an, pietate adversus deos sublata, fides etiam et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur.

genre humain; dont les regards démêlent ce que chacun est, ce que chacun fait, tout ce qu'on se permet à soi-même, dans quel esprit, avec quels sentimens on professe la religion; et qui mettent de la différence entre l'homme pieux et l'impie.

Peut-on nier que ces sentimens-là ne soient d'une grande utilité, lorsqu'on voit dans combien d'occasions le serment est le sceau de nos paroles; pour combien la religion entre dans la foi de nos alliances; combien de crimes la crainte d'une punition divine a détourné; et combien est sainte une société d'hommes persuadez qu'ils ont au milieu d'eux, et pour juges, et pour témoins, les dieux immortels?

✱✱✱
Il en est de la piété comme de toutes les autres vertus, elle ne consiste pas en de vains dehors. Sans elle il n'y aura ni sainteté, ni religion: et dès-lors quel dérangement, quel trouble parmi nous? Je doute, si d'éteindre la piété envers les dieux, ce ne seroit pas anéantir la bonne foi, la société civile, et la principale des vertus, qui est la justice.

actions whether good or bad, discern whether our professions of religion are sincere, and from the heart or not, and are sure to make a difference between good men and the wicked.

Now who can dispute the utility of these sentiments, when he shall reflect, how many cases of the greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites, performed in making treaties, tend to assure peace and tranquillity; also what numbers has the fear of divine punishment reclaimed from a vicious course of life; and how * sacred the social rights must be, in a society, where a firm persuasion obtains of the immediate intervention of the immortal gods, both as witnesses and judges of their actions?



It † is with piety as with other virtues, it cannot consist in dissimulation: without piety, neither sanctity of manners, nor religion, can in any wise be supported; and if these are destroyed, what dreadful confusion and disorder must ensue? And indeed, it is a question with me, whether, without piety towards the gods, the mutual confidence and society of mankind, or that most excellent of all virtues, justice, could subsist.

* Other translators may seize occasions to praise and point out the delicacy of a thought, or the happiness and elegance of an expression. Let me, on juster grounds, admire here the manner in which a heathen lays down to us that important doctrine of the omni-presence of God, the searcher of hearts.

† De Nat. Deor, I, 2.

II.

De HOMINE.

ANIMAL hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus HOMINEM, præclarâ quâdam conditione generatum est à summo Deo. Solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis, particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum cætera sint omnia expertia.



Est illud quidem maximum, animo ipso animum videre : et nimirum hanc habet vim præceptum Apollinis, quo monet, ut se quisque noscat. Non enim, credo, id præcipit, ut membra nostra, aut staturam, figuramve noscamus: neque nos corpora sumus: neque ego tibi hæc dicens, corpori tuo dico. Cum igitur, *Nosce te*, dicit, hoc dicit, *Nosce animum tuum*. Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est, aut aliquod animi

recep-

II.

Sur L'HOMME.

UN animal, dans lequel sont prévoyance, sagacité, talens divers, pénétration, mémoire, raisonnement, jugement ; cet animal que nous appelons HOMME, a été singulièrement favorisé par le Dieu suprême, qui l'a mis au monde. Car, de tous les animaux, dont il y a tant d'espèces différentes, celui-là est le seul qui ait reçu en partage la raison et la pensée. Tous les autres en sont dépourvus.



Rien n'est si grand, que de voir avec les yeux de l'ame, l'ame elle même. Aussi est-ce là le sens de l'Oracle, qui veut que chacun se connoisse. Sans doute qu'Apollon n'a point prétendu par-là nous dire de connoître notre corps, notre taille, notre figure. Car qui dit nous, ne dit pas notre corps ; et quand je parle à vous, ce n'est pas à votre corps que je parle. Quand donc l'Oracle nous dit, *Connoitoi*, il entend, *Connoi ton ame*. Vo-

tre

II.

On M A N.

MAN *, whom we may define to be an animal endowed with forecast, sagacity, wit, penetration, memory, judgment, and prudence, holds, by the singular favour of the supreme being, a very distinguished rank in the creation. For he, of all the different species and kinds of animals, is the only partaker of reason and thought.



It is † a matter of the greatest importance, for the human soul to comprehend its own nature: and doubtless, this is the meaning of Apollo's ‡ precept, enjoining every one to know himself: for I cannot think that it directs us to make ourselves acquainted with the different parts of our bodies, or their stature and form. Body by no means constitutes our being; nor when I discourse with you, is it to your body I address myself. Wherefore, when the oracle says, 'Know yourself,' it certainly intends, Know your soul. For, in fact, the body is no more than the vessel, or receptacle of the soul; and the actions
of

* De Legib. I. 7.

† Tuscul. I. 22.

‡ Pliny, l. 11. c. 32. informs us, that in the temple at Delphos, they read three precepts of Chilon, one of the seven wise men; the first of which was that here mentioned; the second was, 'That we ought to desire nothing with too great eagerness;' the third, 'That it is a misfortune to be in debt, or engaged in law-suits.'

receptaculum. Ab animo tuo quidquid agitur, id agitur à te. Hunc igitur nosse, nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc acrioris cujusdam animi præceptum, sic, ut tributum deo sit.



Illud, ἰσοθεοῦ, noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solùm esse dictum, verùm etiam ut bona nostra norimus.



Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, ingeniumque in se suum, sicut simulacrum aliquod, dedicatum putabit; tantòque munere deorum semper dignum aliquid et faciet, et sentiet: et, cum se ipse perspexerit, totumque tentarit, intelliget, quemadmodum à natura subornatus in vitam venerit, quantaque instrumenta habeat ad obtinendam adipiscendamque sapientiam: quoniam principio rerum omnium quasi adumbratas intelligentias animo ac mente conceperit: quibus illustratus, sapientiâ duce, bonum virum, et ob eam ipsam causam cernat se beatum fore.

tre corps n'est, pour ainsi dire, que le vaisseau, que le domicile de votre ame. Tout ce que vous faites, c'est votre ame qui le fait. Admirable précepte, que celui de connoître son ame ! On a bien jugé qu'il n'y avoit qu'un homme d'un esprit supérieur, qui pût en avoir conçu l'idée : et c'est ce qui fait qu'on l'a attribué à un dieu.



Quand on dit à l'homme, Connoitoi, ce n'est pas seulement pour rabaisser son orgueil, c'est aussi pour lui faire sentir ce qu'il vaut.



Tout homme qui rentrera en lui-même, y découvrira des traces de la divinité : et se regardant comme un temple où les dieux ont placé son ame pour être leur image, il ne se permettra que des sentimens, que des actions, qui répondent à la dignité de leur présent. Un sérieux examen de ce qu'il est, et de ce qu'il peut, lui fait comprendre de quels avantages la nature l'a pourvu, et combien de secours lui facilitent l'acquisition de la sagesse. Venu au monde avec des notions générales, qui d'abord ne sont que comme ébauchées, il voit qu'en suivant cette lumière, guidé par la sagesse, il fera homme de bien, et par conséquent heureux.

of the latter only, can properly be called the actions of the man. In fine, was not the knowledge of the soul an excellent accomplishment, it could not have passed for an apophthegm of such acuteness, as to have been attributed to a deity.



This * precept, 'Know yourself,' was not solely intended to obviate the pride of mankind; but likewise, that we might understand our own intrinsic worth.



Whoever † knows himself, must be conscious that he is possessed of a divine principle; he will look upon his rational part as the resemblance of some divinity, consecrated within him; and will always be careful, that his sentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be worthy of this inestimable divine present. A serious and thorough examination of all his powers will inform him, what signal advantages he has received from nature, and with what infinite helps he is furnished for the attainment of wisdom: for, from his first entrance into the world, he has faint conceptions ‡ of all things delineated, as it were, in his mind; by the enlightening assistance of which, and the guidance of wisdom, he may become a good, and consequently a happy man.

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* Ad. Q. Fratrem, III. 6.

† De Legib. I. 22.

‡ Cicero, here, seems to take it for granted, that our ideas, which have any regard to the law of nature, are innate, or such as we come into the world with. But Mr Locke clearly evinces, that we have no ideas

Nam cum animus, cognititis perceptisque virtutibus, à corporis obsequio indulgentiaque discesserit, voluptatemque, sicut labem aliquam decoris, opprèsserit, omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem effugerit, societatemque caritatis coierit cum suis, omnesque naturâ conjunctos, suos duxerit, cultumque deorum, et puram religionem susceperit, et exacerit illam, ut oculorum, sic ingenii aciem, ad bona deligenda, et rejicienda contraria : quid eo dici, aut excogitari poterit beatius ?

Idemque cum cœlum, terras, maria, rerumque omnium naturam perpexerit, eaque unde generata, quo recurrant, quando, quo modo obitura, quid in iis mortale et caducum, quid divinum æternumque sit, viderit, ipsumque ea moderantem et regentem panè prehenderit, seseque non unis circumdatum mœnibus, popularem alicujus definiti loci, sed civem totius mundi, quasi unius urbis, agnoverit : in hac ille magnificentia rerum, atque in hoc conspectu et cognitione naturæ, dii immortales ! quam ipse se noscet : quod Apollo præcipit Pythius ? Quam contemnet, quam despiciet, quam pro nihilo putabit

Qu'y a-t-il, en effet, de plus heureux qu'un homme, qui, parvenu à une exacte connoissance des vertus, n'a point de lâche complaisance pour les sens, et foule aux pieds la volupté, comme quelque chose de honteux ; qui ne craint ni la douleur, ni la mort ; qui chérit tendrement les siens, et met au nombre des siens tout ce qu'il a de semblables ; qui honore religieusement des dieux, et les sert purement ; qui, comme nous ouvrons les yeux du corps pour distinguer les objets, emploie de même les yeux de l'esprit pour discerner le bien et le mal.

Quand ses regards auront embrassé le ciel, la terre, les mers, tout ce qui existe : quand il aura compris de quoi les choses sont formées, ce qu'elles doivent redevenir, dans quel temps et de quelle manière elles finiront, ce qu'elles ont de périssable, et ce qu'elles ont d'éternel : quand il aura presque touché au doigt et à l'œil, si j'ose ainsi dire, l'être qui règle et gouverne l'univers : quand il verra, que lui personnellement il n'est point resserré dans un petit coin de la terre, mais que le monde entier ne fait que comme une seule ville, dont il est citoyen : ô ! qu'un si magnifique spectacle, où la nature se montre à découvert, mettra bien l'homme à por-

What can be conceived more truly happy than the state of that man who, having attained to an exact knowledge of virtue, throws off all indulgence to body and sense, tramples upon pleasure as a thing unbecoming the dignity of his nature; is not terrified at the approach of affliction, or even of death itself; who maintains a benevolent intercourse with his friends, and in that number includes the whole race of mankind, as being united together by one common nature; in short, who preserves an unfeigned piety and reverence towards the gods, and exerts the utmost force of his rational powers to distinguish good from evil, just as we strain our eyes in order to view an object with the greater attention?

When this man shall have surveyed the heavens, the earth, and the seas; studied the nature of all things, and informed himself whence they were generated, to what state they return, the time and manner of their dissolution, and what parts of them are mortal and perishing, and what divine and eternal; when he shall have attained, in a great measure, the knowledge of that being who superintends and governs them; and shall look upon himself not as confined within the walls of any one city, or as the member of any particular community, but as a citizen of the universe, considered as one state: on such a grand representation of things as this,

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ideas besides those we receive by the senses, and those which the mind forms by its own operations on the former. So that if a man was born without any external sense at all, he could form no idea, not even of reflection; because the mind would have no subject to ground its reflections on.

ea, quæ vulgò ducuntur amplissima?

Atque hæc omnia, quasi sepimento aliquo, vallabit defferendi ratione, veri et falsi judicandi scientiâ, et arte quadam intelligendi, quid quamque rem sequatur, et quid sit cuique contrarium. Cumque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatione sibi utendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua regat populos, qua stabiliat leges, qua castiget improbos, qua tueatur bonos, qua laudet claros viros: qua præcepta salutis et laudes aptè ad persuadendum edat suis civibus: qua hortari ad decus, revocare à flagitio, consolari possit afflictos: factaque et consulta fortium et sapientium, cum improborum ignominia, sempiternis monumentis prodere.

Quæ cum tot res tantæque sint, quæ inesse in homine perspiciantur ab iis, qui se ipsi velint nosse, earum parens est, educatrixque sapientia.

à portée de se connoître lui-même, conformément au précepte d'Apollon ! O ! que tous ces objets, dont l'ambition vulgaire se fait une si grande idée, seront peu capables de l'éblouir ! Qu'ils lui paroîtront vils, et dignes du dernier mépris !

Pour faire la solidité et la sûreté de ses connoissances, il les entourera comme d'une baie, en leur associant la logique, qui enseigne à démêler le vrai d'avec le faux, à tirer d'un principe une conséquence juste, à voir comment une proposition détruit l'autre. Et comprenant qu'il est né pour la société civile, il ne s'en tiendra pas à cette précision des logiciens ; mais il fera usage de l'éloquence, pour gouverner les peuples, pour affermir les loix, pour châtier les méchans, pour défendre les bons, pour célébrer le mérite, pour instruire, pour animer, pour exhorter au bien, détourner du mal, consoler les affligés, et immortaliser le vice et la vertu.

Qui voudra se connoître, verra que l'homme naît avec de si heureuses dispositions. Mais il faut que la sagesse les cultive, et les mette en œuvre.

and on such a prospect and knowledge of nature ; how well, O heavens ! would such a one understand the precept of Pythian Apollo, by knowing himself ? How low would he esteem, how thoroughly would he contemn and despise those things which by vulgar minds are held in the highest esteem ?

All these acquirements he would secure and guard, as with a fence, by the science of distinguishing truth from falsehood, and the art of reasoning, that teaches him to know what consequences follow from premisses, and how far one proposition clashes with another. When such a person was convinced that nature designed him for society, he would not rest contented with these subtle disquisitions, but would put in practice that comprehensive eloquence which is necessary for governing nations, enacting laws, punishing malefactors, defending the honest part of mankind, and publishing the praises of great men ; he would likewise use his persuasive eloquence to recommend salutary maxims to his countrymen ; to rouse them to the practice of virtue, and turn them from wickedness ; to comfort the afflicted ; and in fine, by his writings, to immortalize the wise regulations and noble actions of the prudent and brave, and to publish the shame and infamy of wicked men.

So many and so excellent are the things that will be found in man, by those who desire to know themselves ; of all which, however, wisdom is the parent and director.

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 Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest. Nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur: nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut flabile, aut igneum. His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia: quæ sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi à Deo. Singularis est igitur quædam natura atque vis animi; sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est: ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est.

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 Sanguinem, bilem, pituitam, ossa, nervos, venas, omnem denique membrorum et totius corporis figuram videor posse dicere, unde concreta et quo modo facta sint. Per animum ipsum, si nihil esset in eo, nisi id, ut per eum viveremus, tam natura putarem hominis vitam sustentari, quam vitis, quam arboris: hæc enim etiam dicimus vivere. Item si nihil haberet animus

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 On ne peut absolument trouver sur la terre, l'origine des âmes. Car il n'y a rien dans les âmes, qui soit mixte et composé; rien qui paroisse venir de la terre, de l'eau, de l'air, ou du feu. Tous ces élémens n'ont rien qui fasse la mémoire, l'intelligence, la réflexion; qui puisse rappeler le passé, prévoir l'avenir, embrasser le présent. Jamais on ne trouvera d'où l'homme reçoit ces divines qualitez, à moins que de remonter à un Dieu. Et par conséquent l'âme est d'une nature singulière, qui n'a rien de commun avec les élémens que nous connoissons. Quelle que soit donc la nature d'un être, qui a sentiment, intelligence, volonté, principe de vie: cet être-là est cœleste, il est divin, et dès-là immortel.

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 Je comprends bien, ce me semble, de quoi et comment ont été produits le sang, la bile, la pituite, les os, les nerfs, les veines, et généralement tout notre corps, tel qu'il est. L'âme elle-même, si ce n'étoit autre chose dans nous que le principe de la vie, me paroîtroit un effet purement naturel, comme ce qui fait vivre à leur manière la vigne et l'arbre. Et si l'âme humaine n'avoit
 en



The * origin of human souls is not to be met with in any terrestrial matter : there is in them no mixture, or composition of parts ; nothing that participates of earth, or consists of water, air, or fire. There is no quality in these substances, that has the least resemblance to the powers of memory, intelligence, and reflection ; or that is able to recollect the past, provide against the future, or comprehend what is present : these are all emanations from the divinity : Nor can they possibly be derived to man from any other source besides God himself. Whence we may conclude, that the nature and powers of the human soul are of a singular kind, and entirely distinct from these common and well known substances. It likewise follows, that a being endowed with perception, understanding, free-will, and a principle of life, is certainly of celestial and divine origin, and consequently immortal.



It † would be no difficult matter to account for the formation of our blood, choler, phlegm, bones, nerves, veins ; and, in a word, to point out from whence, and after what manner, all the constituent parts of the whole body were produced. Was there nothing in the soul but a bare vital principle, we might suppose that human life was sustained in the same manner as vegetables ; for these also are said to live. Besides, was the soul of man possessed of

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* Fragm. de Consol.

† Tuscul. I. 24, and 25.

mus hominis, nisi ut appeteret aut refugeret, id quodque esset ei commune cum bestiis.

Habet primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium. Quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitæ. Nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur *Menon*, pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quædam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer : et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quo si geometrica didicisset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit, nisi recordari. Quem locum multo etiam accuratius explicat in eo sermone, quem habuit eo ipso die, quo excessit à vita : docet enim, quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis esse videatur, bene interroganti respondentem, declarare, se non tum illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere ; nec verò fieri ullo modo posse, ut à pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas *ἐνείκες* vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. Cumque nihil esset, ut omnibus locis à Pla-

en partage que l'instinct de se porter à ce qui lui convient, et de fuir ce qui ne lui convient pas, elle n'auroit rien de plus que les bêtes.

Mais ses propriétés sont, premièrement, une mémoire capable de renfermer en soi une infinité de choses. Et cette mémoire, Platon veut que se soit la réminiscence de ce qu'on a su dans une autre vie. Il fait parler dans le *Ménon*, un jeune enfant, que Socrate interroge sur les dimensions du quarré : l'enfant répond comme son âge le permet : et les questions étant toujours à sa portée, il va de réponse en réponse si avant, qu'enfin il semble avoir étudié la géométrie. De là Socrate conclut, qu'apprendre, c'est seulement se ressouvenir. Il s'en explique encore plus expressément dans le discours qu'il fit le jour de sa mort. Un homme, dit-il, qui paroît ne rien savoir, et qui cependant répond juste à une question, fait bien voir que la matière sur laquelle on l'interroge, ne lui est pas nouvelle ; et que, dans le moment qu'il répond, il ne fait que repasser sur ce qui étoit déjà dans son esprit. Il ne seroit effectivement pas possible, ajoute Socrate, que dès notre enfance nous eussions tant de notions si étendues, et qui sont comme imprimées en nous mêmes, si nos âmes n'a-

voient .

no other faculties, than a mere instinct of appetite and aversion, this would be common to it with brutes.

One of the most distinguishing powers of the human soul is memory, and that almost infinite, being capable of containing incidents innumerable * : infomuch that Plato will have it to be the recollection of what passed in a former life ; for in that treatise of his, entitled *Menon* †, Socrates is introduced interrogating a child concerning the geometrical dimensions of a square. The child answers in a manner agreeable to his age ; and yet the questions are put in so easy a way, that he goes on answering one thing after another, till he comes to the same conclusion as if he had learned geometry : whence Socrates infers, that to learn is only to recollect. This he explains with greater accuracy, in the discourse he held the very day on which he suffered death ‡ : for he there maintains, that a quite illiterate person, by giving proper answers to the questions put to him, makes it evident, that he did not learn those things at that time, but only recalled them to his remembrance. Nor is it possible, that the ideas of so many, and so vast objects, should in our very infancy be implanted and stamped,

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* Instances of an extraordinary memory are every where to be met with in history. Cyrus knew every soldier in his army by name. Cynneas, ambassador to the Romans from king Pyrrhus, in one day learned the names of his spectators so well, that the next he saluted the whole senate and populace assembled, each by his name. See Seneca Controvers. lib. 1.

† Plato has given the title *Ménon* to one of his dialogues.

‡ Plato gives an account of this discourse in another dialogue called *Phædon*.

à Platone differitur, (nihil enim ille putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat; idque solum esse, quod semper tale sit, qualem ideam appellat ille, nos *speciem*) non potuit animus hæc in corpore inclusus agnoscere, cognita attulit. Ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio tollitur. Neque ea planè videt animus, cum repentè in tam insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium immigravit; sed cum se collegit atque recreavit, tum agnoscit illa reminiscendo. Ita nihil aliud est discere, nisi recordari.

Quæ sit illa vis, et unde, intelligendum puto. Non est certè nec cordis, nec sanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum. Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio: nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam. Illud si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possem, sive anima, sive ignis sit animus, eum jurarem esse divinum. Quid enim, obsecro te, terrâ ne tibi, aut hoc nebuloso et caliginoso cœlo, aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriæ? Si, quid sit hoc,

non

voient pas eu des connoissances universelles, avant que d'entrer dans nos corps. D'ailleurs, selon la doctrine constante de Platon, il n'y a de réel que ce qui est immuable, comme le sont les idées. Rien de ce qui est produit, et périssable, n'existe réellement. L'ame, enfermée dans le corps, n'a donc pu se former ces idées: elle les apporte avec elle en venant au monde. Dès-là ne soyons plus surpris, que tant de choses lui soient connues. Il est vrai que tout en arrivant dans une demeure si sombre et si étrange pour elle, d'abord elle ne démêle pas bien les objets: mais quand elle s'est recueillie, et qu'elle se reconnoît, elle fait l'application de ses idées. Apprendre n'est donc autre chose que se ressouvenir.

Voyons ce qui fait la mémoire, et d'où elle procède. Ce n'est certainement ni du cœur, ni du cerveau, ni du sang, ni des atomes. Je ne sais si notre ame est de feu, ou d'air; et je ne rougis point, comme d'autres, d'avouer que j'ignore ce qu'en effet j'ignore. Mais qu'elle soit divine, j'en jurerois, si, dans une matière obscure, je pouvois parler affirmativement. Car enfin, je vous le demande, la mémoire vous paroît-elle n'être qu'un assemblage de parties terrestres, qu'un amas d'air grossier

as it were, on our minds, and on that account called *innate*, had not the soul been possessed of the knowledge of things before its entrance into the body *. Besides, if, as Plato every where maintains, nothing has a real existence that has a commencement of being, or that comes to a dissolution ; because true existence is peculiar to what is always the same, and such are our ideas : in this case the soul, having no real existence after its union with the body, could not have attained such an extensive knowledge ; and therefore must have brought this valuable acquisition along with it. Whence the wonder ceases, how it comes to be acquainted with such a diversity of things. The soul, indeed, does not perceive all its ideas immediately upon entering so strange and disordered an habitation ; it takes some time to recollect and recover itself, and then it regains them by reminiscence. So that learning is nothing but recollection.

The nature and origin of this power within us, I suppose, may be investigated. It is neither the effect of the heart, the blood, the brain, nor of a concourse of atoms. Whether the soul consists of air or fire, I cannot tell : nor am I ashamed, as many are, to confess myself ignorant, when I really am so.

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And

* This great man seems to have lost himself in the visionary notion of the pre-existence of the human soul ; which, with Plato, he endeavours to prove from its innate ideas ; but we have remarked before, that Mr. Locke has clearly proved, that there are no such ideas, and consequently the pre-existence of the soul must fall of course. And here we cannot but admire, how simple, how natural, how beautiful Mr. Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge is, when set in contrast with this wild notion of the Platonists ! See above, page 41.

non vides : at, quale fit, vides. Si, ne id quidem : at, quantum fit, profectò vides. Quid igitur ? utrum capacitatem aliquam in animo putamus esse, quò tantquam in aliquod vas ea, quæ meminimus, infundantur ? Absurdum id quidem : qui enim fundus, aut quæ talis animi figura intelligi potest ? aut quæ tanta omnino capacitas ? An imprimi quasi ceram animum putamus, et memoriæ esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia ? Quæ possunt verborum, quæ rerum ipsarum esse vestigia ? Quæ porro tam immensa magnitudo, quæ illa tam multa possit effingere ?

Quid illa vis, quæ tandem est, quæ investigat occulta, quæ inventio atque excogitatio dicitur ? Ex hacne tibi terrenâ mortali-que naturâ et caducâ concreta ea videtur ? aut qui primus, quod summæ sapientiæ Pythagoræ visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina ? aut qui dissipatos homines congregavit, et ad societatem vitæ convocavit ? aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis litterarum notis terminavit ? aut qui errantium stellarum cursus, regressiones, institutiones notavit ? Omnes magni : etiam superiores, qui fruges, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitæ, qui

grossier et nébuleux ? Si vous ne savez ce qu'elle est, du moins vous voyez de quoi elle est capable. Hé bien ? dirons-nous qu'il y a dans notre ame une espèce de réservoir, où les choses que nous confions à notre mémoire, se versent comme dans un vase ? Proposition absurde : car peut-on se figurer que l'ame soit d'une forme à loger un réservoir si profond ? Dirons nous que l'ame s'imprime comme la cire, et que le souvenir est la trace de ce qui a été imprimé dans l'ame ? Mais des paroles et des idées peuvent-elles laisser des traces ? Et quel espace ne faudroit il pas, d'ailleurs, pour tant de traces différentes ?

Qu'est-ce que cette autre faculté, qui s'étudie à découvrir ce qu'il y a de caché, et qui se nomme intelligence, esprit ? Jugez-vous qu'il ne fût entré que du terrestre et du corruptible dans la composition de cet homme, qui le premier imposa un nom à chaque chose ? Pythagore trouvoit à cela une sagesse infinie. Regardez-vous comme pétri de limon, ou celui qui a rassemblé les hommes, et leur a inspiré de vivre en société ? Ou celui qui dans un petit nombre de caractères, a renfermé tous les sons que la voix forme, et dont la diversité paroît inépuisable ? Ou celui qui a observé comment se meuvent les planètes ; et qu'elles sont

And indeed, if it were allowable to affirm any thing, where positive evidence is wanting, I could swear, that the soul is something divine, whether it be made up of fire or of air. For I would ask, is it possible to imagine how so vast a memory could grow, or be anywise produced, either out of the earth, or in this gross and cloudy atmosphere? But though its essence be above our reach, yet its qualities are discoverable by us; or if this be denied, its capacity is certainly conspicuous. What? Shall we suppose that the human mind is like a common vessel of capacity, into which the various notices, which we consign to our memory, are poured, as it were, to be preserved? This would be a glaring absurdity: for what bottom or figure can we conceive of the soul; or how very large must its capacity be? Shall we then imagine the soul to be like wax, and that memory is nothing but the traces or signatures of things upon it? But what traces do words, or even things themselves, leave behind them? And besides, what an immense volume must it be, that is capable of receiving the impressions of so many different objects?

What then is that other power, or faculty, which investigates the secrets of nature; and is called thought or invention? Can you imagine it to be the effect of the happiest temperament of an earthly, frail, and perishing matter? Can this be the origin of his mind who first imposed names on all things; which, by Pythagoras, was esteemed a work of the greatest wisdom? or of his, who gathered the scattered individuals of mankind, and united them in society? Can this be said of him, who taught how to express,

qui præsidia contra feras invenerunt : à quibus mansuefacti et exculti, à necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora defluximus. Nam et auribus oblectatio magna parta est, inventâ et temperatâ varietate et naturâ sonorum : et astra suspeximus, tum ea, quæ sunt infixæ certis locis, tum illa non re, sed vocabulo errantia. Quorum conversiones, omnesque motus, qui animo vidit, is docuit similem animum suum ejus esse, qui ea fabricatus esset in cœlo.



Sensus autem, interpretes ac nuntii rerum, in capite, tanquam in arce, mirificè ad usus necessarios et facti, et collocati sunt. Nam oculi, tanquam speculatores, altissimum locum obtinent : ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere. Et aures cum sonum percipere debeant, qui naturâ in sublime fertur, rectè in altis corporum partibus collocatæ sunt. Itemque nares, eo quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, rectè sursum sunt : et quod cibi et potionis judicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicini-

sont tantôt rétrogrades, tantôt stationnaires ? Tous étoient de grands hommes : mais plus grands encore ceux qui enseignèrent à se nourrir de bled, à se vêtir, à se bâtir, à se policer, à se précautionner contre les bêtes féroces. Par eux nous fûmes adoucis et civilisez. On passa des arts nécessaires, à ceux qui on l'élégance pour but. On trouva, pour charmer l'oreille, les règles de l'harmonie. On étudia les étoiles, tant celles qui sont fixes, que celles qu'on appelle errantes, quoiqu'elles ne le soient pas. Quiconque découvrir les diverses révolutions des astres, il fit voir par là que son esprit tenoit de celui qui les a formez dans le ciel.



À l'égard des sens, par qui les objets extérieurs viennent à la connaissance de l'ame, leur structure répond merveilleusement à leur destination, et ils ont leur siège dans la tête, comme dans un lieu fortifié. Les yeux, ainsi que des sentinelles, occupent la place la plus élevée, d'où ils peuvent, en découvrant les objets, faire leur charge. Un lieu éminent convenoit aux oreilles, parcequ'elles sont destinées à recevoir le son, qui monte naturellement. Les nares devoient être dans la même situation, parce que l'odeur monte aussi : et il les fal-
loit

press, by the characters * of a few letters, the almost infinitely different sounds of the voice? or of that man who marked out the courses, progressions, and order of the planets? All these were men of an excellent genius: but those were still greater and more beneficial to mankind, who discovered the arts of agriculture, architecture, and making cloth; who refined human life, and invented new methods of defence against wild beasts: by such men as these, being civilized and polished, mankind left the mere necessary arts of life for those of taste and elegance. For in order to charm the ear, harmony, or the duly tempered variety and pitch of sounds, was invented. Then followed astronomy, or the study of the stars, as well those called fixed, because seen always in the same situation, as the planets or wandering stars, which are only such in name, and not in fact. The man, therefore, who could fully comprehend their revolutions and various motions, gave a full proof that his mind was of a similar nature to that of him who formed these heavenly bodies.



As to the senses †, those interpreters and messengers of things, they are admirably contrived for all the necessary occasions of life, and placed in the head, as in a castle. Thus the eyes are posted as centinels above all the rest; that by observing a very great number of objects, they may answer the end they were designed for. Then the ears, as being intended

* The art of writing was invented in Phœnicia, according to Lucan, III. 220.

† De Nat. Deor. II. 56, 57, and 58.

vicinitatem oris secutæ sunt. Jam gûstatus, qui sentire eorum, quibus vescimur, genera deberet, habitat in ea parte oris, quæ esculentis et potulentis iter natura patefecit. Tactus autem toto corpore æquabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus, omnesque nimios et frigoris et caloris appulsus sentire possimus. Atque, ut in ædificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis et naribus dominorum ea, quæ profluentia necessario tetri essent aliquid habitura: sic natura res similes procul amandavit à sensibus.

Quis verò opifex, præter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam solertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus? Quæ primùm oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et sepfit: quas primùm perlucidas fecit, ut per eas cerni posset; firmas autem, ut continerentur. Sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et declinarent, si quid noceret: et aspectum, quo vellent, facile converterent. Aciesque ipsa, qua cernimus, quæ pupula vocatur, ita parva est, ut ea, quæ nocere possint, facile vitet. Palpebræque, quæ sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimæ tactu, ne læderent

loit près de la bouche, parce qu'elles nous aident beaucoup à juger du boire et du manger. Le goût, qui doit nous faire sentir la qualité de ce que nous prenons, réside dans cette partie de la bouche, par où la nature donne passage au solide et au liquide. Pour le tact, il est généralement répandu dans tout le corps, afin que nous ne puissions recevoir aucune impression, ni être attaqué du froid, ou du chaud, sans le sentir. Et comme un architecte ne mettra point sous les yeux, ni sous le nez du maître, les égoûts d'une maison: de même la nature a éloigné de nos sens ce qu'il y a de semblable à cela dans le corps humain.

Mais quel autre ouvrier que la nature, dont l'adresse est incomparable, pourroit avoir si artistement formé nos sens? Elle a entouré les yeux de tuniques fort minces: transparentes au devant, afin que l'on puisse voir à travers: fermes dans leur tissure, afin de tenir les yeux en état. Elle les a faits glissans et mobiles, pour leur donner le moyen d'éviter ce qui pourroit les offenser, et de porter aisément leurs regards où ils veulent. La prunelle, où se réunit ce qui fait la force de la vision, est si petite, qu'elle se dérobe sans peine à ce qui seroit capable de lui faire mal. Les paupières, qui sont les

intended to perceive sound, which naturally ascends, were placed erect in the upper parts of the body. The nostrils too have a similar situation, because all scent likewise ascends; but are with good reason placed near the mouth, because by their means we judge of the good or bad qualities of what we eat and drink. In the next place, our taste, being designed to give us a relish of the different kinds of food, has its situation in that part of the mouth where nature has opened a way for the passage of our meat and drink. But then the sense of feeling is equally diffused over the whole body, that neither blows, nor the too near approach of heat or cold, might escape our notice. And, as in building, a skilful architect removes from under the master's nose, and conceals out of his sight, all the sinks of the house designed for the carrying off every thing that is apt to give disgust; so nature has removed at a distance from our senses the like parts in the human body.

Now what artificer but nature, whose penetration and skill nothing can exceed, could have shown so much design and dexterity in forming the senses? In the first place, she has invested the eyes with a covering of very delicate and thin membranes; and these she has formed transparent, that objects might be seen through them, and likewise firm, to preserve the eyes in their proper situation. But then she has made the eyes themselves slippery and moveable, that they might turn away from every disagreeable object, and easily direct their view wherever they pleased. Add to this, that the point of the eye called the pupil is so exceedingly small, that it may with great ease

rent aciem, aptissimè factæ et ad claudendas pupulas, ne quid incideret, et ad aperiendas : idque providit, ut identidem fieri posset cum maxima celeritate. Munitæque sunt palpebræ tanquam vallo pilorum : quibus, et apertis oculis, si quid incideret, repelleretur ; et somno conniventibus, cum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut qui, tanquam involuti, quiescerent. Latent præterea utiliter, et excelsis undique partibus sepiuntur. Primum enim superiora, superciliis obducta, sudorem à capite et à fronte defluentem repellunt. Genæ deinde ab inferiore parte tutantur subiectæ, leviterque eminentes. Nasus ita locatus est, ut quasi murus oculis interjectus esse videatur.

Auditus autem semper patet : ejus enim sensu etiam dormientes egemus, à quo, cum sonus est acceptus, etiam è somno excitamur. Flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit, si simplex et directum pateret. Provisum etiam, ut, si qua minima bestiola conaretur irrumpere, in sordibus aurium, tanquam in visco, in hæresceret. Extra autem eminent,

les couvertures des yeux, ont une surface polie et douce pour ne point les blesser. Soit que la peur de quelque accident oblige à les fermer, soit qu'on veuille les ouvrir, les paupières sont faites pour s'y prêter, et l'un ou l'autre de ces mouvemens ne leur coûte qu'un instant. Elles sont, pour ainsi dire, fortifiées d'une palissade de poils, qui leur sert à repousser ce qui viendrait attaquer les yeux, quand ils sont ouverts ; et à les envelopper, afin qu'ils reposent paisiblement, quand le sommeil les ferme, et nous les rend inutiles. Nos yeux ont, de plus, l'avantage d'être cachés, et défendus par des éminences. Car d'un côté pour arrêter la sueur qui coule de la tête et du front, ils ont le haut des sourcils : et de l'autre, pour se garantir par le bas, ils ont les joues, qui avancent un peu. Le nez est placé entre les deux, comme un mur de séparation.

Quant à l'ouïe, elle demeure toujours ouverte, parce que nous en avons toujours besoin, même en dormant. Si quelque son la frappe alors, nous en sommes réveillés. Elle a des conduits tortueux, de peur que s'ils étoient droits et unis, quelque chose ne s'y glissât. La nature a eu même la précaution d'y former une humeur visqueuse, afin que si de petites bêtes tâchoient

ease escape whatever is hurtful. Then the eye-lids, those coverings of the eyes, are of an exquisite softness, lest they should injure the sight; and nicely formed for opening and shutting the eyes, to prevent any thing from falling into them: now nature has taken care that this might be done with incredible quickness every other instant. They are likewise fortified, as it were, with a palisade of hair; that the eyes, when open, might thereby be secured from any thing falling into them; and in time of sleep, when there is no occasion to use them, they might lie wrapt up, as it were, in bed-cloaths. Besides all this, they are commodiously situated in a covert, and are guarded on every side with prominent parts. For above them are placed the eye-brows; which are covered with hair, and serve to defend them from the sweat descending from the head and face. The cheeks on the other hand, rising into gentle hillocks, guard them from beneath. And finally, the nose is placed, as it were a wall, between the two.

As to the organ of hearing, it is always open, that being a sense necessary to us even in sleep; for when it is impressed with the sensation of sound, we are even roused from sleep. Its passage is winding, to prevent things from falling into it; which would happen if it was simple and straight. Nature has also provided a viscous matter, that if any insect should endeavour to get into the ear, they might be caught and entangled in it, as it were with birdlime. The outer part of the ear, called the auricle, is prominent; as being formed for covering and protecting

eminent, quæ appellantur aures, et tegendi causâ factæ, tutandique sensus; et ne adjectæ voces laberentur atque errarent, priusquam sensus ab his pulsus esset. Sed duros et quasi corneolos habent introitus, multisque cum flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus. Quocirca et in fidibus testudine resonatur, aut cornu: et ex tortuosis locis et inclusis referuntur ampliores.

Similiter nares, quæ semper propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent introitus, ne quid in eas, quod noceat, possit pervadere: humoremque semper habent ad pulverem, multaque alia depellenda non inutilem. Gustatus præclare septus est. Ore enim continetur, et ad usum aptè, et ad incolumitatis custodiam.

Omnisque sensus hominum multò antecellit sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quarum iudicium est oculorum, in pictis, fictis, cælatisque formis, in corporum

etiam

tâchoient de s'y jeter, elles y fussent prises comme à de la glu. Les oreilles (par ce mot on entend la partie qui débordé) ont été faites pour mettre l'ouïe à couvert, et pour empêcher que les sons ne se dissipent, et ne se perdent, avant que de la frapper. Elles ont l'entrée dure comme de la corne, et sont d'une figure sinueuse, parceque des corps de cette sorte renvoient le son, et le rendent plus fort. Aussi voyons nous que ce qui fait résonner les lyres, est d'écaille, ou de corne; et que la voix retentit mieux dans les endroits renfermez, où il y a plusieurs détours.

Les narines, à cause du besoin continuel que nous en avons, ne sont jamais bouchées. Elles ont l'entrée plus étroite, de peur qu'il ne s'y glisse quelque chose de nuisible; et il y a toujours une humidité, qui sert à empêcher qu'il n'y séjourne de la poussière, ou d'autres corps étrangers. Le goût ayant la bouche pour clôture, c'est précisément ce qu'il lui falloit, et par rapport à l'usage que nous en faisons, et par rapport à sa propre conservation.

Tous nos sens, au reste, sont bien plus exquis que ceux de la bête. Car nos yeux découvrent ce qui lui échappe, dans les arts dont ils sont les juges, dans la peinture, dans la sculpture, dans le geste même,

protecting the immediate organ, and that sounds might not dissipate and be lost before they reach it. Its entrance consists of hard, and, as it were, horny substances, with a great many sinuosities and windings; because hereby the impressed sound is much increased. Hence it is, that we use shell or horn to play on stringed-instruments; and experience shews, that sounds returned from close and sinuous places, are greatly augmented.

In like manner the nostrils, which for necessary purposes stand always open, have their apertures narrow, that nothing hurtful may get through them; and are always bedewed with moisture, for repelling dust and many other things. The taste is admirably well secured; for being placed in the mouth, it is finely situated both for its own preservation, and the use it was designed for.

In short, all the senses of mankind are much superior to those of other animals *. For, first the eyes, in those arts of which they are properly judges, as painting, engraving, sculpture, and the motion and gesture of bodies, discern many things with greater penetration. The human eyes judge like-
wise

* As the truth of this assertion, with regard to the external organs of sense, may be justly called in question; this superiority of mankind must be derived from another source. To what then shall we ascribe it, if not to the internal, the spiritual, the divine part of man? It is the soul gives him this pre-eminence over the rest of the animal world. Hence it is he derives this nicety of taste, this discerning faculty, this *internal sense* of beauty and harmony, as Mr. Hutcheson, in his excellent treatise on *beauty and virtue*, chooses to call it. The works of this ingenious writer deserve to be read, not only by students, but by all who lay claim to taste, and true delicacy of sentiment.

etiam motione, atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius. Colorum etiam, et figurarum venustatem, atque ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, decentiam oculi judicant: atque etiam alia majora. Nam et virtutes, et vitia cognoscunt: iratum, propitium: lætantem, dolentem: fortem, ignavem: audacem, timidumque cognoscunt. Aurium item est admirabile quoddam, artificiosumque judicium, quo judicatur et in vocis, in tibiarum, nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum, intervalla, distinctio, et vocis genera per multa: canorum, fuscum: læve, asperum: grave, acutum: flexibile, durum: quæ hominum solum auribus judicantur. Nariumque item, et gustandi pariter et tangendi magna judicia sunt. Ad quos sensus capiendos et perfruendos plures etiam, quam vellem, artes repertæ sunt. Perspicuum est enim, quo compositiones unguentorum, quo ciborum conditiones, quo corporum lenocinia proferint.



Quam verò aptas, quamque multarum artium ministras manus natura homini dedit! D'ignorum enim contractio facilis, facilisque porrectio, propter molles commissuras et artus, nullo
in

même, dans tous les mouvement du corps. Ils connoissent la beauté, la justesse, les proportions des couleurs et des figures. Que dis-je? ils démêlent même les vices et les vertus; si l'on est irrité, ou tranquille; joyeux ou triste; brave, ou lâche; hardi, ou timide. Le jugement de l'oreille n'est pas moins admirable, pour ce qui regarde le chant et les instrumens. Elle distingue les tons, les mesures, les pauses, les diverses sortes de voix, les claires, les sourdes, les douces, les aigres, les basses, les hautes, les flexibles, les rudes; et il n'y a que l'oreille de l'homme, qui en juge. L'odorat, le goût, et le toucher ont aussi leur manière de juger. On a même inventé plus d'arts que je ne voudrois, pour jouir de ces sens, et pour les flatter. Car vous savez à quel excès on a porté la composition des parfums, l'assaisonnement des viandes, toutes les délicatesses du corps.



Mais nos mains, de quelle commodité ne sont-elles pas, et de quelle utilité dans les arts? Les doigts s'allongent, ou se plient sans la moindre difficulté, tant leurs jointures sont flexibles. Avec leur secours,

wife of the beauty, the order, and if the expression may be allowed, the comeliness and decency of colours and figures. Besides this, things of much greater importance fall under their notice; they discern the virtues and imperfections of others; and can distinguish the passionate from the mild and good-natured person; the joyful from those oppressed with grief; the man of true courage from the dastardly coward, and the bold and daring from those of a timorous disposition *. Nor is the nice judgment of the ear less admirable; for by its means, we distinguish the almost infinite variety of sounds, whether of the voice, or of musical instruments; perceive their intervals and difference; and remark their various kinds, as the high and low, the smooth and harsh, the grave and acute, the flexible and stiff sound; which can only be apprehended by the human ear. Our other senses of smelling, tasting, and feeling, are likewise possessed of very acute discernments: for the gratification and indulgence of which, more arts have been invented than I could wish. It is abundantly manifest to what an extravagant pitch the composition of perfumes, the seasoning of meats, and other refinements of sensuality, have been carried.



As † to hands, with which nature has furnished mankind; how commodious, how subservient are they to many different arts! By reason of their fine articulations and joints, the fingers with the greatest ease

* The art of physiognomy is here pointed at; which judges of the disposition of the mind from the features and external lineaments of the body.

† De Natura Deorum, II. 60.

in motu laborat. Itaque ad pingendum, ad fingendum, ad scalpendum, ad nervorum eliciendos sonos ac tibiularum, apta manus est, ad motionem digitorum. Atque hæc oblectationis : illa necessitatis ; cultus dico agrorum, extructionesque tectorum, tegumenta corporum, vel texta, vel suta, omnemque fabricam æris, et ferri. Ex quo intelligitur, ad inventa animo, percepta sensibus, adhibitis opificum manibus omnia nos consecutos, ut tecti, ut vestiti, ut salvi esse possimus ; urbes, muros, domicilia, delubra haberemus.

Jam verò operibus hominum, id est, manibus, cibi etiam varietas invenitur, et copia. Nam et agri multa ferunt manu quæsitâ, quæ vel statim consumantur, vel mandentur condita vetustati. Et præterea vescimur bestiis et terrenis, et aquatilibus, et volatilibus, partim capiendâ, partim alendâ. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadrupedum vectiones : quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis affert vim et celeritatem. Nos onera quibusdam bestiis, nos juga imponimus : nos elephantorum acutissimis sensibus, nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur : nos è terræ cavernis ferrum elicimus, rem ad colendos

secours, les mains usent du pinceau, et du ciseau ; elles jouent de la lyre, de la flûte : voilà pour l'agréable. Pour le nécessaire, elles cultivent les champs, bâtissent des maisons, font des étoffes, des habits, travaillent en cuivre, en fer. L'esprit invente, les sens examinent, le main exécute. Tellement que si nous sommes logez, si nous sommes vêtus, et à couvert, si nous avons des villes, des murs, des habitations, des temples, c'est aux mains que nous le devons.

Par notre travail, c'est-à-dire, par nos mains, nous savons multiplier et varier nos alimens. Car beaucoup de fruits, ou qui se consomment d'abord, ou qui doivent se garder, ne viendroient point sans culture. D'ailleurs, pour manger des animaux terrestres, des aquatiques, et des volatiles, nous en avons partie à prendre, partie à nourrir. Pour nos voitures, nous domptons des quadrupèdes, dont la force et la vitesse suppléent à notre faiblesse et à notre lenteur. Nous faisons porter des charges aux uns, le joug à d'autres. Nous faisons servir à nos usages la sagacité de l'éléphant, et l'odorat du chien. Le fer, sans quoi l'on ne peut cultiver les champs,
3 *nous*

ease move every way, and may be closed and opened at pleasure. So that by their aid, the hands are formed for painting, carving, engraving, and playing on musical instruments, whether of the stringed or wind kind. But these are only the elegant arts; those of necessary use in life are, agriculture, architecture, the art of making cloth, of preparing proper habits for the body, and working in brass and iron. Hence it appears, that as invention is the peculiar property of the mind, and perception of the senses; so all the accommodations of life are obtained by the application of the hands of proper workmen: to this we are indebted for our houses, clothes, and means of safety; also, that we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, is owing to the same cause.

By human labour, or, what is the same thing, the application of the hands, plenty and variety of food is likewise procured: for it is to manual culture, that much of the fruits of the earth, whether such as serves for present use, or what is pickled to be preserved for some time, is owing. Land and water-animals, with fowl, make also part of our food; but then they must either be taken, or nourished and brought up by us. We break four-footed beasts, to answer the purposes of carriage; and by their strength, and swiftness, make up what is wanting in ours. We put burdens on some animals, and the yoke on others. The exceeding acute senses of the elephant, and the sagacity of dogs, are by us turned to our own advantage. We extract iron out of the bowels of the earth, because necessary for the

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purposes

66 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

colendos agros necessariam: nos æris, argenti, auri venas, penitus abditas, invenimus et ad usum aptas, et ad ornatum decoras: arborum autem confectione, omnique materiâ, et cultâ, et silvestri, partim ad calefaciendum corpus, igni adhibito, et ad mitigandum cibum utimur, partim ad ædificandum, ut tectis septi frigora caloresque pellamus. Magnos verò usus affert ad navigia facienda, quorum curribus suppeditantur omnes undique ad vitam copiarum: quasque res violentissimas natura genuit, earum moderationem nos soli habemus, maris atque ventorum, propter nauticarum rerum scientiam: plurimisque maritimis rebus fruimur, atque utimur. Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine dominatus. Nos campis, nos montibus fruimur: nostri sunt amnes, nostri lacus: nos fruges serimus, nos arbores: nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus: nos flumina arcemus, dirigimus, avertimus: nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alteram naturam efficere conamur.

nous allons le prendre dans les entrailles de la terre. Les veines de cuivre, d'argent, et d'or, quoique très-cachées, nous les trouvons, et nous les employons à nos besoins, ou à des ornemens. Nous avons des arbres, ou qui ont été plantés à dessein, ou qui sont venus d'eux mêmes, et nous les coupons; tant pour faire du feu, nous chauffer, et cuire nos viandes, que pour bâtir, et nous mettre à l'abri du chaud et du froid. C'est aussi de quoi construire des vaisseaux, qui de toutes parts nous apportent toutes les commoditez de la vie. Nous sommes les seuls animaux, qui entendons la navigation, et qui par-là nous soumettons ce que la nature a fait de plus violent, la mer et les vents. Ainsi nous tirons de la mer une infinité des choses utiles. Pour celles que la terre produit, nous en sommes absolument les maîtres. Nous jouissons des plaines, des montagnes: les rivières, les lacs sont à nous: c'est nous qui semons les bleds, qui plantons les arbres: nous fertilisons les terres en les arrosant par des canaux: nous arrêtons les fleuves, nous les redressons, nous les détournons. En un mot, nos mains tâchent de faire dans la nature, pour ainsi dire, une autre nature.

purposes of agriculture ; and however deeply concealed the veins of copper, silver and gold may be, we find them out, as being fit, not only for use, but likewise for ornament. Again, by felling trees, whether those we plant, or such as grow in the forest, we make them serve either for fuel to warm us and dress our food, or for building houses to cover and defend us from the severities of heat and cold. Another great use they serve for, is the building ships ; by the navigating of which, all the necessaries of life are imported from every part of the globe : for we alone, by our knowledge of maritime affairs, are able to give laws to those most violent productions of nature, the sea and winds ; and in fact, we have the enjoyment and use of most things the sea produces. Man likewise is absolute lord of all the conveniencies the earth affords. We enjoy the mountains and the champain country ; the rivers and lakes are ours ; it is we that sow all kinds of corn, and plant trees ; we add new fertility to lands, by overflowing them with water ; the chaining up rivers, and directing or altering their courses, is our work : in a word, by the labour of our hands, we endeavour to introduce another face of things, and another nature, as it were, into the world.

III.

De CONSCIENTIA.

ME A mihi conscientia pluris est, quam omnium sermo.



Mihi quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ sine venditione et sine populo teste sunt: non quo fugiendus sit, (omnia enim benefacta in luce se collocari volunt) sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia majus est.



Vis ad recte facta vocandi, et à peccatis avocandi non modò senior est, quam ætas populorum et civitatum, sed æqualis illius, cœlum atque terras tuentis et regentis Dei. Neque enim esse mens divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sancendis habere: nec, quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnes hostium copias in ponte unus assisteret, à tergoque pontem intersecindi juberet, idcirco minus Coclitem illum rem gessisse tantam, fortitudinis lege

III.

Sur la CONSCIENCE.

JE préfère le témoignage de ma conscience, à tous les discours qu'on peut tenir de moi.



Rien ne me paroît si louable, que ce qui se fait sans ostentation, et sans témoins: non que les yeux du public soient à éviter, car les belles actions demandent à être connues: mais enfin, le plus grand théâtre qu'il y ait pour la vertu, c'est la conscience.



Il y a dans l'homme une puissance, qui porte au bien, et détourne du mal, non seulement antérieure à la naissance des peuples et des villes, mais aussi ancienne que ce Dieu, par qui le ciel et la terre subsistent, et sont gouvernez. Car la raison est un attribut essentiel de l'intelligence divine; et cette raison, qui est en Dieu, détermine nécessairement ce qui est vice ou vertu. Ainsi, quoiqu'il ne fût écrit nulle part, qu'il falloit, seul contre toute une armée, défendre la tête d'un pont, pendant qu'on

III.

On CONSCIENCE.

I Prefer * the testimony of my conscience to what all mankind may say of me.



Whatever † is done without ostentation, and without the people's being witnesses of it, is, in my opinion, most praise-worthy : not that the public eye should be entirely avoided, for good actions desire to be placed in the light ; but notwithstanding this, the greatest theatre for virtue is conscience.



That ‡ power of the mind which incites to good actions, and dissuades from evil ones, is not only more antient than the origin of nations, but is coeval with that God who beholds and governs both heaven and earth : for it is impossible that the divine mind should exist without reason ; and divine reason must necessarily be possessed of a power to determine what is virtuous, and what vitious. Nor, because it was no where written, that one man should maintain the pass of a bridge against the enemy's whole army, and that he should order the bridge be-

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* Ad Attic. XII. 28.

† Tuscul. II. 26.

‡ De Legib. II. 4.

lege atque imperio putabimus: nec, si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sextus Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ, Tricipitini filiæ, attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, et ad rectè faciendum impellens, et à delicto avocans: quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum, cum orta est: orta autem simul est cum mente divina.

Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna: quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat: quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec verò aut per senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator, aut interpret ejus alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis; alia

nunc,

qu'on le feroit rompre par derrière, il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'Horace, en faisant une si belle action, obéissoit à la loi, qui nous oblige d'être courageux. Ainsi, quoique du temps de Tarquin, la loi contre l'adultère ne fût pas encore écrite, il ne s'ensuit pas que le fils de ce roi, en violant Lucrece, n'ait péché contre la loi, qui est de toute éternité. Car l'homme avoit dès lors une raison, qui naturellement le portoit au bien, et le détournoit du mal. Raison, qui a force de lui, non du jour qu'elle est écrite, mais du moment qu'elle a commencé. Or elle a commencé au même instant que l'intelligence divine.

Qu'elle est la véritable loi? C'est la droite raison, invariable, éternelle, conforme à la nature, et répandue dans tous les hommes. Elle leur commande le bien, elle leur défend le mal: mais de manière que ses commandemens et ses défenses, qui ne s'adressent pas en vain à d'honnêtes-gens, ne font nulle impression sur les méchans. On ne peut, ni l'abolir, ni en retrancher, ni faire des loix contraires à celle-là. Personne n'en peut être dispensé, ni par le sénat, ni par le peuple. Elle n'a besoin que d'elle-même pour se rendre claire et intelligible.

Elle

hind him to be cut down, are we therefore to imagine, that the valiant Cocles * did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the nature and dictates of true bravery. Again, though in the reign of Tarquin there was no written law concerning adultery; it does not therefore follow, that Sextus Tarquinius did not offend against this eternal law, when he committed a rape on Lucretia, Tricipitinus's daughter: for even then he had the light of reason, deduced from the nature of things, that incites to good actions and dissuades from evil; and which has the force of a law, not from the time it was written, but from the first moment it began to exist. Now its existence must be equal to that of the divine mind.



Right † reason, or that which is agreeable to nature, invariable, eternal, and with which all mankind are impressed, is in every respect a true law. It expressly commands our duty, and strictly forbids all treachery: it is only on the virtuous, however, it has this good effect; for on the vitious it makes no impression. Nothing can supersede ‡ this law, nothing retrench it, or make it void. It is neither in the power of the senate nor people to dispense with it. It requires no comment, it wants no interpreter.

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* The detail of this affair may be seen in Livy, l. ii. c. 10. Horatius Cocles had the *agnomen* Cocles given him, because he had only one eye, the other being lost in the engagement.

† Fragm. lib. III. de Rep.

‡ *Obrogare* signifies, to make a new law directly contrary to a former one; *derogare*, to repeal some clause or part of it only; and *abrogare*, to repeal or make void the whole, without excepting any part.

nunc, alia posthac ; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit ; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus. Ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator : cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur : atque hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiam si cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit.



Itaque pœnas luunt, non tam judiciis, (quæ quondam nusquam erant, hodie multifariam nulla sunt ; ubi sunt tamen, persæpe falsa sunt) quam conscientia : ut eos agitent insectenturque furia, non ardentibus tædis, sicut in fabulis, sed angore conscientia, fraudisque cruciatu.



Nolite enim putare, quemadmodum in fabulis sæpe numero videtis, eos, qui aliquid

Elle n'est point autre à Rome, autre à Athènes ; autre aujourd'hui, et autre demain. Universelle, immuable, elle obligera toutes les nations, et dans tous les temps. C'est ainsi que Dieu sera éternellement lui seul, et l'instructeur, et le souverain de tous les hommes. Il a conçu le plan de cette loi, et c'est à lui qu'appartenoit le droit de l'examiner, et de la publier. Quiconque ne s'y soumettra point, ennemi de ses propres intérêts, oubliant ce que sa condition d'homme lui prescrit, il trouvera en cela même la plus affreuse punition, quand il éviteroit d'ailleurs tout ce qui est regardé comme supplice.



Aussi les peines ordonnées par la justice, ne sont-elles pas ce qu'un scélérat doit le plus redouter. Autrefois la justice n'étoit réglée nulle part : elle ne l'est pas même aujourd'hui en tous lieux : et dans les lieux où elle l'est, on la trompe souvent. Mais la vraie punition d'un scélérat, c'est sa conscience. Il est agité, il est poursuivi, non par des furies avec des torches ardentes, comme dans les tragédies ; mais par le remords, qui est l'effet du crime.



Car ne croyez pas que les flambeaux allumés de ces furies, dont le théâtre offre souvent

This law differs nothing at Rome from what it is at Athens, nor is it any other at present from what it will be hereafter; it is an eternal and immutable law, that is universally binding over all nations and at all times. Hence it is, that God becomes, as it were, the common instructor and governor of mankind. It was He who composed, examined, and promulged it. Whoever therefore acts contrary to this law, opposes his own interest, and spurns at the true dignity of man; and by this very means will be sure to suffer the greatest of all punishments, though he should escape what commonly goes under that name.



The * punishments they undergo are not so much those inflicted by courts of justice, (which formerly were not in being, nor are, at present, in many places; and even where established, are frequently biassed and partial), as what they suffer from conscience. The furies pursue and torment them, not with their burning torches, as the poets feign, but by remorse, and the tortures arising from guilt.



I † would not have you credit what you see so often represented in the drama, That those who have been guilty of any impiety or wickedness, are continually

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* De Legibus, l. 14.

† Pro S. Roscio Am. cap. 24.

aliquid impiè, sceleratéque commiserint, agitari, et perterriti furiarum tædis ardentibus : sua quemque fraus, et suus terror maximè vexat : suum quemque scelus agitat, amentiaque afficit : suæ malæ cogitationes, conscientiaque animi terrent. Hæ sunt impiis assiduæ, domesticæque furia.

souvent l'image à vos yeux, fassent le tourment et l'effroi d'un scélérat. Quiconque a été injuste, porte en lui-même la principale cause de sa frayeur. Il ne lui faut que son crime pour le tourmenter, pour lui troubler l'esprit. Au fonds de sa conscience il sait avoir fait mal, et voilà ce qui l'épouvante. Voilà les furies, qui s'emparent d'un coupable, et l'accompagnent nuit et jour.

Quod si homines ab injuria, pœna, non natura arceri deberet, quænam sollicitudo vexaret impios, sublato suppliciorum metu ? quorum tamen nemo tam audax unquam fuit, quin aut abnueret à se commissum esse facinus, aut justii sui doloris causam aliquam fingeret, defensionemque facinoris à naturæ jure aliquo quæreret. Quæ si appellare audent impii, quo tandem studio colentur à bonis ?

Quod si pœna, si metus supplicii, non ipsa turpitudine, deterret ab injuriosa facinorosaque vita : nemo est injustus ; at incauti potius habendi sunt, improbi.

Tum autem qui non ipso honesto movemur, ut boni viri simus, sed utilitate aliqua atque fructu, callidi sumus,

Rien troubleroit-il un scélérat, qui est sûr de l'impunité, s'il étoit vrai que l'on dût s'abstenir du crime, non parce que la nature le défend, mais parce qu'il est puni ? Jamais scélérat, cependant, ne fut si effronté, qu'il ne prît le parti, ou de nier, ou de pallier son crime, en cherchant à se couvrir du droit naturel. Or, si les impies osent réclamer cette loi sacrée, jusqu'où n'ira donc pas pour elle l'attachement et le respect des honnêtes-gens ?

Que ce qui nous doit éloigner du crime, ce soit la crainte du supplice, et non la turpitude attachée nécessairement au crime même, il n'y aura donc point de scélérats ; il n'y aura que des mal-adroits.

Que d'un autre côté nous fassions le bien, non pour le bien, mais parce qu'il en revient du profit, ce n'est plus

tinually pursued and terrified by the furies with their burning torches : It is guilt, and the consternation thence arising, that torments every wicked man, disturbs his rest, and even drives him mad ; his own evil thoughts, and conscious heart fill him with terror. These are the constant, the domestic furies of the wicked.



Was * it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself, that ought to restrain mankind from wickedness ; what, I would ask, could give villains the least uneasiness, abstracting from all fears of this kind ? And yet none of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but endeavoured to justify what he had done by some law of nature, denied the fact, or else pretended a just sorrow for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to these laws, with how profound respect ought good men to treat them ?

If either punishment, or the fear of it, was what deterred from a vicious course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself ; then none could be guilty of injustice, the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.

On the other hand, if we are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but out of a view to some private advantage, we are cunning, and not good men. What will

D 6

not

* De Legibus, I. 14.

mus, non boni. Nam quid faciet is homo in tenebris, qui nihil timet nisi testem et judicem? quid in deserto loco nactus, quem multo auro spoliare possit, imbecillum atque solum? Noster quidem hic naturâ justus vir ac bonus, etiam colloquetur, juvabit, in viam deducet: is vero, qui nihil alterius causâ facit, et metitur suis commodis omnia, videtis, credo, quid sit acturus. Quod si negabit se illi vitam erepturum, et aurum ablaturum, nunquam ob eam causam negabit, quod id naturâ turpe judicet; sed quod metuat, ne emanet, id est, ne malum habeat. O rem dignam, in qua non modò docti, verum etiam agrestes erubescant!



Satis enim nobis (si modò in philosophia aliquid profecimus) persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avarè, nihil injustè, nihil libidinosè, nihil incontinentè esse faciendum. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur à Platone: qui, cum terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbris, in illum hiatus descendit, æneumque equum (ut ferunt fabulæ) animadvertit, cujus in lateribus fores ef-

sent:

plus là ce qui s'appelle prohibé, c'est industrie. Car celui qui ne craint qu'un témoin et un juge, que fera-t-il dans les ténèbres, dans un lieu écarté, où il rencontrera un passant, seul et sans défense, chargé d'or? L'homme qui se conduit par des principes d'honneur, abordera ce passant, l'aidera, le remettra en son chemin: mais celui qui ne connoît que son intérêt propre, vous voyez, je crois, ce qu'il fera. Quand il me voudroit dire qu'il ne lui ôteroit, ni son or, ni la vie; au moins ne dira-t-il pas que ce qui l'arrête, ce soit la noirceur de l'action: c'est la peur qu'elle n'éclatte, et qu'il ne la paye. O! sentiment qui feroit rougir, ne disant pas des personnes éclairées, mais les gens même les plus grossiers!



Pour nous, si nous avons un peu de philosophie, nous sommes bien sûrs que le secret, quand nous l'aurions, de nous cacher aux Dieux et aux hommes, ne peut autoriser, ni avarice, ni injustice, ni, en un mot, quelque passion que ce soit. C'est à ce sujet que Platon raconte l'aventure de Gygès, qui étoit un berger du roi de Lydie. Une grosse pluie ayant formé dans la terre une ouverture profonde, Gygès y descendit: et là, si l'on en croit la fable, il trouva un cheval

not that man do in the dark, who fears nothing but a witness and judge? or, should he meet a single man in a lonely and desert place, with a large sum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed, how would he behave? In such a case, the man whom we have represented to be honest from principle, and the nature of the thing itself, would converse with, assist, and show him the way; but as to the man who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures every thing by the advantage it brings him, it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one would act. Now should he deny that he would kill the man, or rob him of his treasure, his reason for this cannot be, that he apprehends there is any natural turpitude in such actions; but only because he is afraid of a discovery, and the bad consequences that would thence ensue: a sentiment this, of which, I shall not say that men of learning, but even clowns themselves have reason to be ashamed!



We * must be fully persuaded, if our progress in philosophy be anywise considerable, that we ought not to be guilty of avarice, injustice, sensuality, and intemperance, even allowing that we could conceal it both from gods and men. To this purpose Plato brings in the story of Gyges, who having gone down into a fissure of the earth, occasioned by violent rains, observed, if we can give any credit to fables, a brazen horse with doors in its sides: upon opening these, he discovered the body of a dead man of extraordinary

sent : quibus apertis, hominis mortui vidit corpus magnitudine inusitata, anulumque aureum in digito : quem ut detraxit, ipse induit : (erat autem regius pastor) tum in concilium pastorum se recipit. Ibi cum palam ejus annuli ad palmam converterat, à nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat : idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate annuli usus, reginæ stuprum intulit : eaque adjutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit quos obstare arbitrabatur : nec in his eum quicquam facinoribus potuit videre. Sic repente annuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiæ. Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihil plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam si non haberet. Honeſta enim bonis viris, non occulta quærun-
tur.

cheval d'airan, dans les flancs duquel étoit une porte, qu'il ouvrit. Il y remarqua un cadavre, d'une prodigieuse grandeur, et qui avoit un anneau d'or au doigt. Il arracha l'anneau, le mit, et alla rejoindre les autres bergers. Quand il tournoit de son côté la pierre de cet anneau, il devenoit invisible, quoiqu'il ne laissât pas de bien voir les autres : et quand il tournoit la pierre en dehors, il redevenoit visible. Profitant donc de cette facilité, il coucha avec la reine, et de concert avec elle, il tua le roi son maître ; il tua ceux qu'il crut en état de s'opposer à ses desseins ; tout cela sans que personne en pût rien voir : de sorte qu'en peu de temps, grace à son anneau, il parvint à la couronne de Lydie. Or, si c'étoit un sage qui possédât ce même anneau, il ne s'en croiroit pas plus autorisé à faire mal, que s'il ne l'avoit point. Car son objet, c'est la vertu même, ce n'est pas l'impunité.

traordinary size, with a gold ring on its finger: this he pulled off, and having put it upon his own, went to rejoin his companions; for he was one of the king of Lydia's shepherds. By turning the stone of this ring towards the palm of his hand, he became invisible to others, yet saw every thing distinctly himself; and by turning the ring to its proper place, he became visible again. Wherefore embracing the opportunity which the ring afforded him, he lay with the queen; by whose assistance he killed the king his sovereign, and dispatched all those who he thought would oppose him: nor in perpetrating these villainies could he be seen by any one: and thus, by the help of his ring, he in a short time commenced king of Lydia. Now though this very ring were in the possession of a wise man, he would think himself no more authorized to commit a bad action, than if he was without it: for good men consider only the intrinsic excellence and beauty of an action, and not whether it can be concealed.

IV.

De PASSIONIBUS.

EST Zenonis hæc definitio, ut perturbatio sit, *aversa à recta ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio.* Quidam brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem: sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit à naturæ constantia. Partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci, & ex duobus opinatis malis: ita esse quatuor. Ex bonis, libidinem, & lætitiā: ut sit lætitia, præsentium bonorum; libido, futurorum. Ex malis, metum, & ægritudinem nasci censent: metum, futuris; ægritudinem, præsentibus. Quæ enim venientia metuuntur, eadem efficiunt ægritudinem instantia.

Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri, & opinione. Itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modò quàm vitiosæ, sed etiam quàm in nostra

IV.

Sur les PASSIONS.

ZENON définit toute passion, Un mouvement de l'ame, opposé à la droite raison, et contraire à la nature. D'autres, en moins de mots, Un appétit trop violent, c'est à-dire, qui éloigne trop notre ame, de cette égalité, où la nature la voudroit toujours. Et comme il y a dans l'opinion des hommes, deux sortes de biens, et deux sortes de maux, les Stoïciens divisent les passions en quatre genres: deux, qui regardent les biens; deux, qui regardent les maux. Par rapport aux biens, la Cupidité, et la Joie: la cupidité, qui a pour objet le bien futur; la joie, qui a pour objet le bien présent. Par rapport aux maux, la Tristesse, et la Crainte: la tristesse, qui a pour objet les maux présents; la crainte, qui a pour objet les maux futurs.

Mais l'opinion étant, selon les Stoïciens, ce qui fait toutes les passions; ils les ont définies d'une manière encore plus précise, afin que nous concevions, non seulement combien

IV.

On the PASSIONS.

ZENO* defines passion to be, *a commotion of the soul, opposite to right reason, and contrary to nature.* Others, in fewer words, that it is *an excessive appetite*, or such as exceeds the bounds prescribed by nature. Now according to these men †, there are two kinds of good, and as many of evil, whence arise so many passions ‡. Those arising from good, are joy and desire; the former resulting from a good in possession, and the latter from that in expectation. The passions supposed to spring from evil, are sorrow and fear: sorrow regards present evil, and fear that which is to come; for whatever excites fear, when in prospect, naturally raises sorrow, when present.

All || the passions, according to the Stoics §, spring from our judgment and opinion of things; and hence they give a more precise, and determinate, definition of them, in order to make it appear, not only

* Tuscul. IV. 6.

† The Stoics.

‡ Virgil, *Æneid* VI. 733, gives the same division of the passions in four words:

*Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent gaudentque.
Hence their fear, desire, joy and sorrow spring.*

|| Tuscul. IV. 7.

§ The Earl of Shaftsbury agrees with them, in this respect. "Here therefore, says he, arises work and employment for us within: to regulate FANCY, and rectify OPINION," &c. See *Miscel.* 4. chap. 1.

nostra sint potestate. Est igitur ægritudo, opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur. Lætitia, opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum esse videatur. Metus, opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur. Libido, opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse, atque adesse.

Sed quæ judicia, quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solùm positas esse dicunt, verùm illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus. ut ægritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat; metus, recessum quendam animi, et fugam; lætitia, profusam hilaritatem; libido, effrenatam appetentiam.

Opinationem autem, quam in omnes definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse imbecillam assensionem.

Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse esse dicunt; sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ul-

tra

combien elles sont mauvaises, mais combien nous en sommes les maîtres. Ainsi, selon eux, la Tristesse est l'opinion que l'on a d'un mal présent, jugé tel, qu'il mérite que l'ame s'abatte, et se resserre : la Joie, l'opinion que l'on a d'un bien présent, jugé tel, qu'on ne sauroit être trop charmé de le posséder : la Crainte, l'opinion que l'on a d'un mal futur, qui paroît insupportable : et la Cupidité, enfin, l'opinion que l'on a d'un bien futur, qui semble promettre de grands avantages.

Puisque les passions ne sont toutes qu'opinion, les effets qu'elles produisent sont donc aussi l'ouvrage de l'opinion. Et c'est donc l'opinion qui cause cette espèce de mesure intérieure, dont la tristesse est accompagnée; ce rétrécissement de l'ame, dans la crainte; ces vivacitez outrées, dans la joie; ces desirs sans bornes, dans la cupidité.

Au reste, dans toutes ces définitions, les Stoïciens n'entendent par opinion, qu'un foible acquiescement de l'esprit à quelque idée, dont il a été frappé.

Je ne vois donc rien que de mou et d'énervé dans le sentiment des Péripatéticiens, qui regardent les passions comme nécessaires : pourvu, disent-ils, qu'on leur pres-

crite

only how exceedingly blameable they are in themselves, but likewise how entirely subjected to our will. Sorrow then is the opinion of a present evil, on account of which it seems just that the mind should be contracted, as it were, and depressed; joy, the opinion of a present good, for which it is reasonable our spirits should be elated; fear, the opinion of an impending evil, that appears intolerable; and desire, the opinion of a future good, the presence and fruition of which seems to promise great advantage.

I observed above, that the passions are owing to our sentiments and opinion of things; and to these, according to the Stoics, the effects of passion must likewise be attributed; as, the biting anguish which proceeds from grief; the retreat, as it were, and flight of the soul, occasioned by fear; the excessive vivacity of joy; and the unbridled lust of desire.

Now the opinion, which we have supposed to be included in all the above definitions, is by them called a weak assent, or persuasion of the mind.



Certainly * then the reasoning of the Peripatetics, who affirm that our minds are necessarily subject to passions, and yet prescribe certain limits to them which they ought not to exceed, must be trifling and

* Tuscul. IV. 17. It is a famous question in our schools even at present, whether the passions be natural and serviceable to mankind. But would men explain themselves, and define what passion is, they will find that the thing cannot so much as bear a question. However, be this as it will, those who have recourse to what *Muret* has writ on this subject, in his Commentary on *Aristotle's Ethics*, will at least be charmed with his eloquence, though they should not be convinced by his arguments. The reader may likewise consult the ingenious Mr. *Hutchinson's* treatise on the passions.

tra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio ? An vitium nullum est, non parere rationi ? an ratio parum præcipit, nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardentè, aut adeptus efferas te insolenter ? nec porrò malum, quo aut oppressus jaceas, aut, ne opprimare, mente vix constes ? eaque omnia aut nimis tristitia, aut nimis læta errore fieri ? Qui si error stultis extenuetur die, ut, cùm res eadem maneat, aliter ferant inveterata, aliter recentia : sapientes ne attingat quidem omnino.

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Qui modum igitur vitio querit, similiter facit, ut si posse putet eum, qui se è Leucade præcipitaverit, sustinere se, cùm velit. Ut enim id non potest : sic animus perturbatus et incitatus, nec cohibere se potest, nec, quo loco vult, insistere omnino.

Quæque

crive des bornes, au de là desquelles ils ne les approuvent point. Mais prescrit-on des bornes au mal ? Ou direz-vous, que de ne pas obéir à la raison, ce ne soit pas un mal ? Or la raison ne vous dit-elle pas assez, que tous ces objets, qui excitent dans votre ame, ou de fougueux desirs, ou de vains transports de joie, ne sont pas de vrais biens ; et que ceux qui vous consternent, ou qui vous épouvantent, ne sont pas de vrais maux ; mais que ces divers excès, ou de tristesse, ou de joie, sont également l'effet des préjugés, qui vous aveuglent ? Préjugés, dont le temps a bien la force lui seul, d'arrêter l'impression : car, quoiqu'il n'arrive nul changement réel dans l'objet ; cependant, à mesure que le temps l'éloigne, l'impression s'affoiblit dans les personnes les moins sensées : et par conséquent, à l'égard du sage, cette impression ne doit pas même commencer.

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Vouloir dont qu'on marque des bornes à ce qui est mal, c'est prétendre qu'un fou qui se précipite du rocher de Leucade, pourra, s'il le veut, se retenir au milieu de sa chute. Autant que cela est impossible, autant l'est-il qu'un homme emporté par quelque passion, se retienne et s'arrête où il voudra.

Sont

and ridiculous. I would ask any one who sets bounds to vice, whether to act contrary to the dictates of reason, does not deserve that name? Now does not reason abundantly evince, that what you eagerly covet, or are proud to have acquired, is not a substantial good; that what you succumb under the weight of, or become, in a manner, stupified lest it overtake you, is not a real evil; and lastly, that all excess, whether of joy or grief, is the genuine effect of prejudice and error? If then this wrong judgment of things is corrected by time, even with regard to persons of small discernment; so that notwithstanding the object remains the same, yet their sentiments concerning it are very different from what they formerly were; it follows, that men of prudence must be wholly free from its influence.



Whoever * therefore endeavours to set bounds to vice, acts like one who should imagine, that a person who had thrown himself from the precipice of *Leucas* †, could stop his career when he pleased: for as that is impossible to be effected, so neither can the mind, when ruffled with passion, restrain itself, or stop where it pleases.

All

* Tusc. IV. 18.

† Near to *Leucas*, a town of *Epire*, there was a very high rock, the point of which hung over the sea. We learn from *Ovid's* heroic epistles, in the last verse of *Sappho's* letter to *Phaon*, that the leap of *Leucas* was the last resource of unfortunate lovers, whence it was called the *Lover's leap*.

tra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio ? An vitium nullum est, non parere rationi ? an ratio parum præcipit, nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardentè, aut adeptus efferas te insolenter ? nec porrò malum, quo aut oppressus jaceas, aut, ne opprimere, mente vix constes ? eaque omnia aut nimis tristitia, aut nimis læta errore fieri ? Qui si error stultis extenuetur die, ut, cùm res eadem maneat, aliter ferant inveterata, aliter recentia : sapientes ne attingat quidem omnino.

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Quæque crescentia pernicioſa ſunt, eadem ſunt vitioſa, naſcentia. *Ægritudo* autem, cæteræque perturbationes, amplificatæ certè peſtiferæ ſunt. Igitur etiam fuſceptæ continuo in magna peſtis partē verſantur. Etenim ipſæ ſe impellunt, ubi ſemel à ratione diſceſſum eſt : ipſæque ſibi imbecillitas indulget, in altūmque provehitur imprudens, nec reperit locum conſitendi.

Quamobrem nihil intereſt, utrū moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injuſtitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, iſ partem fuſcipit vitiorum. Quod cum ipſum per ſe odioſum eſt, tum eo moleſtius, quia ſunt in lubrico, incitatæque ſemel proclivè labuntur, ſuſtineri que nullo modo poſſunt.

Maximè admonendus eſt, quantus ſit furor amoris. Omnibus enim ex animi perturbationibus eſt proſectò nulla vehementior : ut, ſi jam ipſa illa accuſare noliſ, ſupra dico, et corruptelas, et adulteria, inceſta denique, quorum omnium accuſabilis eſt turpitudine : ſed

Ut

Tout ce qui eſt pernicieux dans ſon progrès, eſt mauvais en commençant. Or la triſteſſe et toutes les autres paſſions, lorsqu'elles arrivent à un certain degré, ſont peſtilentielles. Donc, à les prendre dès leur naiſſance, elles ne valent rien. Car, du moment qu'on a quitté le ſentier de la raiſon, elles ſe pouſſent, elles s'avancent d'elles-mêmes : la foibleſſe humaine trouve du plaiſir à ne point réſiſter : et inſenſiblement on ſe voit, ſi j'oſe ainſi parler, en pleine mer, le jouet des flots.

Approuver des paſſions modérées, c'eſt approuver une injuſtice modérée, une lâcheté modérée, une intempérance modérée. Car preſcrire des bornes au vice, c'eſt en admettre une partie. Et outre que cela ſeul eſt blâmable, rien n'eſt d'ailleurs plus dangereux. Car le vice ne demande qu'à faire du chemin ; et pour peu qu'on l'aide, il gliffe avec tant de rapidité, qu'il n'y a plus moyen de le retenir.

On doit bien faire ſentir à un homme amoureux, dans quel abyme il ſe plonge. Car de toutes les paſſions celle-ci eſt la plus orageuſe. Quand même nous mettrions à part les débauches, les intrigues, les adultères, les inceſtes, toute autre turpitude recon nue pour telle ; et ſans tou cher

All things that are pernicious in their progress, must be evil in their birth. Now grief, and every other passion, if carried to an immoderate height, have undoubtedly very mischievous consequences; and therefore, from their very rise, must be tainted with a great part of the lurking mischief. For no sooner is the government of reason thrown off, than they rush forward of their own accord; weakness takes a pleasure to indulge itself; and having, if the expression may be allowed, imperceptibly launched out into the main ocean, can find no place where to stop.

Hence, in fact, there is no difference between the approving of moderate passions, and the approbation of moderate injustice, moderate cowardice, or moderate intemperance: for he that prescribes limits to corrupt affections, admits them in part: a conduct this, which besides its intrinsic deformity, is the more intolerable; because they are always in a precarious situation; vice being like heavy bodies, which, once set a-going, fall down the precipice with impetuous motion, so that it is impossible to stop them.



To * cure a man of love, he should above all things be made sensible how great a madness it is; since of all the passions of the soul, it is unquestionably the most outrageous: for should we impute to it neither debaucheries, intrigues, adulteries, or incests, all which are crimes of the first magnitude; besides these, I say, the excessive disorder of the mind in love, is a deformity of itself. Not to insist then on
the

ut hæc omittas, perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est. Nam ut illa præteream, quæ sunt furoris, hæc ipsa per sese quam habent levitatem, quæ videntur esse mediocria?

injuriam,

Suspiciones, inimicitiam, induciam,

Bellum, pax rursum. Incerta hæc si postules

Ratione certa facere, nibilo plus agas,

Quàm si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias.

Hæc inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis, quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? Est enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. Etenim si naturalis amor esset: et amarent omnes, et semper amarent, et idem amarent, neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret.



An ille mihi liber, cui mulier imperat? cui leges imponit, præscribit, jubet, vetat

cher ici aux excès où l'amour se porte dans sa fureur, n'y a-t-il pas, dans ses effets les plus ordinaires, et qu'on regarde comme des riens, une agitation d'esprit, qui est quelque chose de pitoyable et de honteux?

Rebuts, soupçons, débats, trêve, guerre nouvelle,

Et puis nouvelle paix. Par ce portrait fidelle,

Voyez que la raison aspire-
roit en vain

A fixer de l'amour le manège incertain.

Quiconque entreprendroit cette pénible cure,

Voudroit extravaguer avec poids et mesure.

Puisque l'amour dérange si fort l'esprit, comment lui donne t-on entrée dans son cœur? Car enfin, c'est une passion, qui, comme toutes les autres, vient absolument de nous, de nos idées, de notre volonté. Et la preuve que l'amour n'est point une loi de la nature, c'est que, si cela étoit, tous les hommes aimeroient, ils aimeroient toujours; l'objet de leur passion ne varierait point, et l'on ne verroit pas l'un se guérir par la honte, l'autre par la réflexion, un autre par la satiété.



Regarderai-je comme un homme libre, celui qu'une femme maîtrise; à qui elle impose

the above excesses of its madness, what levity appears in its ordinary, and most innocent, effects?

*The * quarrels, jealousies, and brawls of love,
Its truce, its war, or peace, uncertain prove :
As justly search for reason in a fool,
As try such whimsies to confine to rule.*

Who then can help being startled at the natural deformity of such an inconstant and fickle temper of mind? What we wanted to demonstrate is, that all the passions are voluntary, and entirely dependent upon opinion and judgment. For example, was the passion of love natural to mankind, they would always be in love, and that too with the same object †; nor should we find love cured by shame in one, reflection in another, and satiety in a third.



Shall † I esteem the man free who is the slave of a woman, that imposes laws on him, commands, forbids and regulates his conduct at pleasure; who neither can refuse what she requests, nor dares disobey her orders? If she asks any thing, it must be given; does she call, he must answer; when shut out, he must quietly be gone; in a word, if she

E threatens

* Terent. Eunuch. Act. I. Sc. 1.

† Plutarch makes the difference between love and friendship to consist in this, that if people of honour are once friends, they will always be so; because the mutual esteem that gave rise to this relation, and serves to support it, can, in such persons, receive no diminution. But love, on the contrary, is the effect of principles that do not always appear in the same point of view, and which depends entirely on opinion. Whence it is, that love is reckoned a passion; but friendship ranked among the virtues.

† Parad. V. 2.

vetat quod videtur? qui nihil imperanti negare potest, nihil recusare audet? Poscit? dandum est: vocat? veniendum: ejicit? abeundum: minatur? extimescendum. Ego verò istum non modò servum, sed nequissimum servum, etiam si in amplissima familia natus sit, appellandum puto.



Qui naturâ dicuntur iracundi, aut misericordes, aut invidi, aut tale quid; ii sunt ejusmodi constituti quasi mala valetudine animi, sanabiles tamen: ut de Socrate dicitur. Cùm multa in conventu vitia collegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se naturam cujusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est à cæteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent: ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cùm illa sibi signa, sed ratione, à se dejecta diceret. Ergo, ut optima quis valetudine affectus potest videri; at naturâ ad aliquem morbum proclivior: sic animus alius ad alia vitia propensior.

impose des loix; à qui el'e prescrit, ordonne, défend ce qu'elle veut, et sans qu'il puisse la refuser, lui résister en rien? Veut-elle avoir? il faut donner. Appelle-t-elle? il faut accourir. Elle congédie? il faut se retirer. Elle menace? il faut trembler. Pour moi, cet homme-là fût-il du sang le plus noble, je tiens que c'est, non un esclave simplement, mais le plus vil de tous les esclaves.



Quand on dit qu'il y a des gens portés naturellement, ou à la colère, ou à la pitié, ou à l'envie, ou à quelque autre passion, cela signifie que la constitution de leur ame, si j'ose ainsi parler, n'est pas bien saine: mais l'exemple de Socrate nous prouve qu'ils ne sont pas incurables. Zopyre, qui se donnoit pour un habile physionomiste, l'ayant examiné devant une nombreuse compagnie, fit le dénombrement des vices qu'il découvroit en lui: et chacun se prit à rire; car on ne voyoit rien de tout cela dans Socrate. Il sauva l'honneur de Zopyre, en déclarant que véritablement il étoit porté à tous ces vices; mais qu'il s'en étoit guéri avec le secours de la raison. Quelque penchant qu'on ait donc pour tel ou tel vice, on est cependant maître de s'en garantir: de même qu'on peut,

Quidnam

threatens him, he must of course be filled with terror. Such a man, let his birth and family be ever so illustrious, deserves, in my opinion, not simply the appellation of slave, but that of the most servile of all slaves.



They * who are said to be naturally inclined to anger, compassion, envy, and the like, are persons who constitutionally, if the expression may be allowed, labour under a disease of the soul; but not an incurable one, as appears from what is related of *Socrates*. *Zopyrus*, a physiognomist, who professed to know every one's natural disposition by appearance, having in a public company laid a great many vices to his charge, was laughed at by those present, because they knew that *Socrates* was guilty of none of them: *Socrates*, however, saved his credit, by declaring he was naturally addicted † to all these vices; but that, by the aid of reason, he had subdued them. Wherefore, as a man in the highest health may appear sickly, and be really more inclined by nature to one disease than another; in like manner, the mind may be more addicted to one vice than another.

E 2

A 2

* Tuscul. IV. 37.

† Instead of *signa*, able critics have proposed to read *infirmitas*, or some term of the like import. *Cicero*, in his treatise concerning fate, chap. 5, joins the following example to that of *Socrates*. It is related of *Stilpo*, says he, a philosopher of *Megara*, even by his own friends, that he was naturally a drunkard, and incontinent. Now this they write, not out of reproach, but rather in praise of him: for his corrupt nature was so thoroughly subdued and kept under by philosophy, that none ever saw him over-taken with drink, or observed the least trace of unclean desire in his behaviour.

peut, quoique né avec des dispositions à certaines maladies, jouir d'une bonne santé.

Quidnam esse causæ putem, cur, cum constemus ex animo et corpore, corporis curandi tuendique causâ quæsitâ sit ars, ejusque utilitas deorum immortalium inventioni consecrata : animi autem medicina nec tam desiderata sit, antequam inventa, nec tam culta, posteaquam cognita est ; nec tam multis grata et probata, pluribus etiam suspecta et invisâ ? An quod corporis gravitatem et dolorem animo judicamus, animi morbum corpore non sentimus ? Ita fit, ut animus de se ipse tum judicet, cum id ipsum, quo judicatur, ægrotet.

Je cherche d'où vient que l'homme étant composé d'une ame et d'un corps, on s'est appliqué, pour se qui regarde la santé du corps, à inventer un art, dont l'utilité a donné lieu de l'attribuer aux dieux immortels : et que pour ce qui regarde les maux de l'ame, non seulement on s'est moins mis en peine d'apprendre à les guérir ; mais depuis que l'art en a été découvert, il n'a pas été si cultivé ; et loin d'avoir autant de partisans, il est suspect, et même odieux à la plupart du monde. Peut-être cela vient-il de ce que l'ame, quand le corps souffre, en a pleine connoissance ; mais que le corps, quand l'ame est malade, n'y voit rien. Tellement que l'ame malade, n'ayant de juge qu'elle-même, et ne pouvant faire alors ses fonctions, ne connoît point son état.

Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, quod animi valentes morbo tentari non possunt ; corpora possunt : sed corporum offensiones sine culpa accidere possunt, animorum non item. Quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex aspernatione rationis eveniunt. Itaque in hominibus solum existunt. Nam

Il y a cette différence entre les maladies de l'ame et celles du corps, que les unes peuvent arriver sans qu'il y ait de notre faute, au-lieu que nous sommes toujours coupables des autres. Car les passions, qui sont les maladies de l'ame, ne viennent que de notre révolte contre la raison : et cela est si vrai,



As * we consist of soul and body, to what cause can it be owing, that the art of restoring, and preserving the health of the latter is cultivated with such care, and its usefulness so much valued, as to be attributed to the invention of the immortal Gods: whereas the art of curing the diseases of the mind, was neither so much sought after before its discovery, nor so carefully improved, when known; and is less acceptable to many, and by the greater part of the world is suspected and hated? Is it because the mind judges of bodily pain and diseases, while the body remains entirely insensible of those of the mind; so that the mind passes no judgment concerning its own state, till after the judging faculty is disordered?



There † is this difference between our souls and bodies, that the latter may be seized with distempers in their most flourishing state, but the former cannot. The diseases of the body indeed, may happen without any fault of ours, but not so of the mind; for every indisposition and disorder of this last, is occasioned by a disregard of reason; and therefore can only take place in the human species: because brutes, however they may have something analogous, are not subject to passions.

E 3

Let

* Tuscul. III. 1.

† Tuscul. IV. 14.

Nam bestiae simile quiddam faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt.



Videamus, quanta sint, quæ à philosophia remedia morbis animorum adhibeantur. Est enim quædam medicina certe: nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa atque inimica natura, ut corporibus tot res salutares, animis nullam invenerit. De quibus hoc etiam est merita melius, quod corporum adjumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in his ipsis est. Sed quo major est in eis præstantia et diviniore, eo majore indigent diligentia. Itaque bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid optimum sit; neglecta, multis implicatur erroribus.



Reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes. Quanquam hoc nescio quo modo dicatur, quasi duo simus, ut alter imperet, alter pareat: non inicitè tamen dicitur. Est enim animus in partes tributus duas: quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers. Cum igitur præcipitur, ut nobismetipsis imperemus, hoc præcipitur,

ut

vrai, que l'homme seul y est sujet. Car les brutes n'en sont point susceptibles, quoiqu'il y ait quelque ressemblance entre passion, et ce qu'elles font.



Pour guérir nos maladies spirituelles, voyons de quels puissants remèdes la philosophie nous ordonne de faire usage. Car il y en a certainement; et la nature qui a tant créé de choses salutaires au corps, n'a point été assez cruelle, assez ennemie de l'homme, pour que son ame fût privée de tout secours. Elle l'a même d'autant plus favorisée, que les secours qui regardent le corps, sont hors de lui; au-lieu que tout ce qui est nécessaire pour le salut de l'ame, est renfermé dans l'ame même. Mais plus elle est d'un ordre supérieur, plus elle demande d'attention. Prenez en soin, ses lumières sont toujours pures: négligez-la, mille et mille erreurs l'offusquent.



Vous n'avez donc plus qu'à vous commander à vous-même. J'avoue que c'est une manière de parler singulière, et qui suppose qu'on soit deux; l'un pour commander, l'autre pour obéir. Mais elle n'est pas sans fondement: car notre ame se divise en deux parties, l'une raisonnable, l'autre privée de raison. Ainsi, lorsqu'on nous

nous



Let * us now consider, what excellent remedies philosophy has provided against the diseases of our minds : for certainly such there are ; nor has nature been so malevolent and unfriendly to mankind, as to produce such a variety of things conducive to the health of the body, and nothing at all for that of the soul. No, in this respect she has been still more favourable ; for whatever contributes to the health of the soul is found within itself, whereas the remedies for the body must be prepared from without. Now the greater the excellence and dignity of human souls, the larger share of attention they require. Hence reason, if duly improved, discovers what is best ; but if neglected, is lost in a labyrinth of errors.



It † remains then, that you keep a constant guard over yourself. Though I cannot say but the propriety of the expression may be questioned, as if we were made up of two persons, the one to command, the other to obey. The observation, however, is entirely just ; for the mind is divided into two parts, the one endowed with reason, and the other not. When, therefore, we are commanded to keep a guard over ourselves ; the meaning is, that reason should restrain the blind propensities of our nature. The souls of most men carry about with them some alloy, something naturally mean, languid and enervate : and did this constitute the whole of our nature,

E 4

ture,

* Tuscul. IV. 27.

† Tuscul. II. 20, 21.

96 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

ut ratio coërceat temeritatem. Est in animis omnium ferè naturâ molle quiddam, demissum, humile, enervatum quodammodo et languidum, senile. Si nihil aliud, nihil effet homine deformius. Sed præsto est domina omnium et regina ratio, quæ connixa per se et progressa longiùs, fit perfecta virtus. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro.

nous ordonne de nous commander à nous-mêmes, c'est nous dire que nous faisons prendre le dessus à la partie raisonnable, sur celle qui ne l'est pas. Toutes les ames renferment, en effet, je ne sais quoi de mou, de lâche, de bas, d'énervé, de languissant : et s'il n'y avoit que cela dans l'homme, rien ne seroit plus hideux que l'homme. Mais en même-temps il s'y trouve bien à propos cette maîtresse, cette reine absolue, la raison, qui, par les efforts qu'elle a d'elle-même le pouvoir de faire, se perfectionne, et devient la suprême vertu. Or il faut, pour être vraiment homme, lui donner pleine autorité sur cette autre partie de l'ame, dont le devoir est d'obéir.

ture, man would be the most despicable creature in the world. But he has likewise reason, the mistress, the queen, of all his other powers; which, by her own natural force, still makes advances in improvement, till she arrives at perfect * virtue. It is the duty, therefore, of every man to be careful, that she effectually governs that part of the soul, which ought to be under her direction.

* Cicero, in numberless places, defines virtue to be, *A conformity to right reason*. And in Tuscul. IV. chap. 15, he says expressly, *Ipse virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest*.

V.

De SAPIENTIA.

QUID est optabilius sapientiâ ? quid præstantius ? quid homini melius ? quid homine dignius ? Hanc igitur qui expetunt, *Philosophi* nominantur : nec quidquam aliud est *philosophia*, si interpretari velis, quàm studium sapientiæ. Sapientia autem est (ut à veteribus Philosophis definitum est) rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque, quibus hæ res continentur, scientia : cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sanè intelligo, quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet. Nam si oblectatio quæritur animi, requiesque curarum : quæ conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beatèque vivendum ? si ratio constantiæ, virtutisque quæritur : aut hæc ars est, aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cùm minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum

V.

Sur la SAGESSE.

QU'Y a-t-il de plus désirable que la sagesse ? Qu'y a-t-il de meilleur, de plus utile aux hommes, et qui soit plus digne d'eux ? On donne le nom de Philosophes, à ceux qui la recherchent : et ce mot de Philosophie veut dire précisément, amour de la sagesse. Or la sagesse, ainsi que les anciens Philosophes l'ont définie, est la connoissance des choses, soit divines, soit humaines, et de ce qui constitue leur nature. Un homme qui mépriseroit cette étude, je ne vois pas ce qu'il peut estimer. Car si vous cherchez l'agréable et l'amusant ; peut-on rien comparer à une sorte d'étude, qui tend à nous rendre gens de bien, et heureux ? Mais d'ailleurs, ou c'est à la philosophie de nous enseigner les principes d'une probité solide et constante, ou il n'y a point d'art pour cela. Or, de prétendre qu'il n'y ait point d'art propre à nous enseigner l'essentiel, tandis qu'il y a des arts pour tout le reste ; c'est un discours

V.

ON WISDOM.

WHAT * is more desirable than wisdom?

What more excellent in itself, so useful to man, or better deserving his pursuit? Hence they who are possessed with an earnest desire to acquire it are called *Philosophers*; for *Philosophy*, in the precise meaning of the word, signifies the love of wisdom. Now wisdom, as defined by the antient sages, is the knowledge † of things divine and human, with their efficient causes. Whoever despises this study, I know not what he can think worthy of his approbation: for whether an agreeable amusement, or freedom from care, be the object of his desires; what is comparable to those studies, which are al-

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ways

* Offic. II. 2.

† By things divine and human is understood all things, without excepting any. Thus the perfect Sage is one who knows every thing. There is a necessity for admitting this principle of the Stoics, with the consequences they drew from it; as that none but fools could be guilty of vice; that those could not commit the least mistake, who saw clearly whence they went, and whither they were going; that in such a case, they could offend neither in respect of morality or policy; and so of the rest. But, in fact, this sage of the Stoics never existed except in idea. However, be this as it will, nothing but an absolute impossibility of attaining perfection in virtue, should hinder us from aspiring to it. Let us here follow the prudent advice of *Horace*,

*Non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus,
Non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi.*

What though you cannot hope for eagle's eyes,
Will you a lenient, strength'ning salve despise?

Francis's Hor.

100 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

minum est parum confideratè loquentium, atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina virtutis, ubi ea quæretur, cùm ab hoc discendi genere discefferis ?



Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus : quibus sapientiam non cernimus. Quàm illa ardentes amores excitaret sui, si videretur !



Principio generi animantium omni est à naturâ tributum, ut se, vitam, corpusque tueatur, declinetque ea, quæ nocitura videantur, omniâque, quæ sint ad vivendum necessaria, acquirat, et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia ejusdem generis. Commune item animantium omnium est conjunctionis appetitus, procreandi causâ, et cura quædam eorum, quæ procreata sunt. Sed inter hominem et belluam hoc maximè interest, quòd hæc tantùm, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest, quodque præsens est, se accommodat, paululùm admodum sentiens præteritum, aut futurum. Homo autem (quòd rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus,

discours peu sensé, et une erreur capitale. Pour apprendre donc la vertu, à quelle autre école iroit-on, qu'à celle de la philosophie ?



Quoique la vûe soit le sens le plus subtil, cependant, dit Platon, l'œil ne sauroit découvrir la sagesse. O ! si elle étoit visible, de quel amour les hommes s'enflammeroient pour elle !



A tout animal, de quelque espece qu'il soit, la nature d'abord lui inspire de veiller à conserver son être, de fuir ce qui pourroit lui être nuisible, et de chercher à se procurer des alimens, une retraite, tout ce qui lui est nécessaire pour mettre sa vie et son corps en sûreté. Tous les animaux ont encore cela de commun, qu'ils se portent à engendrer leur semblable, et qu'ils prennent un certain soin de ce qu'ils ont mis au monde. Mais entre l'homme et la bête, il y a cette différence essentielle : Que la bête, n'ayant pour guide que le sentiment, ne s'attache qu'aux choses présentes, et qui sont devant ses yeux, sans être touchée, que bien foiblement, ni du passé, ni de l'avenir. Que l'homme, au contraire, est doué d'une raison, qui lui montre l'en-

châinement

ways taken up in searching after the means of attaining a good and happy life? Or, is he desirous of learning the principles of virtue and true courage; here, or no where, is to be found the art of acquiring them? They who affirm that there is no art in things of the greatest moment, while nothing however small and trifling is performed without some art, are guilty of the grossest error, and must be men of no consideration. Now if there be any science of virtue, where shall it be learned, if not in the school of philosophy?

Sight *, says *Plato*, though the acutest of all our senses, is too dull to present us with a view of wisdom. With what ardent desires after her would she inflame us, could she become visible?

Nature †, from the first origin of things, has endowed every species of animals with an instinct of self-preservation, by which they not only avoid what would be destructive of their being, or anywise injurious to them; but likewise make provision of the necessaries of life, as food, a place of retreat, and the like. Another instinct, common to all animals, is the desire of copulation for the propagation of their kind, and the care they take of their offspring. But between a man and a brute, there is this difference; that the latter, being directed entirely by sense, is wholly attached to the present, and very little sensible either of what is past, or of futurity. Man, on the contrary, comprehends the whole course of his life, and prepares all things necessary

* De Finib. II. 16.

† Offic. I. 4.

gressus, et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus præsentibus adjungit, atque annectit futuras) facile totius vitæ cursum videt, ad eamque degendam præparat res necessarias.

In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere : cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum, aut admirabilium ad beatè vivendum, necessariam ducimus.

Tantus est innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiæ, ut nemo dubitare possit, quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. Videmusne, ut pueri, ne verberibus quidem, à contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur ? ut pulsi requirant, et aliquid scire se gaudeant ? ut aliis narrare gestiant ? ut pompâ, ludis, atque ejusmodi spectaculis teneantur, ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant ? Quid verò ? qui ingenuis studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne vi-

demus

chaînement des choses ; par où elles sont occasionnées ; quelles en sont les suites ; le rapport des unes avec les autres ; et pouvant d'un coup d'œil, qui embrasse l'avenir avec le présent, voir tout le cours de sa vie, il prend de loin ses mesures pour ne manquer de rien.

Un goût remarquable, et qui est particulier à l'homme, c'est le desir de connaître le vrai. Que nous ayons du loisir, et l'esprit libre, nous nous sentons cette envie de voir, d'entendre, d'apprendre quelque chose ; persuadez que pour vivre heureux, il nous importe de pénétrer dans ce qui est caché, ou qui cause une sorte d'admiration.

Telle est l'envie d'apprendre et de savoir, avec laquelle nous venons au monde, qu'il est clair que c'est un penchant, qui, toute utilité à part, est naturel à l'homme. Remarquez-vous que la crainte du châtimement ne peut même quelquefois empêcher les enfans d'être curieux ? Vous les aurez rebutez, ils vous questionneront encore. Quelle joie pour eux d'avoir enfin appris ce qu'ils vouloient, et quelle demangeaison de le raconter à d'autres ? Une pompeuse cérémonie, des jeux publics, tout ce qui est spectacle, les enchante au point

cessary for his future subsistence: and this he is enabled to do, as being partaker of reason, by which he sees the causes and consequences of things, notes their rise and progress, compares things of a like nature, and connects the future with the present.

The desire of truth, and the power of investigating it, are, in a special manner, peculiar to man. Hence it is, that when freed from the necessary employments and cares of life, we are extremely desirous to see, hear, or learn something; and look upon the knowledge of abstruse things, or such as raise admiration *, to be a necessary ingredient of a happy life.



So † deeply are mankind impressed with the love of knowledge and learning, that by this very propensity of their nature, they would doubtless be engaged in the pursuit of them, though there was no advantage annexed to the attainment. Do we not see, that even chastisements are not sufficient to restrain children from considering and enquiring into things; that though you beat them, they will persist in making further enquiry; nay, how over-joyed are

* It is evident, that the *admiration* here mentioned, is that arising from ignorance, which makes us desire or fear things with which we would be no wise affected, if we knew their true value. *Horace* has the same thought in the beginning of one of his epistles, which he has expressed almost in the same terms:

*Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque, quæ possit facere et servare beatum.*

Not to admire, is of all means the best,
The only means, to make, and keep us blest.

Francis's Hor.

demus eos nec valetudinis, nec rei familiaris habere rationem, omniâque perpeti, ipsâ cognitione et scientiâ captos? et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem?

Mihi quidem Homerus hujusmodi quiddam vidisse videtur in iis, quæ de Sirenium cantibus finxerit. Neque enim vocum suavitate videntur, aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitæ, qui præter vehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur; ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhærescerent. Ita enim invitant Ulysssem: (nam verti, ut quædam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum.)

*O decus Argolicum, quin pup-
pim flectis, Ulysses,
Auribus ut nostros possis ag-
noscere cantus.
Nam nemo hæc unquam est
transvectus cæcula cursu,
Quin prius adstiterit vocum
dulcedine captus;*

Post

point qu'ils en souffriront la faim et la soif. Mais ne voyons-nous, pas les gens de lettres si charmez de leurs études, qu'ils en oublient leur santé, et leurs propres affaires? Pour se rendre savans, ils ne trouvent rien de pénible; et quelque grands que soient leurs travaux, ils se croient dédommages par le plaisir qu'ils goûtent en acquérant des lumieres.

Je m'imagine que c'est à peu près ce qui a donné lieu à la fiction d'Homere, sur le chant des Sirenes. Car il paroît que ce n'est point par la douceur de leur voix, ni par la nouveauté, ou par la variété de leurs chants, qu'elles attiroient les voyageurs à leur écueil; mais que c'étoit plutôt en leur offrant de partager avec eux les rares connoissances, dont elles avoient, à les en croire, l'esprit orné. Voici, en effet, le discours qu'elles tiennent à Ulysse: c'est un des morceaux que j'ai traduits d'Homere.

Arrêtez-vous, Ulysse, au bruit de nos accords.
Pourriez-vous le premier, dédaignant ce rivage,
Au charme de nos voix refuser votre hommage?
Instruit par nos leçons, riche de nos trésors;

Le

are they with their little acquirements of knowledge ; how delighted to communicate them to others ; and how charmed with the sight of any solemnity, the public games, and shows of the like nature : in-
somuch, that on this account they will endure both hunger and thirst ? Besides, do we not observe, that those who take pleasure in the liberal arts and sciences, are regardless of their health and domestic affairs ; endure the greatest hardships, for the sake of acquiring their beloved knowledge ; and think themselves abundantly recompenced for all their vast labour and application, by the intellectual joys that spring from learning ?

It is probable that *Homer* had something like this natural propensity in view, when he composed his fiction of the Sirens * : for it was not so much the melody of their voice, or the novelty and variety of their notes, as their pretensions to an extraordinary knowledge, which attracted and charmed those who sailed that way ; whose desire of learning, kept them, as it were, fixed to the rocks. This is their invitation to *Ulysses* ; for among other passages of *Homer*, I translated the very place that mentions it.

*Thou ornament of Greece ! Ulysses stay !
Why from our tuneful songs thus haste away ?
None ever sail'd along this beach before ;
But with our music charm'd, made for the shore.*

When

* The Sirens were a kind of fabulous beings, with the face of a woman, and the tail of a fish, according to *Ovid* ; but others have decked them with a plumage of various colours. They are supposed to have been the three daughters of the river *Achelous*, and were called *Parthenope*, *Ligea*, and *Leucosia*. *Homer* makes mention only of two Sirens ; but others reckon five. *Virgil* places them on rocks where vessels are in danger of splitting.

106 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

*Post variis avido satiatus
pectore musis,
Doctior ad patrias lapsus
pervenerit oras.
Nos grave certamen belli,
cladèmq; tenemus,
Gràcia quam Trojæ divino
numine vexit;
Omniaque è latis rerum vestigia terris.*

Le voyageur les porte au
sein de sa patrie.
Nous chantons ces travaux,
ces illustres revers,
Par qui le fier Priam vit sa
gloire flètrie.
Il n'est rien de caché pour
nous dans l'univers.

Vidit Homerus, probari fabulam non posse, si cantunculis tantus vir irretitus teneretur. Scientiam pollicentur: quam non erat mirum sapientiæ cupido patriâ esse cariorem.

*Homere comprit qu'un si grand
homme s'arrêtant pour en-
tendre de belles voix, la fic-
tion n'étoit pas recevable.
Mais de promettre la science
à un homme amoureux de la
sagesse, il y avoit de quoi lui
faire oublier sa patrie.*

Ac veteres quidem philosophi, in beatorum insulis, fingunt, qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos curâ omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitæ cultum aut paratum requirentes, nihil aliud esse acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus in quærendo ac discendo, in naturæ cognitione consumant.

*Quelle sera la vie des
sages, dans ces îles qu'on a
imaginées pour en faire le
séjour des bienheureux, et où
il n'y a nulle sorte de soucis,
ni de besoins? Tout leur
temps, disent les anciens
philosophes, ils l'emploieront
à étudier la nature, et à
faire ou tâcher de faire sans
cesse de nouvelles découvertes.*

Nisi multorum præceptis, multisque literis mihi ab adolescentia suavissem, nihil esse in vita magnopere expectandum, nisi laudem atque honestatem: in ea autem persequenda omnes cruciatus corporis, omnia pericula mortis atque exilii parvi esse ducenda: nunquam

*Pour moi, si par beaucoup
de préceptes et de bons livres
que j'ai lus dès ma jeunesse,
je ne m'étois pas convaincu
qu'il n'y avoit rien de fort
desirable en cette vie, si ce
n'est l'honneur et la vertu;
et qu'il falloit, plutôt que de
nous en départir, braver les
tourmens et les dangers, la
mort.*

*When stor'd with learning, homeward they proceed;
And bless their friends with knowledge, they much need.*

O stay! the Trojan war we fully know!

Stay! We'll inform you of all things below!

Homer was sensible that if he had suffered his hero to have been detained by the charms of music only, the fiction could not have passed; but they promise him knowledge, and it was no wonder that his desire for wisdom should get the better of that for his native country.



Now * the antient philosophers represent to us, what the life of wise-men will be in the islands † of the blessed, by supposing that they shall be freed from all anxious care; and having no occasion to make any kind of provision for their subsistence, shall spend their whole time in the delightful employment of studying and searching into the knowledge of nature.



Had ‡ I not been fully persuaded, as well from the books I have read, as by the precepts I received in my youth from many great men, that nothing in human life is truly desirable but honour and virtue; and that neither bodily torture, nor the most formidable dangers, even those of death and banishment, ought to have any weight with us, when put in competition

* Ibid. cap. 19.

† Nothing can come up to the description Muret gives of these islands; not a'l the colours of painters, or figures of poets, are able to add the least improvement to it. *Var. Lect. V. 1.*

‡ Pro Archia, cap. 6.

quam me pro salute vestra in tot ac tantas dimicationes, atque in hos profligatorum hominum quotidianos impetus objecissem. Sed pleni omnes sunt libri, plenæ sapientium voces, plena exemplorum vetustas: quæ jacèrent in tenebris omnia, nisi literarum lumen accederet. Quàm multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum, verum etiam ad imitandum, fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Græci et Latini reliquerunt? quas ego mihi semper ipse administranda republica proponens, animum, et mentem meam ipsâ cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam.

Quæret quispiam, Quid? illi ipsi summi viri, quorum virtutes literis proditæ sunt, istâne doctrinâ, quam tu laudibus effers, eruditi fuerunt? Difficile est hoc de omnibus confirmare. Sed tamen est certum, quid respondeam. Ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse, et sine doctrina, naturæ ipsius habitu propè divino, per seipfos et moderatos, et graves, extitisse fateor. Etiam illud adjungo, sæpius ad laudem atque virtutem naturam

mort et l'exil: jamais je n'aurois risqué, quand votre salut l'ordonnoit, d'avoir tant d'attaques à soutenir, et de me voir en butte, comme j'y suis chaque jour, à la fureur des plus grands scélérats. Mais tous les livres, tous les discours des sages, toute l'antiquité nous met des exemples devant les yeux: et ces exemples, si l'on n'avoit point écrit, seroient ensevelis dans les ténèbres. Combien les écrivains, soit Grecs, soit Latins, nous ont-ils laissé d'excellents portraits, non pour les exposer seulement à nos regards, mais pour nous porter à nous y conformer? Je ne perdois point de vue ces admirables modèles; et c'est de-là que je tirois le courage et la prudence, dont j'avois besoin dans le manie-ment des affaires.

On me dira: Quoi? ces grands hommes eux-mêmes, dont les vertus sont célèbres dans l'histoire, avoient-ils cette sorte d'érudition, que vous comblez de louanges? A l'égard de tous, il ne seroit pas aisé de prononcer. Voici pourtant ce que j'ai de certain à répondre là-dessus. Je conviens qu'il y a eu plusieurs hommes d'un rare mérite, qui, grâce à un naturel heureux, et presque divin, n'ont rien eu à emprunter de l'étude pour devenir vertueux. J'ajouterai même, qu'un beau naturel

competition with the pursuit of them; I had never sustained so many and so great conflicts in defence of your safety, or have exposed myself to continual insults from the most profligate of mankind. But all the books, as well as discourses, of the sages, are full of such precepts; and antiquity lays before us innumerable examples to that purpose, which would have been all buried in darkness, had not the light of learning been called to their assistance. How many portraitures of great men have been drawn by the *Greek* and *Latin* writers, and transmitted down to us, not solely to feast our eyes, but to serve as patterns for our imitation? By keeping these always in view, during the whole of my administration of public affairs, I endeavoured to bring myself, both in courage and prudence, to a conformity with the sentiments of such illustrious men*.

Should any one ask me, What? Were all these great men, whose virtues are celebrated in history, eminently skilled in the literature you so highly praise? It is a difficult matter to make this appear of them all. My answer, however, to the above question, is this; that I confess there have been many men of the greatest courage and virtue, who, by the natural force of their almost divine genius, and without the assistance of learning, have behaved themselves with moderation and gravity: nay, I will add

* *Cicero* speaks here of what he had done with regard to *Catiline's* conspiracy, during his own consulship. The resolution he took to put the principal conspirators to death, was no less dangerous to himself, than necessary for preserving the state. He acted as well the part of a politician, as conformed to the dictates of the most refined virtue; and happy had it been for the *Romans*, had the like conduct of *Brutus* and *Cassius* been attended with the same success.

naturam sine doctrina, quàm sine natura valuisse doctrinam. Atque idem ego contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam atque illustrem accesserit ratio quædam conformatioque doctrinæ: tum illud nescio quid præclarum ac singulare solere existere. Ex hoc esse hunc numero, quem patres nostri viderunt, divinum hominem, Africanum: ex hoc C. Lælium, L. Furium, moderatissimos homines et continentissimos: ex hoc fortissimum virum, et illis temporibus doctissimum, M. Catonem illum senem: qui profectò si nihil ad percipiendam, colendamque virtutem literis adjuvarentur, nunquam se ad earum studium contulissent.

Quòd si non hic tantus fructus ostenderetur, et si ex his studiis delectatio sola peteretur: tamen, ut opinor, hanc animi remissionem, humanissimam ac liberalissimam judicaretis. Nam cæteræ neque temporum sunt, neque ætatum omnium, neque locorum. Hæc studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solatium præbent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.

naturel a plus souvent réussi sans l'étude, que l'étude sans un beau naturel. Mais d'un autre côté, lorsqu'un homme qui est heureusement né, joint à cela de bonnes études, je soutiens que la réunion de tous les deux est ce qui forme ordinairement le mérite supérieur, le mérite singulier. Voilà par quelle route marchérent, et l'incomparable Africain, que nos pères ont vu; et un Lélius, un Furius, modèles de sagesse, de probité; et ce vieux Caton, la valeur même, et qui avoit, pour son temps, un profond savoir. Auroient-ils cultivé les lettres avec tant d'ardeur, s'ils avoient jugé que ce fût un secours inutile pour acquérir la vertu, et pour un bien remplir les devoirs?

Quand même les lettres ne produiroient pas de si grands fruits, et à n'y chercher que du plaisir: au moins ne leur refusera-t-on pas, je crois, d'être l'amusement le plus doux et le plus honnête. Tous les autres plaisirs ne sont ni de tous les temps, ni de tous les âges, ni de tous les lieux. Mais les lettres sont l'aliment de la jeunesse, et la joie de la vieillesse; elles nous donnent de l'éclat dans la prospérité, et sont une ressource, une consolation dans l'adversité; elles sont les délices du cabinet, sans embarrasser

add too, that nature exclusive of learning is often more prevalent, than learning without the aid of nature, to excite mankind to the pursuit of virtue and honour. But this I steadily maintain, that where learning is superadded to a mind naturally endowed with great talents, there results from such a combination, I know not what surprizing excellence, and peculiar beauty of character. Of this number was that divine man *Africanus* *, who adorned the days of our fathers; also *C. Lælius* and *M. Furius*, the perfect patterns of moderation and continency; with these likewise *M. Cato* † the elder is to be ranked, a man of true bravery, and, for the times in which he lived, well skilled in every part of learning. Now it is a thing past all doubt, that these great men would never have applied themselves to the study of letters, had they found no assistance from them, as to the knowledge or practice of virtue.

But admitting that letters did not produce such advantage, and that pleasure was the only benefit arising from the study of them; it will notwithstanding be allowed, I suppose, to be an amusement of the noblest kind, and every way best suited to the nature of man. Other relaxations are peculiar to certain times, places, and stages of life; but the study of letters is the nourishment of our youth, and the joy of our old age; they throw an additional lustre on prosperity, and are the resource and consolation of adversity;

* *Africanus* the second, son of *Paulus Æmilius*, is here meant. He was adopted by the son of the first *Scipio*, to whom the surname of *Africanus* had been given: we shall have occasion to speak of him afterwards.

† See *Cicero's* dialogue on old age.

rasser ailleurs ; la nuit elles nous tiennent compagnie ; aux champs, et dans nos voyages, elles nous suivent.

✱✱✱
Quæ sunt igitur epularum, aut ludorum, aut scortorum voluptates cum his voluptatibus comparandæ ? Atque hæc quidem studia doctrinæ. Quæ quidem prudentibus, et bene institutis pariter cum ætate crescunt : et honestum illud Solonis sit, quod ait versiculo quodam, senescere se multa in dies addiscentem : quâ voluptate animi nulla certè potest esse major.

✱✱✱
In hoc genere et naturali, et honesto, duo vitia vitanda sunt : unum, ne incognita, pro cognitis habeamus, hisque temerè assentiamur : quod vitium effugere qui volet (omnes autem velle debent) adhibebit ad considerandas res et tempus, et diligentiam. Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium, multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt, easdemque non necessarias. Quibus vitiis declinatis, quod in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis operæ curæque ponetur, id jure laudabitur.

✱✱✱
Que deviennent les plaisirs de la table, les spectacles, le commerce des femmes, mis en comparaison avec les douceurs que l'étude nous offre ? Pour les personnes sensées et bien élevées, c'est un goût qui croît avec l'âge. Ainsi le vers de Solon, où il dit qu'en vieillissant il apprend toujours, lui fait honneur. Aucun plaisir, qui flatte l'esprit, ne peut surpasser celui-là.

✱✱✱
Ily a deux inconveniens à fuir, en se livrant à un goût si naturel et si louable. L'un, de croire qu'on sait ce qu'on ne sait point, et d'avoir la témérité de s'y opiniâtrer. Pour se garantir de ce danger, ainsi que nous devons tous le vouloir, il faut donner à l'examen de chaque matière, et l'attention, et le temps qu'elle demande. L'autre inconvenient est de s'appliquer, et avec trop d'ardeur, à des choses obscures, difficiles, et qui ne sont point nécessaires. Qu'on évite ces deux écueils, on sera vraiment estimable de s'attacher à quelque science honnête et digne de curiosité.

Præclare

Heureux,

adversity; they delight at home, and are no incumbrance to us when abroad; in short, they are company to us at night, our fellow-travellers on a journey, and attend us in our rural retirements.



What * then are the pleasures of a luxurious table, of games, shows, and sensuality, when compared with those resulting from the study of letters? A study, that in men of sense and good education, still increases in charms with their years: whence that commendable saying of *Solon*, in a certain verse † of his, that in growing old he daily learned a great deal. Now this pleasure of the mind is one of the most refined enjoyments, we are capable of.



In ‡ this no less natural, than truly commendable, disposition of mind, there are two inconveniencies to be avoided: one is ||, not to confound what we are ignorant of, with those things we know; or rashly build our opinion on such precarious principles. Whoever is desirous to escape this mistake, and certainly it is the duty of every man, will spare neither time, nor pains, in the study of truth. Another error is, when people spend too much study and

F

labour

* De Senect. cap. 14.

† Plutarch, in his life of *Solon*, has preserved this verse:

Γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ καὶα διδάσκουσιν.

Which may be rendered in *English* as follows,

Life's eve I spend in learning what is new.

‡ Offic. I. 6.

|| We shall here insert a short extract of the speech of *M. Daguesseau*, at the opening of the parliament of *Paris* in 1704, who was then advocate-general, and is now chancellor of *France*; as being very pertinent to the subject here treated of. "To think little, talk
" of every thing, doubt of nothing, use only the external parts of
" the



Præclarè Plato : beatum,
cui etiam in senectute con-
tingerit, ut sapientiam, ve-
râsque opiniones assequi
possit.



Heureux, dit très-bien
Platon, l'homme qui peut,
ne fût-ce que dans sa vieil-
lesse, parvenir à être sage,
et à penser sainement.

labour upon subjects, not only obscure and intricate, but likewise unnecessary. Let us but keep free of these inconveniencies ; and whatever diligence and application we bestow on things in themselves laudable, and worthy our knowledge, merit the highest commendation.



* It is an excellent saying of *Plato*, that happy is the man, who, even in his old age, has the good fortune to attain the possession of wisdom, and sentiments agreeable to truth.

“ the soul, and cultivate the surface, as it were, of the judgment ; to
 “ be happy in expression, to have an agreeable fancy, an easy
 “ and refined conversation, and to be able to please without acquiring
 “ esteem ; to be born with the equivocal talent of a ready apprehension,
 “ and on that account to think oneself above reflection ; to fly from
 “ object to object without gaining the perfect knowledge of any ;
 “ to gather hastily all the flowers, and never allow the fruit time
 “ to arrive at maturity. All these put together form a faint picture
 “ of what the present age has been pleased to honour with the name
 “ of wit.”

* *De Finib. V. 21.*

VI.

De HONESTATE.

VI.

Sur la PROBITÉ.

ALIIUD utile interdum, aliud honestum videri solet. Falsò; nam eadem utilitatis, quæ honestatis, est regula. Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus. Sic enim cogitans, *Est istud quidem honestum, verùm hoc expedit, res à natura copulatas audebit errore divellere*: qui fons est fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium. Itaque si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuit, possit in locupletium testamenta nomen ejus irrepere; hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat, id omnino neminem unquam suspicaturum. Homo justus, isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus, nescire fateatur. At verò si quis voluerit animi sui complicatam notionem evolvere, jam se ipse doceat, eum virum bonum esse, qui proficit quibus possit;

Quelquesfois, d'un côté on croit voir l'utile; et de l'autre, l'honnête. On se trompe: car l'utile n'est jamais où n'est pas l'honnête. Un homme qui doute de cette vérité, ne sauroit être qu'un fripon, qu'un scélérat. Il se dira, Voilà l'honnête, mais voici le bon: et du moment que l'audace et l'erreur vont jusqu'à séparer deux choses, que l'ordre de la nature a réunies, la porte est ouverte à toute sorte d'injustices et de crimes. Quand donc un homme de bien n'auroit qu'à claquer des doigts pour se faire coucher sur des testamens des gens riches, à l'insçu du testateur; fût-il même certain de n'en être jamais soupçonné, il n'useroit pas d'un pareil secret. Un homme juste, et qui est ce qu'on entend par homme de bien, ne prendra rien à personne. Trouver cela étonnant, ce seroit absolument ignorer ce que c'est que probité. Quiconque voudra développer l'idée confuse qu'il en a dans l'esprit, verra par ses

VI.

On PROBITY.

PROFIT * and honesty sometimes appear to interfere with one another. But the case is otherwise; for the rule of both is the same. Whoever is not fully convinced of this, must be an arrant knave and villain. By such a train of thought he will be led to say, *this indeed is equitable, but that advantageous*, whence from such a fatal mistake of disjoining things which in their own nature are inseparable, is the source of all manner of treachery, injustice and wickedness. A virtuous man, therefore, though possessed of a secret to get his name inserted into the last wills of people of fortune, so easily as with a knack of his fingers †, would never put it in practice, even though he certainly knew it could never be in the least suspected. A just man, or one who answers to our notion of a good man, will take nothing from another to be applied to his own use. Whoever is surprized at this assertion, tacitly confesses that he is ignorant of what constitutes the character of a good man. But would any one take the pains to revolve this complicated idea in

F 3

his

* Offic. III. 18 et 19.

† A proverbial expression, that signifies, to do a thing with the greatest ease in the world, and which entirely depends on our own pleasure.

possit ; noceat nemini, nisi laceffitus injuriâ. Quid ergo ? hic non noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in eorum locum ipse succedat ? Non igitur faciat (dixerit quis) quod utile sit, quod expediat ? Immo intelligat, nihil nec expedire, nec utile esse, quod sit injustum. Hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non poterit.



Incidunt sæpe causæ, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur ; ut animadvertendum sit, repugnétne planè, an possit cum honestate conjungi. Ejus generis hæ sunt quæstiones : Si (exempli gratiâ) vir bonus Alexandriâ Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame, summâque annonæ caritate : si idem sciat, complures mercatores Alexandriâ solvisse, navésque in cursu, frumento onustas, petentes Rhodum, viderit : dicturûsne sit id Rhodiis, an silentio suum quàm plurimo venditurus ?

Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus : de ejus deliberatione et consultatione quærimus,

ses propres lumières, que l'honnête homme est celui, qui fait tout le bien qu'il peut, et qui ne fait de mal à personne, si ce n'est dans le cas d'une légitime défense. Or celui qui avec je ne sais quelle drogue, feroit disparaître le nom des véritables héritiers, pour ce mettre à leur place, ne feroit-il de mal à personne ?

Mais, dira quelqu'un, négligera-t-on ce qui est utile et avantageux ? Répondons à cela, que rien d'injuste n'est avantageux, ni utile. Point de probité à espérer de qui ne tient pas ce principe.



Il y a bien des cas où l'utile paroît opposé à l'honnête, et il faut alors examiner si l'opposition n'est qu'apparente, ou si elle est réelle. Voici des cas de cette espèce.

On suppose, par exemple, que la famine étant à Rhodes, et le blé porté à une extrême cherté, un Marchand d'Alexandrie, homme de bien, y débarque quantité de grain. Plusieurs autres, partis d'Alexandrie, y en conduisent aussi ; et même il les a vûs en mer. Avertira-t-il les Rhodiens ? ou, ne nisant mot, vendra-t-il son blé au plus haut prix ?

On le suppose vraiment homme de bien, et résolu à ne rien taire, si la probité l'exige.

his own breast, he will find that the good man is one, who does good to all he can, and hurts no body, unless first provoked by ill usage *. What shall we say then? Is he not an injurious person, who, as it were, by the power of some drug, has the address to disinherit the true heirs, in order to succeed in their place? Shall a man then, some may object, forbear to pursue what is profitable and advantageous? I would have such a one know, that nothing unjust in itself, can tend either to our advantage or profit. He that has not learnt this lesson, can have no pretension to the character of a good man.



There † are often cases, wherein profit seems to clash with honesty; but then we should examine whether this supposition be real, or if both be consistent together. The following questions may serve as instances of this: whether, for example, a man of probity, who had brought a large quantity of grain from *Alexandria* ‡ to *Rhodes*, at a time when the *Rhodians* laboured under great scarcity, and an

F 4

excessive

* It would be an injustice to *Cicero*, to believe that he here approves of revenge. Nothing is more clearly established in the writings of the heathen philosophers, than the pardon of injuries. For a proof of this we need only look at *Plato's Criton* and *Gorgias*. And as for instances that their practice corresponded to their principles, they are innumerable. All that *Cicero* would say, is that the law of nature allows us to repel an unjust aggressor, provided that we keep in the bounds prescribed by the same law: with this exception, it is never allowable to offer an injury to any one, nor consequently to return one injury for another. It is a piece of praise full of flattery, which *Cicero* gave to *Cæsar*, when he said, *Oblivisci nihil soles, nisi injurias*, that is, you are wont to forget nothing but injuries.

† *Offic. III. 12.*

‡ *Alexandria* was a town built by *Alexander the Great*, on the banks of the *Nile*. The distance from which to *Rhodes*, a famous Island in the Mediterranean, is about an hundred and forty leagues.

quærimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe judicet; sed dubitet, an turpe non sit.

In hujusmodi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico: aliud Antipatro, discipulo ejus, homini acutissimo. Antipatro, omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret: Diogeni, venditorem, quatenus jure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere: cætera sine insidiis agere: et quoniam vendat, velle quàm optimè vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris, quàm cæteri: fortasse etiam minoris, cum major est copia. Cui sit injuria?

Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu, cum hominibus consulere debeas, et servire humanæ societati, eaque lege natus sis, et ea habeas principia naturæ, quibus parère, et quæ sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua, communis utilitas sit, vicissimque communis utilitas, tua sit: celabis homines, quid iis adfit commoditatis et copiarum?

Respondebit

l'exige. Mais dans le doute si elle l'exige, il délibère sur le parti qu'il prendra.

Pour l'ordinaire, sur ces sortes de questions, Diogène de Babylone, Stoïcien du premier ordre, et Antipater son disciple, homme de beaucoup d'esprit, pensent différemment. Antipater soutient que le vendeur doit nettement déclarer à l'acheteur tout ce qu'il sait. Au contraire, selon Diogène, il n'est tenu qu'à ce qui est prescrit par le droit civil, c'est-à-dire, qu'à déclarer si la marchandise pêche par quelque endroit: après quoi, toute supercherie à part, il n'a qu'à vendre, puisque c'est son métier, le plus qu'il pourra. Je vous apporte du blé, je le mets en vente, je ne suis pas plus cher que d'autres, et peut-être le suis je moins encore, quand la denrée est plus commune. A qui fais-je tort?

Mais, reprend Antipater, n'êtes-vous pas obligé de vous prêter aux besoins d'autrui, et de procurer le bien général? Vous êtes né pour cela; et cette loi que la nature a imprimée dans votre cœur, vous dit que votre intérêt personnel doit tourner à l'utilité publique, comme l'utilité publique tourne à votre avantage personnel. Pouvez-vous par conséquent celer à ces Rhodiens, qui sont des hom-
mes

excessive dearth of provisions ; but who knew that a great many merchants had sailed from *Alexandria*, and had likewise seen several ships laden with grain, all bound for *Rhodes* ; whether, I say, he would inform the *Rhodians* of what he knew, or by keeping silence, sell his own at as high a price as he could ?

We put the case that he is a wise and virtuous man, who would conceal nothing from them, if he thought such a conduct inconsistent with virtue ; but being uncertain whether it be so or not, it is required what the result of his deliberation on such a conjuncture would be.

In questions of this nature, *Diogenes* * the *Babylonian*, a Stoic of the first class, is of different sentiments from those of his disciple *Antipater*, a man of very bright parts. This last thinks every thing should be discovered, and not the least circumstance concealed from the buyer that the feller knows. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, is of opinion, that the feller ought to declare the imperfections of his commodities, only so far as the civil law ordains ; and to act in other respects without fraud ; but as selling is his business, he may endeavour to do it on the most profitable terms he can. I have, says he, imported my corn, set it to sale, and here I sell it for no more than others ; nay, perhaps for less, because there is greater plenty of the commodity. Where is the injustice of all this ?

Antipater, on the contrary, makes answer thus : What ? When it is your duty to consult the wel-

F 5

fare

* Several philosophers have bore this name. The most famous of whom is *Diogenes* the Cynic, a native of *Sinopis*. The person meant here was one of the three deputies whom the *Athenians* sent to *Rome*, in the consulship of *Scipio* and *Marcellus*, as we learn in *Cicero's Lucullus*, chap. 45.

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere. Neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quæ natura deorum sit, quis sit finis bonorum: quæ tibi plus prodesse cognita, quam tritici utilitas: sed non quidquid tibi audire utile est, id mihi dicere necesse est. Immo verò (inquiet ille) necesse est, si quidem meministi, esse inter homines naturâ conjunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille: sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cujusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quidquam est, sed donandum.

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Vendat ædes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quæ ipse norit, cæteri ignorent: pestilentes sint, et habeantur salubres: ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes: malè materiata, ruinosæ: sed hoc præter dominum, nemo sciat. Quæro, si hoc emptoribus venditor non dixerit, ædesque vendiderit pluris multo, quàm se venditurum putarit, num id injustè, an improbè fecerit?

Ille

mes aussi-bien que vous, les ressources et l'abondance qu'ils font à la veille d'avoir?

A cela Diogène pourroit répliquer: Entre celer une chose, et la taire, il y a de la différence. Que je ne taise ici sur la nature des Dieux, ou sur notre souverain bien, dont il vous seroit plus important d'être instruit, que d'avoir du blé à bon compte; est-ce là vous celer quelque chose? Tout ce qu'il vous importerait de savoir, je ne suis pas obligé de vous l'apprendre. Vous y êtes obligé, répondra Antipater, si vous songez que les hommes ne font tous qu'une société, dont la nature est l'auteur. J'y songe, repartira Diogène: mais les droits de cette société sont-ils que personne n'ait rien à soi? Il faut donc, si cela est, ne rien vendre, mais tout donner.

✱✱✱

Un honnête-homme vend une maison, dont lui seul il connoît les défauts. On la croit saine, elle est empestée: on ignore que dans toutes les chambres il y vient des serpents: les matériaux n'en valent rien, elle menace ruine, mais personne hors le maître ne sait cela. Il garde le silence, et vend plus cher de beaucoup, qu'il ne s'en flattoit. Je demande s'il a blessé la justice, la probité?

Oui,

fare of mankind, when you are born to promote the interest of society, and, notwithstanding the very instincts of nature, the direction of which ought constantly to be allowed, teach you that your private advantage and that of the public should mutually promote each other : ought you then to conceal from these men, what plentiful supplies of provisions are coming ?

Diogenes, perhaps, will answer to this effect ; that there is a wide difference between concealing a thing, and being silent on it. Nor can I be said to conceal any thing from you, tho' I don't inform you concerning the nature of the Gods, or what will be the end of good men ; which it much more concerns you to know, than the small advantage * arising from the wheat : but the truth is, I am not obliged to tell you every thing, that it might be for your profit to hear. Yes truly, replies *Antipater*, you are certainly obliged to do it : this you must allow, would you but reflect that all mankind are by nature united in one society. I acknowledge it, answers *Diogenes* ; but is the nature of this society such, that no man can have any property of his own ? If this be the case, nothing ought to be sold, but rather given by way of present.



Again †, suppose an honest man was to dispose of his house, for some inconveniencies known only to

F 6. himself :

* All the editions have *Utilitas*, which, being generally received, I would not take upon me to alter. But I am fully convinced that *Vilitas*, a correction proposed in the Dauphin's *Cicero*, is what ought to be read. Very little logic will show the justness, or rather the necessity of this correction.

† *Offic.* III. 13.

Ille verò, inquit Antipater, improbè facit. Quid enim est aliud erranti viam non monstrare, (quod Athenis execrationibus publicis sancitum est) si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere, et per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est, quàm viam non monstrare: nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere. Diogenes contrà: Num te emere coëgit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit: tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quod si qui proscribunt, villam bonam, beneque ædificatam, non existimantur fefellisse, etiam si illa nec bona est, nec ædificata ratione; multo minùs, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quæ potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne præstandum est: quod dictum non est, id præstandum putas? Quid verò est stultius, quàm venditorem, ejus rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdum, quàm si domini jussu ita præco prædicet, *Domum pestilentem vendo?*

Oui, sans doute, répond Antipater. Car, si c'est un crime, et un crime, que les Athéniens flétrissent par des exécutions publiques, de ne pas montrer le chemin à un passant qu'on voit qui s'égarer; le vendeur qui laisse tomber l'acheteur dans un piège, n'est-il pas également coupable, et plus coupable encore, puisqu'il est à dessein, et avec pleine connoissance? Mais, reprend Diogène, vous a-t-on forcé d'acheter? On ne vous y a pas même excité. Une maison que je n'aime pas, je la vends; et vous, parce qu'elle se trouve à votre gré, vous l'acquérez. Que l'affiche porte, Maison à vendre, bonne et bien bâtie, quoique la maison ne soit ni bonne ni bien bâtie, on ne dira pas que le vendeur soit un fripon; et à plus forte raison, s'il n'a point fait l'éloge de ce qu'il vendoit. Quand l'acheteur est maître de juger, où seroit le fraude du vendeur? On n'est pas toujours garant de tout ce qu'on dit: le serai-je de ce que je n'ai point dit? Veut-on que le marchand décrie sa marchandise? Qu'il seroit plaisant d'entendre un crieux public dire par l'ordre de celui qui l'emploie. Maison empestée à vendre!

himself: every body thinks it is sound, though it be really infected by the plague: no body knows that all the rooms in the house are infested with serpents; the materials worth nothing, and the whole fabric in a ruinous condition: this is known to none but the master himself. Now should this man, without acquainting his purchasers with the bad state of the house, sell it for much more than he expected; I would gladly know, whether this action of his be consistent with justice and honesty, or not?

He certainly acts a dishonest part, answers *Antipater*, for to suffer the purchaser to fall into a mistake, that will be of the highest prejudice to him; is not this the very same with not showing the right road to one that has lost his way; a crime which the *Athenians* punished with public execrations †? Nay, it is more than not showing the way, it is a wilful and deliberate design to deceive our neighbour. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, replies: Did he force you to buy, who did not so much as advise you to it? He only exposed to sale what did not please him; and you bought what was agreeable to you. Now if those who post up a bill to this effect, “*A house to be sold, well built, and in good repair,*” shall not be esteemed guilty of any fraud, though the condition of the house be quite the reverse of this character; much less should those

† It is not certainly known what the *Athenian* public execrations were. But, in general, it is evident that they were certain edicts, read, or fixed up, in a public manner; the observance of which was enforced under the severest penalties. As to the present question, it is a shame that men should need to be put in mind of so plain a duty: and this precaution of the *Athenian* magistrates lets us see, how extensive the humanity of this polite people was.

Quæ dijudicanda sunt : non enim, ut quæreremus, exposuimus, sed ut explicaremus. Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios, nec hic ædium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque, enim id est celare, quidquid reticeas : sed cùm, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causâ velis eos, quorum intersit id scire.

Présentement décidons ; car je n'ai proposé la difficulté que pour la résoudre. Je ne trouve donc le silence innocent, ni dans ce marchand de blé à l'égard des Rhodiens, ni dans le vendeur de cette maison à l'égard de l'acheteur : et cela, non qu'il soit mal de ne pas toujours dire tout ce qu'on sait : mais un silence affecté, qui tourne à notre profit, et au préjudice d'autrui, voilà ce qui est mal.



Quòd si vituperandi sunt, qui reticuerunt : quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt ?



Puisque nous blâmons un silence affecté, que faut-il penser de ceux qui feroient servir le mensonge à leurs fins ?

C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus, et satis literatus, cùm se Syracusas otianti (ut ipse dicere solebat) non negotiandi causâ contulisset, dictitabat, se hortulos aliquos velle emere, quò invitare amicos, et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cùm percrebuisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis :
et

Un chevalier Romain, C. Canius, qui avoit de l'enjouement, et l'esprit orné, alla passer quelque temps à Syracuse, où son unique affaire, disoit-il, devoit être de ne rien faire. Là, il parloit souvent d'acheter un petit jardin, où il pût, loin des importuns, avoir ses amis, et se réjouir avec eux. Sur le bruit qui s'en répandit, un certain Pythius, Banquier, lui dit qu'il avoit un jardin, qui n'étoit pas à vendre, mais dont il le prioit d'user librement.

those be censured, who say nothing in commendation of it ; because where the buyer is at liberty to judge for himself, what room can there be for the seller to impose on him ? If we are not obliged to make good every thing we say, how can you imagine we ought to perform what we never said ? Can any thing be more ridiculous, than for a merchant to depreciate his own commodities ? Or can any thing be imagined more absurd, than for a public crier, by the owner's command, to make proclamation to this effect, "*An infected house to sell ?*"

We come now to the decision of these cases : for it was not our intention to narrate them, by way of proposed difficulties ; but in order to resolve them. In a word then, it is my opinion †, that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed from the *Rhodi-ans*, nor the seller of the house from his purchasers, what each of them knew. To be merely silent on a thing, cannot indeed be called a wicked concealment of it ; for this only takes place, when for the sake of private advantage you designedly conceal what you know from others, whose interest it concerns, that they should be informed of it.



But * if those are blameable, who are guilty of a designed concealment ; what shall we think of them, who likewise use false commendations ?

C. Canius, a *Roman* knight, who wanted neither wit nor learning, having gone to *Syracuse*, not, as he

† Grotius, *de jure belli et pacis*, l. 2. c. 12. differs from the decision of *Cicero* concerning the corn-merchant. Indeed, says he, the merchant would have done a very commendable thing, if he had discovered

* *Offic. III. 14.*

et simul ad cœnam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cùm ille promississet, tum Pythius, qui esset, ut argentarius, apud omnes ordines gratiofus, piscatores ad se convocavit, et ab his petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur : dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cœnam tempore venit Canius : opiparè à Pythio apparatus convivium : cymbarum ante oculos multitudo. Pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat : ante pedes Pythii pisces abjiciebantur. Tum Canius, Quæso, inquit, quid est hoc, Pythi ? tantùmne piscium ? tantùmne cymbarum ? Et ille, Quid mirum, inquit ? hoc loco est, Syracusis quidquid est piscium : hæc aquatio : hæc villâ isti carere non possunt. Incensus Canius cupiditate, contendit à Pythio, ut venderet. Gravate ille primò. Quid multa ? impetrat : emit homo cupidus et locuples, tanti, quanti Pythius voluit, et emit instructos : nomina facit : negotium conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos. Venit ipse maturè. Scalmum nullum videt. Quærit ex proximo vicino, num feriæ quædam piscatorum essent, quod eos nullos videret. Nullæ, (quod sciam) inquit ille : sed

librement. Il invita en même-temps son homme à y souper le lendemain. Canius accepta. Pythius, à qui sa caisse attireroit beaucoup de considération, fit assembler les pêcheurs pour leur demander, que le lendemain ils eussent à pêcher devant son jardin, et il leur détailla ses ordres. Canius ne manqua pas au rendez-vous. Repas magnifique. Quantité de barques, qui faisoient un spectacle, et qui venoient toutes à l'envi présenter leur pêche. Les poissons tomboient en tas aux pieds de Pythius. Hé, dit Canius, qu'est-ce que ceci ? Tout ce poisson ? Tant de barques ? Faut-il, reprend Pythius, que cela vous étonne ? Tout le poisson de Syracuse est ici. C'est le seul endroit où il y ait de l'eau. Sans ce lieu-ci, les pêcheurs ne sauroient où aller. Voilà que Canius ne tient plus contre l'envie d'acheter. D'abord le banquier se défend. A la fin il cède. Canius, plein de son idée, et ne regardant pas à l'argent, prend maison et meubles, donne tout ce qu'on en veut avoir, fait son billet. L'affaire est conclue. Il prie ses amis pour le jour suivant. Il y arrive de bonne heure. Il ne voit pas le moindre bateau. Il s'informe du voisin, s'il n'y a point ce jour-là quelque fête pour les pêcheurs. Aucune que je sache,

he himself used to express it, on account of business, but for retirement, gave out that he wanted to buy some gardens, where he might enjoy himself and the company of his friends, without being interrupted by intruding visitants. When this came to be publickly known, one *Pythius*, a banker of that town, told *Canius* that he had certain gardens, which he did not indeed care absolutely to dispose of, but that *Canius* was very welcome to use them as if they were his own : and at the same time invited him to sup with him in the gardens next day : to which *Canius* having consented, *Pythius* immediately sends for the fishermen ; for by virtue of his business he had a great deal to say with all ranks of people : on these he prevails to fish next day before his gardens, and gives them proper instructions how to behave. At the time appointed, *Canius* comes to supper ; an elegant entertainment is provided by *Pythius* ; and a multitude of fishing-boats make a fine prospect. Every one strives which shall be most diligent in bringing their draught, and throwing what fish they had caught at *Pythius's* feet. Hey ! says *Canius*, what is the meaning of this ? whence such numbers of boats, and all this fish ? To which *Pythius* replies,

covered all he knew : and in some cases, one cannot, without breach of charity, avoid doing so. But there is no necessity, adds *Grotius*, to lay down for a general maxim, as *Cicero* does, that silence is always blameable, when for some private advantage we conceal a thing from those who are interested to know it. This can only happen in certain respects and circumstances, which are necessarily connected with the thing in question. The whole difference then between these two casuists is, that *Grotius* ascribes to charity what *Cicero* attributes to justice. As for my part, I willingly pardon *Cicero*, for having almost confounded these two virtues, with one another.

sed hic piscari nulli solent ; itaque heri mirabar, quid accidisset. Stomachari Canius. Sed quid faceret ? nondum enim Aquilius, collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas : in quibus ipsis cum ex eo quæreretur, quid esset *dolus malus*, respondebat : *Cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum*. Hoc quidem sanè luculenter, ut ab homine perito definienti. Ergo et Pythius, et omnes aliud agentes, aliud simulantes, perfidi, improbi, malitiosi sunt.

sache, dit le voisin : mais ordinairement on ne pêche point ici, et je ne savois hier à quoi attribuer ce que je voyois. Canius de s'emporter. Mais quel remède ? Aquilius, mon collègue et mon ami, n'avoit pas encore publié ses formules contre le dol, où il explique très-bien ce que c'est que dol, en homme qui sait définir. C'est, dit-il, donner à entendre qu'on veut une chose, et en faire une autre. Pythius, par conséquent, et tous autres qui ont de semblables détours, sont gens artificieux, sans foi, et sans probité.

Explica atque excute intelligentiam tuam, ut videas, quæ sit in eâ species, forma, et notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causâ, criminari, præripere, fallere ? Nihil profectò minus. Est ergo ulla res tanti, aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri boni et splendorem, et nomen amittas ? Quid est, quod afferre tantum utilitas ista, quæ dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen eripuerit, fidem justitiamque detraxerit ? Quid enim interest, utrum ex homine se quis conferat in

Rentréz en vous-même, pour savoir ce que c'est qu'être homme de bien. Voyez, en développant cette idée, ce qu'elle vous présente. Trouverez-vous que l'homme de bien puisse mentir pour son intérêt, calomnier, supplanter, tromper ? Rien moins, assurément. Qu'est ce qui peut tenir lieu de l'honneur, et vous dédommager du sacrifice que vous ferez de votre réputation ? Pour une ombre d'utilité, vous allez donc renoncer à la bonne foi et à l'équité, c'est à dire, cesser d'être homme ? Qu'importe, en effet, que la figure humaine vous reste, si dans l'âme

plies, Does that surprise you? All the fish in Syracuse are caught here; it is from this place they have all their water; and as for these fishermen, they could not live without it. On this *Canius*, being mighty desirous to make the purchase, begs of *Pythius* to sell him the gardens. At first he appears very unwilling, but in short, condescends to it. *Canius*, being fond of his bargain, and likewise a man of substance, buys them ready fitted up, and gives him his own price: in short, the writings are drawn, and the whole affair concluded. He invites his friends against next day; but coming rather before the time, and seeing not so much as a single boat, he asks one of his neighbours, whether it was a holiday with the fishermen, because none of them were to be seen? None, that I know of, replies the other: for they never used to fish here; which made me the more surpris'd at what happened yesterday. *Canius* is vexed, but what can he help himself? For my friend, and colleague, *Aquilius*, had not then published his *formulas* concerning fraud; in which he makes answer to one asking a definition of fraud, *that it was to pretend one thing, and act another*. And, indeed, this is a very clear description, and such as might be expected from a man of his learning. Whence it follows, that *Pythius*, and all who do one thing and pretend another, are without honour, faith, or probity.



Revolve * and carefully examine your understanding, in order to see what notion, idea, or representation of a good man you find there. Is it
consistent

* Offic. III. 20.

in belluam, an in hominis *l'ame il n'y a plus que la*
 figura immanitatem gerat *férocité de la bête ?*
 belluæ ?

Facile de damno est.
 Quid ? si vita ejus in periculum veniet, ut eum aliquando necesse sit, aut occupare, aut mori, quid faciet ? Potest hoc evenire, ut naufragio facto inveniat aliquem imbecillum, tabulæ inhærentem : aut victo exercitu, fugiens reperiat aliquem vulneratum, equo infidentem : utrumne aut illum tabulâ, aut hunc equo deturbabit, ut ipse possit evadere ? Si volet justus esse, non faciet.

M. Attilius Regulus, cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset, duce Xantippo Lacedæmonio, juratus missus est ad senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent pœnis captivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem. Is cum Romam venisset, utilitatis speciem videbat : sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam judicavit : quæ erat talis. Manere in patria, esse domi suæ cum uxore, cum liberis ;

Quand il ne s'agit que du pécuniaire, il est aisé de prendre son parti. Mais supposons que l'on se trouve dans la nécessité, ou de faire périr quelqu'un, ou de périr soi-même. C'est un cas qui peut arriver, ou dans un naufrage, si nous rencontrons une personne saisie d'une planche, qu'elle n'ait point la force de nous disputer ; ou dans la déroute d'une armée, si en fuyant nous rencontrons un homme blessé, qui soit à cheval. Prendrons-nous la planche à l'un, ou le cheval à l'autre, pour pouvoir nous sauver ? A ne consulter que la justice, nous n'en ferons rien.

Régulus, consul pour la seconde fois, étant à la tête de nos troupes en Afrique, et ayant été pris dans une embuscade par Xantippe, Lacedémonien, qui commandoit l'armée ennemie, fut envoyé au sénat, pour demander qu'on rendit quelques prisonniers d'un grand nom ; mais avec serment de retourner lui-même à Carthage, s'il n'obtenoit rien. Arrivé à Rome, il trouvoit de l'utilité à

consistent with the character of such a person, to lie for his own advantage; to calumniate, supplant, and cheat? Certainly by no means. Is there any thing then so valuable, or any profit so desirable, as to make amends for the loss of honour and reputation in a man of probity? Can that which we call profit, if it robs us of honour, justice, and the character of a good man, give us any thing so valuable in their stead? For where, pray, is the difference whether one be actually transformed from a man into a brute; or if under the external figure of a man, he carry with him all the ferocity of the brute?

It is * an easy matter to resolve cases of profit and loss. But should one's life be in danger, so that it was absolutely necessary, either to take the advantage of another, or to perish himself: how ought he to behave? The supposition is possible, as in a shipwreck, should one find a weak person sitting on a plank; or in the rout of an army, should he come up with one of the wounded on horseback: would this man, in order to save himself, turn the one off the plank, or pull the other from his horse? Was justice the rule of his conduct, he certainly would do neither †.

M. † *Attilius Regulus*, in his second consulship, being surprized and taken prisoner in *Africa* by *Xantippus*

* *Fragm. lib. de Rep. III.*

† Some will think *Cicero* very scrupulous. But let us here remember the fundamental maxim, the GOLDEN RULE, of all morality, that forbids to do to others, what we would not have them do to us. *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.* And sure this is enough to support *Cicero's* decision; at least, if people would not by groundless subtilties, make justice and charity to be essentially different from each other.

‡ *Offic. III. 26, & 27.*

liberis ; quam calamitatem accepisset in bello, communem fortunæ bellicæ judicantem, tenere consularis dignitatis gradum : quis hæc neget esse utilia ? Quid censes ? Magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat. Num locupletiores quæris auctores ? Harum enim est virtutum proprium, nihil extimescere, omnia humana despicere ; nihil, quod homini accidere possit, intolerandum putare. Itaque quid fecit ? In senatum venit : mandata exposuit : sententiam ne diceret, recusavit : quamdiu jurejurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam (ô stultum hominem, dixerit quispiam, et repugnantem utilitati suæ !) reddi captivos, negavit esse utile : illos enim adolescentes esse, et bonos duces, se jam confectum senectute. Cujus cum valuisset auctoritas, captivi retenti sunt : ipse Carthaginem rediit : neque eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum. Neque verò tum ignorabat, se ad crudelissimum hostem, et ad exquisita supplicia proficisci ; sed jusjurandum conservandum putabat. Itaque tum, cum vigilando necabatur erat in meliore causa, quam si domi senex captivus, perjurus consularis remansisset.

Cum

à réussir, mais une sorte d'utilité, dont il reconnut le faux, comme l'événement le prouve. Jouir de sa patrie, vivre chez lui avec sa femme, avec ses enfans, et ne regardant sa disgrâce que comme on regarde les hasards de la guerre, tenir le rang d'un citoyen, qui a été consul : peut-on douter qu'il n'y ait là de l'utile ? Qu'en croyez-vous ? Mais la grandeur d'ame et le courage n'en conviendront pas. Avez-vous mieux à consulter que ces deux vertus, dont le propre est de ne rien craindre, et de persuader à l'homme que rien de flatteur ne doit l'éblouir, que rien de fâcheux ne doit l'effrayer ? Régulus que fit-il donc ? Il parut au sénat, exposa le motif de son voyage, et refusa d'opiner, sous prétexte qu'il n'étoit point sénateur, tant que son serment le tenoit entre les mains de l'ennemi. A la fin pourtant (le grand fou, dira-t-on, d'être allé contre son intérêt !) il conseilla de ne point rendre les prisonniers : que c'étoient de braves officiers, et jeunes, au-lieu que son âge le rendoit inutile. On s'en tint à son avis : de sorte que les prisonniers furent gardés ; et lui, sans que les douceurs de sa patrie, sans que sa tendresse pour sa famille balançât la fidélité qu'il croyoit devoir à son serment,

tipus the *Lacedemonian* general, was sent to the senate; after having first taken an oath to return to *Carthage*, unless certain prisoners of noble extract were restored to the *Carthaginians*. On his arrival at *Rome*, an appearance of advantage presented itself to his view; which, as appears from the event, he judged entirely void of reality. The advantage was this, to remain in his native country, to stay at home with his wife and children, and, by regarding his misfortune as the common chance of war, to retain the rank of the consular dignity: and will any one deny, that these are profitable? But what shall we say, true fortitude and greatness of soul deny it. Now what greater authority would you require? For it is the peculiar property of these two virtues, to fear nothing, to look down on all human enjoyments, and to think nothing intolerable that can possibly befall a man. How then did he behave himself? He came into the senate, laid before them his commission, but refused to give his sentiments, as having no title to the character of a senator, while he continued under the sacred obligation of an oath to the enemy. And (though some will certainly call him fool, thus to oppose his own interest!) declared that it was not for the good of the state to restore the prisoners; for that they were excellent officers, and in the flower of their age: whereas he himself was worn out with years. In short, his authority prevailed, the prisoners were detained, and he returned to *Carthage*: neither the affection he bore his native country, nor that of his family and friends, being able to hinder him; and notwithstanding he was sensible, that he was going to put himself into
the

ment, il retourna à Carthage, où il n'ignoroit pas qu'une cruauté sans bornes lui réservoir des supplices inouis. Plus heureux dans le sein des plus cuisantes douleurs, qu'il ne l'auroit été de vieillir dans sa maison, avec la honte d'avoir flétri les honneurs du consulat, et par sa captivité, et par son parjure.

✱✱✱
Cum rex Pyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset, cumque de imperio certamen esset cum rege generoso ac potente; perfuga ab eo venit in castra Fabricii, eique est pollicitus, si premium sibi proposuisset, se, ut clam venisset, sic clam in Pyrrhi castra rediturum, et eum veneno necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reduendum curavit ad Pyrrhum: idque factum ejus à senatu laudatum est. Atque si speciem utilitatis, opinionemque quærimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga unus, et gravem adversarium imperii sustulisset: sed magnum dedecus et flagitium, quicum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum.

✱✱✱
Pyrrhus avoit entrepris la guerre volontairement, et il étoit question entre le peuple Romain, et ce roi brave et puissant, de savoir à qui demeurerait l'empire. Untransfuge, qui gagna secrètement le camp de Fabricius, lui promet que si l'on vouloit le récompenser, il repasseroit avec les mêmes précautions au camp de Pyrrhus, et l'empoisonneroit. Fabricius donna ordre qu'il fût remis entre les mains de Pyrrhus. Cette action fut louée par le sénat. A ne considérer pourtant que ce qui paroît utile, et passe pour tel; il ne falloit que ce transfuge pour se débarrasser d'une affreuse guerre, et d'un redoutable ennemi. Mais la gloire nous avoit mis les armes à la main contre Pyrrhus. Quel opprobre, quelle noirceur d'en triompher, non par la valeur, mais par un crime!

Quæro,

Que

the hands of the cruellest of enemies, and to suffer the most exquisite tortures : but to balance all this, he was persuaded that the obligation of an oath ought to be kept inviolable. Wherefore even then, when undergoing the most tormenting * of all deaths, his hard fate was more tolerable, than if he had grown old in his own house, covered with the shame of having sullied his consular dignity by captivity and perjury.



Although † king *Pyrrhus* had made war on the *Romans* without any provocation, and though the dispute with this magnanimous and powerful king was for no less a prize than empire itself; yet when a deserter from him, came into *Fabricius's* camp, and promised, if he would give him a reward, to return secretly into *Pyrrhus's* camp in the same manner he had come, and dispatch the king by poison; *Fabricius* ordered him to be carried back to *Pyrrhus*; which action of his had the approbation of the senate. But if we regard only what has the appearance of

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advantage,

* In the original, it is *vigilando necabatur*, which was very intelligible to those of *Cicero's* time, who knew in what manner *Regulus* had ended his days. *M. Rollin's* account of it, taken from his history of the *Carthaginians*, is as follows :

“ They (the *Carthaginians*) kept him a long time shut up in a dark dungeon, whence having first cut off his eye-lids, they dragged him, in order to be exposed to the brightest and hottest sun-shine. They next shut him up in a kind of chest, all beset with sharp-pointed nails, that allowed him not one moment's rest either day or night. At last, after having long tormented him with cruel watching, they dispatched him by crucifixion; which was an ordinary death among the *Carthaginians*.”

I quote *M. Rollin* preferably to the ancients, from whom he has taken this account, only to have an opportunity to recommend the reading of his works. None have wrote for the benefit of youth, either with better intention, or with greater success.

† *Offic. III. 22.*

✱✱✱
Quæro, quam vim ha-
beat libra illa Critolai : qui
cùm in alteram lancem
animi bona imponat, in al-
teram corporis, et externa ;
tantum propendere illam
boni lancem putet, ut ter-
ram et maria deprimat.

✱✱✱
Que signifie cette balance
de Critolaüs, où il préten-
doit que si l'on avoit mis,
d'un côté, les biens de l'ame ;
et de l'autre, les biens du
corps, avec tous ceux que la
fortune distribue ; ce côté-là
l'emporteroit, quand même
on mettroit encore de celui-ci,
et la terre et les mers ?

advantage, and what commonly passes for such ; this one deserter might have put an end to a very dangerous war, and taken off a very formidable rival for empire : But as the contest was for glory, it would have been a lasting infamy and reproach to have got the better of him, not by valour, but by vile treachery.



I would * ask what can be the meaning of the famous balance of *Critolaus* ; who is of opinion, that if the goods of the mind be cast into one scale, and those of the body, with all external advantages into the other, nay though the whole earth and seas were added to the latter, yet the former would preponderate.

* Tusc. V. 17. *Critolaus* was a Peripatetic philosopher.

To the above account of probity from *Cicero*, I beg leave to subjoin the following beautiful passage of *Musonius* ; which, for its excellence, may be called the GOLDEN MAXIM. "Αν τὶ πράξης καλὸν μετὰ πόνου, ὃ μὲν πόνος διχίσται, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μένει. Ἄν τὶ ποιήσῃς αἰσχρὸν μετὰ ἡδονῆς, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ διχίσται, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν μένει. *Si quid pulchri feceris cum labore ; labor quidem abit, sed pulchrum manet : sin turpe quid feceris cum voluptate ; voluptas abit, at turpe manet.* In *English* thus : " Allowing the performance of an honourable action to be attended with labour ; the labour is soon over, but the honour immortal : whereas, should even pleasure wait on the commission of what is dishonourable ; the pleasure is soon gone, but the dishonour eternal."

VII.

De ELOQUENTIA.

NEQUE verò mihi quidquam præstabilius videtur, quàm posse dicendo tenere hominum cœtus, mentes allicere, voluntates impellere quo velit; unde autem velit, deducere. Hæc una res in omni libero populo, maximeque in pacatis, tranquillisque civitatibus, præcipuè semper floruit, semperque dominata est. Quid enim est aut tam admirabile, quàm ex infinita multitudine hominum exsistere unum, qui id, quod omnibus naturâ sit datum, vel solus, vel cum paucis facere possit? aut tam jucundum cognitu, atque auditu, quàm sapientibus sententiis, gravibusque verbis ornata oratio, et perpolita? aut tam potens, tamque magnificentum, quàm populi motus, judicum religiones, senatûs gravitatem, unius oratione converti? Quid tam porro regium, tam liberale, tam munificum, quàm opem ferre supplicibus, excitare afflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculis, retinere homines

VII.

Sur L'ELOQUENCE.

RIEN de si beau, selon moi, que de s'attirer l'attention de toute une assemblée; que de charmer les esprits; que de pouvoir, ou persuader, ou dissuader comme on veut. Par-tout où le peuple jouit de sa liberté, dans un temps de paix principalement, ce fut toujours là le premier mérite, et ce qui donne le plus de crédit. Qu'y a-t-il, en effet, de si digne d'admiration, qu'un homme, qui, dans ce prodigieux nombre d'hommes, fait seul, ou presque seul, valoir des talens, que la nature accorde à tous? Rien flatte-t-il si délicieusement l'esprit et l'oreille, qu'un discours sagement pensé, et noblement exprimé? Quel empire, quel ascendant comparable à celui de l'éloquence, puisque sous elle les caprices du peuple, la religion des juges, la gravité du sénat, tout plie? Qu'y a-t-il de plus généreux, de plus royal, et qui marque plus un grand cœur, que d'assister l'innocent, que de rétablir l'opprimé, que de protéger le foible, que de conserver

VII.

On ELOQUENCE.

THERE * is nothing, I think, more truly excellent, than for a man to be able to attract, by his eloquence, the attention of a whole assembly; to charm their understandings; and to direct, or restrain, their inclinations at pleasure. This single art hath always, among free people, and especially in times of public peace and tranquillity, not only met with the highest encouragement, but reigned as it were paramount. Now is there any thing so deserving our admiration, as that amidst an infinite number of men, there should be found only one, or at least but few, who are able to exercise those talents, which nature has bestowed on all? Or, can any thing convey so sincere a pleasure to our understanding or ear, as a discourse, which, to the wisest sentiments, adds the lustre and embellishment of expression? What greatness, what power, can compare with his; who, by a single speech, can direct the caprices of the people, the consciences of judges, and even the majestic gravity of the senate? Besides, can any thing be more generous, more like a king, or more truly denote a great soul, than to lend assistance to those who desire it, relieve the oppressed, communicate happiness, protect from dangers,

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and

* De Orat. I. 8.

homines in civitate? Quid autem tam necessarium, quàm tenere semper arma, quibus vel tectus ipse esse possis, vel provocare improbos, vel te ulcisci laceffitus?

Age verò, ne semper forum, subsellia, rostra, curiamque meditare, quid esse potest in otio, aut jucundius, aut magis proprium humanitatis, quàm sermo facetus, ac nulla in re rudis? Hoc enim uno præstamus vel maximè feris, quòd colloquimur inter nos, et quòd exprimere dicendo sensa possumus. Quamobrem quis hoc non jure miretur, summèque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maximè bestiis præsent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat?

Ut verò jam ad illa summa veniamus; quæ vis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare, aut à fera, agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum, civilèque deducere? Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim, bestiarum more, vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant; nec ratione animi quid-

conserver la vie à ceux-ci, et de sauver l'exil à ceux-là? Qu'y a-t-il enfin de si nécessaire, que d'avoir toujours des armes redoutables aux méchans, et qui nous mettent à couvert des insultes, ou en état de les venger?

Mais pour laisser un peu à part les procès et les affaires, le barreau et le sénat: quel plus doux plaisir, et qui convienne mieux à l'homme, que d'avoir, quand nous sommes maîtres de quelques momens, une conversation aimable et polie? L'usage que nous avons de la parole, et la faculté de nous communiquer ainsi nos pensées, est ce qui nous distingue le plus des bêtes. Pouvoir donc l'emporter sur les autres hommes, en ce qui fait principalement que l'homme l'emporte sur la brute, n'est-ce pas quelque chose de merveilleux, et qui mérite qu'on fasse ses derniers efforts pour y réussir?

Voici le plus beau trait enfin, à l'honneur de l'eloquence. Quelle autre force que celle-là, put engager les hommes dispersés, et féroces qu'ils étoient, à se réunir, et à se civiliser? Car il y a eu un temps où, à la manière des bêtes, ils erroient dans les campagnes, et se nourrissoient de leur proie. Presque tout se décidait par la force corporelle, rien par la raison.

Alors

and preserve citizens from exile? What, on the other hand, so necessary, as to have arms always about us to annoy the malefactor, protect us from being insulted, and avenge ourselves when we are injured?

But not to dwell on the forum *, the bar, the rostrum, and the senate; what is more agreeable to human nature, or so delightful an amusement in our recesses from business, as the graceful sprightliness of polite conversation? In this consists our characteristic preheminance over the rest of the animal world, that we converse together; and, by language, are able to express our latent ideas. Wherefore, to endeavour to excel other men in that very thing whence they derive their superiority over brutes; who would not be charmed with the thought, and think no pains too much, in order to attain the dear accomplishment?

But let us come to the principal advantages of eloquence. What power, but hers, could have collected the scattered individuals of mankind, or have made them change their savage and wild manner of living, for the polished and civilized life of society? For † there was a time, when men, like so many wild beasts, wandered up and down in the fields, and supported themselves with the same food that these did: nor had reason and contrivance any part in their actions, as being almost wholly performed by main

G 4

strength

* *Forum*, was the place where the Prætors distributed justice; *Subsellia*, the benches, or seats, where the judges sat; *Rostra* the tribunals, whence they harangued the people; and *Curia*, the place where the senate assembled.

† *De Invent. I. 2.*

quidquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum divinæ religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur: nemo nuptias viderat legitimas: non certos quisquam inspexerat liberos: non jus æquabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem, atque inscitiam, cæca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas, ad se explendam viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus. Quo tempore quidam, magnus videlicet vir et sapiens, cognovit, quæ materia esset, et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere, et præcipiendo meliorem reddere: qui dispersos homines in agris, et in tectis silvestribus abditos, ratione quâdam compulit unum in locum, et congregavit, et eos in unamquamque rem inducens utilem, atque honestam, primò propter insolentiam reclamantes, deinde propter rationem, atque orationem studiosius audientes, ex feris et immanibus, mites reddidit et mansuetos.

Ac mihi quidem videtur hoc nec tacita, nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse, ut homines à consuetudine subito converteret, et ad diversas vitæ rationes

Alors nulle religion, nul devoir. Point de lois pour les mariages. Un pere ne savoit de quel enfant il étoit pere. On ne sentoit pas de quelle utilité il est d'avoir des principes d'équité. Au milieu de l'ignorance et de l'erreur, on étoit tyrannisé par d'aveugles passions, à qui les forces du corps, dangereuses compagnes, fournissoient les moyens de s'assouvir. Quelqu'un, dont les lumieres étoient supérieures, ayant étudié alors ce que c'est que l'homme, comprit qu'en l'instruisant, et mettant en œuvre les qualitez de son ame, il y avoit de quoi en faire quelque chose de grand. Pour y réussir, il obtint que ces hommes épars dans les champs, où des feuillages leur servoient de retraite, se rassemblassent dans un même lieu: et là, travaillant à leur mettre devant les yeux l'utile et l'bonnête, d'abord il les trouva peu soumis à des vérités si nouvelles pour eux: mais gagnant leur attention de plus en plus, il leur fit enfin goûter la raison; et de sauvages, de farouches qu'ils étoient, il les rendit doux et humains.

Un changement et si prompt et si considérable, fut, sans doute, l'ouvrage de l'éloquence autant que de la sagesse. Et lorsqu'une fois il y eut des villes établies, auroit-

strength of body. In those days, neither the study of divine religion, nor that of moral duties, was cultivated : legal marriages were not heard of : none could be sure which were their own children : nor had they learned the many advantages resulting from the law of equity. Whence the passions, by reason of ignorance and error, maintained a blind and tyrannic sway, abusing the powers of the body, those dangerous partizans, for their own purposes. In this period, some great man of superior penetration discovered, that the human mind was possessed of talents sufficient for executing the greatest enterprize, could any one find a method to set them to work, or improve them by instruction. In order to this, he, by some contrivance, convened and brought mankind together ; who had been dispersed in the fields, or lurking in the wild recesses of the forest. Upon his endeavouring to make them sensible of whatever was useful or honourable, they at first proved refractory, as being unaccustomed to such truths ; afterwards, moved by reason and eloquence, they heard with greater attention ; till at last, from fierce and savage monsters, he brought them to be gentle and good-natured.

And, indeed, it appears evident to me, that without the aid of eloquence, it was not in the power of wisdom itself to induce men to change, all of a sudden, their manner of life, for what was just the reverse of it. Nay even when cities were built, what but the powerful persuasion of eloquence could enforce the dictates of reason, establish the obser-

tiones traduceret. Age verò, urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere, et justitiam retinere discerent, et aliis parere suâ voluntate consuescerent, ac non modò labores excipiendos communis commodi causâ, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent : quî tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea, quæ ratione invenissent, eloquentiâ persuadere potuissent ? Profectò nemo, nisi gravi ac suavi commotus oratione, cum viribus plurimum posset, ad jus voluisset sine vi descendere : ut inter quos posset excellere, cum iis se pateretur æquari, et suâ voluntate à jucundissima consuetudine recederet, quæ præsertim jam naturæ vim obtineret propter vetustatem.



Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tanquam poetarum. Id secus est : nam alterum est multiplex. Poëmaticis enim tragici, comici, epici, melici etiam, suum quodvis est diversum à reliquis. Itaque et in tragœdia comicum vitiosum est, et in comœdia turpe tragicum : et in cæteris suus est cujusque certus sonus, et quædam intelligentibus nota vox. Oratorum autem si quis ita numerat plura genera, ut alios grandes, aut graves, aut copiosos : alios

on pu, si l'éloquence n'avoit appuyé ce que la raison proposoit, cimenter la bonne foi et la justice, accoutumer les hommes à la subordination, et les déterminer, ne disons pas seulement à ne point épargner leurs peines, mais à sacrifier même leur vie pour le bien public ? Assurément il fallut la voie de la persuasion, pour amener ceux qui se sentoient les plus forts, à trouver bon qu'un juge décidât de leurs intérêts, à se mettre ainsi au niveau des plus foibles, et à perdre volontairement l'habitude où ils étoient de se faire justice eux-mêmes ; habitude tout-à-fait commode, et si ancienne, qu'elle passoit pour loi de la nature.



On prétend qu'il y a divers genres d'orateurs, ainsi que de poëtes : c'est ce qui n'est point. A la vérité il y a des poëtes tragiques, il y en a de comiques, d'épiques, de lyriques : et ce sont autant de genres différens. Dans la tragédie, le comique fait un mauvais effet : le tragique n'en fait pas un meilleur dans la comédie. Ainsi des autres espèces de poësies : le ton de chacune est marqué, et les connoisseurs ne s'y trompent point. Mais dans l'art oratoire, lorsqu'en dira que

vance of good faith, maintain justice, bring mankind to pay a willing obedience to their magistrates, and persuade them that it was their duty to spare no labour, and even to lay down their life, for the public good? Certainly no man of great power, if not prevailed on by some elegant and convincing speech, would condescend to submit his affairs to the determination of law, without being compelled to it; would put himself on an equal footing with those over whom it was easy to keep up his superiority; or willingly recede from a custom, of all others the most delightful; especially, since by reason of its long continuance, it had acquired a force equal to that of nature itself.



It is * said that orators, like poets, are of different kinds. But the case is otherwise; for of these last there are several sorts, distinct from each other, as the Tragic, Comic, Epic, and Lyric. Whence in tragedy, the least mixture of the comic is insufferable; and it is no less blameable to mix any thing tragic with comedy: and so in the rest, each has its proper tone, which is easily distinguished by people of taste. But should any person thus enumerate different kinds of orators, as the sublime, the grave, and the copious; the low, the subtle, and the concise; or imagine others holding a middle rank between these: all this he may affirm of orators, but not of the art itself †.

G 6

For

* Ibid. cap. 2.

† Aristotle defines rhetoric, or the art of oratory, to be *the faculty of discovering, on every occasion, whatever is proper to persuade*. It consists of four parts, 1. *Invention*, called by the Greeks *εὕρεσις*, is the finding out, or selecting, such arguments as are most conducive to prove

alios tenues, aut subtiles, aut breves : alios eis interjectos, et tanquam medios putet ; de hominibus dicet aliquid, de re parum. In re enim, quod optimum sit, quæritur : in homine dicitur, quod est.

que ceux-ci ont de la noblesse, de la force, de l'abondance ; que ceux-là se bornent à la simplicité, à l'exactitude, à la précision ; et qu'enfin il y en a qui tiennent comme le milieu entre ces deux caractères ; ce sont là des différences qui portent, non sur l'art même, mais sur ceux qui le cultivent. On dit des orateurs, ce qu'ils sont : mais à l'égard de l'éloquence, il s'agit de savoir ce qu'elle doit être.

Optimus est orator, qui dicendo animos audientium et docet, et delectat, et permovet. Docere, debitum est : delectare, honorarium : permovere, necessarium. Hæc ut alius melius, quàm alius, concedendum est : verùm id fit, non genere, sed gradu——Ea igitur omnia in quo summa, erit orator peritissimus : in quo media, mediocris : in quo minima, deterrimus. Et appellabuntur omnes, oratores, ut pictores appellantur etiam fœnali. Nec generibus inter sese, sed facultatibus different. Itaque nemo est orator, qui se Demosthenis similem esse nolit : at Menander Homeri noluit. Genus enim erat aliud. Id non est in oratoribus ; aut si est, ut alius gravitatem sequens, subtilitatem fugiat : contra, alius

Un orateur parfait, c'est celui qui sait instruire, plaire, et toucher. Instruire, cela est d'obligation. Plaire, ou témoigne par-la de l'estime à l'auditeur. Toucher, c'est le but où il faut parvenir. Que les uns remplissent mieux ces devoirs, et les autres moins bien, cela dit inégalité de mérite, mais dans un même genre. Ainsi l'orateur est parfait, ou médiocre, ou mauvais, selon qu'il remplit ses devoirs parfaitement, médiocrement, ou mal. Tous ont le titre d'orateurs, comme le plus misérable peintre est appelé peintre. Ce n'est point l'art qui met de la différence entre eux, c'est le talent. Aussi n'y a-t-il point d'orateur, qui ne voulût ressembler à Démosthène : mais Ménandre n'a point voulu ressembler à Homère. Il travailloit dans un autre genre.

For with regard to the latter, we look for it in its utmost perfection ; but with respect to orators, we declare what they really are.



He * is the most compleat orator, who instructs, delights, and sensibly touches the hearts of his auditory. To instruct is indispensable ; to delight, desirable ; and to touch, necessary. It must be confessed that some perform these better than others ; but then this inequality consists not in the kind, but degree. Every orator, therefore, is reputed good, bad, or indifferent, in proportion as these qualifications unite in him : yet all are called by the name of orator, as painters, however bad, are still called painters. It is by different abilities, and not by different arts, they are distinguished from one another. None therefore can deserve the name of orator, who has not the ambition to vie even with *Demosthenes*. *Menander* †, on the contrary, would not aspire to the perfection of *Homer* for this reason, because

prove the question in hand, or work upon the auditory. 2. *Disposition*, in Greek *τάξις* or *διανομή*, is the marshalling, or properly disposing the several parts of a discourse ; by which means, the things proposed are heard with greater attention, better understood, and longer remembered. These parts are commonly reckoned four, the *Exordium*, the *Narration*, the *Confirmation*, and the *Peroration* or conclusion. 3. *Elocution*, called by the Greeks *λέξις* or *ῥημνεία*, is the using such terms and expressions as are suitable to the subject to be discussed ; and differs nothing from propriety of diction. 4. *Pronunciation*, called in Greek *ὑπόκρισις*, is the regulating and adapting the voice and gesture agreeably to the matter. It is otherwise called *Action*. See *Vossii Rhetorica*.

* De opt. gen. orat. cap. 1.

† *Menander*, the *Albanian*, wrote nothing but comedies, at which he excelled,

alius acutiorem se, quàm ornatiorē, velit : etiam si est in genere tolerabili, certè non est in optimo : siquidem, quod omnes laudes habet, id est optimum.



Ac mihi quidem sæpenu-
mero in summos homines,
ac summis ingeniis præditos
intuenti, quærendum esse
visum est, quid esset, cur
plures in omnibus rebus,
quàm in dicendo admi-
rabiles extitissent. Nam
quocumque te animo, et
cogitatione converteris, per-
multos excellentes in quo-
que genere videbis, non
mediocrium artium, sed
propè maximarum. Quis
enim est, qui, si clarorum
hominum scientiam rerum
gestarum vel utilitate, vel
magnitudine metiri velit,
non anteponat oratori im-
peratorem ? Quis autem
dubitet, quin belli duces
ex hac una civitate præ-
stantissimos penè innúmera-
biles ; in dicendo autem
excellentes vix paucos pro-
ferre possimus ? Jam verò
consilio ac sapientiâ qui
regere ac gubernare rem-
publicam possent, multi
nostrâ,

genre. Voilà ce qui n'est
point vrai des orateurs. Si
l'un, sous prétexte qu'il
cherche à mettre de la force
dans son discours, néglige la
précision : si l'autre, pour
être plus serré, ne s'attache
point aux ornemens : quoique
l'un et l'autre se fassent
supporter, on ne dira qu'au-
cun d'eux soit parfait ; car
la perfection est l'assemblage
de toutes les bonnes qualitez.



Toutes les fois que je me
remets devant les yeux ce
qu'il y a eu de grands hommes
et d'esprits supérieurs, je me
fais cette question, d'où vient
qu'il y en a plus, qui ont
excellé dans tous les autres
arts, que dans celui de l'élo-
quence. Parcourez les autres
genres où il faut du mérite ;
ceux-mêmes où il en faut le
plus ; et vous n'en trouve-
rez point où beaucoup de gens
ne soient parvenus à se faire
admirer. Qui, par exemple,
ne mettra pas au-dessus de
l'orateur, le général d'armée,
si c'est par l'utilité et par la
grandeur des actions, que l'on
apprécie le mérite ? Rome ce-
pendant, Rome seule a pro-
duit une infinité d'illustres
guerriers, tandis qu'à peine
citerons-nous un bien petit
nombre de bons orateurs.
Pour des hommes sages et
capables de gouverner, nous
en avons eu plusieurs de notre
temps : nos pères, nos ancêtres
en

because he employed himself in a quite different kind of poetry. But this takes no place with respect to orators; or allowing that one should use a strong pathetic stile, free from obscure subtilities; another delight more in argument and witticisms, than purity and beauty of expression: yet such peculiarities, though they may be found in an indifferent orator, cannot certainly enter the character of a compleat one, in whom all good qualities must unite.



Upon * a review of the greatest and most able men, it has often indeed appeared a question with me, why fewer have distinguished themselves for eloquence, than in any other art. Turn your attention which way you please, you will find many who have excelled, not only in inferior arts, but in those too of the greatest consequence. Now what person, if he estimates the abilities of great men by their extensive usefulness, but would prefer the general to the orator? And yet who will call in question, that in this one city we have had almost innumerable instances of great and excellent generals; while scarce any can be mentioned that have excelled in oratory? There have been many in our days, and more in the time of our fathers and ancestors, who, by their prudence and wisdom, were well qualified to govern the state: whereas for many ages †, there were none at all that could be called great orators; and indeed, it would be difficult to instance a tolerable one for every age.

Now

* De Orat. I. 2, 3, 4, 5.

† Cicero, in his book *de claris oratoribus*, chap. 15. goes no farther back than Cethegus, who was consul in the year of Rome 550.

nostrâ, plures patrum memoriâ, atque etiam majorum exstiterunt : cùm boni per diu nulli, vix autem singulis ætatibus singuli tolerabiles oratores invenirentur.

Ac, ne quis fortè cum aliis studiis, quæ reconditis in artibus, atque in quadam varietate literarum versentur, magis hanc dicendi rationem, quàm cum imperatoris laude, aut cum boni senatoris prudentiâ comparandam putet ; convertat animum ad ea ipsa artium genera, circumspiciatque qui in iis floruerint, quàmque multi : sic facillimè, quanta oratorum sit, semperque fuerit paucitas, judicabit.

Neque enim te fugit laudatarum artium omnium procreatricem quandam, et quasi parentem, eam, quam φιλοσοφίαν Græci vocant, ab hominibus doctissimis judicari ; in qua difficile est enumerare, quot viri, quantâ scientiâ, quantaque in suis studiis varietate, et copiâ fuerint, qui non una aliqua in re separatim elaborarent, sed omnia, quæcunque essent, vel scientiæ per investigationem, vel differendi ratione comprehenderent. Quis ignorat, ii, qui mathematici vocantur, quanta in obscuritate rerum, et quàm recondita in arte,

en avoient encore plus que nous ; mais des orateurs, le premier qu'on ait pu estimer, n'est venu que bien tard, et à peine chaque siècle en a-t-il fourni un de supportable.

On me dira que le mérite de l'orateur, et celui d'un général d'armée, ou d'un bon sénateur, n'ont point assez de rapport, et qu'il vaudroit mieux ici ne parler que des arts, qui tiennent à la littérature. Renfermons nous donc, et voyons dans quelque autre genre que ce soit, combien de noms célèbres s'offrent à nous. Rien ne prouve mieux à quel point il est vrai, que tous les temps furent stériles en orateurs.

Vous savez que celle des sciences qui est regardée comme la source et la mère de toutes les autres, c'est la Philosophie, ainsi que l'appellent les Grecs. Or il ne seroit pas aisé de compter les Philosophes, qui ont brillé par l'étendue, par la variété, par la profondeur de leur savoir ; et qui, loin de se borner à quelque objet détaché, ont embrassé tout, ont raisonné sur tout. Quoique les mathématiques soient un amas de connoissances abstraites, et qui demandent une grande pénétration ; tel a pourtant été le nombre des habiles mathématiciens, qu'on diroit que

Now that none may think the comparison unfair, between eloquence and the renown of a general, or the prudence of a good senator; and that eloquence ought rather to be compared with those studies which have some connection with the sciences, and other branches of literature; let us take a view of these very sciences, and observe what great numbers of eminent men have flourished in each of them, and then we shall be able to judge how inconsiderable the number of orators has been in former times, or is at present.

You are not ignorant, that what the *Greeks* call philosophy, is esteemed by men of the greatest learning to be, as it were, the source and parent of all the liberal arts: yet it is a difficult matter to enumerate, how many of its professors have been remarkable for their great learning, and the variety and copiousness of their studies; and such as have not confined their researches to one single branch of knowledge, but by an indefatigable application to study, and the sound deductions of reason, have extended their views to every thing. None, sure, is ignorant, how abstruse, intricate, subtle, and perplexing, the study of mathematics is; and yet so many have been eminent for their knowledge in this science, that it should seem, no man ever heartily applied himself to attain it, who did not gain what he proposed. Who ever set himself seriously to study music, or those branches of literature called grammar*, and did not acquire a thorough knowledge

* By the word *Grammarians*, the ancients understood a learned man; or one who was perfectly well skilled in all those branches of literature, that, among the *French*, go by the general name of *Belles Lettres*.

arte, et multiplici, subtilique versentur? quo tamen in genere ita multi perfecti homines exstiterunt, ut nemo ferè studuisse ei scientiæ vehementius videatur, quin, quod voluerit, consecutus sit. Quis musicis, quis huic studio literarum, quod profitehtur ii, qui grammatici vocantur, penitus se dedidit, quin omnem illarum artium pœnè infinitam vim, et materiam scientiâ et cognitione comprehenderit?

Verè mihi hoc videor esse dicturus: ex omnibus iis, qui in harum artium studiis liberalissimis sint, doctrinisque versati, minimam copiam poëtarum egregiorum exstitisse: atque in hoc ipso numero, in quo perrarè exoritur aliquis excellens, si diligenter, et ex nostrorum, et ex Græcorum copia comparare voles, multò tamen pauciores oratores, quàm poëtæ boni reperientur.

Quod hoc etiam mirabilius debet videri, quia cæterarum artium studia ferè reconditis, atque abditis è fontibus hauriuntur; dicendi autem omnis ratio in medio posita, communi quodam in usu, atque in hominum more et sermone versatur: ut in cæteris id maximè excellat, quod longissimè sit ab imperitorum intelligentia, sensûque disjunctum:

in

que personne n'ait voulu s'appliquer à cette science, qu'il n'y ait réussi. Quelqu'un s'est-il bien mis dans l'esprit d'apprendre la musique, ou d'acquérir cette sorte d'érudition, qui est le partage des grammairiens, qu'il n'en soit venu à bout, quoique la quantité des choses qu'il faut savoir pour cela, soit presque infinie?

Je crois pouvoir dire avec vérité, que la poésie est celui de tous les beaux arts, où l'on a le moins de chef-d'œuvres: et cependant, à examiner ce que Rome et la Grèce ont produit dans ce genre-là-même où il est si rare d'exceller, on verra qu'il y a encore bien moins de bons orateurs, que de bons poètes.

Mais ce qui augmente encore ici la surprise, c'est que pour les autres sciences il faut chercher au loin, et creuser profondément: au lieu que l'orateur n'emploie que des raisons et des expressions, qui appartiennent à tout le monde. Tellement que ce qu'on admire les plus dans les autres sciences, c'est ce qui est le moins à la portée des ignorans, et le moins intelligible:

ledge of the almost infinite number of things, whereof these arts consist.

This, I think, I may truly affirm; that there have been fewer who have excelled in poetry, than in any other science within the whole compass of liberal arts. But however scanty the number of good poets is, yet if you carefully reckon up those that *Greece* and *Rome* have produced, you will find them far more numerous than the good orators.

What makes this appear still more extraordinary is, that the knowledge of the other sciences is deduced, for the most part, from abstruse, and not commonly known, principles; whereas eloquence lies open to the views of every body, and employs only such reasons and expressions as are made use of in common life. In other arts, what is most raised above the comprehension and understanding of the ignorant, is esteemed most excellent; but in oratory, it is a fault of the highest kind, to depart from the usual forms of speech, or the received maxims of common sense*.

Now

* Mr. Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.* B. III. chap. 10. sect. 34, passes a severe judgment on the whole art of oratory, as founded on the very fault here condemned. Would we speak of things as they are, says he, we must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore however laudable, or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.

in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit à vulgari genere orationis, atque à consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere.

Ac ne illud quidem verè dici potest, aut plures cæteris artibus inservire, aut majore delectatione, aut spe uberiore, aut præmiis ad perdiscendum amplioribus commoveri. Atque ut omittam Græciam, quæ semper eloquentiæ princeps esse voluit, atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas, in quibus summa dicendi vis et inventa est, et perfecta : in hac ipsa civitate profectò nulla unquam vehementiùs, quàm eloquentiæ studia vigerunt. Nam posteaquam, imperio omnium gentium constituto, diuturnitas pacis otium confirmavit, nemo ferè laudis cupidus adolescens non sibi ad dicendum studio omni enitendum putavit. Ac primò quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam vim, neque aliquod præceptum artis esse arbitrantur ; tantum, quantum ingenio, et cogitatione poterant, consequebantur. Post autem, auditis oratoribus Græcis, cognitisque eorum literis, adhibitisque doctoribus, incredibili quodam nostri homines dicendi studio flagrarunt. Excitabat eos

ligible : qu'en matière d'éloquence, au contraire, le plus infigne défaut est de ne pas parler comme les autres, et pour se faire entendre de tous.

On ne sauroit, au reste, prétexter que l'éloquence ait été moins cultivée ; qu'elle soit moins attrayante d'elle-même ; qu'elle promette des récompenses moins flatteuses. Car, sans parler de la Grèce, où l'on s'est toujours piqué d'y exceller, ni d'Athènes, qui a été le berceau de tous les beaux arts, et à qui l'art de la parole doit son origine et sa perfection ; jamais nos Romains, depuis qu'ils ont été les maîtres de l'univers, n'ont montré plus d'ardeur pour aucune sorte d'étude, que pour l'éloquence. Une paix durable leur ayant dès-lors procuré du loisir, tous ceux de nos jeunes gens que l'amour de la gloire conduisoit, tournèrent leurs vûes et leurs efforts de ce côté-là. Point de méthode d'abord : nul exercice pour se former : nul soupçon qu'il y eût des règles : ils se livroient à leur génie. Mais ensuite, lorsqu'ils eurent connu le goût des Grecs, entendu leurs orateurs, et pris des maîtres, la passion de l'éloquence fut portée au suprême degré. Une foule d'affaires importantes, et dans tous les genres, fournissoient sans cesse l'occasion de parler : en sorte qu'à l'étude du cabinet,

Now it cannot be said, with any appearance of truth, that more people apply themselves to the cultivation of the other sciences, or that they are encouraged in the pursuit of them by more exalted pleasures, greater hopes, or more ample rewards. For not to mention *Greece*, which has always been desirous to excel other nations in point of eloquence; or *Athens*, that parent of all learning, where the art of oratory was first practised and brought to perfection; certainly no study ever flourished so much in this city, as that of eloquence. For after an universal empire was obtained, and the continuance of peace had afforded leisure, every youth, who was any wise ambitious of glory, thought no pains too much, in order to acquire the art of speaking. At first, indeed, being wholly ignorant of method, unacquainted with the great advantage of exercise, and not imagining there were any rules belonging to this art; the progress they made in it, was entirely owing to the strength of their own genius and reason. But as soon as they had heard the *Greek* orators, read their books, and taken masters to instruct them, it is incredible with what vehemence our countrymen thirsted after eloquence. The importance, the variety, and great number of causes afforded every man an opportunity of adding frequent practice, which far exceeds all masters, to what he had learned by study. Besides, the greatest rewards, as public favour, riches, and honour, were then, as well as at present, annexed to this profession. And as to genius, it is evident from many considerations, that

eos magnitudo, et varietas, multitudoque in omni genere causarum, ut ad eam doctrinam, quam suo quisque studio consecutus esset, adjungeretur usus frequens, qui omnium magistrorum præcepta superaret. Erant autem huic studio maxima, quæ nunc quoque sunt, proposita præmia, vel ad gratiam, vel ad opes, vel ad dignitatem. Ingenia verò (ut multis rebus possumus judicare) nostrorum hominum multum cæteris hominibus omnium gentium præstiterunt.

Quibus de causis, quis non jure miretur, ex omni memoria ætatum, temporum, civitatum, tam exiguum oratorum numerum inveniri? Sed nimirum majus est hoc quiddam, quàm homines opinantur, et pluribus ex artibus, studiisque collectum. Quis enim aliud in maxima discentium multitudine, summâ magistrorum copiâ, præstantissimis hominum ingeniis, infinitâ causarum varietate, amplissimis eloquentiæ propositis præmiis, esse causæ putet, nisi rei quandam incredibilem magnitudinem, ac difficultatem?

Est enim et scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum, sine qua verborum volubilitas inanis, atque irridenda est: et ipsa oratio con-

net, on joignoit un fréquent usage, le meilleur de tous les maîtres. Alors, comme aujourd'hui, c'étoit la route de la faveur, des richesses, des honneurs. Ajoutons (car le fait est prouvé d'ailleurs) qu'il y a toujours eu plus d'esprit chez les Romains, que dans le reste du monde.

Peut-on, cela étant, n'être pas surpris de trouver dans toute l'antiquité, et quelque part que ce soit, une si grande disette d'orateurs? Sans doute, leur art est quelque chose de plus grand, et demande plus de talens réunis, que l'on ne pense. Car enfin, de ce qu'il y a tant de beaux génies qui s'y appliquent, tant d'habiles maîtres qui l'enseignent, tant d'heureux et de riches sujets à manier, tant de récompenses, et cependant si peu de succès; que conclure de là, si ce n'est que l'art est donc d'une étonnante difficulté?

Aussi est-il nécessaire pour y réussir, que l'on ait un grand fonds de connoissances; sans quoi ce ne seroit qu'un flux de paroles, vain et digne

that the *Romans* were much superior in this respect to all other nations.

All this being taken into the account, is there not great reason to wonder, that the number of orators have at all times and places of the world been so very few? But in truth, the art of oratory is more noble, and requires the knowledge of more arts and sciences, than is commonly imagined. For what other reason, but the greatness and difficulty of the undertaking, can be assigned, why in such vast numbers of students, endowed with excellent natural parts, so few succeed; though there be no want of able masters, an infinite variety of causes, and the greatest rewards annexed to the attainment?

To form an orator then, besides an extensive knowledge, without which the easiest flow of language will appear trifling and ridiculous; I say, besides this, the stile must likewise be embellished by the justest arrangement, as well as choice of words; a perfect knowledge of all the affections*, which nature has bestowed on mankind, is also necessary; because the whole power of eloquence ought to be exerted, in order to calm and rouse the minds of the

* Affections are either public or private, benevolent or selfish; the former are excited by shewing, that the thing in question has a manifest tendency to promote the happiness of others; and the latter, by proving that an object or event would occasion the greatest share of pleasure to the individual. The exciting truths about means, would be only those which pointed out some means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with less pain or trouble to the agent. See *Hutcheson* on the Passions, p. 224.

conformanda non solum electione, sed etiam constructione verborum: et omnes animorum motus, quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscerendi; quod omnis vis ratioque dicendi in eorum, qui audiunt, mentibus aut sedandis, aut excitandis expromenda est. Accedat eodem oportet lepos quidam, facetiæque, et eruditio libero digna, celeritasque et brevitās, et respondendi, et laceffendi, subtili venustate, atque urbanitate conjuncta. Tenenda præterea est omnis antiquitas, explorumque vis: neque legum, aut juris civilis scientia negligenda est. Nam quid ego de actione ipsâ plura dicam? quæ motu corporis, quæ gestu, quæ vultu, quæ vocis conformatione, ac varietate moderanda est: quæ sola per se ipsa quanta sit, histrionum levis ars, et scena declarat: in qua cum omnes in oris, et vocis, et motus moderatione elaborant, quis ignorat, quàm pauci sint, fuerintque, quos animo æquo spectare possumus? Quid dicam de thesauro rerum omnium memoriâ? quæ nisi custos inventis, cogitatisque rebus, et verbis adhibeatur, intelligimus omnia, etiamsi præ-

de risée. Il faut un style qui frappe autant par le choix que par l'arrangement des mots. Et comme l'essentiel consiste, tantôt à émouvoir les passions, tantôt à les calmer, il faut connaître tous ces ressorts secrets, que la nature cacha dans le cœur humain. Joignez à cela une certaine grace, de l'enjouement, un savoir d'homme bien né, avec de la vivacité à repartir, et à lancer des traites, piquans, mais fins et délicats. On doit posséder l'antiquité, et avoir en main les exemples qu'elle fournit. On ne doit pas ignorer les loix, ni le droit civil. Parlerai-je de l'action, qui embrasse tout à la fois, et les attitudes, et les gestes, et les regards, et la manière de gouverner sa voix? Jugeons de cette difficulté par un art frivole, qui est celui des comédiens, dont l'étude unique est de bien déclamer. Qui ne sait combien les bons acteurs ont été rares dans tous les temps? Parlerai-je de la mémoire, qui est le dépôt universel des pensées et des paroles? Quelques trésors que l'orateur amasse, s'il manque de mémoire pour les conserver, ils sont perdus.

Puisque

the auditory. To this must be added, a certain gracefulness, an enlivening raillery, a gentleman-like learning, and a ready talent for repartee, and attacking an adversary in a delicate and polite manner. One must likewise be acquainted with antiquity, and have a great many examples to produce: nor is the study of laws and jurisprudence to be neglected. What occasion for me to enlarge on action itself, which must be regulated by the motion of the body, the gesture, the countenance, with a due command, and suitable changes of voice*? The great difficulty of this alone, plainly appears from the frivolous art of comedians, and representations on the stage; where, though every one strives to regulate his countenance, voice, and gestures, in a becoming manner; yet, who is ignorant how few there are, or have been, whom we can behold with patience? Need I to mention memory, that treasury of all knowledge; to whose keeping if the inventions, reflections, and expressions of the orator, are not committed, they must, however excellent in themselves, be infallibly lost?

H

Wherefore,

* *Horace*, in his *Art of poetry*, v. 101. seq. observes what sur-
tizing influence this has on an auditory.

With those who laugh, our social joy appears;
With those who mourn, we sympathize in tears;
If you would have me weep, begin the strain,
Then I shall feel your sorrows; feel your pain.

Francis's Hor.

præclarissima fuerint, in
oratore peritura.

Quamobrem mirari de-
finamus, quæ causa sit elo-
quentium paucitatis: cum
ex illis rebus universis elo-
quentia constet, quibus in
singulis elaborare permag-
num est.

*Puisque l'éloquence réunit
tant de talens, dont chacun
à part exige tant de soin,
ne cherchons plus d'où vient
qu'il y a si peu de bons ora-
teurs.*

On ELOQUENCE. 163

Wherefore, since eloquence consists of all these accomplishments put together, the study of each whereof singly, is a matter of the greatest difficulty; let us cease to wonder, why good orators are so few in number.

VIII.

De AMICITIA.

QUA quidem (*amicitiâ*) haud scio, an, exceptâ sapientiâ, quidquam melius homini sit à diis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii præponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Belluarum hoc quidem extremum est: illa autem superiora, caduca et incerta; posita non tam in nostris consiliis, quàm in fortunæ temeritate.

Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, præclarè illi quidem: sed hæc ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit, et continet: nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.

Jam virtutem ex consuetudine vitæ sermonisque nostri interpretemur: nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentiâ metiamur: virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Gallos, Scipiones, Philos. His communis vita contenta est. Eos autem omittamus, qui
omnino

VIII.

Sur l'AMITIE.

APRES la sagesse, je regarde l'amitié comme le plus riche présent que nous fassent les Dieux immortels. D'autres préfèrent l'opulence, d'autres la santé, d'autres la puissance, d'autres les honneurs, et plusieurs même la volupté. Ce dernier est le partage des brutes: et à l'égard du reste, ce sont choses fragiles, incertaines, et qui dépendent moins de notre prudence, que de la fortune, et de ses caprices.

Quant à ceux qui comptent la vertu pour le bien suprême, ils ont grande raison. Mais la vertu même est ce qui fait naître l'amitié; elle en est le soutien, et il ne peut y avoir d'amitié sans vertu.

A ce mot de vertu, n'attachons ici que l'idée qu'il présente communément, et dans le langage reçu: sans nous régler sur la magnificence des termes, que certains doctes emploient. Regardons comme d'honnêtes gens ceux qu'on reconnoît pour tels, les Paulus, les Catons, les Gallus, les Scipions, les Philus.

VIII.

On FRIENDSHIP.

IF we except Wisdom, I know not if the immortal Gods have bestowed so excellent a gift on mankind, as friendship. Some give the preference to riches, some to health, some to power, others to honours, and not a few to pleasures. This last, indeed, constitutes the happiness of brutes; and even the former are frail and uncertain, depending, not so much on our own prudence, as on the caprice of fortune.

Those, on the other hand, who place their chief happiness in virtue, act an excellent part: but then this virtue begets and maintains friendship; which without it could by no means subsist.

We take virtue in the meaning put upon it in common life, and our own language; nor, with some learned men*, do we measure it by superb epithets: we likewise look upon those as good men, who are commonly esteemed such; as the *Paulus's*, the *Cato's*, the *Gallus's*, the *Scipio's*, the *Philus's*. Greater models of virtue than these are not required in common life: whence we make no mention of characters, that are no where to be found.

H 3

Now

* The Stoics. For the idea they give of their wise man, see page 99.

omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

Tales igitur inter viros, amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio, cui potest esse *vita vitalis*, ut ait Ennius, qui non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat? Quid dulcius, quàm habere, qui cum omnia audeas sic loqui, ut tecum? Quis esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis æquè, ac tu ipse, gauderet? Adversas verò ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam, quàm tu, ferret.

Denique cæteræ res, quæ expetuntur, opportunæ sunt singulæ rebus ferè singulis: divitiæ, ut utare: opes, ut colare: honores, ut laudare: voluptates, ut gaudere: valetudo, ut dolere careas, et muneribus fungare corporis. Amicitia res plurimas continet: quòd te verteris, præstò est: nullo loco excluditur: nunquam intempestiva, nunquam molesta est. Itaque non aquâ, non igni, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur, quàm amicitia.

Neque ego nunc de vulgari, aut de mediocri, (quæ tamen

lus. On ne demande rien de plus dans le commerce du monde. Ainsi laissons là ces sages, qui ne se trouvent nulle part.

Une amitié donc, liée avec des gens qui ressemblent à ceux que je nomme, devient une source intarissable d'agrémens. Est-ce vivre, que de n'avoir pas à se reposer dans le sein d'un ami? Quelle douceur comparable à celle d'avoir avec qui parler de tout, aussi librement qu'avec soi même? Ce qui vous arrive d'heureux, vous flatteroit-il également, si personne n'y étoit aussi sensible que vous? Et dans un accident fâcheux, où trouver de la consolation, si ce n'est dans un ami, pour qui vos peines sont encore plus accablantes que pour vous?

Tous les autres objets de nos desirs sont presque bornés chacun à leur utilité propre. Vous aurez des richesses, c'est pour en faire usage; du crédit, pour être considéré; des honneurs, pour être loué; du plaisir, pour le goûter; de la santé, pour ne point souffrir, et pour résister aux fatigues du corps. Mais l'amitié est d'une ressource infinie. Partout elle s'offre à vous. Partout elle a lieu. Jamais elle n'est importune, jamais onéreuse. Aussi est-ce un proverbe. Que l'amitié, pour l'utilité, va de pair avec le feu et l'eau.

Je ne dis pas cela d'une amitié foible et commune, qui

Now the advantages arising from friendship among men of this cast, are greater than I can well express. And first, who can have any relish for life *, as *Ennius* expresses it, that cannot repose himself on the mutual benevolence of a friend? What pleasure so exquisite, as to have one you can talk with as freely as with yourself? Where would be the boasted advantages of prosperity, had we not a friend to share it with us? And as for adversity, it would be almost insupportable, without one to ease us of the greater part of the grief attending our misfortune.

In short, every other object of man's desire, is useful only for some particular purpose; riches, to be used; power, to command respect; honours, to be the subject of applause; pleasures, to be enjoyed; health, to be free from pain, and in condition to discharge such duties as depend on the body. But as for friendship, its advantages are innumerable; which way soever you turn, it is present; it is admitted every where, is never unseasonable, never troublesome. Whence, as the saying is, we can no more be without friendship, than without water and fire.

I am not now speaking of common and ordinary friendship, though that too has its pleasure and use; but of that which is real and perfect, such as existed

H 4

between

* The expression of *Ennius* is, *vita vitalis*, which cannot be rendered literally in *French*, or *English*.

tamen ipsa et dilectat, et prodest) sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res, splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas partiens communicanque, leviores. Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum præstat omnibus, quod bona spe præluceat in posterum, nec debilitari animos, aut cadere patitur.

Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tanquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adfunt, et egentès abundant, et imbecilles valent, et quod difficilius dictum est, mortui vivunt: tantus eos honos memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur: horum vita laudabilis,

✱✱✱
Sæpissimè mihi de amicitia cogitanti, maximè illud considerandum videri solet: num propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia; ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minùs per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio, vicissimque redderet? an effect hoc quidem proprium

qui pourtant ne laisse pas d'avoir son prix, et ses agrémens. Je parle d'une sincère, d'une parfait amitié, dont, à la vérité, on ne cite que bien peu d'exemples. Celle-ci donne à la prospérité un nouvel éclat. Dans l'adversité, comme elle en partage le poids, elle la rend plus légère: et parmi les bons offices qu'elle nous prodigue alors, l'essentiel c'est qu'en nous mettant un avenir favorable devant les yeux, elle ne souffre pas que notre courage succombe.

Avoir un ami, c'est avoir un autre soi-même. Quand l'un est absent, l'autre le remplace. Si l'un est riche, l'autre ne manque de rien. Dans la maladie de l'un, il reste des forces à l'autre pour le secourir. Celui qui meurt le premier, renaît dans la constante estime, dans le souvenir tendre, dans les continuel regrets de l'autre. Pour le mort, c'est une douceur; et pour le survivant, un mérite.

✱✱✱
Quand je pense à l'amitié, ce qui m'arrive souvent, je trouve qu'un point digne d'examen, c'est, si elle doit sa naissance à la faiblesse et aux besoins de l'homme, qui font que chacun, par un commerce réciproque de bons offices, cherche à se procurer ce qu'il n'a point de son fonds: ou si, ces bons offices n'étant

between those few great men mentioned above. For it not only adds new charms to prosperity, but, by communicating and sharing it, renders even adversity itself less intolerable. Now among the many and great advantages of friendship, I take this to be the most essential, that it gives us good hopes of what is to come, and suffers not our minds to be dejected, much less to sink under afflictions *.

Besides, he that takes a view of a friend, beholds, as it were, the perfect resemblance of himself. So that absence cannot separate, want impoverish, sickness weaken, or, what is still more astonishing, death put an end to their life. So constant is the remembrance, so sincere the affection, and so elevated the esteem which are entertained for the deceased by their surviving friends, that the death of the former seems a happiness, and the life of the latter a merit.



In my frequent meditations on friendship, there is one thing appears chiefly to deserve consideration; and that is, whether it be courted merely to supply the weakness and wants of mankind; that, by a mutual exchange of good offices, every one may receive from his friend, what is wanting in himself; and make up, in his turn, the defects of his friend? or, allowing this to be, indeed, a pro-

H 5

perty

* *Cicero* had experience of this, during his banishment, from *Atticus*: whence it is plain, that his design here was to testify his remembrance and gratitude, by dedicating a dialogue on friendship to him.

proprium amicitiae ; sed antiquior, et pulchrior, et magis à natura ipsâ perfecta alia causa ?

Amor enim (ex quo amicitia nominata) princeps est ad benevolentiam conjungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur sæpe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur, et observantur causâ temporis. In amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum ; et, quidquid in eâ est, id est verum et voluntarium. Quapropter à natura mihi videtur potius, quàm ab indigentia, orta amicitia, et applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quàm cogitatione, quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.

Quod, quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest : quæ ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus, et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multò est evidentius. Primum ex ea caritate, quæ est inter natos et parentes : quæ dirimi, nisi detestabili scelere, non potest. Deinde, cum similis sensus extitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus,

n'étant regardez que comme une suite de l'amitié, elle a une origine antérieure, plus noble, et qui part de la nature même ?

Parmi les raisons qui peuvent faire qu'on se veuille du bien l'un à l'autre, la principale est de s'aimer ; et c'est d'aimer, que vient le mot d'amitié. Si l'on n'a que des vûes d'utilité, souvent, pour y réussir, il suffit de se montrer aux hommes sous le masque de l'amitié, et dans la conjoncture où ils peuvent nous servir. Mais l'amitié ne connoît ni feinte, ni déguisement. Tout y est sincère, tout part du cœur. Je l'attribue donc à la nature, plutôt qu'au besoin ; et je la crois l'effet d'une secrète impression, qui se fait sentir dans l'ame, plutôt que d'aucune réflexion sur l'utilité, qui peut nous en revenir.

Vous avez dans les bêtes, une image de cette impression. Car, durant quelque temps, elles aiment leurs petits, et leurs petits les aiment. On voit que ce qui les guide, c'est le sentiment. Il se manifeste encore mieux dans l'homme, par la tendresse des pères et des mères pour leurs enfans ; tendresse suivie d'un parfait retour, et qu'on ne peut étouffer ni de part ni d'autre ; à moins que d'y être forcé par un crime abominable. Quand il se trouve une personne, dont le caractère

perty of friendship, whether it has no other cause, that is more antient, more refined, and nearer allied to nature itself?

It is love (whence, in *Latin*, the word friendship is derived) that chiefly conciliates benevolence. Favours, indeed, may be obtained even from those, for whom friendship is only pretended; and who are courted merely to serve a present interest. But in true friendship, there can be no imposition, or deceit: whatever makes a part of it, must be sincere, and from the heart. On this account, therefore, friendship appears to me, to be derived rather from nature, than the indigence of mankind; and to be owing rather to the benevolent affections of our mind, than to any consideration of the great utility attending it.

As to the nature of this sensation, we may observe a resemblance of it even in some beasts; which love their offspring, and are beloved by them, with so sincere a regard, for some time at least, that it manifestly appears to be the dictate of nature. This instinct is still more visible in man. As first, from the strong affection, which subsists between children and their parents; that cannot be dissolved without incurring the guilt of the most odious of all crimes*. Again, when we meet with one whose nature and manners tally exactly with our own, we are affected

H 6

with

* However general a truth this may be, there are particular exceptions to it, as in the case of *Abraham's* designing to sacrifice his son *Ishaac*; and that of *Brutus*, the first consul of *Rome*; who, when his two sons had engaged in a conspiracy to restore the *Tarquins*, ordered them both to be beheaded. But then private ties of blood are of no force to supersede the divine command, in the former case; nor to cancel a crime against the commonwealth, in the latter.

congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis, et virtutis perspicere videamur. Nihil est enim amabilius virtute: nihil, quod magis alliciat homines ad diligendum: quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem eos etiam, quos nunquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est, qui C. Fabricii, M. Curii non cum caritate aliqua et benevolentia memoriam usurpet, quos nunquam viderit? Quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Mælium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus, de imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Annibale. Ab altero, propter probitatem ejus, non nimis alienos animos habemus: alterum propter crudelitatem semper hæc civitas oderit. Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos nunquam vidimus, vel, quod majus est, in hoste etiam diligamus: quid mirum, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibus cum usu conjuncti esse possunt virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur?

caractère se rapporte au nôtre, un pareil sentiment vient à éclorre dans notre ame; et cela, sur ce que la probité et la vertu nous paroissent briller dans cette personne. Car il n'y a rien de plus attrayant, rien de plus amiable que la vertu. Elle vous intéresse pour des gens même, que vous ne vîtes jamais. Au seul nom de Fabricius, ou de Curius, morts avant que nous fussions au monde, ne sentons-nous pas une sorte d'inclination pour eux? Peut-on, au contraire, penser sans horreur à Tarquin le Superbe, à un Cassius, à un Mélius? Deux guerriers sont venus en Italie nous disputer l'empire. Je parle de Pyrrhus, et d'Annibal. Aujourd'hui nous ne voulons plus guère de mal à l'un d'eux, qui avoit de la probité: mais à l'autre, sa cruauté lui assure la haine éternelle des Romains. Si donc la vertu a tant d'attraits, que nous l'aimons dans ceux que nous n'avons jamais vus, et, qui plus est, dans nos ennemis mêmes; est-il surprenant qu'elle fasse impression sur nous, lorsque nous la croyons voir dans ceux avec qui nous sommes à portée de nous lier?

with a fimilar fenfation of benevolence towards him ; becaufe in fuch a one we feem to difcover the bright effluence, as it were, of virtue and goodnefs. For there is nothing more amiable than virtue, or a ftronger incitement to love : infomuch that on account of their virtue and probity, we in a manner love thofe whom we never faw. Who is there but has a peculiar refpect and veneration for the memory of *C. Fabricius* *, and *M. Curius* † ; though he never had any perfonal knowledge of them ? And who, on the contrary, but detefts *Tarquin the Proud*, *Sp. Caffius* ‡, and *Sp. Mælius* § ? There have been two generals, *Pyrrhus* and *Annibal*, who contended with us for empire in the heart of *Italy* : one of thefe, by reafon of his generofity, was never greatly the object of our averfion ; whereas the cruelty of the other has rendered him obnoxious to the conftant abhorrence of this ftate. Now if the power of virtue is fo very great, that we love it even in thofe whom we never faw ; or, what is ftill more, in one who is our profefled enemy ; is it any wonder, that the affections of mankind are ftrongly wrought on, when

* We have mentioned *Fabricius*, and *Pyrrhus* king of *Epire*, already. See page 137.

† *M. Curius Dentatus* is equally famous for his frugality, valour, and victories. It is of him *Juvenal* fpeaks, in the well-known verfe againft hypocrites,

Qui Curios fimulant, et Bacchanalia vivunt.

At diftance, they like *Curius* appear ;

But are true Bacchanals, when you come near.

‡ *Sp. Caffius Vifcellinus*, after having been three times confu', and twice honoured with a triumph, was impeached for aspiring to be king : in confequence of which, he was thrown headlong from the *Tarpeian* rock, in the year of *Rome* 270.

§ *Sp. Mælius*, accused likewise of aspiring to be king, was killed by *Servilius Abala*, general of the horfe, in the year of *Rome* 315.

Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto, et studio perspecto, et consuetudine adjunctâ : quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis, admirabilis quædam exardescit benevolentia magnitudo : quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem quisque assequatur, quod desideret ; humilem sanè relinquunt, et minimè generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitia, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset ; ut quisque minimum in se esse arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus : quod longè secus est. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maximè virtute et sapientiâ sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat, suâque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet : ita in amicitia expectendis colendisque maximè excellit. Quid enim Africanus indigens mei ? Minimè herclè. Ac ne ego quidem illius. Sed ego admiratione quâdam virtutis ejus : ille vicissim opinione fortasse nonnullâ, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit. Auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multæ et magnæ consecutæ sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causæ diligendi profectæ.

Ut

J'avoue que les bons offices, les marques d'attachement, l'assiduité à se voir, fortifient l'amitié. Tout cela joint à inclination, à ce premier mouvement du cœur, il en résulte une tendresse si grande, si vive, qu'elle tient du prodige. Vouloir qu'elle porte sur des motifs d'intérêt, c'est en faire quelque chose de bien vil, et lui donner une origine bien ignoble. On pourroit conclurre de là, que moins un homme croit avoir de ressource en lui-même, plus il seroit propre à l'amitié : et c'est pourtant le contraire. Car l'homme le plus riche de son propre fonds, et dont la sagesse, dont la vertu est comme un rempart, qui le garantit du besoin ; c'est l'homme le plus sensible aux charmes de l'amitié, et le plus exact à en remplir les devoirs. Quel besoin Scipion avoit il de moi ? Aucun. Je pouvois également me passer de lui. Mais moi, rempli d'admiration pour sa vertu, et lui, peut-être, un peu prévenu en ma faveur, nous conçûmes de l'inclination l'un pour l'autre. L'habitude en serra les nœuds. Mais, quoique cette liaison nous ait beaucoup servi, et dans beaucoup d'occasions ; l'idée qu'elle dût jamais nous être utile, n'y étoit cependant entrée pour rien.

On

when virtue and goodness are discovered in those, with whom a social intercourse may be enjoyed?

True affection, however, is much confirmed by good offices, by marks of esteem, and intimate acquaintance; and if these concur with inclination, that first movement of the heart, there results, from such a conjunction, a height of benevolence not to be expressed. Should any one imagine, that all this is the effect of the natural weakness of mankind, in order to supply their mutual wants and indigence; this would be to debase friendship, and to assign its origin to a principle, which, I may venture to say, is far from being generous. If this was the case, he who is most sensible of his own imperfections, would be best qualified for friendship; but, in fact, it is quite the reverse: for in proportion as every man is confident of his own ability, and has such a stock of virtue and wisdom, with every other necessary qualification, within himself, as to need no foreign assistance; so much keener will his desires be for friendship, and his care the greater in cultivating it. Did *Africanus* * stand in any need of me? By no means. Nor, indeed, had I any occasion for his aid. However, being charmed with his virtues, I loved him; and he, on the other hand, had an affection for me, occasioned, perhaps, by the good opinion he had conceived of my manners. Our mutual benevolence increased as we became better acquainted. Now though many, and great, advantages resulted from our friendship; yet certainly it was not the prospect of them that gave rise to it.

For

* *Lelius* says this of *Scipio Africanus*, who has been mentioned above. See page 111.

Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam, (neque enim beneficium sceneramur) sed naturâ propensi ad liberalitatem sumus : sic amicitiam, non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis ejus fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. Ab iis, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omni referunt, longè dissentimus; nec mirum : nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abjecerunt in rem tam humilem, tamque contemptam. Quamobrem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus : ipsi autem intelligamus, naturâ gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem, facta significatione probitatis : quam qui appetiverunt, applicant sese, et propius admovent, ut et usu ejus, quem diligere cœperunt, fruantur, et moribus : sintque pares in amore, et æquales : propensioresque ad bene merendum, quàm ad reposcendum. Atque hæc inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximæ capientur : et erit ejus ortus à natura, quàm ab imbecillitate, et gravior, et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinet, eadem commutata dissolveret.

Sed

On est obligé et généreux, non pour avoir du retour mais parce qu'on se livre à son penchant naturel. Un bien-fait, et l'usure ne vont pas ensemble. Aussi doit on, tout intérêt à part, ne chercher dans l'amitié que ce qui provient d'elle, l'avantage d'aimer et d'être aimé. Ce n'est pas ainsi que raisonnent ceux qui, comme les bêtes, rapportent tout à la volupté. Je n'en suis pas surpris. Des gens occupés d'un objet si bas, et si méprisable, ne peuvent rien concevoir de grand, rien de noble et de divin. Ici donc nulle mention d'eux. L'amitié, selon nous, est un sentiment que la nature forme dans nos cœurs, en nous faisant voir dans quelqu'un, l'image de la vertu. Attirez par cette image, des cœurs s'approchent, si j'ose ainsi parler, ils s'attachent réciproquement, pour goûter les douceurs que le caractère de l'un promet à l'autre. Touchez au même degré, épris d'un égale tendresse, c'est à qui marquera le plus de générosité. Une si louable émulation fait que l'amitié devient très-utile, sans que l'utilité soit le fondement de l'amitié. Elle a dans la nature une origine et plus honnête, et plus solide. Car, si deux cœurs n'étoient unis que par l'intérêt, ils cesseroient de l'être, quand

For as we do acts of kindness and generosity, not with any prospect to have a return, such a conduct being inconsistent with the nature of a favour; but from our natural propensity to beneficence: in the same manner, friendship, in my opinion, ought not to be cultivated for mercenary views; but because the cordial affection whereon it is founded, is, of itself, advantage enough. We are of quite different sentiments from those who refer every thing to pleasure*: and no wonder, for they whose thoughts are wholly taken up with so groveling and contemptible an object, can never have any taste for what is sublime, excellent, and divine. Therefore let us make no further mention of them. But as to ourselves, it is fit we should know, that the endearing affections of love and benevolence naturally arise from a discovery of virtue. Those who are affected in this way, draw near, and unite themselves, in order to enjoy the company and social virtues of the person beloved; they aim at an equality of friendship; and are more solicitous to do good offices, than about a return. Whence arises a laudable emulation between them. Thus the advantages of friendship will

* The Epicurean doctrine, which makes the happiness of mankind to consist in pleasure, has been greatly mistaken by antient and modern philosophers: and the reason is, because they have given the name of happiness, not to the thing itself, but to its efficient cause. Hence as the fancy took them, they placed it in riches, knowledge, honour, reputation, virtue, &c. *Epicurus*, on the other hand, considers the formal cause of happiness, or the state of one who is actually happy. He examines wherein the thing itself consists; and finds it to be in the sensation of pleasure, or the sentiment of a mind that is pleased, satisfied, and contented. It cannot be hence inferred, that *Epicurus* made human happiness to consist in good cheer, or sensuality; for these are only efficient causes, and consequently foreign to his enquiry. Mr. *Bayle* thinks such a method of considering happiness the most exact and philosophical of all others. See his *Dict. Hist. Crit.* article *EPICURUS*, Remark (H)

178 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

Sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco veræ amicitiae sempiternæ sunt.

quand l'intérêt change. Mais la nature ne pouvant jamais changer, les véritables amitiex sont éternelles.

Quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Græcia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quædam; sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur suis argutiis: partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus: satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum: alienis nimis implicari molestum esse: commodissimum esse, quàm laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae; quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas. Caput enim esse ad beatè vivendum, securitatem; quâ frui non possit animus, si tanquam parturiant unus pro pluribus.

Alios autem dicere aiunt multò etiam inhumanius, (quem locum breviter perstrinxi paulo antè) præsidii adjumentique causâ, non benevolentiae, neque caritatis, amicitias esse expectandas. Itaque ut quisque minimum firmitatis habeat, minimumque virium, ita amici-

J'entends dire qu'en Grèce on regarde comme des sages, certains amateurs de paradoxes, gens qui, avec leurs vaines subtilitez, entreprennent de prouver tout. Ils vous disent, qu'il faut éviter d'être trop amis, afin qu'un seul n'ait point à s'embarasser pour plusieurs: que chacun a bien assez, et n'a que trop de ses propres affaires: qu'il est fâcheux d'entrer trop avant dans celles d'autrui: que le mieux est de tenir les rênes de l'amitié, pour être toujours maîtres de les allonger, ou de les accourcir, quand ils nous plaît. Car, disent-ils, l'essentiel pour vivre heureux, c'est la tranquillité: et il n'est pas possible d'en jouir, si des intérêts étrangers nous agitent sans cesse.

On prête à d'autres une opinion encore bien moins raisonnable, et dont j'ai déjà touché un mot: Qu'il faut se faire de l'amitié, non pas un attachement de cœur, mais une liaison utile. Qu'ainsi, moins on a de quoi se soutenir par soi même, plus il faut songer à se faire des amis.

will be very considerable; and its origin, deduced from nature, not only more agreeable to truth, but likewise more solid and durable, than that from the indigence of mankind: for was interest the only bond of friendship, a change in the former could not fail to dissolve the latter. But since nature cannot be changed, true friendship must of consequence be eternal.



Some * men, who in *Greece* are ranked, as I am informed †, among the wisest sages, have taken up very extraordinary notions on this subject; but then there is nothing can escape their sophistry. They maintain, that too extensive friendships ought not to be entered into, lest one man involve himself in the disquietudes of a multitude; that every one has business enough, and perhaps too much, of his own; that it is extremely troublesome to be too deeply interested in the affairs of other people; and that it is most eligible to hold the reins of friendship in such an unconfined manner, as to have it always in our power to strengthen or slacken them, as we shall see occasion. For tranquillity, with these men, makes the principal ingredient of a happy life; and this the mind can never enjoy, while one person is in labour, if the expression may be allowed, with the concerns of many.

Others are said to affirm, what is still more unworthy of a man, and has been slightly touched on
above,

* *De Amicitia*, cap. 13.

† In the time of *Laelius*, whom *Cicero* introduces speaking in this place, the *Grecian* literature was not become common at *Rome*; which is the reason that *Cicero*, to keep up the *decorum* of the dialogue, makes *Laelius* say, that he had only *been informed* concerning the opinion that prevailed among their philosophers.

amicitiās appetere maximè. Ex eo fieri, ut mulierculæ magis amicitiarum præfidia quærant, quàm viri; et inopes, quàm opulenti; et calamitosi, quàm ii, qui putantur beati.

O præclaram sapientiam! Solem enim è mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam è vita tollunt: quâ à diis immortalibus nihil melius habemus, nihil jucundius.



Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffuentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu, nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deum fidem, atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis, atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Hæc enim est tyrannorum vita; ni qua nimirum nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentia potest esse fiducia: omnia semper suspecta, atque sollicita: nullus locus amicitia. Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuit; aut eum, à quo se metui putat? Coluntur tamen simulatione duntaxat ad tempus. Quod si fortè (ut fit plerumque) ceciderint: tum intelligitur, quàm fuerint inopes amicorum.

Quod

amis. *Que par cette raison, les femmes y songent plus que les hommes; les pauvres, plus que les riches; ceux à qui la fortune est contraire, plus que ceux à qui elle rit.*

O la belle philosophie! *Oter aux hommes l'amitié, qui est ce que les Dieux leur ont donné, et de meilleur, et de plus agréable, c'est comme si l'on ôtoit le soleil à l'univers.*



On n'en croira donc point ces riches voluptueux, lorsqu'ils veulent raisonner sur l'amitié, dont ils n'éprouverent jamais les douceurs, et dont ils n'ont pas même d'idée. *Qui est-ce, ô Ciel! qui voudroit regorger de biens, mais à condition de n'aimer personne, et de n'être aimé de personne? Tel est le sort des tyrans. Pour eux, nul attachement solide, qui vienne du cœur, et qui soit à l'épreuve. Toujours nouveaux soupçons, nouvelles inquiétudes: point d'amitié. Aimeroit-on des gens qu'on craint, ou dont on se persuade qu'on est craint? On s'en va les dehors avec eux, tant qu'ils sont en place. Quand ils tombent, comme il leur arrive ordinairement, alors on voit combien peu ils avoient d'amis.*

Tarquin,

above, that friendship ought to be contracted for self-defence and mutual aid, and not out of affection and benevolence. Hence it is, say they, that the desires of friendship in every man are greater, in proportion as his ability and strength is less; also, that women court the aid of friendship more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the afflicted more than those who are esteemed happy.

Excellent wisdom! They might as well take the sun out of the world, as deprive mankind of friendship; which is the best, the most delightful gift of heaven.



Should * men intoxicated with pleasures, take upon them to reason about friendship, which they neither know from practice or theory, they do not merit our attention; for who, in the name of goodness! would chuse to live in the greatest affluence and plenty, on condition neither to love, or be beloved by, any one? This is the life of a tyrant, utterly inconsistent with fidelity, sincere affection, and all solid assurance of benevolence; in which every thing gives suspicion, causes anxiety, and banishes friendship: For who can love a man whom he is afraid of, or one by whom he imagines himself dreaded? An hypocritical regard is only paid them for a time; but should fortune frown on them, as is often the case, it will then appear, how destitute of friends they were.

Tarquin

* De Amicitia, cap. 15.

Quod Tarquinius dixisse ferunt tum exultantem se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum jam neutris gratiam referre posset. Quanquam miror, illâ superbiâ et importunitate si quemquam habere potuit. Atque ut hujus, quem dixi, mores, veros amicos parare non potuere : sic multorum opes præpotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa fortuna cæca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa est. Itaque efferuntur illi ferè fastidio et contumaciâ : neque quidquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerunt moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus immutari, spernique ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgere novis.

Quid autem stultius, quàm, cum plurimum copiiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cætera parare, quæ parentur pecuniâ, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa : amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, supellestem ? Etenim cætera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cujus causâ laborent. Ejus enim est istorum quidque, qui vincit

Tarquin, dans son exil, disoit que ses vrais et ses faux amis lui étoient connus, depuis qu'il ne pouvoit marquer du retour, ni aux uns, ni aux autres. J'ai peine à croire qu'il pût en avoir de vrais. Un homme si orgueilleux, si féroce, n'étoit pas d'un caractère à pouvoir être aimé ; et la plupart de ceux qui sont extrêmement puissans, ont cela de commun avec lui. Car non seulement la fortune est aveugle, mais pour l'ordinaire elle aveugle ses favoris. Presque tous dédaigneux, arrogans. Rien au monde n'est plus insupportable qu'un fou dans la prospérité. On voit même des gens, qui étoient auparavant d'un commerce doux et facile, lorsqu'ils passent à un poste élevé, changer tout d'un coup, et mépriser leurs anciens amis, pour se livrer à de nouveaux.

Qu'y a-t-il de moins sensé, que d'employer les secours qu'on tire d'une grande fortune, à se procurer les choses qu'on a pour de l'argent, chevaux, valets, superbes habits, vases précieux ; et de ne pas songer à s'acquérir des amis ; qui sont, pour ainsi parler, le meilleur et le plus beau meuble qu'on puisse avoir ? Toutes nos autres acquisitions, nous ne savons à qui elles iront, car elles sont

Tarquin is reported to have said, that it was only in his exile he understood who were his faithful, and who his treacherous, friends, when he could reward neither of them according to their merits: Though I should be greatly surprized, if a man of his haughty and imperious temper could find a real friend in the world. And as a man of his character could not make friends; so the power of many great men, is an insuperable obstacle to true friendship: for fortune is not only blind herself, but for the most part makes those likewise so, to whom she is favourable. Hence it is, they are commonly puffed up with arrogance, and self-conceit: and, indeed, nothing can be more insufferable than a fortunate fool. Instances also may be seen of those, who formerly were of an obliging and courteous behaviour, that on being promoted to power and authority, or better circumstances, have despised their old friends, and courted new ones.

Now what can be more unreasonable, than for those who are possessed of all the affluence of a great fortune, to provide themselves with whatever can be got for money, as horses, slaves, fine cloaths, and costly plate; but make no friends, who, if the expression may be allowed, are the best, the most splendid, furniture in life? As to other things, they are ignorant for whose sake they take so much pains to get them, since they fall to the share of whoever is strongest; but the possession of friendship is lasting and sure. Besides, allowing all the enjoyments in the disposal of fortune to be durable; yet life
without

vincit viribus : amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio : ut, etiam si illa mancant, quæ sunt quasi dona fortunæ, tamen vita inculta et deferta ab amicis non possit esse jucunda.

non blues restant ad his

non blues restant ad his

Constituendi sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines, et quasi termini diligendi : de quibus tres video sententias ferri ; quarum nullam probo. Unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus, quo erga nosmetipsos. Alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia, illorum erga nos benevolentia pariter æqualiterque respondeat. Tertiam, ut, quanti quisque seipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior.

Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quemadmodum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quæ nostrâ causâ nunquam faceremus, facinus causâ amicorum ? precari ab indigno, supplicare : tum acerbius in aliquem invehi, insectari, que vehementius : quæ in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum sunt honestissime. Multæ quoque res sunt, in quibus de

sont destinées à être un jour la proie de plus fort. Au lieu que la possession de nos amis ne peut nous être disputée : et quand même tous les présens de la fortune demeureroient entre nos mains, il n'y auroit pas de quoi nous rendre la vie agréable, si nous manquions d'amis.

On doit prescrire des bornes à l'amitié, et savoir jusqu'où elle doit aller. Je connois là-dessus trois opinions, que je n'adopte point. La première, Que nous soyons pour nos amis dans les dispositions où nous sommes à notre égard. La seconde, Que notre bienveillance pour eux soit exactement proportionnée à celle qu'ils ont pour nous. Et la troisième, Que nous pensions pour nos amis comme ils pensent eux-mêmes sur leur sujet. Aucun de ces trois sentimens n'est de mon goût.

Premièrement, Que nous devions être pour un ami dans les dispositions où nous sommes à notre égard, cela est faux. Combien de choses qu'on ne feroit pas pour soi, et qu'on fait pour un ami ? Prier qui l'on méprise, et paroître devant lui en posture de suppliant ; traiter durement quelqu'un, et le pousser avec trop de chaleur ; on rougiroit de le faire pour soi : il est beau de la faire pour un ami. Il y a d'ailleurs bien des

without friends to adorn it, can yield little satisfaction.



One * point to be settled, is, what limits, what bounds ought to be prescribed to friendship and benevolence? Concerning this, I know there are three different opinions, none of which has my approbation. One is, that we should love our friend as ourselves: another, that our benevolence to our friends should exactly correspond to theirs for us: and the third, that we ought to esteem our friends according to the value they set on themselves. To none of the three can I thoroughly assent.

As to the first, that every man should be affected in the same manner towards his friend as to himself, it is very remote from truth; for how many things do we for them, which we would never do for ourselves? Thus, to turn suppliant, and petition a man of no worth; also, to attack any one with bitter expressions of reproach, and rail at him immoderately; are what cannot be done with a good grace, in our own case; but with regard to our friends, are highly commendable. There are likewise many cases, wherein good men detract much

I from

* De Amicitia, cap. 16, 17.

de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt, detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius, quàm ipsi, fruantur.

Altera sententia est, quæ definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exiguum et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi, et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia: nec observare restrictè, ne plus reddat, quàm acceperit. Neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus æquo quid in amicitiam congeratur.

Tertius verò ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Sæpe enim in quibusdam aut animus abjectior est, aut spes amplificandæ fortunæ fractior. Non est igitur amici, talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est: sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici jacentem animum excitet, inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem.

Alius igitur finis veræ amicitiae constituendus est, si prius quid maximè reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, edixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri,

des cas où les bonnêtes-gens préfèrent, et approuvent qu'on préfère à leurs propres intérêts, ceux d'un ami.

Vouloir, en second lieu, que la bienveillance d'une part, se mesure précisément sur celle qui est de l'autre part, c'est avoir la petitesse de calculer tous les services rendus et reçus, afin que ceux-ci égalent ceux-là. Pour moi, je tiens que la vraie amitié est plus riche, plus généreuse; et n'examine pas à la rigueur, de quel côté se trouve le plus ou le moins. Jamais ne craignons d'en faire trop, ni qu'il y ait quelque chose de ce que nous faisons, qui tombe à terre.

Quant à la troisième opinion, Qu'il faut se conformer à la manière dont nos amis pensent d'eux-mêmes, c'est bien la plus mauvaise. Car il n'est point rare de trouver des gens plus humbles qu'il ne faudroit, ou qui désespèrent trop aisément de réussir. Il ne seroit pas d'un ami de penser comme eux. Tâchons, au contraire, d'obtenir qu'ils rappellent leur courage, et faisons leur concevoir des espérances plus flatteuses.

Pour fixer donc les bornes de la véritable amitié, cherchons quelque autre règle: mais après avoir parlé d'une maxime, dont Scipion, étoit souverainement blessé, Qu'on doit aimer, comme pouvant

from their own interests, or suffer it to be done, in order to promote the welfare of their friends.

The next position defines friendship by an equality of good offices, and benevolent affections. But thus to balance the kindnesses on both sides, is to make too mean, too particular an estimate of it. True friendship appears to me more noble and generous; and is not over scrupulous, lest more favours be returned, than have been received. For there is no occasion to fear, that any part of our good offices should be lost, or fall to the ground; or that more than what is reasonable be expended on friendship.

But the third opinion, that the value which every man sets on himself, ought to be the standard of the esteem paid him by his friends, is worst of all: for it is a frequent case to find some of too humble a spirit, whose hopes of bettering their circumstances are too languid. It cannot, therefore, be the part of a friend, to regulate his behaviour by the notions, which a man of this character has of himself. He ought rather to raise the drooping mind of his friend, and make him entertain more elevated prospects, and better thoughts of himself.

We must therefore find some other definition of friendship: but let us first premise, what *Scipio* used highly to condemn; which was, that no tenet could be more opposite to true friendship, than the sentiments of him who affirmed, *that a man ought to love, as if he was sure he should one day hate.* He could

quàm ejus, qui dixisset, *ita amare apportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus*. Nec verò se adduci posse, ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, à Biantè esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus è septem ; sed impuri cujusdam, aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse ? Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quàm sapissimè peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tanquam ansas ad reprehendendum : rursus autem rectè factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere. Quare hoc quidem præceptum, cujuscunque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet. Illud potiùs præcipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiiis comparandis, ut nequando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quinetiam si minùs felices in deligendo fuissimus, ferendum id Scipio potiùs, quàm inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum, putabat.

His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut cùm emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, volun-

vant haïr un jour. Rien, disoit il, n'est plus opposé à l'amitié : et il ne croyoit point que cette maxime fût, comme on le croit, de Bias, l'un des sept sages : mais il la croyoit de quelque ame corrompue, de quelque ambitieux, qui n'est occupé que de sa fortune. Peut-on, en effet, aimer quelqu'un, et avoir tout à la fois dans l'esprit, qu'un jour on le haïra ? On en sera donc réduit à souhaiter que souvent il se mette dans son tort, afin d'avoir toujours un prétexte de rompre avec lui. On sera fâché qu'il se conduise bien : et jaloux, s'il réussit. Que cette maxime soit de qui l'on voudra, elle porte un coup mortel à l'amitié. Il falloit plutôt nous recommander d'être attentifs à faire un si bon choix, qu'il ne tombât point sur une personne capable de mériter un jour notre haine. Quand même nous aurions eu le malheur de nous y tromper, encore vaud-il mieux prendre patience, disoit Scipion, que de se mettre devant les yeux une haine cachée dans l'avenir.

Voici donc enfin, selon moi, les règles qu'il faut se prescrire. Qu'entre des amis, honnêtes-gens, tout soit commun, et qu'ils se fassent part l'un

not be persuaded that this was an apophthegm of *Bias*, one of the seven wisemen, as was commonly thought ; but rather the maxim of some debauchee, a person fired with ambition, or one who makes every thing subservient to his own interest. For how can any man be a true friend, that supposes it possible he may become an enemy ? Besides, at this rate, we must wish that our friend may fall into frequent mistakes, in order to give us the more opportunities of reproving him : and, on the other hand, one must be vexed and grieved at the virtuous behaviour of his friends, and envy their good success. This maxim, therefore, whoever is its author, strikes at the very root of friendship. The following precept ought rather to have been given, “ that we ought “ to use such caution in contracting friendships, as “ never to allow our affection to settle on one, who “ afterwards may incur our hatred.” But farther, should we even prove unfortunate in our friendships, it is *Scipio*’s opinion, that we ought to bear our misfortune with patience, rather than entertain a single thought of a rupture.

The bounds then which, in my opinion, ought to be prescribed, are these ; that among friends of refined morals, all things should be in common, and their several desires and intentions imparted without reserve ; also allowing that the pursuits of our friends may happen to deviate a little from strict justice *, yet, if their life or reputation be at stake,

I 3

they

* It is evident from several passages of *Cicero*, that all he means here is only that an orator may undertake the defence of his friend, though he be persuaded in his own breast that his friend is not altogether innocent. This he practised himself in the affair of *Milo*.

voluntatum, sine ulla exceptione communitas : ut etiam si qua fortuna acciderit, ut minùs justæ amicorum voluntates adjuvandæ sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur, aut fama, declinandum sit de via, modò ne summa turpitudine sequatur. Est enim quatenus amicitia dari venia possit.



Sunt firmi, et stabiles, et constantes eligendi ; cujus generis est magna penuria : et judicare difficile est sanè, nisi expertum. Experientiam autem est in ipsa amicitia. Ita præcurrit amicitia judicium, tollitque experiendi potestatem.

Est igitur prudentis, sustinere, ut currum, sic impetum benevolentia : quod utamur quasi equis tentatis, sic amicitias, aliquâ parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam sæpe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur, quàm sint leves : quidam, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin verò erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam præferre amicitia, sordidum existiment : ubi eos invenimus,

l'un à l'autre de toutes leurs pensées, de toutes leurs intentions, sans réserve. Que si par hasard l'un fait un faux pas, qui le mette en danger de perdre l'honneur ou la vie ; l'autre, pour l'en tirer, s'écarte un peu du droit chemin, à moins que ce ne fût absolument se diffamer lui-même. On veut bien, mais jusqu'à un certain point, nous pardonner en faveur de l'amitié.



Pour nous faire des amis, il faut ne s'attacher qu'à des caractères décidés, et capables de constance. Il y en a peu : et il n'est pas aisé de les connoître, sans en avoir fait l'épreuve. Mais cette épreuve, il n'y a que dans le cours de l'amitié qu'on puisse la faire. Ainsi la liaison se forme avant que d'avoir pu se connoître ; et le parti pris, il n'y a plus d'examen.

Un homme prudent ira bride en main, comme quand on veut essayer des chevaux. Avant que de se livrer, il cherchera un peu à connoître ses gens. Pour découvrir leur foible, souvent le plus mince intérêt pécuniaire suffit. Une somme plus considérable en démasquera d'autres. Quelqu'un eût-il assez de noblesse pour préférer l'amitié à l'argent ; la préférera-t-il aux honneurs, aux magistratures, au commandement d'une

they ought to be supported, though we should strain a point for their service, provided the basest dishonesty be not the consequence : for friendship itself will excuse us only to a certain degree.



Men * of resolution, constancy, and a steady temper, should be chosen for friends : but those of this character are few in number ; and it is a difficult matter to form a true judgment in this respect, till experience has proved them. Friendship, however, must be commenced, before this can be done ; for which reason, all previous opportunities of trying them are impossible to be obtained.

It therefore becomes a prudent man, like an able charioteer, to restrain the impetuosity of his benevolence † ; that friendship, to use the expression, may be proved in the same way as horses of manege, by putting the morals of our friends to the test in some particular point. Some will discover their inconsistency on account of a small sum of money ; others, who cannot be wrought on by a small sum, will

I 4

show

To be convinced that he allows of no greater liberty to depart from the path of justice, one needs only read his Offices, lib. III. cap. 10. " A good man will neither be guilty of an offence against the state, nor break his oath or promise, even to serve his friend, and though he were appointed his judge : For at the time he puts on the character of a judge, he lays aside that of a friend. He owes, indeed, so much to friendship, as to wish his friend's cause was just ; and to allow him as much time as the laws permit, for pleading it."

* De Amicitia, cap. 21.

† An allusion to a verse quoted in his letters to *Atticus*, XIII. 21.

mus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant? cum ex altera parte proposita hæc sint, ex altera jus amicitiae, non multò illa malint? Imbecilla enim natura est ad contemnendam potentiam: quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sunt, excusatum iri se arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque verae amicitiae difficillimè reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur. Ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo?



Est etiam quasi quædam calamitas in amicitiiis dimittendis nonnunquam necessaria: jam enim à sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt sæpe vitia amicorum cum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos; quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usûs eluendæ, et (ut Catonem dicere audivi) *diffuendæ magis, quàm discindendæ*: nisi quædam admodum intolerabilis injuria exarserit, ut neque rectum, neque honestum sit, neque fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disjunctioque facienda sit.

Plerique

d'une armée? Quand il ne trouvera pour tout obstacle à son aggrandissement, que les droits de l'amitié; hésitera-t-il? Car le mépris de la grandeur passe les forces du cœur humain. Et lorsqu'il n'en coûte pour s'élever, que de sacrifier un ami, on se persuade que le succès porte son excuse avec soi. Aussi est-il bien difficile que la sincère amitié se rencontre avec l'ambition. Voit-on, en effet, quelqu'un préférer à sa propre élévation, celle de son ami?



On éprouve quelquefois la dure nécessité d'en venir à une rupture. Je parle des liaisons ordinaires, et non de celles qui se forment entre des sages. Quelquefois il arrive que la probité de nos amis se dément, ou à notre égard, ou à l'égard de quelque autre, mais de manière que la honte en rejaillit sur nous. Alors, en cessant peu à peu de se voir, on vient à cesser d'être ami: et il faut, comme disoit Caton, plutôt découdre, que déchirer: à moins qu'il ne s'agisse d'une noirceur, qui nous porte à une séparation et à un éclat, qu'il ne soit ni juste, ni honnête, ni possible de différer.

Une

show themselves for a greater. But admitting that some should be found, who think it base to prefer money to friendship; yet where shall we meet with any, who do not prefer honours, magistracies, power, dignity, and riches, to it; or, if all these be proposed on the one hand, and the duties of friendship on the other, that do not readily give the preference to the former? For our nature is too weak to resist the temptation of power; and men think themselves very excusable, though they acquire it even at the expence of friendship; because it is not without great cause they do so. Whence it is next to impossible to find true friendship among the votaries of ambition, and ministers of state. For where is the man to be found, that takes more concern for the preferment of his friend, than that of himself?



There * is likewise a cruel necessity sometimes for dropping friendship; for I am now speaking of that in ordinary life, and not such as takes place among wise men. Our friends are frequently guilty of offences both against ourselves and others, the scandal whereof chiefly lights on us. Such as these, therefore, must be dropped, by neglecting all friendly intercourse; and rather by little and little, as I have heard *Cato* say, than abruptly: unless some very heinous crime be committed, so that it is neither right, honourable, or even possible, for us to defer one moment to break with the guilty person.

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Plerique perversè ne dicam impudenter, amicum habere talem volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt : quæque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, hæc ab iis desiderant. Par est autem, primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quærere. In talibus ea, quam jamdudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest : cum homines benevolentia conjuncti, primum cupiditatibus iis, quibus cæteri serviunt, imperabunt : deinde æquitate justitiæque gaudebunt, omniæque alter pro altero suscipiet : neque quidquam unquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit : neque solum colent inter se, ac diligunt, sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existimant, libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. Virtutum amicitia adiutrix à natura data est, non vitiorum comes.

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Una est amicitia in rebus humanis, de cujus utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. Quanquam à multis ipsa virtus contemnitur, et venditatio

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Une injustice, pour ne pas dire une impudence bien commune parmi les hommes, c'est de vouloir que les bonnes qualitez, dont ils sont dépourvus, se trouvent dans leur ami ; et qu'ont ait pour eux des égards, dont ils se dispensent. La raison veut que nous commençons par être honnêtes-gens, et qu'ensuite nous cherchions qui nous ressemble. Toute liaison, pour être durable, suppose qu'on a triomphé des passions, qui commandent au reste des hommes : qu'on aime la droiture et la justice : qu'on est disposé à tout entreprendre l'un pour l'autre : qu'on ne se demande jamais rien que de conforme à l'honneur et à la probité : qu'on a l'un pour l'autre, non seulement de la déférence, mais du respect. Car dépouillée du respect, l'amitié perd le plus beau de ses ornemens. Ainsi, de croire qu'on puisse entre amis prendre toute sorte de libertez, c'est une pernicieuse erreur. L'amitié nous est donnée par la nature, non pour favoriser le vice, mais pour aider la vertu.

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Rien au monde n'est reconnu généralement pour utile, que l'amitié. Plusieurs méprisent la vertu elle-même, et ne la regardent que comme



Most * people are so unreasonable, not to say shameless, as to desire their friends should be, what they themselves cannot attain to; and expect more from them than they are willing to give in return. In justice, however, one should first be a good man himself, and then cultivate friendship with those of his own character. Among such as these, the friendship we have been recommending may be established on a solid basis; because men united by benevolence, will not only triumph over those passions which enslave the rest of mankind, but likewise take a pleasure in justice and equity, and readily do all kind of good offices for one another: nor will they ever require any thing, but what is just and honourable; and besides love and esteem, will have a mutual reverence for each other. To deprive friendship of this reverence, is to rob it of its greatest ornament; and for any to suppose, that all manner of licentiousness and offences are allowable among friends, is a pernicious error. Friendship was given by nature, not to favour vice, but to be an aid to virtue.



Friendship † is the only thing in the world, concerning the usefulness of which all mankind are agreed. Even virtue itself is despised by many, and called a sort of vanity and ostentation. Many, who are content with little, and pleased with frugality in meat and dress, look down on riches with

I 6

contempt.

* De Amicitia, cap. 22.

† Ibid. cap. 23.

ditatio quædam atque ostentatio esse dicitur : multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat : honores verò, quorum cupiditate quidam inflamman-
tur, quàm multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil levius esse existiment : itémque cætera, quæ quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt, qui pro nihilo putent. De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt : et ii, qui ad rempublicam se contulerunt : et ii, qui rerum cognitione doctrinæque delectantur : et ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi : postremò ii, qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam sentiunt, si modò velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere.

Serpit enim nescio quomodo per omnium vitam amicitia, nec ullam ætatis degendæ rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quinetiam si quis eâ asperitate est, et immanitate naturæ, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus : tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerb-
tatis suæ.

Atque hoc maximè judi-
cetur,

me une sorte d'ostentation. Plusieurs, contents de peu, et qui ne connoissent ni bonne chère, ni luxe, ne font nul cas des richesses. Pour une infinité d'autres, rien de si frivole, rien de si vain, que ces mêmes honneurs, qui ont tant d'appas pour certaines gens. Ainsi de tout le reste : ce qui enchante les uns, est néant aux yeux des autres. Mais sur l'amitié, il n'y a qu'une voix : et ceux qui gouvernent les affaires publiques, et ceux qui se livrent par goût à l'étude, et ceux qui se bornent à leurs affaires particulières, et ceux, enfin, que le plaisir occupe uniquement ; tous, sans exception, trouvent que de vivre sans amis, c'est ne pas vivre, si l'on veut tenir de l'honnête-homme par quelque endroit.

A tout âge, dans toute condition, l'amitié se fait, je ne sais comment, une route dans tous les cœurs, et ne souffre point qu'on se passe d'elle. Un homme fût-il assez farouche, assez dénaturé pour fuir tout commerce avec les autres hommes, et pour les haïr, comme faisoit, à ce qu'on dit, un certain Timon d'Athènes ; encore ne seroit-il pas en son pouvoir de ne pas chercher quelqu'un, dans le sein de qui le poison de sa mauvaise humeur pût trouver à se répandre.

*On sentiroit mieux cette
vérité,*

contempt. And as to honours, which are so earnestly desired by some, there are others, and they not a few, who have so low an opinion of them as to think nothing so insignificant and empty. Thus it is likewise in other cases: what raises the admiration of some, is by many others reckoned good for nothing. But all the world, to a man, are of the same sentiments about friendship: statesmen and philosophers, the men of business, and those who are entirely devoted to pleasures, are all agreed that there is no living without friendship, at least in such a way, as is not altogether unbecoming a gentleman.

Friendship insinuates itself, I know not how, among all ranks of men; nor is there any condition of life free from its influence: nay, could we suppose a man of so surly and savage a disposition, as to hate and avoid human society, like a certain fellow of *Athens* called *Timon*; yet even one of this complexion cannot live at ease, till he has found a person on whom he may vent his spleen and ill humour.

Of this we would be more fully convinced, should some God, if the supposition may be allowed, transport us from the society of mankind; and placing us in a desert, there supply us with all the necessaries of life in great abundance; but make it impossible for us to see the face of a man. Who could be so hard-hearted, as to be able to endure
this

caretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleretur, et in solitudine uspiam collocaret, atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quis natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam, hominis omnino adspicendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?

Verum ergo illud est, quod à Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum, nostros senes commemorare audivi, ab aliis senibus auditum: *Si quis in cœlum ascendisset, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.* Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tanquam adminiculum annitur: quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

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Cujus aures veritati clausæ sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, hujus salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis: *Multò melius de quibusdam*

vérité, s'il étoit possible qu'un Dieu, en nous dérobant à la société des hommes, nous transportât dans un désert, où il nous fourniroit abondamment tout ce qui peut flatter les sens, mais de manière qu'il n'y eût pour nous aucun moyen, aucune espérance de voir personne. Quel est le cœur d'airain, qui pût à ce prix-là supporter la vie, et dans cette affreuse solitude, trouver du goût aux plaisirs qu'on lui offriroit?

Archytas de Tarente (au moins il ne semble que c'est lui) étoit donc bien fondé à dire une chose que je tiens de nos pères, qui la tenoient des leurs, Que si quelqu'un étoit monté au ciel, d'où il découvreroit la beauté des astres et la structure de l'univers; cette vûe, quoique si merveilleuse et si ravissante, deviendrait insipide pour lui, parce qu'il n'auroit pas à qui raconter ce qu'il voit. Tant il est vrai, que le dégoût pour la solitude nous est naturel. On est porté à chercher toujours quelque sorte d'appui. Or l'ami le plus tendre, est l'appui le plus agréable.

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Regardons comme un malade incurable, l'homme que la vérité offense dans la bouche de son ami. On a bien plus d'obligation, disoit Caton, à des ennemis durs.

this way of life, and whose pleasures of every kind would not be rendered insipid by such a solitude?

Nothing therefore is more true, than the saying of, I think, *Archytas* of *Tarentum*, as I have heard it told by our fathers*, who had it from theirs; *that could a man ascend into heaven, and there observe the structure of the universe, and the beauty of the stars; yet, if he has no friend to relate it to, that which otherwise would have been most delightful, will prove insipid to him.* Hence it appears, that nature has an invincible aversion to solitude, and always leans, as it were, against some prop; which support yields us most pleasure, when proceeding from our best friends.



The † case of that man is certainly desperate, whose ears are shut against truth; so that he cannot endure to hear it even from the mouth of his friend. For it is wisely remarked by *Cato*; *that some men are more beholden to their inveterate enemies, than to such friends as always appear complaisant. The former frequently tell the truth, but the latter never.* It is certainly a great absurdity in those, who being put in mind of their duty, give themselves no trouble about what they ought chiefly to lay to heart; and are vexed, where there is no sufficient cause. They are not grieved at the commission of a fault, but at being

* Between *Archytas* and *Lelius*, who speaks here, there was about the space of two centuries; for *Archytas* was cotemporary with *Plato*. See *De Senectute*, chap. 12. But as we have already observed, it is to keep up the decorum of the dialogue, that *Cicero* does not make *Lelius* speak with more exactness, which would discover too much knowledge.

† *De Amicitia*, cap. 27.

busdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quàm eos amicos, qui dulces videantur: illos verum sæpè dicere, hos nunquam. Atque illud absurdum est, quòd ii, qui morientur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt: eam capiunt, quàm debent vacare. Peccasse enim se non anguntur, objurgari molestè ferunt: quod contrà oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

Ut igitur et monere, et moneri, proprium est veræ amicitiae: et alterum liberè facere, non asperè; alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter: sic habendum est, nullam in amicitias pestem esse majorem, quàm adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem. Quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum, levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluptatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. Cùm autem omnium rerum simulatio est vitiosa, (tollit enim judicium veri, idque adulterat) tum amicitiae repugnat maximè: delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest.

Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus: qui
id

durs et mordans, qu'à ces sortes d'amis, qui paroissent la douceur même: ceux là nous disent souvent la vérité, ceux ci ne la disent jamais. On est cependant si peu raisonnable, qu'on ne se fait pas une peine de ce qui devroit chagriner, et qu'on se chagrine de ce qui ne devroit pas être une peine. Au lieu d'être fâché d'avoir tort, et charmé d'être repris, on ne se reproche point l'un, et on ne peut souffrir l'autre.

Puisque les avis réciproques sont un devoir essentiel de l'amitié, il faut donc les donner librement, et sans aigreur; les recevoir avec soumission, et sans repugnance. Par la même raison, il n'y a rien de si pernicieux dans l'amitié, que la flatte-rie, les manières doucereuses, la complaisance outrée: Je me sers de plusieurs expressions, pour mieux peindre ces hommes frivoles et artificieux, qui n'ouvrent la bouche que pour plaire, et aux dépens de la vérité. Tout déguisement est un mal, puisqu'il altère le vrai, et nous empêche de le discerner. Mais sur-tout il ne s'allie point avec l'amitié: car il exclut la vérité, sans quoi l'amitié n'est rien.

Tel est le pouvoir de l'amitié, que de plusieurs ames elle n'en fait, pour ainsi dire,

being reproved for it: whereas they ought to be sorry on account of the fault, and well pleased with the admonition.

Wherefore, as it is a peculiar property of true friendship, both to give and take advice *; and as the one ought to be done with freedom, not ill-nature; the other received patiently, and not with reluctance: so it should be laid down for a maxim; that nothing can happen in friendship so pernicious as flattery, and a complaisant, cajoling, behaviour. For though several names are necessary to express the vice of those trifling deceivers, whose whole conversation is in order to please, and not to be subservient to truth: yet as dissimulation is, in every case, faulty, because it corrupts and hinders us from discerning truth; so it is in a singular manner repugnant to friendship: for it destroys truth, without which the bare name of friendship will signify little.

Now since the power of friendship consists in forming, as it were, several minds into one; how can

* It is an easy matter to lay down a beautiful theory of friendship, set forth its usefulness, and prescribe rules to those who enter into it. The description charms our fancy, and fills us with a kind of enthusiastic warmth. All pay homage to the enchanting idea of friendship, acknowledge its usefulness, and are ravished with the thoughts of its refined pleasures. But where is the thing itself to be found? Is there such a thing as perfect friendship in the world? Or, allowing there is, how few are qualified to act the part of a true friend? What delicacy is necessary to form such a character? Nothing is more difficult, than to comply with the precept here mentioned, of giving and taking advice. However, as this must be allowed to be an essential part of friendship, I shall subjoin the *Spectator's* advice concerning it, as the most proper that can be followed.

“ The most difficult province in friendship is the letting a man
“ see his faults and errors, which should, if possible, be so contrived,
“ that he may perceive our advice is given him not so much to
“ please

id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit, idemque semper; sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium, quàm animus ejus, qui ad alterius non modò sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

Negat quis? nego. Ait?

aio. Postremo imperavi egomet mihi,

Omnia assentari,

ut ait idem Terentius: sed ille sub Gnathonis persona: quod amici genus adhibere, omnio levitatis est. Multi autem Gnathonum similes, cùm sint loco, fortunâ famâ superiores: horum est assentatio molesta, cùm ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. Secerni autem blandus amicus à vero, et internosci tam potest, adhibitâ diligentîâ, quàm omnia fucata, et simulata à sinceris atque veris.

dire, qu'une seule. Or cela se peut-il, lorsqu'il y a dans l'un des prétendus amis, non une ame simple, et toujours la même; mais une ame double, et qui se diversifie à chaque instant? Quelle souplesse, que celle d'une ame qui se plie et se replie comme elle veut, pour se conformer, ne disons pas seulement aux volontez de quelqu'un, mais à l'air qu'on lui voit, et au moindre signe qu'il fait?

On dit non, je dis non: on dit oui, je le dis:

Jamais je ne conteste, et toujours j'approuve.

Térence fait parler ainsi Gnathon, un parasite. Il y a bien de l'imprudence à se lier avec de telles gens: mais le caractère de ces Gnathons n'étant point rare dans les personnes d'un tout autre rang, il est à craindre que la flatterie, accompagnée de la réputation, de la fortune, et du crédit, ne trouve à se faire écouter. Qui voudra pourtant y regarder de près, distinguera le flatteur d'avec l'ami, comme on discerne la faux et le fardé, d'avec le vrai et le naturel.

can this be done, where every particular person has not always one and the same mind ; but is fickle, inconstant, and various * ? For can any thing be so wavering and unnaturally pliant, as the mind of one who conforms not only to the sentiments and desires, but even the least look and nod, of another ?

Does he affirm a thing, or it deny ?

I do the same : and still, you're right, I cry.

As Terence † has it : but this he puts into the mouth of *Gnatho*, a Parasite ; which kind of friends it would be the height of imprudence to have any connexion with. There are many, however, not unlike *Gnatho* in manners, though they be much superior to him in birth, fortune, and reputation. The flattering complaisance of such men is the more troublesome, as their vanity is supported by the authority due to their rank. But the cajoling friend may, with a little attention, be as easily distinguished from a true one, as things counterfeited and painted, from those that are true and natural.

“ please ourselves as for his own advantage. The reproaches therefore of a friend should always be strictly just, and not too frequent. The violent desire of pleasing in the person reproved, may otherwise change into a despair of doing it, while he finds himself censured for faults he is not conscious of. A mind that is softened and humanized by friendship, cannot bear frequent reproaches ; either it must quite sink under the oppression, or abate considerably of the value and esteem it had for him who bestows them.”

* *Martial* has given us a fine description of a friend of this stamp, in the following epigram :

*Difficilis, facilis, jucundus, acerbus es idem,
Nec tecum possum vivere, nec sine te.*

† Eunuch, Act II. Sc. 2.

IX.

De SENECTUTE.

QUIBUS nihil opis est in ipsis ad bene beatéque vivendum, iis omnis gravis est ætas : qui autem omnia bona à se ipsi petunt, iis nihil potest malum videri, quod naturæ necessitas afferat. Quo in genere in primis est senectus : quam ut adipiscantur omnes optant, eandem accusant adepti : tanta est inconstantia stultitiæ, atque perversitas. Obrepere aiunt eam citius quam putassent. Primum, quis coegit eos falsum putare ? qui enim citius adolescentiæ senectus, quam pueritiæ adolescentia obrepit ? Deinde, qui minùs gravis esset iis senectus, si octingentesimum annum agerent, quam octogesimum ? præterita enim ætas, quamvis longa, cum effluxisset, nullâ consolatione permulcere posset stultam senectutem.

Quocirca si sapientiam meam admirari soletis, (quæ utinam

IX.

Sur la VIELLESSE.

POUR ceux qui n'ont point de ressource dans eux-mêmes, tout âge est difficile à passer. Mais, lorsqu'on tire de son propre fonds toute sa félicité, on ne trouve rien de fâcheux dans les ordres de la nature. Appliquons cela sur-tout à la vieillesse. Tout le monde souhaite d'y parvenir : et quand on y est arrivé, tout le monde s'en plaint. Tant il y a d'inconstance et d'injustice dans les hommes qui ne raisonnent pas. La vieillesse, disent-ils, est venue à eux sourdement, et bien plus vite qu'ils ne s'y attendoient. Mais, s'ils ont mal supputé, à qui le faute ? Car la vieillesse s'est elle plus vite glissée après la jeunesse, que la jeunesse après l'enfance ? Mais de plus, leur seroit-elle moins onéreuse au bout de huit cents ans, qu'elle ne l'est au bout de quatre-vingts ? Tout le passé, quelque long qu'il fût, ne pourroit, étant passé, consoler une folle vieillesse, et l'adoucir.

Ainsi ma sagesse (hé que ne répond-elle à l'idée que vous

IX.

On OLD AGE.

EVERY * stage of life is a burthen to those who have no fund of happiness within themselves: but they who derive all their felicity from this source, cannot possibly think any thing grievous, that proceeds from the stated order of nature. In which class old age may, in a special manner, be ranked: the attainment whereof is the universal wish of mankind; who make it no less the subject of complaint, when obtained. So great is the mutability of their folly and perverseness. It has stolen upon us, say they, sooner than we could have imagined. But then who obliged them to make a false computation? For what faster, pray, does old age creep upon youth, than youth upon infancy? Again, what less burthensome would old age be, should they live to eight hundred years, than it is at eighty? For the past part of life, however long that may be, can afford no satisfaction to comfort an old age ridiculous in itself.

Now † if it be true that you are charmed with my wisdom (and I wish it may be answerable to your

* De Senectute, cap. 2.

† He who speaks here, and through the whole of this article, is Cato the Elder; whose life is written by *Plutarch*.

utinam digna esset opinione
vestrâ, nostrôque cogno-
mine!) in hoc sumus sa-
pientes, quòd naturam op-
timam ducem, tanquam
deum, sequimur, eique pa-
rémus: à qua non verifi-
mile est, cùm cæteræ par-
tes ætatis bene descriptæ
sint, extremum actum, tan-
quam ab inertî poëta, esse
neglectum. Sed tamen ne-
cessè fuit esse aliquid ex-
tremum, et, tanquam in
arborum baccis terræque
frugibus, maturitate tem-
pestivâ, quasi vietum et
caducum: quod ferendum
est molliter sapienti. Quid
enim est aliud, gigantum
modo bellare cum diis, nisi
naturæ repugnare?



Etenim cùm contemplor
animo, reperio quatuor
causas, cur senectus misera
videatur: unam, quòd avo-
cet à rebus gerendis: alte-
ram, quòd corpus faciat
infirmius: tertiam, quòd
privet omnibus ferè volup-
tatibus: quartam, quòd
haud procul absit à morte.
Earum, si placet, causarum
quanta, quàmque sit justa
unaquæque, videamus.

A rebus

*vous en avez, et au surnom
que l'on me donne!) cette
sagesse qui vous cause, dites-
vous, de l'admiration, ne
consiste qu'en ce que je suis
pas à pas le meilleur de tous
les guides, la nature. Je
lui obéis, comme à un Dieu.
Puisqu'elle a si bien arrangé
les autres parties, dont la
vie humaine est composée, il
n'est pas vrai-semblable qu'
elle ait négligé, comme fe-
roit un poëte ignorant, le
dernier acte de la pièce.
Mais enfin, comme les fruits,
à un certain point de maturi-
té, le flétrissent, et ne ti-
ennent presque plus à l'arbre,
il y a nécessairement pour nous
quelque chose de semblable;
et c'est un état que l'homme
sage prend en gré. Vouloir
s'opposer à la nature, ne se-
roit-ce pas, à la manière des
géants, déclarer la guerre
aux Dieux?*



Pour moi, quand j'exa-
mine par où la vieillesse pa-
roît attaquer notre bonheur,
je vois que cela se réduit à
quatre points, dont le premier
est, Qu'elle nous rend inca-
pables d'agir: le second,
Qu'elle affoiblit le corps: le
troisième, Qu'elle nous pri-
ve presque de tout plaisir: le
quatrième, Qu'elle n'est pas
bien éloignée de la mort. Voy-
ons, s'il vous plaît, ce que
chacune de ces raisons a de
force et de solidité.

Un

your good opinion, and the surname I bear!) it consists in this, that I have followed nature, the best of guides; and obeyed her precepts, as I would those of a God: nor is it probable, that after having acted the former parts of my life as I ought, nature should, like a bad poet, quite neglect the last act of the piece. In a word, like the fruits of the earth arrived at full maturity, it is necessary there should be a last period of life, that withers, as it were, and drops down of itself; which a wise man ought to bear with patience: for what else is it to wage war with the Gods, after the manner of the giants *, if it be not to resist nature?



Upon † serious examination, then, I find four causes why old age appears miserable. The first is, that it disqualifies us for business; the second, that it enfeebles our bodies; the third, that it deprives us of all pleasure; and the fourth, that it borders upon death. Let us examine then, if you please, what justice and weight there is in each of them.

Does

* The giants are feigned by the poets to have been men of a monstrous size. *Typhon*, the chief of them, according to *Hesiod*, was the son of *Tartarus* and *Terra*: But *Homer* will have him to be the son of *Juno* alone. His stature was so prodigious, that he reached the east with one hand, the west with the other, and the stars with his head. By this fable, the poets represent the winds: for as they blow from all parts of heaven; so in a storm, they agitate and drive the clouds with extreme violence; which gave rise to the fable of the giants making war upon heaven.

† De Senectute, cap. 5.

✱✱
A rebus gerendis senectus abstrahit? Quibus? an iis, quæ in juventute geruntur et viribus? Nullæne igitur res sunt seniles, quæ vel infirmis corporibus, animo tamen administrantur?

Qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant, similes sunt iis qui gubernatorem in navigando agere nihil dicant, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursent, alii sentinam exhauriant: ille autem clavum tenens sedeat in puppi quietus. Non faciat ea, quæ juvenes. At verò multo majora et meliora facit. Non viribus, aut velocitatibus, aut celeritate corporum res magnæ geruntur: sed consilio, auctoritate, sententiâ, quibus non modò non orbari, sed etiam augeri senectus solet. Nisi fortè ego vobis, qui et miles, et tribunus, et legatus, et consul versatus sum in vario genere bellorum, cessare nunc videor, cum bella non gero. At senatui, quæ sunt gerenda, præscribo, et quomodo.

✱✱
Un vieillard n'est plus capable d'agir? Et dans quelles occasions? Dans celles où il faudroit la vigueur de la jeunesse? Mais n'y en a-t-il donc point, où ce soit assez que l'esprit agisse, quelque foible que soit le corps?

Prétendre que la vieillesse n'est bonne à rien, c'est comme qui diroit que le pilote est inutile dans un vaisseau, sous prétexte que les uns montent au haut des mâts, les autres pompent au fond de cale, les autres manœuvrent ça et là; tandis que le pilote, qui tient le gouvernail, est tranquillement assis sur la poupe. Un vieillard ne fait pas les mêmes choses, que de jeunes gens: mais il en fait, et de bien plus importantes, et de bien meilleures. Ce qui décide les grandes affaires, ce n'est pas la force, la vitesse, l'agilité du corps; c'est la prudence, l'autorité, un avis ouvert à propos. Or cette espèce de mérite, loin de péricliter, augmente pour l'ordinaire avec l'âge. J'ai longtemps fait le métier des armes, en qualité de soldat, de tribun, de lieutenant, de consul. Aujourd'hui, parce que je ne vais pas à l'armée, me croyez-vous inutile? Je ne marche pas en personne: mais le sénat apprend de moi en quels lieux il doit porter la guerre, et comment.

Quodd

Vous



Does * old age render us unfit for business ? For what business pray ? Is it such as requires the strength and vigour of youth ? Are there then no occupations proper for old age, that may be managed by the rational part of man, even though the body be weakly ?

To affirm that old age is incapable of business, is the same as to maintain that a pilot is of no use in navigation ; because, whilst some mount the shrouds, others run on the deck, or work at the pump, he sits quietly at the helm. An old man, indeed, cannot perform such actions as requires youth ; but he does what is much greater, as well as better. It is neither by strength, swiftness, or agility of body, that affairs of great importance are transacted ; but by prudence, authority, and good advice ; which, far from being lost, are even much improved, for the most part, by age. Unless, perhaps, you think that I, who have acted the part of a soldier, a tribune, a lieutenant-general, and a consul, am now become wholly useless, because I can no longer bear a part in all manner of warlike expeditions, as formerly. But then I inform the senate what is fit to be done, and after what manner.

* De Senectute, cap. 6.

Quòd si legerè, aut audire voletis externa, maximas respublicas ab adolescentibus labefactas, à senibus sustentatas et restitutas reperietis.

Cedo, quæ vestram rempublicam tantam amisistis tam citò ?

Sic enim percontanti, ut est in Nævii poëtæ ludo, respondentur et alia, et hæc in primis :

Proveniebant oratores novi, stulti, adolescentuli.

Temeritas est videlicet florentis ætatis ; prudentia, senescentis.

At memoria minuitur : Credo, nisi eam exerceas, aut si sis naturâ tardior.

Nec verò quemquam senum audivi oblitum, quo loco thesaurum obruisset. Omnia, quæ curant, meminerunt : vadimonia constituta : qui sibi, quibus ipsi debeant.

Quid jurisconsulti ? quid pontifices ? quid augures ? quid philosophi senes ? quàm multa meminerunt ? Manent ingenia senibus, modò permaneat studium et industria

Vous trouverez dans les histoires étrangères que les plus grandes républiques ont été renversées par de jeunes gens ; soutenues et rétablies par des vieillards. On demande, dans une comédie de Névius :

Comment vous êtes-vous si-tôt précipitez.

Du faite de votre puissance ?

Parmi les causes qu'on en allègue, la principale est celle-ci :

En nommant aux emplois, de jeunes éventez, Sans cervelle et sans connoissance.

Aussi est-il bien vrai qu'à la fleur de l'âge, la témérité domine, et la prudence, lorsqu'on est sur le déclin.

Mais la mémoire se perd ? Oui, quand elle n'a jamais été bonne, ou qu'on néglige de l'exercer.

Je n'entendis jamais dire qu'un vieillard eût oublié dans quel endroit il avoit caché son trésor. Toute affaire qui le touche, une assignation donnée ou reçue, ceux qui lui doivent, ceux à qui lui-même il doit, il ne l'oubliera point.

Parlerai-je des jurisconsultes, des pontifes, des augures, des philosophes, qui poussent loin leur carrière ? Quel amas de connoissances ils conservent jusqu'à la fin !

Pourvu

Would you but consult the accounts left us of foreign transactions, you will find that the greatest states have been ruined by young men; but supported and restored by the old. Thus, in a play of the poet *Nævius*, it is said,

*Sudden the fall of your once mighty state!
Unfold, I pray, the cause of its dire fate?*

The answer to which is chiefly what follows;

*Its counsellors were men of no repute;
Or unfledg'd striplings, that were fools to boot.*

For rashness is the true characteristic of youth, as prudence is of old age.

But memory decays. This may indeed be the case, if it is neglected, or naturally a bad one.

I * never heard, however, of an old man, that forgot where he had hid his treasure. They easily remember all that nearly concerns them, as obligations entered into, their own debtors, or those to whom they themselves are indebted.

What shall we say of lawyers, priests, augurs, and philosophers, who, though advanced in years, have remembered a vast multiplicity of things? Old men never lose their abilities, if diligence and application to study be not wanting: nor speak I this of men of fame and renown only, but likewise of those who live in a private and undisturbed retirement.

K 2

Sophocles

* De Senectute, cap. 7.

dustria: nec ea solum in claris et honoratis viris, sed in vita etiam privata et quieta. Sophocles ad summam senectutem tragoedias fecit, quod propter studium, cum rem familiarem negligere videretur, à filiis in iudicium vocatus est: ut, quemadmodum nostra more malè rem gerentibus patribus bonis interdici solet; sic illum, quasi desipientem, à re familiari removerent iudices. Tum senex dicitur eam fabulam, quam in manibus habebat, et proxime scripserat, Oedipum Coloneum recitasse iudicibus, quæsiitque, num illud carmen desipientis videretur. Quo recitato, sententiis iudicum est liberatus.

Possim nominare ex agro Sabino rusticos Romanos vicinos et familiares meos, quibus absentibus, nunquam ferè ulla in agro majora opera fiunt, non ferendis, non percipiendis, non condendis fructibus. Quanquam in illis minùs hoc mirum. Nemo enim est tam senex, qui se annum non putet posse vivere. Sed iidem elaborant in eis, quæ sciunt nihil ompino ad se peruenire.

Pourvu qu'on ne discontinue pas de s'appliquer, l'esprit ne baisse point avec l'âge. Vous le voyez dans la vie privée, aussi-bien que dans les grandes places. Temoin Sophocle, qui dans une extrême vieillesse, composoit encore des tragédies. Occupé de ses vers, il paroissoit négliger ses affaires domestiques: et là dessus, selon ce qui se pratique chez nous à l'égard des pères dissipateurs, ses enfans demandèrent qu'il fût interdit, comme ne sachant ce qu'il faisoit. Alors, dit-on, ce bon vieillard étant allé réciter à ses juges son Oedipe Colone, qu'il venoit seulement d'achever, il leur demanda si c'étoit là l'ouvrage d'un imbécille: et ses juges, après avoir entendu la pièce, le renvoyèrent absous.

J'ai pour amis, et pour voisins à la campagne, des vieillards qui ne permettroient pas qu'il se fit rien de considérable chez eux, comme de semer, de moissonner, de serrer les grains, sans qu'ils y fussent présents. A la vérité, cela n'est pas bien étonnant: car il n'y a personne d'assez décrépit, pour ne pas se flatter qu'on pourra bien vivre encore une année. Mais le merveilleux est, qu'un vieillard se donne des peines, dont il est sûr de ne pas recueillir le fruit: et comme

Sophocles continued to write plays to an extreme old age; and because he seemed, for the sake of study, to throw off all regards for his domestic affairs, he was sued at law by his sons; that, according to our own usage of removing from the management of an estate such fathers as are unfit for discharging that trust to advantage, the judges might restrain him in the same manner, as being turned a dotard. On which the old man is said to have read to his judges the play of *Oedipus Coloneus**, which happened to be in his hand, and had been but lately finished: This done, he asked his judges if that poem could be the work of one that had lost his senses; whereupon they unanimously stopped any farther prosecution against him.

I † could name old country gentlemen ‡ in the *Sabine* territories, who are my friends and neighbours, and our own fellow-citizens, that were never absent from their farms when any work of consequence was to be done, as sowing, reaping, and gathering the corn into barns. This, however, is no-wise surprizing in them: for there are none so old, but think they may live a year. Nay, these very men take a great deal of pains about what

K 3 they

* *Oedipus Coloneus*, or more clearly, *Oedipus retired to a hill*. There are two tragedies, written by *Sophocles*, called *Oedipus*; to distinguish which, the title of this one, here mentioned, comprehends the place where the scene is laid.

† De Senectute, cap. 8.

‡ In the *French*, it is in the country, in general: but the original has it, in the country of the *Sabines*. It was here that *Cato*, though born at *Tusculum*, used to reside and pass his time, before he went to serve in the army, on some lands and possessions, which his father, according to *Plutarch* of *Amyot*, had left him.

214 THOUGHTS of CICERO.

*Serit arbores, quæ alteri
seculo profint,*

ut ait Statius noster in Synephebis. Nec verò dubitet agricola, quamvis senex, quærenti, cui ferat, respondere: Diis immortalibus, qui me non accipere modò hæc à majoribus voluerunt, sed etiam posteris prodere.



Nec nunc quidem vires desidero adolescentis, (is enim erat locus alter de vitiis senectutis) non plus, quàm adolescens tauri, aut elephanti desiderabam. Quod est, eo decet uti: et quidquid agas, agere pro viribus.

Et si ista ipsa defectio virium adolescentiæ vitiis efficitur sapius, quàm senectutis. Libidinosa etenim, et intemperans adolescentia effectum corpus tradit senectuti.

Arbitror te audire, Scipio, hospes tuus avitus Masinissa quæ faciat hodie, nonaginta annos natus: cum ingressus iter pedibus fit, in equum omnino non ascendere; cum equo, ex equo

dit Cecilius, dans les Synephebes,

Il s'occupe à planter pour le siècle prochain.

Allez lui demander, Pour qui plantez-vous? Il vous répondra, Pour les Dieux immortels, qui ont voulu, et que je profite du travail de ceux qui m'ont précédé, et que ceux qui me suivront, profitent du mien.



A l'égard des forces corporelles, sur quoi porte le second reproche qu'on fait à la vieillesse: présentement je desire tout aussi peu d'être fort comme un jeune homme que je desirois autrefois d'être fort comme un taureau, ou comme un éléphant. Il s'agit d'employer ce que vous avez de forces, et de faire toujours de votre mieux ce que vous pouvez.

Il est pourtant vrai que c'est à la jeunesse, encore plus souvent qu'à la vieillesse, qu'on doit imputer le dépérissement de ses forces. Une jeunesse qui se livre à ses passions, et sans mesure, ne transmet à la vieillesse qu'un corps usé.

Vous savez sans doute, Scipion, ce que fait encore aujourd'hui l'hôte de vos aïeux, Masinissa, qui est dans sa quatre-vingt-dixième année. A pied, à cheval, il est infatigable. Toujours la tête

they very well know can never be of any service to themselves.

His trees he plants, the future age to serve.

As our countryman *Statius* has it, in his *Synephebi* *. Now should any one ask an old farmer for whom he plants, he will make no scruple to answer, For the immortal Gods, whose pleasure it is that I should not only receive these from my ancestors, but likewise perpetuate them to posterity.



At † present, indeed, I no more desire the strength of a young man, for that is the second objection to old age, than I desired that of a bull or elephant, when young. Whatever ability a man possesses, he ought to make a good use of it, and in all his actions exert himself accordingly.

The want of bodily strength, however, is more frequently owing to the vices of youth, than to old age itself. For intemperance and debauchery in the former, renders the body exhausted and feeble before the latter arrives.

You ‡ have heard, *Scipio*, I dare say, how *Masiniſſa*, the dear friend of your ancestors ||, passes
K 4 his

* *Synephebi*, or, the young Companions, was a Greek comedy of *Menander*, translated, or rather imitated in *Latin* by *Cecilius*, who is called *Statius* in the original. *Statius* is the name of a slave, and was a kind of nick-name given him, on account of his former slavery.

† De *Senectute*, cap. 9.

‡ Ibid. cap. 10.

|| We shall see afterwards, in *Scipio's* dream, how intimate a friendship subsisted between *Masiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, and the family of the *Scipio's*. At the beginning of the second punic war, he had joined the *Carthaginians*; but one of his nephews being made prisoner,

equo non descendere : nullo imbre, nullo frigore adduci, ut capite operto sit : summam in eo esse corporis siccitatem : itaque exequi omnia regis officia et munera. Potest igitur exercitatio, et temperantia etiam senectuti conservare aliquid pristini roboris.

Nunquam sum assensus veteri illi laudatôque proverbio, quod monet, maturè fieri senem, si diù velis esse senex. Ego verò me minùs diù senem esse mallem, quàm esse senem antè, quàm essem.

Resistendum senectuti est, ejusque vitia diligentia compensanda sunt. Pugnandum, tanquam contra morbum, sic contra senectutem. Habenda ratio valetudinis : utendum exercitationibus modicis : tantum cibi et potionis adhibendum, ut reficiantur vires non opprimantur. Nec verò corpori soli subveniendum est, sed menti atque animo multò magis. Nam hæc quoque, nisi tanquam lumini oleum instilles, extinguuntur senectute—Nam quos ait Cæcilius, *comicos stultos senes* : hos significat credulos, obliuifos, dissolutos : quæ vitia sunt non senectutis, sed inertis, ignavæ, somniculosæ senectutis.

tête nue, quelque pluie, et quelque froid qu'il fasse. Point chargé de chair, ni d'humeurs. Remplissant tous ses devoirs, faisant toutes ses fonctions de roi. Ainsi l'exercice et la tempérance sont capables de conserver aux vieillards quelque chose de leur première vigueur.

Je n'ai jamais goûté ce vieux proverbe, qui est si commun, Que pour être long-temps vieux, il faut l'être de bonne heure. Pour moi, plutôt que de l'être avant terme, j'aime mieux l'être moins long-temps.

Raidissons-nous contre la vieillesse. Que l'attention redoublée de notre part, compense les torts qu'elle peut avoir. Traitons-la comme une maladie, contre laquelle il faut lutter. Prenons soin de notre santé ; faisons un exercice modéré : buvons et mangeons pour réparer nos forces seulement, et non jusqu'à les outrer. Mais pourvoyons aux besoins de l'esprit, autant et plus qu'à ceux du corps. C'est une lampe où il faut remettre de l'huile, sans quoi la vieillesse l'éteint. Car ces fots vieillards de comédie, ainsi que parle Cécilius, c'est-à-dire, qui sont crédules, oublieux, négligens, ce n'est point leur âge qui les rends tels, c'est leur paresse, c'est qu'ils ne savent rien faire, c'est qu'ils ne font que dormir.

Ut

J'aime

his time ; who is now ninety years of age : if he begins a journey on foot, he can by no means be prevailed on to make use of a horse ; and if he sets out on horseback, he never alights : rain and cold, however tempestuous, cannot hinder him from going bare-headed : his body is absolutely firm and free from humours : in a word, he discharges all the duties and business incumbent on a king. Hence we see that exercise and temperance may transmit something of our former vigour to old age.

I could never approve of the old proverb, so much in repute, that advises, if we would live to be old to begin early to be so. As for my part, I had rather my old age should be the shorter ; than to act the old man, before I really was so.

We * ought to hold out against old age with courage, and compensate, by our diligence, for its inconveniencies. We should struggle with old age, as with a disease. The preservation of health demands our utmost attention. In order to which, we should use moderate exercise, and take so much meat and drink as is necessary to refresh and recruit, and not to oppress, our strength. Nor is the body alone to be cared for, much more concern ought to be taken about our mind, and rational part. For even these will be extinguished by old age, unless, like a lamp, you feed them with new oil. As to

K 5

those

prisoner, and set at liberty by *Scipio* the elder without any ransom, he was so sensibly touched with this generosity, that he declared himself wholly for the *Romans*. He was far from being useless to them, and for a reward of his services, they not only confirmed him in his own kingdom, but gave him some other lands, which they had taken from the *Cartaginians*.

* De Senectute, cap. 11.

Ut adolescentem, in quo senile aliquid ; sic senem, in quo est adolescentis aliquid, probò : quod qui sequitur, corpore senex esse poterit, animo nunquam erit.



Sequitur tertia vituperatio senectutis, quòd eam carere dicunt voluptatibus. O præclarum munus ætatis, si quidem id aufert nobis, quod est in adolescentia vitiosissimum !

Accipite enim, optimi adolescentes, veterem orationem Archytæ Tarentini, magni in primis, et præclari viri : quæ mihi tradita est, cum essem adolescens Tarenti cum Q. Maximo. Nullam capitaliorem pestem, quàm corporis voluptatem, hominibus dicebat à natura datam : cujus voluptatis avidæ libidines temerè et effrenatè ad potiundum incitarentur. Hinc patriæ prodiones, hinc rerumpublicarum everfiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci : nullam denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret : stupra verò, et adulteria, et omne tale flagitium nullis aliis illecebris excitari, nisi voluptatis. Cumque homini sive natura, sive quis deus nihil mente præstabilus

J'aime que le jeune homme tienne un peu du vieillard, et que le vieillard tienne un peu du jeune homme. Observons cette règle, et notre corps pourra bien vieillir ; mais notre esprit, non.



On reproche, en troisième lieu, à la vieillesse, de n'être plus propre à goûter le plaisir. Que nous lui sommes donc redevables, d'avoir écarté de nous ce que la jeunesse a de plus dangereux !

Jeunes gens, écoutez ce que disoit un des grands hommes qu'il y ait eu, Archytas de Tarente. J'ai entendu raconter son discours à Tarente même, où j'étois dans ma jeunesse avec Fabius. La volupté, disoit-il, est le plus terrible fléau du genre humain, puisque c'est la soif de la volupté, qui allume les plus violentes passions. Pour la satisfaire on trahit sa patrie, on renverse les républiques, on a de secrets entretiens avec l'ennemi, on se porte à tous les crimes, à tous les attentats possibles. On ne connoîtroit ni adultères, ni autres horreurs de cette espèce, sans les amorces du plaisir. Et comme le plus riche présent que l'homme ait reçu, ou de la nature, ou de quelque Dieu, c'est la raison, aussi la raison n'a-t-elle point de plus mortelle ennemie que la volupté. Où la volupté domine,

those whom *Cæcilius* calls *old comic fools*, he means such as were credulous, forgetful, and indolent; which are not properly the vices of old age, but rather the effects of laziness, inactivity, and sluggishness.

As I approve of a youth that has something of the old man in him; so I am no less pleased with an old man, that has something of the youth. He that follows this rule, may be old in body, but can never be so in mind.



Next * follows the third objection to old age, viz. that it has no relish for pleasures. Excellent advantage of age, since it frees us from what is most blameable in youth.

For attend, ye best of youths, to what *Archytas* of *Tarentum* has said on this subject, who was one of the greatest and most renowned men that ever lived. I had it related to me when a young man at *Tarentum* with *Q. Fabius Maximus* †. Sensual pleasure, said he, is the most pernicious endowment that nature has bestowed on mankind; for in order to gratify it, we give a loose to our most inordinate passions, which carry all before them. Hence proceed treasons against our country, the subversion of states, and clandestine conferences with the public enemy ‡: in short, there is no crime

K 6

* De Senectute, cap. 12.

† *Cato*, in this dialogue on old age, chap. 5. tells on what occasion, and character, he was at *Tarentum* with *Fabius* the Great, who was furnished the *Temporiser*.

‡ This is a satirical touch on what likewise happened at the siege of *Tarentum*, where *Fabius* had the address to carry on an intrigue of gallantry, in order to serve his own purposes.

lius dedisset; huic divino muneri ac dono nihil esse tam inimicum, quàm voluptatem. Nec enim libidine dominante temperantiæ locum esse; neque omnino in voluptatis regno virtutem posse consistere. Quod quò magis intelligi posset; fingere animo aliquem jubebat, tantâ incitatum voluptate corporis, quanta percipi posset maxima: nemini censebat fore dubium, quin tamdiu, dum ita gauderet, nihil cogitatione consequi posset. Quocirca nihil esse tam detestabile, tàmque pestiferum, quàm voluptatem: si quidem ea, cum major esset atque longior, omne animi lumen extingueret.

domine, il n'y a plus de retenue, et la vertu ne séjourne point où la volupté régné. Pour le mieux comprendre, figurez-vous quelqu'un, disoit Archytas, dans l'accès du plaisir le plus vif que les sens puissent goûter. Tant que durera ce transport, assurément l'esprit de cet homme-là ne sauroit faire aucune fonction. Rien donc de si détestable, rien de si nuisible que la volupté, puisque l'effet qu'elle produit, lorsqu'elle a le plus de force et de durée, c'est d'éteindre le flambeau de l'ame.

Bene Sophocles, cum ex eo quidam jam affecto ætate quæreret, uteretur rebus venereis: *Dii meliora, inquit. Libenter verò istinc, tanquam à domino agresti ac furioso profugi.*

On demandoit à Sophocle, qui étoit déjà sur le retour de l'âge, s'il avoit encore quelque commerce avec Vénus. Que les Dieux m'en preservent, dit il sagement. J'ai été ravi de me tirer de là, comme d'entre les mains d'un maître brutal et furieux.

crime so heinous, no villany so base, which the lust of pleasure will not make people commit: as for rapes, adulteries, and such like base actions, it is to the insinuating blandishments of pleasure they are entirely owing. Again, though reason be the most excellent gift that nature, or rather some God, has bestowed on man; yet nothing is such an enemy to this divine present, this blessing of the Gods, as pleasure: For there can be no room for temperance, where lust bears an uncontrouled sway; nor is it possible for virtue to have any residence, where pleasure reigns. And in order to make this still better understood, he bid us figure to ourselves a man under the influence of as exquisite pleasure as the imagination can possibly conceive: there are none, he thinks, but will allow, that while this transport lasts, such a man could not do one single action with judgment, reason, or reflection. Wherefore nothing is so detestable and hurtful, as pleasure; because, should it prevail in any high degree, or considerable length of time, it would quite extinguish every spark of intellectual light in the soul *.

It † was admirably well answered by *Sophocles*, when asked if he had any commerce with women

now

* Pleasure, no less than our ideas, may be distinguished into that which is apprehended by means of our bodily senses, and that which proceeds from reflexion. The former comprehends whatever is pleasing to animal nature; the latter, whatever is agreeable to right reason. The one is limited to the correspondence between external objects and our organs of sensation, the other unbounded as the universe. They differ also in degree; for on comparing the pleasures of the palate and smell, or even those arising from a fine prospect or concert of music, with that we feel from the reflexion of having discharged the duties of an affectionate parent, of a grateful child, of a sincere friend, of a
generous

† De Senectute, cap. 14.



Quarta restat causa, quæ maximè angere atque sollicitam habere nostram ætatem videtur, appropinquatio mortis, quæ certè à senectute non potest longè abesse. O miserum senem, qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa ætate non viderit!

Quamquam quis est tam stultus, quamvis sit adolescens, cui sit exploratum, se ad vesperum esse victurum? Quin etiam ætas illa multò plures, quàm nostra, mortis casus habet. Facilius in morbos incidunt adolescentes graviùs ægrotant, tristius curantur. Itaque pauci veniunt ad senectutem: quod ni ita accideret, melius et prudentius viveretur. Mens enim, et ratio, et consilium, in senibus est.

At sperat adolescens, diù se victurum: quod sperare idem senex non potest. Insipienter sperat. Quid enim stultius, quàm incerta pro certis habere, falsa pro veris? Senex ne quod speret quidem habet. At est eo meliore conditione, quàm adolescens: cùm id, quod ille sperat, hic jam consecutus est. Ille vult diù vivere: hic diù vixit.



Reste un quatrième sujet de plainte contre la vieillesse, Qu'elle n'est pas éloignée de la mort. Voilà principalement ce qui cause la mauvaise humeur d'un vieillard. O! qu'il est digne de pitié, d'avoir tant vécu, sans avoir appris à mépriser la mort.

Quel est l'insensé, qui tiennent pour sûr, fût-il à la fleur de l'âge, qu'il vivra jusqu'au soir? Une jeune homme a même plus de risques à courir que nous. C'est un âge où les maladies sont plus communes, plus aiguës, plus longues. Aussi voit-on peu de gens vieillir. On s'en trouveroit bien mieux, que cela fût autrement. Car le bon sens et la prudence n'appartiennent qu'aux vieillards.

Mais le vieillard ne peut espérer de vivre long-temps, au lieu que le jeune homme s'en flatte. C'est follement qu'il s'en flatte. Quelle illusion moins raisonnable, que de compter sur l'incertain, et de prendre le faux pour le vrai? Un vieillard est sans espérance: d'accord. Mais sa condition est la plus avantageuse, en cela même qu'il possède déjà ce que l'autre ne fait qu'espérer. Celui-ci veut vivre long-temps: l'autre a long-temps vécu.

Breve

Quelque

now in his old days : *Heaven forbid*, says he. *No, I have with pleasure made my escape from all desires of this kind, as from a savage and furious tyrant.*



There * remains a fourth objection, that renders our advanced state of life full of anxiety and concern, viz. the approach of death ; which cannot, in the nature of things, be far removed from old age. How wretched is the old man, who, in the whole course of his long life, has not learned that death is to be despised !

Besides, who is there, though in the very flower of his youth, so infatuate, as to promise himself one single day's existence ? And, indeed, this age is much more subject to mortal accidents, than ours. Young men fall into distempers more easily, are sicker under them, and cured with greater difficulty. Hence few arrive at old age ; which is one reason, why mankind live not better and more prudently : for good sense, understanding, and prudence are only to be found in old men.

Ay, but a youth may hope to live for a considerable time, which an old man cannot. Such hopes are folly : for what is more inconsistent with reason, than to hold incertainties for certain, and falsehoods for truth ? An old man, indeed, has nothing to hope for. But even in this respect, he has
the

generous patriot, in short, of one who has acted as he ought both towards God and man ; what a disparity shall we find between them ? How low and groveling the one ? How exalted and rational the other ? Besides, sensual pleasure is fleeting and momentary ; but that of reflexion, durable and lasting as our existence. Now though old men lose, in a great measure, the pleasures of the former ; yet they enjoy those of the latter in a superior degree to the young. So that, by remembering this distinction, the objection vanishes of course.

* De Senectute, cap. 19.

Breve tempus ætatis, satis est longum ad bene honestèque vivendum. Sin processeris longiùs, non magis dolendum est, quàm agricolæ dolent, præteritâ verni temporis suavitate, æstatem autumnûmque venisse. Ver enim, tanquam adolescentiam significat, ostenditque fructus futuros : reliqua tempora demetendis fructibus, et percipiendis accommodata sunt. Fructus autem senectutis est (ut sæpe dixi) antè partorum bonorum memoria et copia.



Nec tamen omnes possunt esse Scipiones, aut Maximi, ut urbium expugnationes, ut pedestres navalisque pugnas, ut bella à se gesta, ut triumphos recordentur. Est etiam quieté, et purè et eleganter actæ ætatis placida, ac lenis senectus : qualem accepimus Platonis, qui uno et octogesimo anno scribens mortuus est. Qualem Isocratis, qui eum librum, qui Panathenæicus inscribitur, quarto, et nonagesimo anno scripsisse dicitur, vixitque quinquennium postea : cuius magister, Leontinus Gorgias, centum, et septem complevit annos : neque unquam in suo studio, atque opere cessavit. Qui, cum ex eo quæreretur, cur tamdiu vellet

Quelque peu qu'on vive, c'est assez pour bien vivre. Si votre carrière est plus longue, imitez alors le laboureur, que ne s'attriste pas de voir que l'aimable printemps ait disparu, pour faire place à l'été et à l'automne. Le printemps, image de la jeunesse, donne l'espérance des fruits, dont la récolte est destinée à d'autres saisons. Avoir de bonnes actions, et un grand nombre de bonnes actions à repasser dans son esprit, c'est, comme je l'ai dit souvent, le fruit réservé à la vieillesse.



Tous les hommes, il est vrai, ne sauroient être des Scipions, ou des Fabius : avoir le mémoire remplie de villes prises, de combats sur terre et sur mer, de victoires, de triumphes. Mais à des jours passez tranquillement, innocemment, en honnête homme, succède aussi une douce et paisible vieillesse. Telle fut celle de Platon, mort dans sa quatre-vingt-unième année, la plume à la main. Telle fut celle d'Isocrate, qui, lorsqu'il fit son Panathenæique, avoit, dit-on, quatre-vingt-quatorze ans, et vécut encore cinq ans au delà. Gorgias, qui avoit été son maître, vécut cent sept ans accomplis, et il étudia, il travailla jusqu'au bout. Quelqu'un lui ayant demandé comment il ne se

the advantage of a young man ; as having already obtained, what the other only hopes to arrive at. The latter wishes to live long, the former hath actually done so.

However short the duration of life, 'tis abundantly long, if spent agreeably to the dictates of virtue and honour. But should it be spun out longer, there is no more reason to be grieved on that account, than the husbandmen have, when after the sweet season of spring is past, they see the summer and autumn advance. For the spring is a kind of emblem of youth, and exposes to our view the buds of the future fruit ; for the reaping and in-gathering of which, the other seasons are accommodated. Now the fruit of old age, as I have often observed, is the remembrance of our many brave and virtuous actions in the former part of life.



All * men, however, cannot be *Scipio's*, or *Maximus's*, to have their memories filled with sieges of cities taken, with land and sea engagements, with wars they had happily finished, or triumphs they had been honoured with. But if life is spent in an easy, innocent, and genteel manner, old age will not fail to be calm and serene. Such was that of *Plato*, who though he lived to be eighty-one years old, yet continued his studies to the last. Such also was that of *Isocrates*, who is said to have written the treatise called *Panathenaicon* †; in the ninety-fourth year of his age, and to have lived five years afterwards. His præceptor *Leontinus Gorgias* lived

no

* De Senectute, cap. 5.

† This is the title of a long discourse in praise of the *Athenians*.

vellet esse in vita: *Nihil habeo*, inquit, *quod incusem senectutem*. *Præclarum responsum, et docto homine dignum*. Sua enim vitia insipientes, et suam culpam in senectutem conferunt: quod non faciebat Ennius,

*Sicut fortis equus, spatio qui sæpe supremo
Vicit olympia, nunc senio confectus quiescit.*

Equi fortis, et victoris senectuti comparat suam.

se dégoûtoit point de la vie, C'est, dit-il, que je n'ai point à me plaindre de la vieillesse. Réponse bien digne d'un savant homme: car les fous, au contraire, rendent la vieillesse responsable de leurs propres défauts: injustice dont Ennius fut exempt, comme on le voit par cette comparaison, qu'il s'applique à lui-même:

Tel qu'un Courfier fameux,
qui, jeune et plein d'ardeur,
De l'Elide vingt fois remporta tout l'honneur,
Par les ans accablé, sans perdre sa noblesse,
Abandonne au repos une lente vieillesse.

no less than an hundred and seven; and yet never gave over his study and occupation. Being asked, what pleasure he could take in life, at those years: *I have no reason*, says he, *to complain of old age*. An answer truly excellent, and worthy of a learned man: for it is ignorant fools alone, who throw the blame of their own vices, and bad conduct, on old age. *Ennius* acted in another manner, who compares his own old age, to that of a victorious race-horse.

*As the brave steed, who oft th' olympic prize has won,
Rests from the glorious toil, when feeble age comes on.*

X.

De MORTE.

NIHIL in malis ducamus, quod sit vel à diis immortalibus, vel à natura parente omnium constitutum. Non enim temerè nec fortuito sati et creati sumus : sed profectò fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consuleret humano : nec id gigneret, aut aleret, quod, cum exanclavisset omnes labores, tum incidere in mortis malum sempiternum. Porro potius paratum nobis et perfugium putemus : quò utinam velis passis pervehi liceat ? Sin restantibus ventis rejiciemur, tamen eodem paulò tardius referamur necesse est. Quod autem omnibus necesse est, idne miserum esse uni potest ?

X.

Sur la MORT.

RIEN de ce qui a été déterminé, ou par les Dieux immortels, ou par notre commune mère la nature, ne doit être compté pour un mal. Car enfin, ce n'est pas le hasard, ce n'est pas une cause aveugle, qui nous a créés : mais nous devons l'être certainement à quelque puissance, qui veille sur le genre humain. Elle ne s'est pas donné le soin de nous produire, et de conserver nos jours, pour nous précipiter, après nous avoir fait éprouver toutes les misères de ce monde, dans une mort suivie d'un mal éternel. Regardons plutôt la mort comme un asyle, comme un port qui nous attend. Plût à Dieu que nous y fussions, menez à pleines voiles ! Mais les vents auront beau nous retarder, il faudra nécessairement que nous arrivions, quoiqu'un peu plus tard. Or, ce qui est pour tous une nécessité, seroit-il pour moi seul un mal ?

X.

On D E A T H.

WE * esteem nothing to be an evil, that is the appointment of the immortal Gods, or of nature the common parent of all things. For we were not created and formed by chance, or at random: no, there certainly was some powerful being, that took care of the interests of mankind, and would never have given them existence, or furnished them with the means of life, if, after having struggled with the various misfortunes attending it, they were at last to be swallowed up by, that worst of evils, everlasting death †. Let us rather account it a haven, or place of refuge, prepared for us; and oh that we could fly thither with full spread sails! But should we be detained by contrary winds, it is absolutely certain, however, that we shall arrive at it, only somewhat later. Now how can that be a hardship to any one person, which all must necessarily undergo?

In

* Tuscul. I. 49.

† According to the idea which the natural reason of the Pagans formed of a supreme Being, they looked upon his character to be made up of infinite goodness alone. But religion teaches us, that the goodness of God is inseparable from his justice; and as there are eternal rewards for good men, so there are eternal punishments for the wicked. Whence the certainty of a future state, is proved to a demonstration; because necessarily connected with the existence of a good and just God, who will reward the virtuous, and punish the wicked. See page 37.

✱✱✱
Mulieres in India, cum est cujusvis earum vir mortuus, in certamen judiciumque veniunt, quam plurimum ille dilexerit. Plures enim singulis solent esse nuptæ. Quæ est victrix, ea læta, prosequentibus suis, unâ cum viro in rogam imponitur: illa victa, moesta discedit. Nunquam naturam mos vinceret: est enim ea semper invicta.

✱✱✱
Pellantur istæ ineptiæ penè aniles, ante tempus mori miserum esse. Quod tandem tempus? Naturæne? At ea quidem dedit usuram vitæ, tanquam pecuniæ, nullâ præstitutâ die. Quid est igitur, quod querere, si repetit, cum vult? eâ enim conditione acciperas.

Iidem, si puer parvus occidet, æquo animo ferendum putant: si verò in cunis, ne querendum quidem. Atqui ab hoc acerbius exegit natura, quod dederat. Nondum gustaverat, inquiunt, vitæ suavitatem: hic autem jam sperabat magna, quibus frui cœperat. At id quidem ipsum

✱✱✱
Aux Indes, la pluralité des femmes est reçue. Quand un homme est mort, ses veuves se rendent devant le juge, pour faire décider laquelle a été le plus tendrement chérie: et celle qui remporte la victoire, court d'un air gai, suivie de ses parens, se placer sur le bûcher de son époux, tandis que l'autre se retire, accablée de tristesse. Jamais coutume n'eût fait braver la mort, si la mort étoit contre la nature: car la nature est toujours au dessus de tout.

✱✱✱
Peut-on donner dans ce préjugé ridicule, qu'il est bien triste de mourir avant le temps? Et de quel temps veut-on parler? De celui que la nature a fixé? Mais elle nous donne la vie, comme on prête de l'argent, sans fixer le terme du remboursement. Pourquoi trouver étrange qu'elle la reprenne, quand il lui plaît? Vous ne l'avez reçue qu'à cette condition.

Qu'un petit enfant meure, on s'en console. Qu'il en meure un au berceau, on n'y songe seulement pas. C'est pourtant d'eux que la nature a exigé le plus durement sa dette. Mais, dit on, ils n'avoient pas encore goûté les douceurs de la vie; au lieu que tel autre, pris dans un âge

In * *India*, where a plurality of wives is allowed, when a husband happens to die, they all make their appearance in a court of justice, and have a hot dispute, which of them was most beloved by the deceased. She that gets the better, is escorted thence by her friends, and joyfully mounts the funeral pile, to be placed beside her husband : whereas she that is cast, departs quite overwhelmed with grief. No custom sure could thus brave nature, which always maintains its superiority.



Hence † then with these womanish complaints, that it is a great misfortune to die before our time. I would ask what time ? Is it that of nature ? But she, indeed, has lent us life, as we do a sum of money, only no certain day is fixed for the payment. What reason then to complain, if she demands it at pleasure ; since it was on this condition you received it ?

Such men as these, think the death of a young boy ought to be born with patience ; but should an infant in the cradle happen to die, there is not the least ground of complaint. And yet, in this last case, nature exacts her loan more rigorously than in the other. Ay, but say they, the latter had not as yet tasted the sweetness of life ; whereas the other had entertained very great expectations, and had even begun to enjoy them. In other matters, however, it is thought much preferable to receive a part, rather than none at all ; and why not so with regard to life ? Though it is a true enough observation

* *Tuscul. V. 27.*

† *Ibid. 1439.*

ipsum in cæteris rebus melius putatur, aliquam partem, quàm nullam, attingere ; cur in vita secus ? Quamquam non malè ait Callimachus, *multo sæpius lacrymassè Priamum, quàm Troilum.*

Eorum autem, qui exactâ ætate moriuntur, fortuna laudatur. Cur ? Nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, possèt esse jucundior. Nihil est enim perfectò homini prudentiâ dulcius : quam, ut cætera auferat, affert certè senectus.

Quæ verò ætas longo est ? Aut quid omnino homini longum ? Nonne modò pueros, modo adolescentes, in cursu, à tergo insequens, nec opinantes affecuta est senectus ? Sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum ducimus. Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt, pro rata parte aut longa aut brevia dicuntur. Apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europæ parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles ait bestio-
las quasdam nasci, quæ unum diem vivant. Ex his igitur,

âge plus avancé, se promettoit une fortune riante, et déjà commençoit à en jouir. D'où vient qu'il n'en est donc pas de la vie comme des autres biens, dont on aime mieux avoir une partie, que de manquer le tout ? Priam, dit Callimaque, et c'est une sage réflexion, Priam a plus souvent pleuré que Troïle.

On loue la destinée de ceux qui meurent de vieillesse. Par quelle raison ? Il me semble au contraire, que si les vieillards avoient plus de temps à vivre, c'est eux dont la vie seroit la plus agréable. Car de tous les avantages dont l'homme peut se flatter, la prudence est certainement le plus satisfaisant ; et quand il seroit vrai que la vieillesse nous prive absolument de tous les autres, du moins nous procure-t-elle celui là.

Mais qu'appelle-t-on vivre long-temps ? Hé qu'y a-t-il pour nous qu'on puisse appeler durable ? Il n'y a qu'un pas de l'enfance à la jeunesse ; et notre course est à peine commencée, que la vieillesse nous atteint, sans que nous y pensions. Comme la vieillesse est notre borne, nous appelons cela un grand âge. Vous n'êtes sensé vivre peu, ou beaucoup, que relativement à ce que vivent ceux-ci, ou ceux-là. Aristote dit que sur les bords du Fleuve Hypanis, qui tombe du côté de l'Europe dans

observation of *Callimachus*, that *Priam* wept much oftener than *Troilus* *.

On the other hand, the good fortune of those who die of old age, is highly celebrated. For what reason? It is my opinion, indeed, that was the life of old men protracted longer, it would be the most agreeable of all others: for certainly there is nothing yields a man more satisfaction than prudence; and though old age deprives us of other comforts, yet it is sure to bring this one along with it.

But what age deserves to be called long? Or is there any thing at all, which concerns man, that merits to be called so? Are we not hurried on from infancy to youth, and from youth to old age, which, pursuing invisibly, overtakes us in the middle of our career, and before we are aware? But because we have nothing beyond, we account it long. All these stages of life, in every individual, are said to be either long or short, only in regard to their stated and usual length. *Aristotle* tells us, that on the banks of the river *Hypanis* †, which on the part of *Europe* falls into the Black-sea, there are found certain insects, which live but the space of one day. Such of

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these

* *Priam* having lived to be an old man, and suffered such a number of misfortunes, must certainly have had many more occasions to weep than *Troilus* his son, who was slain by *Achilles* in the flower of his age.

† A river of antient *Sarmatia*, now called the *Bog*; which running through the east-part of *Poland*, falls into the *Pontus Euxinus*, or Black-sea, to the north of the *Neister*.

igitur, horâ octavâ quæ mortua est, propectâ ætate mortua est: quæ verò occidente sole, decrepitâ: eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. Confer nostram longissimam ætatem cum æternitate: in eadem prope modum brevitatem, qua illæ bestiolæ, reperiemur.

dans le Pont-Euxin, il se forme de certaines petites bêtes, qui ne vivent que l'espace d'un jour. Celle qui meurt à deux heures après midi, meurt bien âgée; & celle qui va jusqu'au coucher du soleil, meurt décrépète, surtout un grand jour d'été. Si vous comparez avec l'éternité la vie de l'homme la plus longue, vous trouverez que ces petites bêtes y tiennent presque autant de place que nous.

Non deterret sapientem mors, quæ propter incertos casus quotidie imminet, propter brevitatem vitæ nunquam longè potest abesse, quo minùs in omne tempus reipublicæ suisque consulat, & posteritatem ipsam, cujus sensum habiturus non sit, ad se putet pertinere. Quare licet etiam mortalem esse animum judicantem, æterna moliri, non gloriæ cupiditate, quam sensurus non sit, sed virtutis, quam necessariò gloria, etiam si tu id non agas, consequatur.

Quoiqu'à toute heure mille accidens nous menacent de la mort, & que, même sans accident, elle ne puisse jamais être bien éloignée, vu la brièveté de nos jours; cependant elle n'empêche pas le sage de porter ses vûes le plus loin qu'il peut dans l'avenir, & de regarder l'avenir comme étant à lui, en tant que la patrie & les siens y sont intéressés. Tout mortel qu'il se croit, il travaille pour l'éternité. Et le motif qui l'anime, ce n'est pas la gloire, car il sait qu'après sa mort elle ne le touchera point: mais c'est la vertu, dont la gloire est toujours une suite nécessaire, sans que l'on y ait même pensé.

Sed profectò mors tum æquissimo animo appetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. Nemo

A l'heure de la mort, c'est une ressource bien consolante, que le souvenir d'une belle vie. En quelque temps que meure

these therefore as die at the eighth hour *, arrive to a considerable age; but those which die at sunset, live to be decrepid; and the more so, if it happens to be one of the longest days in summer. Now our longest life if compared with eternity, will be found to differ almost nothing from the short duration of these insects.



Though † death, by reason of many unforeseen accidents, daily hangs over us; and cannot, considering the shortness of human life, be far remote; yet it never deters a wise man from consulting the future welfare of his country and family, and interesting himself for posterity, of whom he shall have no knowledge. Wherefore should one even believe the soul to be mortal, he may mind things of eternal consequence, and that not from a desire of glory, whereof he can have no sense; but from a principle of virtue, which is necessarily attended by real glory, notwithstanding he should have no such view.



But ‡ certainly we suffer death with greatest resignation, when we can solace our dying minutes

L 2

with

* The eighth hour of the *Romans* answered nearly to our two o'clock in the afternoon: for they divided the day, *viz.* from sun-rising to sunset, into twelve hours; which though always equal among themselves, yet varied in length according to the different seasons of the year; and therefore could not correspond exactly to our hours, except at the two equinoxes. Their night was divided after the same manner.

† Tusc. I. 38.

‡ Tusc. I. 45.

Nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectæ perfectio functus est munere.

meure un homme qui a toujours fait tout le bien qu'il a pu, il n'a point à se plaindre de n'avoir pas vécu assez.

✱✱✱
In animi cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi planè in physicis plumbeifumus, quin nihil sit animus admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certè nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerni, nec distrahi potest: nec interire igitur. Est enim interitus quasi discessus, & secretio, ac diremptus earum partium, quæ ante interitum junctione aliquâ tenebantur.

His & talibus rationibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit: adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbia; & supremo vitæ die de hoc ipso multa differuit; & paucis antè diebus, cum facillè posset educi è custodia, noluit: & cum penè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in cœlum videretur ascendere.

✱✱✱
A moins que d'être d'une crasse ignorance en physique, on ne peut douter que l'ame ne soit une substance très-simple, qui n'admet point de mélange, point de composition. Il suit de là que l'ame est indivisible, & par conséquent immortelle. Car la mort n'est autre chose qu'une séparation, qu'une desunion des parties, qui auparavant étoient liées ensemble.

Pénétré de ces principes, Socrate, au point d'être jugé à mort, ne daigna, ni faire plaider sa cause, ni se montrer devant les juges en posture de suppliant. Il conserva une noble fierté, qui venoit, non d'orgueil, mais de grandeur d'ame. Le jour même de sa mort, il discourut long-temps sur le sujet que nous traitons. Peu de jours auparavant, maître de s'évader de sa prison, il ne l'avoit point voulu. Et dans le temps qu'on alloit lui apporter le breuvage mortel, il parla, non en homme à qui l'on arrache la vie, mais en homme qui monte au ciel.

with reflections of self-approbation. No man hath lived too short a time, who has fully discharged the duties of an exalted virtue.



As * to the knowledge of the soul, if we be not perfectly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot entertain a doubt, that it is absolutely simple, free from all mixture, and nowise compounded, joined or made up of different parts. Since this then is the case, surely it can neither be separated nor divided, and consequently must be immortal. For death is, as it were, the separation, division, and disunion of those parts, that formerly were somehow united.

Induced by these, and the like reasons, *Socrates* neither desired an advocate to plead his cause, nor turned suppliant to his judges: but showed a free and generous boldness, that proceeded from true greatness of soul, and not from pride. On the day of his death, he held a long discourse on this very subject. Though he might have been easily rescued from prison some days before this happened, he refused to comply. Nay when he was just going to lay hold of the deadly cup, he talked in such a manner, as if he was not about to suffer a violent death, but to ascend into heaven.

* Ibid. 29.

Ita enim censebat, itaque differuit, duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium. Nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent, & se totos libidinibus dedissent, quibus cæcati vel domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent, vel in republica violanda fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent, iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum à concilio deorum. Qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum: his ad illos, à quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere.



Neque assentior iis, qui hæc nuper differere cœperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire, atque omnia morte deleri. Plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum majorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa jura tribuerunt; quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur: vel eorum, qui in hac terra fuerunt, magnamque Græciam (quæ nunc quidem deleta est; tum florebat) institutis & præceptis suis erudierunt: vel ejus, qui Apollinis oraculo

Deux chemins, disoit-il, s'offrent aux âmes, lorsqu'elles sortent des corps. Celles qui dominées et aveuglées par les passions humaines, ont à se reprocher, ou des vices personnels & domestiques, ou des injustices irréparables, prennent un chemin tout opposé à celui qui mène au séjour des Dieux. Pour celles qui ont, au contraire, conservé leur innocence & leur pureté; qui se sont sauvées, tant qu'elles ont pu, de la contagion des sens; & qui, dans des corps humains, ont imité la vie des Dieux; le chemin du ciel, d'où elles sont venues, leur est ouvert.



Je ne crois nullement que l'âme périsse avec le corps, ainsi que l'enseignent des philosophes modernes, qui veulent que la mort soit un anéantissement total. Je défère bien plus au sentiment de nos pères, qui étoit celui de l'antiquité: car ils n'auroient pas si religieusement prescrit ce qui se doit aux morts, s'ils avoient cru que les morts ne fussent plus sensibles à rien. Et le sentiment, pour lequel je me déclare, fut aussi celui de ces sçavans hommes, qui répandus autrefois dans nos contrées, annoncèrent leur doctrine

For thus he thought, and constantly maintained, that there are two different ways, and two opposite courses, taken by souls at their departure from the body. Such as have polluted themselves with the common vices of mankind, devoted their whole powers to the gratification of their lusts, and stained their characters with private crimes, or been guilty of irreparable injustice against the state, follow a by-path, directly opposite to that which leads to the mansions of the Gods. But they, on the contrary, who have preserved their innocence and purity entire, kept themselves as free as possible from the contagion of bodies, acted always as distinct from them, and though united to human bodies, have imitated the life of the Gods; these, I say, have an easy return to the immortal beings, from whom they came.



I * can, by no means, assent to those †, who have lately attempted to prove that the soul perishes with the body, and that the whole of man is absorbed by death. The authority of the antients, and of our own ancestors, is of more weight with me; who have ordained sacred rites to be performed for the dead; which certainly they would never have done, had they believed that the dead are no wise interest-

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* De Amicitia, cap. 4.

† The Epicureans. Cicero, in his dialogue on *friendship*, makes *Laelius* speak in this manner, in regard of whom *Epicurus* was only a modern. *Laelius* was born about thirty or forty years after the death of *Epicurus*.

culo sapientissimus est judicatus; qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem dicebat semper, animos hominum esse divinos; iisque, cum è corpore excessissent, reditum in cœlum patere, optimoque & justissimo cuique expeditissimum.

doctrine à la grande Grece, aujourd'hui deserte, mais alors florissante. Ce fut celui de cet Athénien, que l'oracle d'Apollon reconnut pour le plus sage des hommes. Assez incertain presque sur tout le reste: mais à cet égard, soutenant toujours que nos âmes sont d'une nature divine; qu'au sortir du corps elles retournent au ciel; & que plus elles ont été innocentes, plus elles y arrivent rapidement.

Tota philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est. Nam quid aliud agimus, cum à voluptate, id est, à corpore, cum à re familiari, quæ est ministra & famula corporis, cum à republica, cum à negotio omni sevocamus animum? Quid, inquam, tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum esse cogimus, maximè que à corpore abducimus? Secernere autem à corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est quàm emori discere.

Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disjungamurque nos à corporibus, id est, consuecamus mori. Hoc &, dum erimus in terris, erit illi vitæ cœlesti simile: &, cum illuc ex his

Toute la vie des philosophes, disoit encore Socrate, est une continuelle méditation de la mort. Car enfin, que faisons-nous, en nous éloignant des voluptez sensuelles, de tout emploi public, de toute sorte d'embarras, et même du soin de nos affaires domestiques, qui ons pour objet l'entretien de notre corps? Que faisons-nous, dis-je, autre chose, que rappeler notre esprit à lui-même, que le forcer à être à lui-même, et que l'éloigner de son corps, tout autant que cela se peut? Or, détacher l'esprit du corps, n'est-ce pas apprendre à mourir?

Pensons-y donc sérieusement, croyez-moi, séparons-nous ainsi de nos corps, accoutumons-nous à mourir. Par ce moyen, et notre vie tiendra déjà d'une vie céleste, et nous en serons mieux disposés.

ed in them. I likewise prefer the opinion of those, who formerly taught their doctrines in that part of our own country called the *Greater Greece* *, which though now destroyed, was then a flourishing state: or the sentiments of him †, who was declared the wisest of men by the oracle of *Apollo*. However undetermined he might be in other matters, yet he never failed to assert, that our souls are of a divine nature; and that, on leaving the body, they return to heaven, and have a passage thither, so much the more expeditious as they themselves have been good and upright.



The † whole life of philosophers, says Socrates, is one continued meditation on death. For what else do we, when we call off our attention from sensual pleasure, and all domestic concerns, those servants of the body; when we detach our mind from public business, and every kind of embarrassment? What is this, I say, but to call the soul home, to make it keep company with itself, and draw it off from the body as far as possible? Now to abstract the soul from the body, is nothing else, but to learn to die.

We ought therefore, take my word upon it, seriously to consider this, that by disuniting ourselves

L 5

from

* They called that part of *Italy* the *Greater Greece*, which now makes the kingdom of *Naples*. It was in it that *Pythagoras*, the first who assumed the name of *Philosopher*, taught his doctrine in the reign of *Tarquin* the Proud.

† *Socrates*.

† *Tuscul. l. 31.*

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vinculis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum.

posez à prendre notre essor, quand nos chaînes se briseront.

✱✱✱
Utrum sit melius (vivere, an mori) dii immortales sciunt: hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem.

✱✱✱
Vivre, ou mourir, lequel vaut le mieux? Les Dieux immortels le savent, mais je crois qu'aucun homme ne le sait.

from bodies, we may render death familiar to us. By which means, we shall lead a heavenly life, even while on earth; and when the soul is freed from these fetters, her flight will be the more speedy.



Whether * it be better to live or die, is only known to the immortal Gods: for no man, I verily believe, has any certain knowledge of the matter.

* Tusc. I. 41.

XI.

SOMNIUM SCIPIONIS.

CUM in Africam venissem, M. Manilio consuli ad quartam legionem tribunus (ut scitis) militum; nihil mihi potius fuit, quam ut Masinissam convenirem, regem familiæ nostræ justis de causis amicissimum.

Ad quem ut veni, complexus me senex collacrymavit, aliquantôque post suspexit in cœlum: & grates, inquit, tibi ago, summe sol, vobisque reliqui cœlites, quod antè quam ex hac vitâ migro, conspicio in meo regno, & his tectis P. Cornelium Scipionem, cujus ego nomine ipso recreor: ita nunquam ex animo meo discedit illius optimi, atque invictissimi viri memoria.

XI.

SONGE de SCIPION.

QUAND j'arrivai en Afrique, où, comme vous le savez, je fus chargé par le consul Manilius de commander la quatrième légion; ma première attention fut de visiter le roi Masinissa, prince qui pour de justes raisons étoit lié d'une étroite amitié avec ma famille.

J'aborde ce vieillard, il me tend les bras, il m'arrose de ses larmes; et un moment après, ayant levé les yeux au ciel: Souverain Soleil, dit-il, et autres Dieux célestes, je vous rends grâces à tous, de ce qu'avant que de quitter la vie, je vois dans mon royaume, et dans ce palais, Publius Cornélius Scipion, dont le nom seul me ravit de joie: tant l'idée de l'honnête-homme, et de l'invincible guerrier, qui a rendu ce nom si glorieux, est pour jamais présente à mon esprit.

XI.

SCIPIO's DREAM.

NO * sooner was I arrived in *Africa*, in quality of tribune † of the fourth legion, as you know, to *M. Manilius* the consul, than, above all things, I was solicitous to wait upon king *Masiniſſa* ‖; who, for very good reasons, was most steadily attached to our family.

When I came into his presence, the good old prince embraced me with such tenderness as drew tears from his eyes; and after a short pause, looking up to heaven, Sovereign Sun, says he, and all ye other heavenly powers, I thank you, that before departing this life, I here behold in my own kingdom, and under this roof, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, whose very name inspires me with fresh vigour; so deeply rooted in my mind is the memory of that best, and most invincible, of men!

After

* *Fragm. lib. vi. de rep. cap. 1.* It is *Scipio* that speaks; but as the whole discourse concerns another *Scipio*, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish them well from one another. They both had the surname of *Africanus*. He that speaks here was the son of *Paulus Emilius*, and has been mentioned already.

† *Tribune*, an officer in the *Roman* army, who commanded a division of a legion; and not unlike our *Colonel*, and the *French Mestre de camp*. There were six of them in every legion.

‖ *Masiniſſa*, king of *Numidia*, of whom we have spoken already. See page 215.

Deinde ego illum de suo regno: ille me de nostra republica percontatus est: multisque verbis ultrò citròque habitis, ille nobis consumptus est dies. Pòst autem regio apparatu accepti, sermonem in multam noctem produximus, cùm senex nihil nisi de Africano loquebatur, omniaque ejus non facta solum, sed etiam dicta meminisset. Deinde, ut cubitum discessimus, me et de via, et qui ad multam noctem vigilassem, arctior, quam solebat, somnus complexus est.

Hic mihi (credo equidem ex hoc, quod eramus locuti: fit enim ferè, ut cogitationes, sermonisque nostri pariant aliquid in somno tale, quale de Homero scribit Ennius, de quo videlicet sèpissimè vigilans solebat cogitare, et, loqui) Africanus se ostendit ea forma, quæ mihi ex imagine ejus, quàm ex ipso, erat notior. Quem ut agnovi, equidem cohorruì. Sed ille, ades, inquit, animo, et omitte timorem, Scipio, et quæ dicam, trade memoriæ.

Je le mis ensuite sur les affaires de son royaume; il me questionna sur celles de notre république, ainsi se passa le reste de la journée à nous entretenir. Sur le soir, la table fut servie avec une magnificence royale, et nous pousâmes la conversation bien avant dans la nuit. Tous ses discours rouloient sur l'Africain: il en savoit toutes les actions, toutes les paroles remarquables. Enfin nous allâmes nous reposer; et comme j'étois fatigué du chemin, et d'avoir veillé si tard, je dormis plus profondément qu'à l'ordinaire.

Quelquesfois ce qui nous a fort occupé de jour, nous revient pendant le sommeil, et occasionne des songes semblables à celui d'Ennius, qui, tout pleine d'Homère, & sans cesse parlant de ce poète, crut le voir en dormant. Pour moi, de même, tout pleine de ce que m'avoit dit Masnissa, je crus voir l'Africain. Il m'apparut sous la forme que je lui connoissois, non pour l'avoir vû, mais par son portrait. A son aspect je frissonnai. Mais lui: Scipion, me dit-il rassurez-vous, ne craignez point, et retenez bien ce que vous allez entendre.

After this I enquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom: he, on the other hand, questioned me about the state of our republic; and in this kind of conversation we passed away the day. Towards evening, being entertained in a manner worthy the magnificence of a king, we carried on our discourse for a considerable part of the night: all which time the good old king spoke of nothing but *Africanus* *, whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, he remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into a more profound sleep than usual, both on account of my journey, and because I had sat up a great part of the night.

Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our preceding conversation; for it commonly happens that the thoughts and discourse, which employ us in the day time, produce in our sleep a somewhat similar effect to that which *Ennius* writes happened to him about *Homer*; of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think and speak. *Africanus*, I thought, appeared to me in a shape, with which I was better acquainted from his picture, than any personal knowledge of him.

* I say *Africanus* by way of distinction, that the *Scipio* here meant may not be confounded with another of that name, whom I shall mention by and by. This *Africanus*, after a great many other exploits, carried the war into *Africa*; where proving victorious against *Asdrubal* and *Annibal*, he obliged *Carthage* to demand peace, on which account he was surnamed *Africanus*. He was the first of the *Romans*, that was honoured with a surname derived from his conquests. But afterwards a great many other generals had their pride flattered with the like titles, without having either the virtues, or success, of *Scipio*. "In imitation of him, says *Livy*, those who were by no means comparable to him for victories, transmitted titles of renown, and honourable surnames, to their family."

Vidéſne illam urbem, quæ parère populo Romano coacta per me, renovat priſtina bella, nec poteſt quieſcere? (oſtendebat autem Carthaginem de excelſo, et pleno ſtellarum, illuſtri, et claro quodam loco) ad quam tu oppugnandam nunc venis penè miles. Hanc hoc biennio conſul evertes, erit que cognomen id tibi per te partum, quod habes adhuc à nobis hereditarium.

Cùm autem Carthaginem deleveris, triumphum egeris, cenſor que fueris, et obieris legatus Ægyptum, Syriam, Aſiam, Græciam, deligère iterum conſul abſens, bellum que maximum conficies, Numantiam exciendes.

Sed cùm eris curru Capitolium inveſtus, offendes rempublicam perturbatam conſiliis

Voyez vous cette ville (c'étoit Carthage; il me la montrait du haut des cieux, où je me croyois avec lui, dans un endroit tout ſemé de brillantes étoiles) voyez-vous cette ville, qui forcée par moi à obéir au peuple Romain, reſſuſcite nos guerres anciennes, et ne peut vivre dans le repos? Aujourd'hui, à peine ſorti du rang de ſimple ſoldat, vous la venez attaquer. Avant qu'il ſoit deux ans, vous la détruirez étant conſul: et ce ſurnom d'Africain, qui juſqu'à préſent ne vous appartient que comme une portion de mon héritage, vous l'aurez mérité alors par vous-même.

Après la ruine de Carthage, vous recevrez les honneurs du triomphe: vous ſerez cenſeur: vous irez par l'ordre de la république, viſiter l'Egypte, la Syrie, l'Aſe, la Grèce: vous ſerez une ſeconde fois élu conſul, ſans vous être préſenté: et par le deſtruction de Numance, vous terminerez une guerre des plus ſanglantes.

Mais au retour de cette expédition, après que vous aurez été conduit ſur un char

him *. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with consternation: but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my *Scipio*, be not afraid, and carefully remember what I shall say to you.

Do † you see that city, (pointing to *Carthage* from a bright and glorious place of the firmament, that was all studded with stars) which though brought under the *Roman* yoke by me, is now renewing the former wars, and cannot live in peace? It is to attack it you are this day arrived, in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier. Before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and complete its overthrow; whence you shall obtain, by your own merit, the surname of *Africanus*, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as derived from me.

After the destruction of *Carthage*, you shall receive the honour of a triumph, be advanced to the censorship, and in quality of legate, visit *Egypt*, *Syria*, *Asia* and *Greece*: you shall be elected a second time consul, in your absence ‡; and by utterly destroying *Eumantia*, put an end to a most dangerous war.

But on entering the capitol in your triumphal car, you

* Though the original seems to say, *less for having seen himself, than for having seen his picture*; yet this must not be taken in a strict sense, for *Sigonius* assures us that the young *Scipio Africanus*, the person who speaks in this place, was born the same year; and what is more, the same day, that the other died.

† Cap. 2.

‡ In the text it is, *deligere iterum consul absens*. But the authority of *Valerius Maximus*, VIII. 15. does not permit the word *absens* to be taken literally. It does not mean that *Scipio* was absent from *Rome* the day on which the consuls were to be elected; but as he did not appear in the *Campus Martius*, dressed in a white robe, according to the custom of those that stood candidates for the consulship; it was the same thing as if he had been really absent.

consiliis nepotis mei. Hic tu, Africane, ostendas oportebit patriæ, lumen animi, ingenii, consiliique tui.

au capitolé, vous trouverez la république agitée par les pratiques de mon petit-fils : et c'est alors, Scipion, qu'il faudra montrer à votre patrie ce que vous avez de courage, d'esprit, de prudence.

Sed ejus temporis ancipitem video quasi fatorum viam. Nam cum ætas tua septenos octies folis anfractus, reditusque converterit, duoque hi numeri, quorum uterque plenus, alter altera de causa, habetur, circuitu naturali summam tibi fatalem confecerint : in te unum, atque in tuum nomen, se tota convertet civitas : te senatus, te omnes boni, te socii, te Latini intuebuntur : tu eris unus, in quo nitatur civitatis salus ; ac ne multa, dictator rempublicam constituas oportet, si impias propinquorum manus effugeris.

Je vois les destinées de ce temps là, incertaines, pour ainsi dire, de la route qu'elles prendront. Car, quand vous compterez par vos jours huit fois sept révolutions du soleil ; et que l'heure fatale aura été marquée par le concours de ces deux nombres, dont chacun, mais par diverses raisons, est regardé comme un nombre parfait ; alors vous serez l'unique objet, l'unique espérance de Rome ; c'est sur vous que le sénat, que tous les bons romains, que nos allies, que toute l'Italie tournera ses regards ; vous serez l'appui de Rome vous seul : enfin, revêtu du pouvoir suprême de dictateur, vous rétablirez l'ordre dans l'état, pourvu que vous puissiez échapper aux parricides mains de vos proches.

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you shall find the republic all in a ferment through the intrigues of my grandson *. It is on this occasion, my dear *Africanus*, that you must show your country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence.

The destiny, however, of that time, appears uncertain, as it were, which way it shall take: for when your age shall have accomplished eight times seven revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked out by the natural product of these two numbers †, each whereof is esteemed a perfect one, but for different reasons ‡; then shall the whole city have recourse to you alone, and place their hopes in your auspicious name; on you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, and people of *Latium*, shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the state shall entirely depend; in a word, if you escape the impious machinations of your relations, you must, in quality of dictator, establish order and tranquillity in the commonwealth.

Here

* *Tiberius Gracchus*, who being tribune, excited the people to revolt against the senate. His mother, the illustrious *Cornelia*, was a daughter of the elder *Scipio*; and was the ornament of her age for wit, and the glory of her sex for virtue.

† Fifty-six years. He actually died at this age; and not without the suspicion of having been poisoned by his wife, who was the sister of *Tiberius Gracchus*.

‡ What, pray, can these reasons be? If they are those mentioned by *Macrobius*, in his commentary on *Scipio's* dream, they deserve only to be considered as the chimeras of a wild imagination; and being of no manner of use to us, do not merit to be explained.

Hic cum exclamasset Lælius, ingemuissentque cæteri vehementius: leniter aridens Scipio, quæso, inquit, ne me è somno excitetis, et parum rebus: audite cætera.

Sed quò sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandum rempublicam, sic habeto: omnibus, qui patriam conseruant, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo definitum locum, ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruuntur. Nihil est enim illi principi Deo, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius, quàm concilia, cœtusque hominum, jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur: harum rectores, et conservatores hinc profecti, huc revertuntur.

Hic ego, etsi eram perterritus, non tam metu mortis quàm insidiarum à meis, quæsi tamen, viveretne ipse et Paulus pater, et alii, quos nos extinctos arbitraremur.

Immo verò, inquit, ii vivunt, qui ex corporum vinculis,

Ici Lélius ayant marqué son inquiétude par un cri, et le reste de la compagnie par de profonds soupirs: Je vous en prie, leur dit Scipion avec un sourire gracieux, ne me réveillez pas: silence; écoutez le reste.

Pour animer votre zèle, ajouta l'Africain, soyez bien persuadé qu'il y a dans le ciel, pour tous ceux qui aurent travaillé à la conservation, à la défense, et à l'aggrandissement de la patrie, un lieu marqué, où ils vivront heureux à jamais. Car, de tout ce qui se fait sur la terre, rien n'est plus agréable à ce Dieu suprême, par qui l'univers est conduit, que ce qu'on appelle des villes, c'est à dire, des assemblées, des sociétés d'hommes réunis sous l'autorité des loix. D'ici partent ceux qui les gouvernent, qui les conservent; et ils retournent ici.

A ces mots, quoique troublé, moins par l'appréhension de la mort, que par l'idée de cette perfidie dont j'étois menacé, je ne laissai pas de lui demander s'il étoit donc bien vrai que lui, Paulus mon père, et les autres qu'on croyoit morts, fussent vivans?

Oui sans doute, reprit l'Africain: et ceux-là seuls sont

Or, SCIPIO'S DREAM. 253

Here *Laelius* * wept bitterly, and the rest of the company gave vent to their sorrow by deep groans; on which *Scipio*, with a gentle smile, says, " Pray, gentlemen, do not wake me out of my dream, have patience †, and hear the rest."

Now ‡ in order to encourage you, my dear *Africanus*, to defend the state with the greater cheerfulness, be assured, that for all those who have anywise conduced to the preservation, defence, or enlargement of their native country, there is a certain place in heaven, where they shall enjoy an eternity of happiness: for nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the supreme governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies of men united together by laws, which are called States: it is from heaven their governors and defenders came, and thither they return.

Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much for fear of death, as at the perfidy of my own relations; yet I recollected myself enough to enquire, whether he himself, my father *Paulus*, and others, whom we looked upon as dead, really enjoyed life.

Yes truly, replied he, they alone enjoy life, who have

* *Laelius*, whose intimate connection with *Scipio* is so well known from the dialogue on *Friendship*, was one of the interlocutors in the dialogue on a *Commonwealth*, of which *Scipio*'s dream is the conclusion. As to the other interlocutors, their names may be seen in the epistles to *Atticus*, IV. 16.

† It is plain that in the words, *et parum rebus*, there is something either altered, or omitted. Concerning which the critics have proposed different conjectures, none of which has all the evidence that could be wished.

‡ Cap. 3.

vinculis, tanquam è carcere, evolaverunt: vestra verò, quæ dicitur vita, mors est. Quin tu aspicias ad te venientem Paulum patrem.

Quem ut vidi, equidem vim lacrymarum profudi. Ille autem me complexus, atque osculans, flere prohibebat. Atque ego ut primum, fletu represso, loqui posse cœpi: quæso, inquam, pater sanctissime, atque optime, quoniam hæc est vita, (ut Africanum audio dicere) quid moror in terris, quin huc ad vos venire propero?

Non est ita, inquit ille: nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne quod conspicias, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest. Homines enim sunt hac lege generati, qui tuerentur illum globum, quem in hoc templo medium vides, quæ terra dicitur: hisque animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quæ sidera, et stellas vocatis: quæ globosæ, et rotundæ, divinis animatæ mentibus, circulos suos, orbésque conficiunt celeritate mirabili. Quare

et

sont vivans, qui délivrez des liens du corps, s'en sont sauvez, comme d'une prison. Mais ce que vous autres vous appelez vivre, c'est être mort. Regardez, voilà que Paulus votre père vient à vous.

Je le vis. A l'instant mes larmes coulèrent en abondance. Mais lui, en m'embrassant, et me baisant: Ne pleurez point, me disoit-il. Pour moi, dès que mes pleurs me laissèrent la liberté de parler; O mon père, m'écriai-je! Vous, dont la sainteté, dont les vertus sont l'objet de ma vénération! Puisque la véritable vie n'est que dans ces lieux, comme je l'apprens de l'Africain; que fais-je donc plus long-temps sur la terre? Pourquoi ne pas me hâter de vous rejoindre?

A moins, me répondit-il, que ce Dieu, dont le temple est tout ce que vous découvrez ici, n'ait lui-même brisé les chaînes qui vous lient à votre corps, vous ne sauriez être admis en ces lieux. Car les hommes ont reçu l'être à une condition, qui est de travailler à la conservation du globe, que voilà au milieu de ce temple, et que l'on appelle la terre. Ils ont une ame, portion de ces feux éternels, que vous nommez Etoiles, Astres, qui sont des corps sphériques, animés par des intelligences divines, et dont la

Or, S C I P I O's D R E A M. 255

have escaped from the body, as from a prison ; but as to what you call life, it is no more than a state of death. Nay see, here comes your father *Paulus* * towards you.

As soon as I observed him, my eyes burst out with a flood of tears : but he took me into his arms, embraced me, and bid me not to weep. No sooner were my first transports subsided, and I had regained the liberty of speech, than I addressed my father thus, Thou best and most venerable of parents, since this, as I am informed by *Africanus*, is the only substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to come hither where you are ?

That, replied he, is impossible : for unless the God, whose temple is all that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received their being on this very condition, that they should labour for the preservation of that globe, which is situate, as you see, in the middle of this temple †, and is called earth. They are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal fires, that you call stars and constellations ; and these being round spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their revolutions with amazing rapidity. It is therefore your duty, my *Publius*, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to preserve the union of your soul and
body ;

* *Paulus Emilius*, surnamed *Macedonicus*, as having overcome *Perseus* king of *Macedon*, and reduced his kingdom into the form of a Roman province.

† *Viz.* Of the world. We have already remarked that *Cicero* follows the *Ptolemaic* system of the world. See page 25.

et tibi, Publi, et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis: nec injussu ejus, à quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum à Deo defugisse videamini. Sed sic, Scipio, ut avus hic tuus, ut ego, qui te genui, justitiam cole, et pietatem: quæ, cum sit magna in parentibus, et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est. Ea vita, via est in cælum, et in hunc cœtum eorum, qui jam vixerunt, et corpore laxati, illum incolunt locum, quem vides.

Erat autem is splendidissimo candore inter flammæ circulus elucens, quem vos, ut à Græcis accepistis, orbem lacteum nuncupatis.

Erant quo omnia mihi contemplanti præclara cætera, et mirabilia videbantur. Erant autem eæ stellæ, quas nunquam ex hoc loco vidimus: et eæ magnitudines omnium, quas esse nunquam suspicati sumus: ex quibus erat illa minima,

quæ

là révolution se fait avec une prodigieuse rapidité. Vous donc, mon fils, et tous ceux qui ont de la religion, vous devez constamment retenir votre ame dans le corps où elle à son poste; et sans l'ordre exprès de celui qui vous l'a donnée, ne point sortir de cette vie mortelle; parce qu'autrement vous paroîtriez avoir voulu secouer l'emploi, dont la volonté divine vous a chargé. Ainsi ce que vous avez à faire présentement, c'est d'imiter, et l'Africain votre aïeul, et moi votre père: de cultiver à notre exemple la justice: d'aimer vos parens, et vos amis, mais votre patrie plus que tout le reste. Voilà par où l'on arrive au ciel, et dans cette assemblée de gens, qui, après avoir vécu sur la terre, maintenant dégagent de leur corps, habitent le lieu que vous voyez.

Il me parloit de ce cercle brillant, que son éclatante blancheur fait remarquer entre toutes les constellations, et que vous appelez le Cercle de Lait, comme les Grecs vous l'ont appris.

Promenant de là mes yeux sur le reste de l'univers, je n'y découvrois que du beau, du merveilleux. J'y voyois des étoiles qui n'ont jamais été apperçues d'ici: et toutes soit celles là, soit les autres qui nous sont connues, je les voyois d'une grandeur que jamais

body; nor without the exprefs command of him who gave you a foul, ſhould the leaſt thought be entertained of quitting human life, leſt you ſeem to deſert the poſt aſſigned you by God himſelf. Follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me your father, in paying a ſtrict regard to juſtice and piety; the influence of which towards parents and relations is great indeed, but that to our country greateſt of all. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of thoſe, who after having lived on earth, and been diſunited from body, inhabit the place you now behold.

Now * it was that ſhining circle or zone, whoſe remarkable brightneſs diſtinguiſhes it among the conſtellations; and which, after the *Greeks*, you call the *milky orb* †.

From which, as I took a view of the univerſe, every thing appeared beautiful and admirable: for there, not only thoſe ſtars were to be ſeen, that are never viſible from this globe ‡; but all of them of ſuch magnitude as we could not have imagined. The leaſt of all the ſtars was that removed fartheſt from the heavens, and ſituated neareſt the earth;

M

which

* Here *Scipio* begins to ſpeak, and it is not known what became of his father afterwards.

† Hence its appellation, among us, of the *milky way*; which is a vaſt collection of ſtars, that by their nearneſs and arrangement, trace a kind of road in the heavens. See the different opinions of the antients on this ſubject, in a work aſcribed to *Plutarch, de placit. philoſ.* III. i.

‡ There are ſtars ſo remote, that it is impoſſible to diſcern them with the eye. As a proof hereof we need only mention the modern invention of teleſcopes, by the aſſiſtance of which a great many ſtars have been diſcovered, that were not known to the antients.

quæ ultima cœlo, citima terris, luce lucebat alienâ. Stellarum autem globi terræ magnitudinem facile vincebant. Jam ipsa terra ita mihi parva visa est, ut me imperii nostri, quo quasi punctum ejus attingimus, pœniteret.

Quam cùm magis intuerer. Quæso inquit Africanus, quousque humi defixa tua mens erit? nōne adspicis, quæ in templa veneris? Novem tibi orbibus, vel potiùs globis, connexa sunt omnia: quorum unus est cœlestis, extimus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse Deus, arcens, et continens cæteros: in quo infixi sunt illi, qui volvuntur, stellarum cursus sempiterni: cui subjecti sunt septem, qui versantur retro, contrario motu, atque cœlum, ex quibus unum globum possidet illa, quam in terris Saturniam nominant. Deinde est hominum generi prosperus et salutaris ille fulgor, qui dicitur Jovis. Tum rutilus, horribilisque terris, quem Martem dicitis. Deinde subter mediam ferè regionem sol obtinet, dux, et princeps, et moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi, et temperatio,

tantâ

jamais nous n'avons imaginée. La moindre, qui étoit la plus éloignée du ciel, et la plus proche de la terre, ne brilloit que d'une lumière d'emprunt. A l'égard des autres globes, ils surpassoient de beaucoup en grandeur le globe de la terre. Mais pour celui-ci, il me parut bien si petit, que notre empire, dont l'étendue n'en occupe que comme un point, me fit pitié.

Je continuois à regarder fixement la terre. Jusques-à quand, me dit l'Africain, aurez-vous l'esprit collé sur cet objet? Quoi! les temples superbes, où vous voici, ne méritent pas votre attention? Voyez comme le tout est composé de neuf cercles ou plutôt de neuf globes, l'un desquels est ce globe céleste, qui, placé au-dessus de tous les autres les embarras tous, et les soutient de tous côtez. A celui-là sont attachées les étoiles fixes, qui de toute éternité se meuvent dans le même sens que ce premier ciel. Plus bas sont sept autres globes, qui ont un mouvement de rétrogradation. Un de ces globes est celui que les habitans de la terre appellent Saturne. Un autre nommé Jupiter, dont les influences sont favorables et salutaires aux hommes. Après on voit le feu étincelant et terrible, que vous appelez Mars. Presque au milieu de ce grand espace,

which shone with a borrowed light. Now the globes of the stars far surpassed * the magnitude of our earth ; which at that distance appeared so exceeding small, that I could not but be sensibly affected on seeing our whole empire no larger, than if we only touched the earth, as it were, in a single point.

As † I continued to observe the earth with still greater attention, How long, I pray, says *Africanus*, will your mind be fixed on that object ? Why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples whither you are arrived ? The universe is composed of nine circles, or rather spheres ‡, the uppermost of which is this celestial one, that comprehends all the rest, and where the supreme God resides, who bounds and contains the whole. In it are fixed those stars, that revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres, which move backwards, or with a contrary motion to that of the heavens : one of these is taken up by the globe, which the inhabitants of the earth call *Saturn*. Next to that is the star of *Jupiter*, so benign and salutary to mankind. The third in order is that fiery and terrible planet, called *Mars*. Below this again, almost in the middle region, is the sun, that leader,

M 2

governor,

* One cannot precisely determine what the magnitude of a star is. To judge of it by the help of optics, its exact distance from the earth must be known. The learned *M. Huygens*, in his *Cosmotheoros*, pretends that a cannon-ball would be about 70,000 years in reaching the fixed stars ; and he supposes that the said ball, moving always with the same velocity, passes over about 100 fathoms in a second of time. Whence it will move 360,000 fathoms in an hour ; so that the whole distance of the fixed stars, according to the above supposition, will be 220,752,000,000,000 fathoms, or 250,854,545,454½ miles.

† Cap. 4.

‡ The best commentary to explain this passage, is to have an armillary sphere to look at.

tantâ magnitudine, ut cuncta suâ luce illustret, et compleat. Hunc ut comites consequuntur, alter Veneris, alter Mercurii cursus: in infimôque orbe luna, radiis solis accensa, convertitur. Infrâ autem jam nihil est, nisi mortale et caducum, præter animos generi hominum, munere decorum datos. Supra lunam sunt æterna omnia. Nam ea, quæ est media, et nona tellus, neque movetur et infima est, et in eam feruntur omnia suo nutu pondera.

Quæ cùm intuerer stupens, ut me recepi, Quid? hic inquam, quis est, qui complet aures meas tantus, et tam dulcis sonus? Hic est, inquit ille, qui intervallis conjunctus imparibus, sed tamen pro rata portione distinctis, impulsu, et motu ipsorum orbium conficitur: qui acuta cum gravibus temperans, varios æquabiliter concentus efficit. Nec enim silentio tanti motus incitari possunt, et natura fert, ut extrema ex altera parte graviter, ex altera autem

espace, vous voyez le soleil, qui est le conducteur et le chef des autres planètes, l'intelligence et la règle de l'univers, et dont la grandeur est telle, que de ses rayons il éclaire, il remplit tout. A sa suite, et comme pour l'accompagner, sont Vénus et Mercure. Vous avez enfin la lune, dont le globe n'a de lumière que ce qu'il en reçoit du soleil. Au-dessous il n'y a plus rien, qui ne soit corruptible et mortel: si ce n'est les âmes humaines, présent des Dieux. Audessus de la lune tout est éternel. Quant à la terre, qui est le neuvième globe, et qui occupe le centre, elle n'a point de mouvement; elle est placée au lieu le plus bas; et c'est où tendent naturellement tous les corps entraînez par leur poids.

J'étois saisi d'étonnement à la vue d'un tel spectacle. Quand je me fus un peu remis: Mais, dis-je à l'Africain, quel est ce son si éclatant, et si agréable, dont j'ai l'oreille remplie? C'est, dit-il, l'harmonie qui résulte du mouvement des sphères; et qui composée d'intervalles inégaux, mais pourtant distinguez l'un de l'autre suivant des justes proportions, forme régulièrement par le mélange de sons aigus avec les graves, différens concerts. Il n'est pas possible en effet, que

governor, and prince of the other luminaries, that mind and temperament of the world, whose bulk is so vastly great, that he fills and enlightens all things with his rays. Then follow *Venus* and *Mercury*, that attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines only by the reflected rays of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of all : below which, if we except that gift of the Gods, human souls, every thing is mortal, and tends to dissolution ; but above it all is eternal *. For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the center, is immovable, and to it all heavy bodies naturally tend, as being the lowest place in the universe.

After † recovering myself from the amazement, occasioned by such a wonderful prospect, I thus bespoke *Africanus*. What, pray, is this sound, that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner ? To which he replied, It is that produced by the impulse and motion of the spheres ; and being formed by unequal intervals ‡, (but such, however, as are divided according to the justest proportion)

M 3

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* It may be concluded from this passage, that *Cicero* was not for a plurality of peopled worlds ; for if all things above the moon be free from corruption, there can be no generation, and consequently no animals. As to the moon herself, several of the antients believed she was inhabited like the earth. See *Acad.* II. 39.

† Cap. 5.

‡ I am indebted, says the *Abbé d' Olivet*, for this and the following remark, to *M. Burette* ; whom I have consulted on this subject, as being better acquainted with the music of the antients, than any other of our learned men.

“ *Cicero*, agreeably to the imaginary system of *Pythagoras*, compares in this place the motions of the seven planets, and the orb of the fixed stars, which makes up the number of eight, to the vibratory motions of eight strings, which composed the ancient instrument called *Ottachord*, that was formed of two separate *Tetrachords*, or of eight strings in all, which, in the Diatonic system of music, gave the following eight sounds of our music, *mi*,
“ *fa*,

autem acutè sonent. Quam ob causam summus ille cœli stelliferi cursus, cujus conversio est concitatio, acuto, et excitato movetur sono: gravissimo autem hic lunaris, atque infimus. Nam terra, nona, immobilis manens, imâ sede semper hæret, complexa medium mundi locum. Illi autem octo cursus, in quibus eadem vis est duorum, septem efficiunt distinctos intervallis sonos: qui numerus rerum omnium ferè nodus est.

Quod docti homines nervis imitati, atque cantibus, aperuere sibi reditum in hunc locum: sicut alii, qui præstantibus ingeniis in vita humanâ divina studia coluerunt.

Hoc sonitu oppletæ aures hominum obscurerunt: nec est ullus hebetior sensus in vobis: sicut ubi Nilus ad illa, quæ catadupa nominantur, præcipitat ex altissimis

que de si grands mouvemens se fassent sans bruit: et c'est conformément aux loix naturelles, que des deux extrêmes où se termine l'assemblée de tous ces intervalles, l'un fait entendre le son grave, et l'autre le son aigu. Par cette raison, l'orbe des étoiles fixes, comme le plus élevé, et dont le mouvement est le plus rapide, doit rendre un son très-aigu; pendant que l'orbe de la lune, comme le plus bas de tous ceux qui se meuvent, doit rendre un son des plus graves. Car pour la terre, dont le globe fait le neuvième, elle demeure immobile, et toujours fixe au plus bas lieu, qui est le centre de l'univers. Ainsi les révolutions de ces huit orbes, deux desquelles ont même puissance, produisent sept différens sons: et il n'y a presque rien dont le nombre septénaire ne soit le nœud.

On a imité cette harmonie céleste, soit avec des instrumens, soit avec la voix; et les grands musiciens se sont par là ouvert un chemin pour revenir ici; de même que tous ces sublimes génies, qui pendant le cours de cette vie mortelle ont cultivé les sciences divines.

Que si cette harmonie ne s'entend point sur la terre, c'est qu'un si grand bruit a rendu les hommes sourds. Aussi le sens de l'ouïe est le plus foible et le plus obscur de tous

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it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, various concerts of music. For it is impossible that motions so great should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature, that the extremes on the one side should produce sharp, and on the other flat, sounds. For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars being highest, and carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a shrill and acute sound: whereas that of the moon being lowest, moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth sphere, it remains immoveably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the world. Now the revolutions of these eight orbs, every two of which have the same force*, give seven distinct sounds; which number is the measure of almost all things in the world.

This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians†, both on stringed instruments and with the voice; whereby they have opened themselves a way to return hither: as have likewise many others, who have employed their sublime genius, while on earth, in cultivating the divine sciences.

M 4

By

“*fa, sol, la, si, ut, re, mi*; so that the moon, as being the lowest of the planets, corresponds to *mi*, the greatest of the eight sounds; “*Mercury*, to *fa*; “*Venus*, to *sol*; the Sun, to *la*; “*Mars*, to *si*; “*Jupiter*, to *ut*; “*Saturn*, to *re*; and the orb of the fixed stars, as being the highest of all, to *mi*, which is the acutest sound, and makes an octave with the gravest. These eight sounds, then, are separated by eight intervals, according to certain proportions; so that from *mi* to *fa*, is an hemitone; from *mi* to *sol*, a third minor; from *mi* to *la*, a fourth; from *mi* to *si*, a fifth; from *mi* to *ut*, a sixth minor; and from *mi* to *re*, a seventh minor; which together with the octave make seven consonances in all.”

* “*Cicero* says, *illi autem octo cursus, in quibus eadem vis est duorum*, &c. On which we remark, that the two words, *eadem vis*, may be taken in two different senses, either for the revolutions of two “stars,

† *Amplion, Linus, Orpheus, &c.*

simis montibus, ea gens, quæ illum locum accolit, propter magnitudinem sonitus, sensu audiendi caret. Hic verò tantus est totius mundi incitatissimâ conversione sonitus, ut eum aures hominum capere non possint: sicut intueri solem adversum nequitis, ejusque radiis acies vestra, sensusque vincitur.

Hæc ego admirans, referebam tamen oculos ad terram identidem. Tum Africanus, sentio, inquit, te sedem etiam nunc hominum ac domum contemplari: quæ si tibi parva (ut est) ita videtur, hæc cælestia semper spectato: illa humana contemnit. Tu enim quam celebritatem sermonis hominum, aut quam expetendam gloriam consequi potes? Vides habitari in terra, raris et angustis in locis: et in ipsis quasi maculis, ubi habitatur, vastas solitudines interjectas: hosque, qui incolunt terram, non modò interruptos ita esse, ut nihil inter ipsos ab aliis ad alios manare possit: sed partim obliquos, partim aversos, partim etiam adversos stare vobis: à quibus exspectare gloriam certè nullam potestis. Cernis autem eandem

tous les sens. Il est arrivé de même au peuple qui habite auprès des cataractes du Nil, d'être assourdi par l'épouvantable bruit que fait ce fleuve en se précipitant du haut des montagnes. Et quant à ce prodigieux son, que toutes les sphères ensemble forment en se mouvant avec tant de rapidité, vos oreilles ne sont non plus capables de le recevoir, que vos yeux de soutenir l'éclat du soleil, si vous le regardez fixement.

Tout en m'occupant de ces merveilles, je ne laissois pas de jeter toujours de temps en temps les yeux sur la terre. Vos regards, me dit l'Africain, cherchent encore, à ce que je vois, l'habitation des mortels. Mais quoi? puisqu'elle vous paroît si petite, comme effectivement elle l'est, n'ayez pour elle que du mépris, et ne regardez jamais que le ciel. Qu'est-ce après tout, que cette renommée, que cette gloire, dont l'espérance pourroit vous éblouir? Vous voyez que la terre est peuplée dans un bien petit nombre d'endroits, qui sont chacun de peu d'étendue, et si fort coupez par de vastes solitudes, qu'ils nous paroissent d'ici comme des taches répandues de loin à loin sur votre globe. Telle est la situation de leurs divers habitans, qu'ils ne sont point à portée de commercer ensemble;

By the stupifying noise of this sound, the ears of mankind have been rendered deaf; and, indeed, hearing is the dullest of all the human senses. Thus the people who live near the cataracts of the *Nile*, are by the excessive roar which that river makes in precipitating itself from those vastly high mountains, entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. Now so inconceivably great is the sound produced by the rapid motion of the whole universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it, than the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose beams easily dazzle the strongest sight.

While * I was busied in admiring this scene of wonders, I could not help casting my eyes every

M 5

now

“ stars, the inequality of which is so small, that they may well
 “ enough correspond to the vibrations of two strings of the octachord
 “ tuned unisons; or for the revolutions of two stars, one of which
 “ is twice as rapid as the other, whereby it resembles the vibrations
 “ of the two extream strings of the octachord, or those marked *mi*,
 “ that are at the interval of an octave from each other. It is in this
 “ last sense that the *Latin* phrase, *eadem vis est duorum*, ought to
 “ be taken; and thus it is in the edition of *Grævius*, agreeable to
 “ what is found in several manuscripts. In this case, all the prin-
 “ cipal consonances are taken into the comparison; whereas if *Mercurii*
 “ *et Veneris* be added to the *eadem vis est duorum*, as may be seen in
 “ some editions, supported likewise by the authority of some manu-
 “ scripts, we must give it the first sense, by causing the octave to
 “ make way for the unison, which is not a consonance. In fact, if
 “ this was the case, the sphere of the fixed stars would not be an
 “ octave to that of the moon, but only a seventh to it; because,
 “ say some interpreters, *Mercury* and *Venus* being almost unisons on
 “ account of the inconsiderableness of the inequality of their revo-
 “ lution, they must both of them be only about a hemitone from
 “ the moon; and consequently the system of the stars would answer,
 “ not to an octachord, but to an heptachord, or an instrument with
 “ seven strings, composed of six consonances, or intervals, and
 “ wholly destitute of the octave, which nevertheless is one of the
 “ principal consonances, and the complement, as it were, of the
 “ harmonic system. This has made some people conjecture, that
 “ the words *Mercurii et Veneris*, may be only a gloss, which, though
 “ at first only written in the margin, might afterwards have crept
 “ into the text.”

* Cap. 6.

dem terram, quasi quibusdam redimitam, et circumdatam cingulis: è quibus duos maximè inter se diversos, et cœli verticibus ipsis ex utraque parte subnixos, obriguiffe pruinâ vides, medium autem illum, et maximum, solis ardore torrerî. Duo sunt habitabiles: quorum australis ille, in quo qui insistent, adversa vobis urgent vestigia, nihil ad vestrum genus: hic autem alter subjectus aquiloni, quem incolitis, cerne, quàm tenui vos parte contingat. Omnis enim terra, quæ colitur à vobis, angusta verticibus, lateribus latior, parva quædam insula est, circumfusa illo mari, quod Atlanticum, quod Magnum, quod Oceanum appellatis in terris: qui tamen tanto nomine, quàm sit parvus, vides. Ex his ipsis cultis, notisque terris, num aut tuum aut cujusquam nostrum nomen, vel Caucasum hunc, quem cernis, transcendere potuit, vel illum Gangem transnare? Quis in reliquis Orientis, aut obeuntis solis ultimis, aut aquilonis, austrive partibus tuum nomen audiet? quibus amputatis, cernis profectò, quantis in angustiis vestra gloria se dilatari velit.

ble; les uns étant à l'égard des autres, placez obliquement, ou même opposez diamétralement: et ceux-ci, sans doute, ne peuvent rien pour votre gloire. Remarquez aussi ces zones, qui partagent le globe terrestre. Vous en voyez deux, qui sont les plus éloignées l'une de l'autre, et précisément sous les deux pôles, assiéguées de glaces et de frimas. Au milieu est la plus grande, brûlée par l'ardeur du soleil. Il n'y en a d'habitables que deux: l'Australe, qui est occupée par vos antipodes, avec lesquels vous n'avez nulle communication: et la septentrionale, qui est celle où vous êtes situés. Or jugez combien est mince la portion qui vous en revient. Car, à prendre tout ce que contient votre zone, qui a quelque largeur au milieu, mais qui est fort serrée aux deux extrémités; cela ne fait qu'une espèce de petite île, entourée de cette Mer que vous appelez l'Atlantique, la grande Mer, l'Océan: et dont, malgré ces titres pompeux, vous voyez quelle est la petitesse. Votre renommée, ou celle de quelque autre Romain, a-t-elle jamais pu, de ces pays que vous connoissez, passer au de-là du Caucase ou du Gange, montagne et fleuve que vous avez là sous les yeux? Qui, dans le reste de l'Orient, et
aux

now and then upon the earth. On which, says *Africanus*, I perceive you are still taken up in contemplating the seat and residence of mankind: now if it appears to you so small as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix your attention for ever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible you should attain any human applause, or glory, that is worth the contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in a very few places, and those too of small extent; so that they appear like so many spots, as it were, scattered through vast uncultivated desarts: its inhabitants are not only so remote from each other, as to cut off all mutual correspondence; but their situation being either oblique, on contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps diametrically opposite to yours, all expectations of universal fame must fall to the ground. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt and surrounded, as it were, with certain zones; whereof those two which are most remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are congealed with frost; but that one in the middle, which is by far the largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two only are habitable*: one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your Antipodes, with whom you have no connexion: the other towards the north is that you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may see, falls to

M 6

your

* Virgil, *Georg.* I. 233; Ovid, *Metam.* I. 49; Pliny, II. 69; in a word, all the ancients were persuaded that only two of the five zones were inhabited, or even habitable. Their ignorance in this respect would cease to occasion our surprize, did we but reflect that even at this day, and notwithstanding the great helps we draw from commerce and navigation, we are far from knowing all the countries that are inhabited. Discoveries of this sort are the work of time and chance, and not of human wit. See *Remark*, page 25.

aux extrémités de l'Occident, du septentrion, du Midi, entendra parler de Scipion ? Toutes ces parties de la terre n'étant donc à compter pour rien par rapport à vous, comprenez à quoi se réduit l'espace, que votre ambition se propose de remplir.

Mais de plus : ceux qui parleront de vous, combien de temps en parleront-ils ? Quand même la génération suivante auroit envie de transmettre à une génération plus éloignée, les éloges qu'elle aura entendu faire de nous : il n'est pas possible que notre gloire soit, je ne dis pas éternelle, mais de quelque durée, à cause des inondations et des incendies, que le cours de la nature doit nécessairement amener.

Que vous importe d'ailleurs, d'avoir un nom parmi les hommes qui vous suivront, puisque ceux qui vous ont précédé, dont le nombre n'est pas moindre, et dont le mérite certainement a été supérieur, n'ont point parlé de vous ?

Ajoutons que tous ceux qui peuvent jamais vous connoître, ne sauroient faire que votre mémoire vive seulement l'espace d'une année. On appelle en termes populaires une année, ce que le soleil, qui n'est qu'un astre seul, met de temps à faire son cours. Mais l'année vraiment complète, est

Ipsi autem, qui de vobis loquuntur, quam diù loquentur ? Quin etiam, si cupiat proles illa futurorum hominum deinceps laudes uniuscujusque nostrum à patribus acceptas posteris prodere, tamen propter elusiones, exustionesque terrarum, quas accidere tempore certo necesse est, non modò non æternam, sed ne diuturnam quidem gloriam assequi possumus.

Quid autem interest, ab iis, qui postea nascentur, sermonem fore de te, cum ab iis nullus fuerit, qui antè nati sint ? qui nec pauciores, et certè meliores fuerunt viri.

Cum præsertim apud eos ipsos, à quibus audiri nomen nostrum potest, nemo unius anni memoriam consequi possit : homines enim populariter annum tantummodò solis, id est, unius astri reditu metiuntur : cum autem ad idem, unde semel profecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint,

your share. For the whole extent of what you possess is but a small island, narrow at both ends and wide towards the middle, which is surrounded by the sea, called on earth the Atlantic, the Great sea, and the Ocean. You cannot but remark how exceeding small it is, notwithstanding its pompous titles. Now I would ask if it be possible for your fame, or that of any other *Roman*, to be carried from these known and cultivated parts of the earth, over mount *Caucasus* * yonder, or cross the *Ganges* †? Who in the remotest places of the east and west, or those of the north and south, shall hear your name so much as mentioned? And if these are left out of the account, you see within what scanty bounds your ambition would exert itself.

Now ‡ as to those very persons who shall speak of you, how long, pray, will they do it? Besides, allowing that the succeeding generations of men were desirous to transmit down to posterity the fine things they have heard their fathers tell of us; yet by reason of inundations and conflagrations, which must unavoidably happen at certain periods, it is impossible our reputation should be of any considerable, much less of an eternal duration.

Again, what great matter is it, to have your praise celebrated by those who come after you; when they that preceded, whose number was not perhaps less, and merit certainly greater, were not so much as acquainted with your name?

And the more so, that not one of those who shall hear of us, is able to retain in his memory the transactions

* *Caucasus*, a mountain of *Colchis*, towards the mouth of the river *Phasis*.

† *Ganges*, a river of the *East-Indies*,

‡ Cap. 7.

redierint, eandemque totius cœli descriptionem, longis intervallis retulerint, tum ille verè vertens annus appellari potest: in quo vix dicere audeo, quàm multa secula hominum teneantur. Namque, ut olim deficere sol hominibus, extinguique visus est, cum Romuli animus hæc ipsa in templa penetravit: ita quandoque eandem parte sol, eodemque tempore iterum defecerit, tum signis omnibus ad idem principium, stellisque revocatis, expletum annum habeto. Hujus quidem anni nondum vicesimam partem scito esse conversam.

Quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis, et præstantibus viris: quanti tandem est ista hominum gloria, quæ pertinere vix ad unius anni partem exiguum potest?

Igitur altè spectare si voles, atque hanc sedem, et æternam domum contueri: neque te sermonibus vulgi dederis, nec in præmiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum: suis te oportet illecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus. Quid de te alii, loquantur, ipsi videant: sed loquentur tamen.

Sermo

est celle où généralement tous les astres revenus au même point d'où ils étoient partis, ramènent après un long intervalle de temps le même plan du ciel tout entier. Je n'ose presque dire combien pour cela il faut de ce que vous appelez siècles. Autrefois, lorsque l'ame de Romulus pénétra dans ces lieux, il y eut sur la terre une éclipse de soleil. Quand tous les astres, toutes les planètes se retrouvant dans la même position, il arrivera que le soleil au même point, au même temps, s'éclipsera tout de nouveau, alors vous aurez une année complete. Or sçachez que présentement vous n'en avez pas encore la vingtième partie de révolue.

Perdez-vous donc l'espérance de revenir dans ces temples, l'unique objet des grandes ames? Que vous reste-t-il dès-lors, et qu'est-ce que cette gloire humaine, dont à peine la durée embrasse quelque petite partie d'une année?

Vos regards au contraire, vos vœux se portent-ils à cette demeure éternelle? Que les discours du vulgaire ne fassent point d'impression sur vous: ne fondez point votre espoir sur des récompenses terrestres: il faut que la vertu elle-même vous attire par ses propres charmes au véritable honneur. On parlera de vous

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actions of one year. The bulk of mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is only one star; but the true and compleat year is when all the stars shall have returned to the place, whence they set out, and after long periods shall have again exhibited the same aspect of the whole heavens: and, indeed, I scarcely dare attempt to enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when the soul of *Romulus* penetrated into these eternal mansions; so when all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary position, and the sun shall at the same point, and time, be again eclipsed, the grand year shall then be compleated. Be assured, however, that the twentieth * part of it is not yet elapsed.

Now had you no hopes of returning to this place, where great and good men enjoy all that their souls could wish; what, pray, would be the signification of all human glory, which can hardly endure for a small portion of one year †?

Wherefore if you desire to entertain exalted expectations, and to keep in view this eternal place of residence; let not the discourse of the vulgar make any impression upon you, nor place your utmost hopes

* By supposing the date of this dream to be in the year of the consulship of *Manilius*, and that *Romulus*, according to *F. Petau*, died in the 38th year of *Rome*, there are 568 years between them; and since this space of time does not make the twentieth part of a grand year, it justifies what is reported of *Cicero* in the dialogue *de Causis corr. Eloq.* cap. 16. that according to him this grand year is not compleated till 12854 years.

† How agreeable are the sentiments of this great philosopher to the doctrines of christianity! The apostle *Peter* tells us, that *all the glory of man is as the flower of grass*; and *St. Paul* desires the *Colossians* to set their

Sermo autem omnis ille, et angustis cingitur iis regionum, quas vides; nec unquam de ullo perennis fuit; et obruitur hominum interitu; et oblivione posteritatis exstinguitur.

Quæ cum dixisset, ego verò inquam, ô Africane, si quidem bene meritis de patria quasi limes ad cœli aditum patet, quanquam à pueritia vestigiis ingressus patriis, et tuis, decori vestro non defui: nunc tamen, tanto præmio proposito, enitar multò vigilantius.

Et ille, tu verò enitere, et sic habeto, non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc. Nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat: sed mens cujusque, is est quisque: non ea figura, quæ digito demonstrari potest. Deum te igitur scito esse: siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit, et moderatur, et movet id corpus, cui præpositus est, quàm hunc mundum ille princeps Deus: et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse Deus æternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet.

Nam

vous dans le monde: c'est l'affaire des autres, de voir comment ils en doivent parler. Mais enfin leurs discours, quels qu'ils soient, ne passent pas les bornes étroites des régions que vous voyez. Et d'ailleurs, nulle réputation durable. A mesure que les hommes meurent, les noms qui leur étoient connus, se perdent, et sont éteints par l'oubli de la postérité.

Pour moi, lui dis je alors, quoique depuis mon enfance marchant sur vos traces, et sur celles de mon père, je n'aye pas dégénéré: cependant, puisque l'entrée du ciel est ouverte à ceux qui ont bien servi leur patrie, désormais la vue d'une si grande récompense me fera redoubler mes efforts.

Oui, reprit il, vous le devez: et tenez pour certain, que votre corps est tout ce qu'il y a de mortel en vous. Quand je dis vous, je n'entens pas cette figure qui nous tombe sous les sens. Tout homme est ce qu'il est, non par son corps, mais par son esprit. Apprenez, cela étant, que vous êtes un Dieu: parce qu'effectivement c'est être un Dieu, que de posséder en soi la vie, et le sentiment; que d'être capable de mémoire, et de prévoyance; que d'avoir sur le corps, à la conduite duquel on est préposé, tout autant d'empire, qu'en a le souverain Dieu sur l'univers.

Aussi

hopes in human rewards : virtue alone, by her own proper charms, ought to allure you to true honour. What others shall talk of you, for talk they will, is their concern. All discourse, however, of this nature is confined within the narrow limits of the countries you now behold ; with regard to every man they are but a short duration, decrease in proportion as the present generation die, and are quite forgotten by posterity.

After † these words, I thus addressed *Africanus*. Though from my infancy I have closely followed my father's, and your illustrious example, and never degenerated from it ; yet since all those who have deserved well of their country, have free admission into heaven, I shall redouble my efforts, now that I have the prospect of so ample a reward.

Do so, replied he, and be assured that nothing of you, except the body, is mortal. For it is not this external form, or figure, that falls under the notice of our senses, which constitutes your being ; it is the soul, and not the body, that makes the real man. Know then that you are a God, if he can be said to possess divinity, who has life, intelligence, memory, and foresight in himself ; and who rules, governs, and moves the body allotted him, as the supreme God does the universe : and as God, who is eternal,

gives

their affection on things above, not on things on the earth. This is an ambition more than heroic. To aspire after eternal happiness, purifies the soul from every low passion, and exalts it to a pitch above the herd of mankind : and yet we see an heathen animated with this divine ambition. A thought which should make worldlings blush, who assume to themselves the sacred title of Christians !

Aussi maître de gouverner ce corps fragile, et de le mouvoir à votre gré, que l'est ce Dieu éternel de gouverner et de mouvoir l'univers, qui, à certains égards, n'est pas moins corruptible que votre corps.

Nam quod semper movetur, æternum est: quod autem motum affert alicui, quôdque ipsum agitur aliunde; quando finem habet motûs, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. Solum igitur, quod sese movet, quia nunquam deseritur à se; nunquam ne moveri quidem definit: quin etiam cæteris, quæ moventur, hic fons, hoc principium est movendi.

Principio autem nulla est origo. Nam ex principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest: nec enim id esset principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. Quod si nunquam oritur, ne occidit quidem unquam. Nam principium extinctum, nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec ex se aliud creabit, si quidem necesse est à principio oriri omnia.

Un être qui se meut toujours existera toujours. Mais celui qui donne le mouvement à un autre, et qui le reçoit lui-même d'un autre, cesse nécessairement d'exister, lorsqu'il perd son mouvement. Il n'y a donc que l'être lui-même par sa propre vertu, qui ne perde jamais son mouvement, parce qu'il ne se manque jamais à lui-même. Et de plus il est pour toutes les autres choses qui ont du mouvement, la source et le principe du mouvement qu'elles ont.

Or qui dit principe, dit ce qui n'a point d'origine. Car c'est du principe que tout vient, et le principe ne sauroit venir de nulle autre chose. Il ne seroit pas principe, s'il venoit d'ailleurs. Et n'ayant point d'origine, il n'aura par conséquent point de fin. Car il ne pourroit, étant détruit, ni être lui-même reproduit par un autre principe, ni en produire un autre, puisqu'un principe ne suppose rien d'antérieur.

Ita

Ainsi

gives motion to the world, which is in part mortal *; so the immortal soul moves the body, that is subject to corruption.

For whatever is always in motion, is eternal; but that which communicates motion to another, and is itself impelled by some external agent, must necessarily cease to live, when the motion ceases. That therefore alone, which moves itself, can never cease to move, because it is never deserted by itself †. Besides, such a motion must be the source and principle of all others whatever.

Now a principle has no origin. For from it all things are derived; yet is it self derived from nothing, otherwise it would be no principle. And if it has no beginning, it consequently must have no end; because being once extinct, it could neither be reproduced by another, or of itself give birth to any thing, since all things must necessarily spring from some principle.

Hence

* All the antients believed the universe incorruptible, as to its matter; that is, they were persuaded that the matter of which it is composed could not be annihilated. But the greater part of them, and especially the Stoics, were of opinion, that it was corruptible and perishable, with regard to its form.

† All the natural arguments, adduced to prove the immortality of the soul, may be reduced to the two following heads, viz. 1. The nature of the soul itself, its desires, passions, sense of moral good and evil, increase in knowledge and perfection, principle of self motion, &c. 2. The nature of God, as a wise, just, and good creator and governor of the world.

Cicero, we find, draws the most of his arguments from the former of these topics; which, to men of a philosophical turn, will appear perfectly conclusive, because nature, or rather the God of nature, does nothing in vain. But arguments drawn from the latter head, are not only better adapted to convince men unacquainted with abstract reasoning, but equally certain and conclusive with the former; *Shall not the judge of all the earth do right*, is

Ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo fit, quod ipsum à se movetur: id autem nec nasci potest, nec mori: vel concidat omne cœlum, omnisque natura consistat necesse est, nec vim ullam nanciscatur, quâ ut primò impulsâ, moveatur.

Cùm pateat igitur æternum id esse, quod à se ipso moveatur, quis est, qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? Inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitur externo: quod autem animal est, id motu cietur interiore, et suo. Nam hæc est natura propria animæ, atque vis. Quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ sese moveat: neque nata est certè, et æterna est.

Hanc tu exerce in optimis rebus. Sunt autem optimæ curæ, de salute patriæ: quibus agitur, et exercitatus animus, velocius in hanc sedem, et domum suam pervolabit.

Idque ocyùs faciet, si jam tum, cùm erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit foras, et ea, quæ extrâ erunt contemplans,

Ainsi le principe du mouvement est dans l'être mù par sa propre vertu. Principe qui ne sauroit être, ni produire, ni détruire. Autrement il faut que le ciel et la terre soient bouleversés, et qu'ils tombent dans un éternel repos, sans pouvoir jamais recouvrer une force, qui, comme auparavant, les fasse mouvoir.

Il est donc évident, que ce qui se meut par sa propre vertu, existera toujours. Et peut-on nier que la faculté de se mouvoir ainsi, ne soit un attribut de l'ame? Car tout ce qui n'est mù que par une cause étrangère, est inanimé. Mais ce qui est animé, est mù par sa propre vertu, par son action intérieure. Telle est la nature de l'ame, telle est sa propriété. Donc l'ame étant de tout ce qui existe, la seule chose qui se meuve toujours elle-même; concluons de là qu'elle n'est point née, et qu'elle ne mourra jamais.

Occupez-la dignement. Rien de mieux, que de travailler au salut de la patrie. Une ame, que ces sortes de soins auront occupée, revient d'un vol plus rapide dans ce lieu-ci, qui est son véritable séjour.

Vous lui donnerez encore plus d'agilité, si, pendant qu'elle est renfermée dans le corps, vous faites que sou-
vent

Or, SCIPIO's DREAM. 277

Hence it is, that the principle of motion is in that Being, which moves by an intrinsic power of its own; and can neither have a beginning or end, otherwise the whole heavens would go to wreck, and all nature be at a stand, without a possibility of recovering any power, whereby she might be set in motion, as at first.

Since * then it is manifest, that whatever moves of itself is eternal; who can deny that the human soul is endowed with this power? For whatever being is set in motion by external impulse, is inanimate, or without a soul. But an animated being is moved by a proper intrinsic motion of its own; and this power is natural and peculiar to the soul. Then, since it alone, of all other beings, moves itself, we may fairly conclude that it never had a beginning, and that it will continue for ever.

Let it then have full employment in matters of the highest importance; and such are all efforts in defence of our country. The soul that exercises and exerts itself in actions of this kind, will have a more speedy flight to this blessed abode, its true home.

This it will do with still greater swiftness, if even while shut up in the body, it free and abstract itself
as

a question which all mankind will resolve in the affirmative. And, therefore arguments drawn from the manifest and constant prosperity of the wicked, and the frequent unhappiness of good men in this life, must convince every candid and thinking person, that there is a future state wherein all will be set right, and God's attributes of wisdom, justice, and goodness fully vindicated. Had the virtuous no hope of a future state, *they would be of all men most miserable*; but as this is absolutely inconsistent with the character of God, the certainty of such a state is clear to a demonstration.

* Cap. 9.

278 THOUGHTS of CICERO;

templans, quàm maximè
se à corpore abstrahet.

Namque eorum animi,
qui se corporis voluptati-
bus dediderunt, earumque
se quasi ministros præbue-
runt, impulsuque libidinum
voluptatibus obedientium,
deorum et hominum jura
violaverunt: corporibus e-
lapsi circum terram ipsam
volutantur: nec hunc in
locum, nisi multis exagita-
ti seculis, revertuntur.

Ille discessit: ego somno
solutus sum.

vent elle en sorte par la
contemplation des objets cé-
lestes, et qu'elle ait le moins
qu'il se peut de commerce avec
les sens.

A l'égard de ces ames ser-
vilement livrées au plaisir,
et qui, pour n'écouter que la
voix des passions, esclaves de
la volupté, auront violé
toutes les loix, et divines,
et humaines; leur partage,
lorsqu'elles sortiront du corps,
sera d'errer autour de la
terre, et de n'obtenir qu'a-
près une punition de plusieurs
siècles, leur retour en ces
lieux.

Après ces paroles, l'Afri-
cain disparut: et moi, je me
réveillai.

Or, SCIPIO'S DREAM. 279

as much as possible from the body, in order to contemplate eternal objects.

For the souls of those who have devoted themselves to, and become the slaves of, sensual pleasures ; and by blindly following the impulse of such passions as are subservient to sensuality, have violated all laws divine and human ; such souls as these, I say, are tossed to and fro about the earth ; nor do they return to this place, till after they have been tormented in that manner for many ages.

On this he withdrew, and I awoke from sleep.

XII.

COGITATIONES VARIÆ.

QUOD si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri et perspicere, eadēque optimā duce cursum vitæ conficere possemus : haud erat sanè, quòd quisquam rationem ac doctrinam requireret. Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibùsque depravatis sic restringimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat. Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum : quæ si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret. Nunc autem, simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur : ut penè cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. Cum verò parentibus redditī, demum magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, et opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat. Accedunt etiam poëtæ : qui cum magnam speciem doctrinæ, sapientia-

XII.

PENSEES DIVERSES.

ON n'auroit eu besoin, ni de préceptes, ni d'étude, si l'homme naissoit avec la faculté de bien voir la nature elle-même, et quel chemin cet excellent guide voudroit nous faire tenir. Mais elle ne nous donne que de faibles lueurs, qui bien-tôt viennent à être si fort obscurcies par la corruption de mœurs, et par de fausses idées, que le flambeau de la nature ne paroît plus. Ces semences de vertu, avec lesquelles nous naissons, suffiroient pour nous rendre la vie heureuse, si nous leur laissons la liberté de croître et de fructifier. Mais à peine respirons-nous, que c'est pour ne rien voir, pour ne rien entendre, qui ne soit pernicieux. Vous diriez que nous suçons l'erreur avec le lait de la nourrice. Remis entre les mains de nos parens, et livrez ensuite à des maîtres, nous recevons tant de mauvaises impressions, qu'enfin la force du préjugé l'emporte sur les principes de la nature, et le mensonge sur la vérité. Joignez à cela les poètes : on se laisse pré-

venir

XII.

MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS.

HAD * nature formed us in such a manner, as to be able, at first sight, to discover and fully comprehend herself; and, under her infallible conduct, to regulate the whole affairs of life, there would have been no need of reason and instruction. But in fact, she has only endowed us with faint glimmering sparks; which by our immorality and depraved opinions are so extinguished, that the light of nature no where appears. The seeds of virtue, it is true, are blended with our very constitution; and were they suffered to grow up to maturity, nature could not fail to lead us to happiness. But as the case now stands, from our very first appearance in the world, we are constantly engaged in all manner of wickedness, and entertain the most grossly absurd notions that can be imagined; so that we may be said to suck in error with our nurse's milk. When brought home to our parents, and placed under the care of preceptors, then it is we imbibe such a variety of erroneous sentiments, that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself yields to confirmed prejudice. To these the poets may be added; who carrying a great shew of learning and wisdom, are listened to, read,

N

studied,

* Tuscul. III. 1.

pientiaëque præ se tulerunt, audiuntur, leguntur, edificantur, et inhærescunt penitus in mentibus. Cum verò accedit eodem quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum planè inficimur opinionum pravitate, à naturaque desciscimus.

venir d'une haute estime pour leur savoir, on les écoute, on les lit, on les apprend par cœur, et leurs leçons ne s'oublent point. Joignez-y encore la principale école, qui est le monde : c'est bien là que nous achevons de nous gâter l'esprit, et que nous perdons absolument de vue la nature, parmi cette multitude d'hommes, qui tous, d'un commun accord, se portent au mal.



Cæteris specimen esto.
Quod si est, tenemus omnia. Utenim cupiditatibus principum et vitiis infici solet tota civitas : sic emendari et corrigi continentia. Vir magnus, L. Lucullus, ferebatur quàm commodissimè respondisse, cum esset objecta magnificentia villæ Tusculanæ, duo se habere vicinos : superiorem, equitem Romanum ; inferiorem, libertinum : quorum cum essent magnificæ villæ, concedi sibi oportere, quod iis, qui inferioris ordinis essent, liceret. Non vides, Luculle, à te id ipsum natum, ut illi cuperent, quibus id, si tu non faceres, non liceret. Quis enim ferret istos, cum videret eorum villas signis et tabulis refertas, partim



Que les grands soient un modèle pour le public. Tout ira bien, si cela est. Pour infecter la ville entière, il suffit que leurs passions et leurs vices éclatent : comme aussi, pour y mettre la réforme, c'est assez qu'ils se contiennent. On reprochoit à Lucullus, homme du premier rang, d'avoir si magnifiquement bâti à Tusculum, et là-dessus il fit une réponse qu'on trouvoit fort belle : Qu'il avoit pour voisins, plus haut, un chevalier Romain, et plus bas, le fils d'un affranchi, lesquels étant superbement logez tous les deux, on pouvoit bien lui passer ce qui n'étoit pas défendu à des gens de moindre condition. Mais, Lucullus, ne voyez-vous pas que c'est vous

studied, and imprinted, as it were, on our minds. Now if we add to all this the populace, which tho' a multitude universally agreed in every thing that is wrong, are notwithstanding the greatest of all other directors of opinion; when this, I say, is taken into the account, no wonder if we lose sight of nature, and are quite bewildered in the most pernicious errors.



Be a pattern to others *, and then all will go well; for as a whole city is infected by the licentious passions and vices of great men; so it is likewise reformed by their moderation. *L. Lucullus*, a man of the first rank, being rallied for the magnificence of his seat at *Tusculum*, is said to have made the following extremely suitable answer; that he had two neighbours, the greater of whom was only a *Roman* knight †, and the other the son of one who had been once a slave: and as each of them had magnificent villas, it could not be thought an extravagance in him, what was lawful for those of inferior rank. Alas! *Lucullus*, you are not sensible, that it was you gave rise to their ambition; were it not for your example, such an action in them would be looked on as criminal. Who could bear that people of this sort should have their villas crowded with

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statues

* De Legib. III. 13, 14. It is to *Atticus Cicero* addresses himself.

† There were three orders, or ranks, of people among the *Romans*; the *Patrician*, which comprehended the Nobles; the *Equestrian*, that consisted only of Knights; and the *Plebeian*, or that of the Commons.

To be a knight, it was necessary they should have a certain revenue, that their poverty might not disgrace the order; and when they fell short of the said revenue, they were expunged out of the list of knights, and thrust down among the *Plebeians*. Ten thousand crowns is computed to have been the revenue required.

partim publicis, partim etiam sacris et religiosis? quis non frangeret eorum libidines, nisi illi ipsi, qui eas frangere deberent, eisdem tenerentur? Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes, (quanquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt.

Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescunque summi civitatis viri fuerint, talem civitatem fuisse: quæcunque mutatio morum in principes extiterit, eandem in populo secutam. Idque haud paulo est verius, quam quod Platoni nostro placet, qui musicorum cantibus ait mutatis, mutari civitatum status. Ego autem nobilium vitâ victûque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciosius de republica merentur vitiosi principes, quod non solum vitia concipiunt ipsi, sed ea infundunt in civitatem: neque solum obsunt, quod ipsi corrumpuntur, sed etiam

vous qui leur en avez fait naître l'idée, dont, si votre exemple ne les autorisoit pas, on leur feroit un crime? Verroit-on tranquillement, que des gens de cette sorte eussent des maisons de campagne remplies de statues et de tableaux, qui appartiennent, ou à des monumens publics, ou à des temples? Quel soulèvement contre un tel désordre, si ceux qui devoient l'arrêter, n'y tomboient pas eux-mêmes? Car, que les grands s'écartent de la règle, c'est un mal, qui, tout considérable qu'il est par lui-même, l'est infiniment plus, en ce qu'ils ont quantité d'imitateurs.

Rappelez-vous la mémoire des temps passez, et vous verrez que ce qu'ont été les grands, le reste des citoyens l'a toujours été. Quelque changement qu'il y ait eu dans les mœurs des grands, le peuple s'y est conformé. Et cette observation est bien plus certaine que celle de Platon, qui prétend qu'un nouveau genre de musique, est capable d'altérer les mœurs. Pour moi, je crois que cela est attaché à la manière dont vivent les grands. Ainsi les grands qui vivent mal, sont doublement pernicioeux à l'état: car non seulement ils ont des vices, mais ils les communiquent: non seulement ils sont corrompus, mais ils corrompent:

statues and pictures, relating either to public, or what is more, to sacred and religious, subjects? Who would not join in demolishing the monuments of their vanity and pride, if those who ought to exert themselves on such an occasion, were not guilty of the same extravagance? For the mischief necessarily attending the vices of the great, though that must be allowed to be very considerable, is but small when compared with the ill consequences, which arise from the multitude of those who will certainly follow their example.

Would you but look into the history of former ages, you might plainly see, that the manners of the people were always regulated by those of the leading men of the state; and that whatever change took place in the latter, the same always happened in the former. Now this observation is much more certain than that of *Plato*, who pretends that a change in the songs of musicians is able to alter the manners of a nation: whereas my opinion is, that the manners of mankind change with those of their superiors. Whence great men of a vicious life are doubly pernicious to the state, as being not only guilty of immoral practices themselves, but likewise the authors of spreading them among their fellow-citizens. The mischief they do, is owing not only to their being debauched themselves; but also to their debauching of others. In a word, they do more harm by their example, than by the crimes they commit.

am quoddam corrumpunt, plusquam exemplo, quam peccato nocent.



Ille quidem princeps ingenii et doctrinae Plato, tum denique fore beatas respublicas putavit, si aut docti ac sapientes homines eas regere cœpissent; aut ii, qui regerent, omne suum studium in doctrina ac sapientia collocassent. Hanc conjunctionem videlicet potestatis ac sapientiae, salutis censuit civitatibus esse posse.



Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum, Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret? *Haud scio*, inquit: *nunquam enim cum eo collocutus sum. Ain' tu? an tu aliter id scire non potes? Nullo modo. Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatissime sit? An ego possum, cum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus? Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas? Ita prorsus existimo, bonos, beatos: improbos, miseros. Miser ergo Archelaus? Certè, si injustus.*



Extenuantur magnificentia et sumptus epularum, quoddam

corrumpent: et l'exemple qu'ils donnent, est pire que le mal qu'ils commettent.



Platon, ce beau génie, et ce savant homme disoit, qu'enfin un jour les peuples seroient heureux, s'il arrivoit ou que des sages fussent choisis pour gouverner, ou que la sagesse fût la seule étude, le seul objet de ceux qui gouvernent. Qu'en effet, pour opérer le salut public, il faut que la sagesse et la puissance soient réunies.



On demandoit à Socrate, si le fils de Perdiccas, Archelaüs, qui passoit alors pour l'homme le plus heureux, étoit heureux en effet. Je n'en fais rien, dit-il, car je ne lui ai jamais parlé. Quoi? vous n'avez point d'autre règle pour en juger? Aucune. Vous ne pourriez donc pas dire non plus, si le grand roi de Perse est heureux? Hé le pourrois-je, puisque j'ignore à quel point il est savant, et homme de bien? Prétendez-vous que ce soit là ce qui fait la félicité? Oui, sans doute, je crois les gens de bien, heureux; et les méchans, malheureux. Archelaüs l'est donc? Oui certainement, s'il est injuste.



Puisque la nature se contente de peu, à quoi bon une table



Plato *, that prince of genius and learning, was of opinion that states would never be happy, till either wise and learned men took the government upon them; or those who governed, applied themselves to the study of wisdom and knowledge. Such a conjunction of power and wisdom, was, in his mind, abundantly capable of promoting the happiness of public communities.

The † question being put to *Socrates*, whether *Archelaus* the son of *Perdiccas*, who in the estimation of the world passed for the happiest man alive, was, in his opinion, really so, or not. He replied, *I know nothing of the matter, for I never had any conversation with him.* What? Is there no other way of coming at the knowledge of it? *None at all.* Cannot you then positively say, whether the great king of *Persia* himself be happy? *How should I, who am ignorant how learned and virtuous he is?* Is it in this then you imagine the happiness of life consists? *Yes truly, it is my opinion, that the good only are happy, and the wicked miserable.* Is *Archelaus* then unhappy? *Certainly, if he is unjust.*



What ‡ greatly detracts from the magnificence and sumptuousness of entertainments, is, that nature

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* Ad Q. Frat. I. ep. I. cap. 10.

† Tusc. V. 12.

‡ Ibid. V. 34.

quòd parvo cultu natura contenta sit. Etenim, quis hoc non videt, desiderii ista condiri omnia? Darius in fuga, cùm aquam turbidam et cadaveribus inquinatam bibisset, negavit unquam se bibisse jucundiùs. Nunquam videlicet sitiens biberat. Nec esuriens Ptolemæus ederat : cui cùm peragranti Ægyptum, comitibus non consecutis, cibarius in casa panis datus esset, nihil visum est illo pane jucundius.

Et si omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus, eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas, et in judiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa et doctissimi et antiquissimi invenire se possent, quod cuperent, diffusi sint; tamen nec illi desecerunt, neque nos studium exquirendi defatigati relinquimus, neque nostræ disputationes quidquam aliud agunt, nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo et audiendo eliciant, et tanquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit, aut ad id quàm proximè accedat. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quidquam interest, nisi quòd illi non dubitant, quin ea vera sint quæ

table servie avec somptuosité, et avec profusion? Car ne sait-on pas que le meilleur assaisonnement, c'est l'appétit? Darius, dans sa déroute, réduit à boire d'une eau bourbeuse, et infectée par des corps morts, dit qu'il n'avoit jamais bû avec tant de plaisir. C'est qu'il n'avoit jamais bû, pressé par la soif. Ptolémée, de même, n'avoit jamais connu la faim, lorsqu'en parcourant l'Égypte, un jour qu'il n'avoit pas ses gens avec lui, il ne trouva dans une cabane que du pain bis, qui lui parut le plus délicieux mets, dont il eût goûté de sa vie.

Toute connoissance est bouchée par mille difficultés : et les choses sont tellement obscures d'elles-mêmes, nous n'avons que de si foibles moyens pour en juger, que les hommes les plus doctes qu'il y eut jamais, ont craint, et avec raison, de manquer le but qu'ils se proposoient. Mais ils ne laissèrent pourtant pas de continuer leurs recherches : et nous, de même, sans perdre courage, nous continuerons les nôtres. Le seul motif qui nous engage à disputer, et pour et contre, c'est afin que ces discussions enfantent la vérité, ou du moins ce qui en approche le plus. Et si nous différons de ceux qui prétendent la posséder, ce n'est qu'en ce qu'ils croient

ture loves simplicity and plainness: for who does not perceive, that all things of this kind owe their relish to appetite? *Darius*, in his flight, being obliged to drink water, which was not only muddy, but likewise stained with dead bodies, affirmed he never before had drank with such pleasure: for this plain reason, because he never had done so, when thirsty. Nor had *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, ever eaten with an appetite; for being on a progress through his dominions without his ordinary retinue about him, he happened to go into a cottage, where he met with no other entertainment than plain household bread; which proved the sweetest refreshment he ever tasted.



Though * every branch of knowledge be attended with many difficulties, though such the obscurity which envelops things themselves, and so great the uncertainty of our determinations concerning them, that it was not without reason the most learned men of antiquity had little hopes of finding out the great object of their researches; yet they were not wanting on their part, nor shall we so far lose courage, as to give up our inquiries. Now the only design of these disquisitions, is, by arguing on both sides of the question, to force, as it were, a discovery of the truth, or something as near it as possible: nor is there any difference between us and those who imagine they possess the knowledge of things, unless it be, that they are fully persuaded of the truth of their

N 5

opinions:

* Academic. II. 3. *Cicero* speaks here of the Academics opposed to the Dogmatists; and were there nothing else, this passage alone is sufficient to overturn the sentiments of some moderns, who take the Academies for Pyrrhonists.

quæ defendunt : nos probabilia multa habemus, quæ sequi facile, affirmare vix possumus.

Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quodd integrā nobis est judicandi potestas : nec, ut omnia, quæ præscripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus, necessitate ullā cogimur.

Nam cæteri primū antē tenentur adstricti, quā, quid esset optimum, judicare potuerunt. Deinde infirmissimo tempore ætatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam, aut unā alicujus, quem primum audierunt, oratione capti, de rebus incognitis judicant, et, ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam, tanquam ad saxum, adhærescunt.

Nam, quod dicunt omnia se credere ei, quem judicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent. Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis. Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis. Judicaverunt autem re semel auditā, atque ad unius se

croient voir dans leurs opinions une certitude absolue ; tandis que nous, dans les nôtres, nous ne voyons qu'une certaine probabilité, qui peut bien nous servir de règle, mais qui ne fait pas une conviction.

Toujours maîtres de nos jugemens, nous conservons une parfaite liberté, et nous ne connoissons point l'obligation de soutenir des sentimens, qui nous aient été dictés, et, pour ainsi dire, commandez.

Quant aux autres, ils se trouvent liez à un parti, avant que d'avoir pu discerner si c'est le bon. Ou gagnés par un ami, dans un âge qui n'est capable de rien, ou séduits par le discours du premier maître qu'ils entendent, ils jugent de ce qu'ils ne conçoivent pas, et ils embrassent une secte au hasard, comme dans une tempête nous embrassons le premier rocher, où les vents et les flots nous jettent.

Quelqu'un, dont le grand savoir, disent-ils, leur étoit connu, a mérité toute leur confiance. Je les en louerois, s'ils avoient pu, étant ignorans eux-mêmes, se connoître au savoir de quelqu'un. Car, pour pouvoir décider qu'un homme est savant, il faut qu'on sache beaucoup. Et quand même ils l'auroient pu, encore falloit-il se mettre au fait, et savoir ce que pensent

opinions : whereas we hold many things to be only probable ; which may very well serve to regulate our conduct, though we cannot positively say they are certain.

In this however we have greatly the advantage of them, as being more disengaged, more unbiassed, and at full liberty to determine as our judgment shall direct. We lie under no obligation to maintain whatever sentiments are prescribed, and, in a manner, commanded.

As for others, they engage themselves to one side, before they are able to judge which is best : and either take up with the opinions of a friend, in an age capable of nothing, or, charmed with the discourse of the first person they hear, pretend to judge of matters far above their knowledge ; and to whatever sect chance unites them, they embrace it as a man in a storm would do the first rock he is thrown upon.

They reply, indeed, that they put such an entire confidence in none but one they know to be a wise man ; and this conduct of theirs should have my approbation, were it possible for persons void of all learning and education, to form such a judgment : for it is certainly the chief characteristic of a wise man, to be able to determine who are so. But in order to this, they ought not only to have examined every circumstance, but likewise to know the opinions of others : whereas they have given their judgment on a single hearing, and sheltered them-

se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare malunt, éamque sententiam, quam adamarunt, pugnacissimè defendere, quàm sine pertinacia, quid constantissimè dicatur, exquirere.

Ut magistratibus leges, ita populo præsunt magistratus : verèque dici potest, magistratum legem esse loquentum ; legem autem, mutum magistratum.

Huic (*senatori*) iussa tria sunt : aut adfit ; nam gravitatem res habet, cùm frequens ordo est : ut loco dicat, id est, rogatus : ut modo, ne sit infinitus ; nam brevitatis non modò senatoris, sed etiam oratoris, magna laus est in sententia.

Ut quisque est vir optimus, ita difficillimè esse alios improbos, suspicatur.

Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ est, rationisque, quòd unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis, dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quæ ad spectu

pensent les autres sectes : au lieu de se rendre au premier mot d'un homme seul. Mais la plupart des gens, je ne sais pourquoi, aiment mieux se tromper, et combattre opiniâtrement pour un opinion de leur goût, que de chercher sans entêtement la vérité.

Ainsi que les loix sont au dessus des magistrats, les magistrats sont au dessus du peuple ; et l'on peut dire avec vérité, que le magistrat est une loi parlante ; et la loi, un magistrat muet.

On demande trois choses d'un sénateur. Qu'il assiste ; car plus l'assemblée est nombreuse, plus les délibérations en ont de poids et d'éclat. Qu'il parle à son rang, c'est-à-dire, lorsqu'il est interrogé. Qu'il prescrive des bornes à son discours ; car la précision est un grand mérite, non seulement dans le sénateur, mais même dans l'orateur.

Plus on est bonnête-homme, plus on a de peine à soupçonner les autres de ne l'être pas.

Un effet singulier de la nature, et de cette raison qu'elle a donnée en partage à l'homme, c'est qu'il est de tous les animaux le seul qui ait une idée de l'ordre, de la décence, d'une règle à observer

selves under the authority of one man. But the generality of mankind, I know not how, are fond of error, and rather strenuously defend the opinion they have once embraced, than with candour and impartiality examine what sentiments are most agreeable to truth*.



† As the laws are above magistrates, so are the magistrates above the people: and it may truly be said, that the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate.



‡ There are three things necessary to form a good senator: that he be always present; for when an assembly is numerous, it adds weight to their deliberations: that he speak in his turn, that is, when the question is put to him: that he do it in a becoming manner, and know when to leave off; for brevity is not only a merit in a senator, but even in an orator.



The || more virtuous any man is, the more difficult is it for him to harbour a suspicion that others are wicked.



It § is certainly no small superiority of nature and understanding, that, of all the animal world, man alone has any idea of order, decency, and a due

* How similar, alas! are the present times to those of *Cicero*! We pretend, it is true, to have many advantages over former ages; but where does this appear? If we know human nature better, how comes it that the same absurd customs, and that with some aggravating circumstances, still prevail?

† De Legib. III. 1.

‡ De Legib. III. 18.

|| Ad Q. Frat. I. ep. I. cap. 4.

§ Offic. I. 4.

specu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit: quam similitudinem natura, ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat: cavetque, ne quid indecorè, effœminatè faciat: tum in omnibus et opinionibus, et factis, ne quid libidinosè aut faciat, aut cogitet.

ver dans les actions et dans les discours. Aussi est-il le seul, qui dans les objets dont les sens peuvent juger, soit touché du beau, et sache ce que c'est qu'agrément, ce que c'est que justesse des proportions. Et ces mêmes idées, dont ses yeux sont frappés, sa raison les lui fait appliquer aux opérations de l'ame. Il conçoit que la beauté, la règle, l'ordre, sont encore bien plus à ménager dans ses projets, dans ses démarches: et attentif à n'oublier jamais la décence, à ne montrer aucune foiblesse, il ne se permet de rien penser, de rien faire d'irrégulier.

Sp. Carvilio graviter claudicanti ex vulnere ob rempublicam accepto, et ob eam causam verecundanti in publicum prodire, mater dixit: *Quin prodi, mi Spuri, ut quotiescunque gradum facies, toties tibi tuarum virtutum veniat in mentem?*

Un coup que Spurius reçut dans une bataille, l'avoit rendu boiteux à un point qu'il se faisoit une peine de paroître en public. Paroissez, lui dit sa mère, afin que chaque pas que vous ferez, mon cher enfant, vous fasse ressouvenir de votre bravoure.

Publium Scipionem, eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus est dicere solitum scripsit Cato, *Nunquam se minus otiosum esse, quàm cum otiosus: nec minus solum, quàm cum solus esset.* Magnifica verò vox, et magno viro, ac sapiente digna: quæ declarat, illum et in otio de negotiis cogitare,

Je ne suis jamais moins seul qu'étant seul, ni plus occupé que quand je n'ai rien à faire, disoit souvent celui des Scipions, qui le premier a porté le nom d'Africain. On lit cela dans Caton. Par ces belles paroles, si dignes d'un grand homme, et d'un homme sage, on voit que Scipion, ne connoissant

due mean necessary to be observed both in his words and actions. Hence with regard to the objects of sight, he is the only animal which is sensible of their beauty, gracefulness, and symmetry of parts; and this similitude of visible things being by reason applied to the mind, he is convinced that beauty, constancy, and order, ought much more to take place in our designs and actions: he is likewise careful to do nothing in an unbecoming and unmanly way: also, that his sentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be free from the influence of all unruly passion.



Sp. * *Carvilius* being much lamed by a wound he had received in the service of the commonwealth, was on that account ashamed to appear in public: *My Spurius*, said his mother to him, *why don't you appear abroad, that every step you take may remind you of your virtues?*



Cato † has left it on record, that the elder *Scipia*, who first had the surname of *Africanus*, was wont to say, *he was never less at leisure, than when at leisure; nor less alone, than when alone.* This excellent saying, and truly worthy of a great and wise man, plainly shows that he spent even the usual times of relaxation in some valuable employment; and, in his retirement, used to converse with himself; so that he never was idle, nor had always occasion to be

et in solitudine secum loqui solitum; ut neque cessaret unquam, et interdum colloquio alterius non egeret. Itaque duæ res, quæ languorem afferunt cæteris, illum acuebant, otium et solitudo.



Nunquam mehercule ego neque pecunias istorum, neque testa magnifica, neque opes, neque imperia, neque eas, quibus maximè adstricti sunt, voluptates in bonis rebus aut expetendis esse duxi: quippe cùm viderem, rebus his circumfluentibus, ea tamen desiderare maximè, quibus abundarent. Neque enim expletur unquam, nec satiatur cupiditatis fitis: neque solùm ea qui habent, libidine augendi crueantur, sed etiam amittendi metu. In quo equidem continentissimorum hominum, majorum nostrorum, sæpe requiro prudentiam, qui hæc imbecilla et commutabilia pecuniæ membra, verbo bona putaverunt appellanda, cùm re ac factis longè aliter judicavissent. Potestne bonum cuiquam malo esse? aut potest quisquam in abundantia bonorum ipse esse non bonus? Atqui ista omnia talia videmus, ut etiam improbi habeant, et obfint

noissant point l'oisiveté; employoit son loisir à méditer des projets; et se parlant à lui-même, n'avoit pas besoin de compagnie pour avoir de l'entretien. Ainsi le manque d'occupation, et la solitude, deux choses qui rendent les autres paresseux, étoient un aiguillon pour lui.



Je ne comptai jamais pour de véritables biens, ni les trésors, ni les palais, ni ces places qui nous donnent un grand crédit, ou qui nous mettent l'autorité en main, ni ces plaisirs, dont les hommes sont esclaves. J'ai toujours vu que la même avidité se conservoit au milieu de l'abondance: car la soif des passions ne se rassasie, ne s'étanche jamais: et l'on est tourmenté, non seulement par l'envie d'acquérir, mais par la crainte de perdre. Aussi n'approuve-je pas fort nos ancêtres, qui étoient la vertu même, d'avoir donné le nom de biens à des richesses frivoles et périssables: eux, dont la conduite faisoit assez voir qu'ils en jugeoient tout autrement. Un bien pourroit-il être nuisible quelquefois? ou l'homme qui possède abondamment ce qui est bon, pourroit-il lui-même n'être pas bon? Or ces prétendus biens sont de nature à être le partage du crime, et la ruine de la vertu. Qu'on me trouve

be entertained by the conversation of others. Solitude, therefore, and leisure, two things which render other men indolent, gave him new life and activity.



I * never accounted treasures, splendid palaces, posts of dignity and power, nor even the pleasures of sense, to which some men are entirely devoted, among the number of things really good in themselves, and worthy our pursuit; because I observed, that they who possessed the largest share of them, had by far the most craving appetite for more: for the thirst of avarice is never quenched or satisfied; nor are persons of this complexion only tormented with the pain of acquiring, but likewise that of losing, their wealth. Though our ancestors were, in this respect, men of the greatest temperance; yet I am frequently at a loss to account for their prudence, in giving the name of *Goods* to insignificant and perishing riches; when, in fact, they had very different sentiments of them, as appears from their actions. Can a wicked man possess any thing that is good? or, is it possible for one to have great plenty of things really good, and not be good himself? And yet we see all such pretended goods, pressed into the service of wicked men, to the prejudice of the good. Let therefore any person ridicule me that pleases, I shall always pay a greater regard to the dictates of right reason, than to vulgar prejudices:

I shall

* Parad. I. 1.

obfint probis. Quamobrem licet irrideat, fi quis vult: plus apud me tamen vera ratio valebit, quàm vulgi opinio. Neque ego unquam bona perdidiffe dicam, fi quis pecus aut fupellectilem amiferit: neque non fæpe laudabo fapientem illum, Biantem, ut opinor, qui numeratur in feptem; cujus cùm patriam Prienen cepiffet hoftis, cæterique ita fugerent, ut multa de fuis rebus fecum asportarént; cùm effet admonitus à quodam, ut idem ipfe faceret: *Ego verò, inquit, facio. Nam omnia mea porto mecum.* Ille hæc ludibria fortunæ, ne fua quidem putavit, quæ nos appellamus etiam bona. Quid eft igitur, quæret aliquis, bonum? Quod rectum, et honeftum, et cum virtute eft, id folum opinor bonum.

✱✱✱

In primis conftituendum eft, quos nos, et quales effe velimus, et in quo genere vitæ: quæ deliberatio eft omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adolefcentiâ, cùm eft maxima imbecillitas confilii, tum id fibi quifque genus ætatis degendæ conftituit, quod maximè adamavit. Itaque antè implicatur aliquo certo genere curfûque vivendi, quàm potuit, quod optimum eft,

trouve donc ridicule, fi l'on veut: je ne laifferai pas d'écouter la droite raifon, plûôt que les préjugez vulgaires: je ne dirai point d'un homme qui perd fes troupeaux, ou fes meubles, qu'il perd fes biens: et fouvent je répéterai avec élogé la réponfe, je crois, de Bias, l'un des fept fages. Après la prife de Triène fa patrie, les vaincus, en fuyant, tâchoient d'emporter une partie de leurs effets. Quelqu'un l'avertit d'en faire autant. Auffi fais-je, dit-il. J'emporte tout ce qui eft à moi. Il ne regardoit pas feulement comme quelque chofe qui fût à lui, ces jouëts de la fortune, que nous osons appeler des biens. Qu'eft-ce donc, me direz-vous, qui mérite ce nom? Je ne reconnois pour tel, que ce qui eft conforme à la juftice, à l'honneur, et à la vertu.

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Voyons d'abord ce que nous voulons être; quel genre, de vie nous voulons embraffer. Rien de fi difficile que de bien prendre fon parti. On eft jeune, on n'a point encore le jugement formé, chacun fe tourne du côté où fon goût le porte. Ainfi l'engagement fe trouve pris, avant que l'on fût capable de juger quel auroit été le mieux. Xénophon raconte qu'à l'âge où le poil vient au menton, âge où il eft

I shall never say of one who has lost his cattle or furniture, that he has lost his goods; nor shall I be sparing in my praises of *Bias*, one of the seven wise men; who, when his native country *Priene* * was taken by the enemy, being admonished to imitate others that were betaking themselves to flight, and carrying off a considerable part of their effects; *I do so*, replied he, *for I carry every thing that is mine about me*. He looked on whatever is the sport of fortune, as no wise belonging to him; and yet we call them goods. Some will ask, what then is good? I answer, that, in my opinion, nothing is good but what is agreeable to justice, honour, and virtue.



First † of all, we ought to determine under what character, and in what station, we are to appear in the world. To fix this point, is a matter of the utmost difficulty: for at our first entrance upon youth, a time when we are the least capable of forming a judgment with propriety, every one makes his choice according as fancy directs him; so that he is actually engaged in some particular course of life, before he is able to judge which is best. It is related indeed by *Xenophon*, that *Hercules* of *Prodicus* ‡ being arrived at manhood, a season when it is natural for every one to choose what course of life he shall

* A city of *Ionia*, near the mouth of the river *Meander*.

† *Offic. I. 32.*

‡ That is to say, according to what is related of *Hercules* by *Prodicus* the Sophist.

set, judicare. Nam quod Herculem Prodicium dicunt (ut est apud Xenophontem) cùm primùm pubesceret (quod tempus à natura ad deligendum, quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est) exisse in solitudinem, atque ibi sedentem, diù secum multùmque dubitasse, cùm, duas cerneret vias, unam voluptatis, alteram virtutis, utram ingredi melius esset: hoc Herculi, Jovis satù edito, potuit fortasse contingere: nobis non item, qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum studia institutaque impellimur.

Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam: utriusque omnino ratio habenda est in deligendo genere vitæ; sed naturæ magis: multò enim et firmior est, et constantior.

Philippum quidem Macedonum regem, rebus gestis et gloriâ superatum à filio; facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse. Itaque alter semper magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus fuit: ut rectè præcipere videantur, qui monent, ut quantò superiores sumus, tantò nos geramus summissius.

Adhibenda

est naturel qu'on fasse choix d'un état, l'Hercule de Prodicus alla dans un desert, où deux routes se présentèrent à lui, celle de la volupté, et celle de la vertu. Qu'à la vue de ces deux routes, assis et rêveur, il fut long-temps à examiner laquelle méritoit la préférence. Je veux bien croire cela d'Hercule, fils de Jupiter: mais ce n'est pas ce qui se pratique communément. On cherche à se mouler sur quelqu'un, et on a envie de faire comme on voit que d'autres ont fait.

Pour nous déterminer avec sagesse, nous avons premièrement à consulter nos dispositions naturelles; et secondement, la situation de notre fortune. Mais nos dispositions sur tout; car elles sont bien moins capables de changer.

Philippe, roi de Macédoine, fut un conquérant moins fameux que son fils: mais il l'emporta de beaucoup en bonté, en humanité. Jamais la vraie grandeur ne se démentit en lui: au lieu que dans la vie de son fils, il y eut de vilaines taches. On a bien raison de nous dire, que plus nous sommes au dessus des autres, plus il nous convient

shall pursue, retired into a desert; where sitting himself down, he continued for a long time much perplexed which way he should take, there being two paths then in his view, one leading to pleasure, and the other to virtue. This might possibly do well enough for *Hercules*, the son of *Jupiter*; but not for us, who imitate such persons as hit our several tastes, to whose studies and manner of life we naturally attach ourselves.

Since then our natural disposition has the greatest influence on our way of living, and, next to it, the situation of our fortune; we ought, by all means, to have regard to both these in determining this affair; but principally to our natural genius, as being far more certain, and less liable to change.



Philip * king of *Macedon*, it is true, was inferior to his son in glory and military achievements; but in humanity and courteous behaviour, his superior. Hence the one was always great, and the other frequently brutal to the highest degree. So that it is an excellent advice, that the more elevated our situation, the more submissive should be our demeanour.

We

convient d'être modestes et retenus.

Adhibenda est quædam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cujusque, et reliquorum. Nam negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti.

Xerxes quidem refertus omnibus præmiis donisque fortunæ, non equitatu, non pedestribus copiis, non navium multitudine, non infinito pondere auri contentus, præmium proposuit, qui invenisset novam voluptatem. Quâ ipsâ non fuit contentus : neque enim unquam finem inveniet libido. Nos vellem præmio elicere possemus, qui nobis aliquid attulisset, quo hoc firmitus crederemus : virtutem ad beatè vivendum se ipsâ esse contentam.

Quæ est ista in commemoranda pecunia tua tam insolens ostentatio ? Solusne tu dives ? Prô dii immortales ! egone me audivisse aliquid, et didicisse, non gaudeam ? Solusne tu dives ? Quid si ne dives quidem ? Quid si pauper etiam ? Quem enim intelligimus divitem ? aut, hoc verbum, in quo
homine

Respectons les hommes, et non seulement les honnêtes-gens, mais le public en général. Pour mépriser ce qu'il pense de nous, il faut plus que de l'orgueil ; il faut ne conserver pas un reste de probité et d'honneur.

Xerxès, à qui la fortune avoit prodigué toutes ses faveurs, puissantes armées, flottes nombreuses, trésors inépuisables, n'étant pas encore satisfait, proposa un prix à qui pourroit trouver un nouveau plaisir. On lui en trouva, dont il ne fut pas encore content, parce qu'en effet la soif du plaisir est insatiable. Pour moi, je souhaiterois qu'en proposant aussi une récompense, on pût exciter quelqu'un à découvrir une nouvelle raison, qui achevât de nous convaincre, que pour vivre heureux, il ne faut qu'être vertueux.

Par ces fastueux, par cet insolent récit que vous faites de vos richesses, croyez-vous persuader qu'il n'y ait que vous de riche ? Juste ciel ! je me serois cultivé l'esprit en pure perte ? Vous seul êtes riche ? Mais, si vous ne l'étiez pas ? Mais, si même vous étiez pauvre ? Car qu'est-ce qu'on entend par
un



We * ought to respect all men, not only the virtuous, but others too: for to have no concern what the world thinks of us, besides its being extremely arrogant, is the sure characteristic of a person lost to all virtue.



Though † *Xerxes* enjoyed all that fortune could bestow; yet, not satisfied with being master of powerful armies, numerous fleets, and immense treasures, he offered a reward to the man who should invent some new delight. Nor did even that content him; for thirst of pleasure is insatiable. As for me, I should be glad we could, at any price, engage some person to find out a new reason, which should more strongly convince us, that virtue alone is sufficient to make us live happy.



What ‡ means, I pray, this extravagant Vanity in recounting your riches? Are you the only rich man in the world? O heavens! What do I hear? Shall I not rejoice at every addition to my knowledge? Are you alone then rich? But what if you are not? Nay what if you be even poor? For whom, I would ask, do we call rich; or, to whom does this epithet properly belong? I suppose it is one, who has enough to make him live genteelly; and being satisfied with this, neither desires nor wishes for any more.

* Offic. I. 28.

† Tuscul. V. 7.

‡ Parad. VI. 1. It is thought by some, that *Craffus* is here meant, who was the richest man of his time.

homine ponimus? Opinor in eo, cui tanta possessio est, ut ad liberaliter vivendum, facilè contentus sit; qui, nihil quærat, nihil appetat, nihil optet amplius. Animus oportet tuus, se judicet divitem, non hominum sermo, neque possessiones tuæ: nihil sibi deesse putet, nihil curet amplius. Satiatus est, aut contentus etiam pecuniâ? concedo, dives es. Sin autem, propter aviditatem pecuniæ, nullum quæstum turpem putas, cum isti ordini ne honestus quidem possit esse ullus: si quotidie fraudas, decipis, poscis, pacisceris, aufers, eripis: si socios spoliâs, ærarium expilas: si testamenta amicorum expectas, aut ne expectas quidem, at ipse supponis: hæc utrùm abundantis, an egentis signa sunt? Animus hominis, dives, non arca appellari solet. Quamvis illa sit plena, dum te inanem videbo, divitem non putabo. Etenim ex eo, quantum cuique satis est, metiuntur homines divitiarum modum. Filiam quis habet? pecuniâ est opus. Duas? majore. Plures? majore etiam. Et si, ut aiunt, Danaï quinquaginta sint filiæ: tot dotes magnum quærun't pecuniam. Quantum enim cuique opus est, ad id accommodatur, ut antè

un homme riche? Je m'imagine qu'on veut dire quelqu'un à qui son bien suffit pour vivre honorablement, et dont les desirs se bornent à ce qu'il a. Vos immenses revenus, et l'idée qu'on en peut avoir, ne décident pas de votre opulence. Votre cœur en peut décider lui seul. Rien ne le tente, il ne connoît nul besoin, il est rassasié, ou du moins content? Vous êtes riche, je l'avoue. Mais si vous ne trouvez aucune manière de gagner honteuse, vous qui êtes d'un rang pour lequel il n'y en a point d'honnête; si tous les jours c'est quelque fourberie nouvelle, quelque traité frauduleux, quelque tour de fripon, quelque vol; si vous pillez, et les alliez, et le trésor public; si vous mandiez des testamens, qui vous soient favorables, ou si même vous en fabriquez: dites moi, sont ce là des signes d'opulence, ou d'indigence? C'est le cœur, ce n'est pas le coffre, qui fait l'homme pécunieux. En vain le coffre regorgera d'or et d'argent, si le cœur n'est pas rempli. On doit mesurer ses richesses à ses besoins. A-t-on une fille? il faut avoir de quoi la marier. Pour deux, il faudra encore plus. Pour un plus grand nombre, encore plus. Et si, comme Danaüs, on en avoit cinquante, tant des dots iroient loin. Car le besoin, encore

more. It is not your possessions, or what mankind may say of you, but your mind alone, that can determine whether you are rich or not. Are you fully satisfied with what you have ; supplied with every thing your heart could wish ; and even content with your present supply of cash ? Then you are a rich man, I allow. But, on the contrary, if you are such a slave to avarice, as to think no sort of gain dishonourable ; whereas every kind of it, in a man of your rank *, must be so : if you are every day guilty of fraud, deceit, exaction, dishonest bargains, theft, or robbery : if you plunder the allies, or rob the public treasury : if you expect great things from the wills of your friends ; and not only so, but even forge them yourself. Are these, I pray, the signs of a rich, or poor, man ? It is the mind, not the coffer, of a man that can be said to be rich. Though the latter should be ever so full ; yet, if empty yourself, I shall never think you a rich man. Wealth is measured by the necessities of mankind. Have you a daughter ? Then doubtless you have occasion for money. Have you two ? You need a greater sum ? Have you several of them ? Then a still greater. And if you have fifty of them, as *Danaüs* is said to have had ; so many portions require a large estate. For, as I said before, the standard of riches is regulated according to every man's necessity. Can he, therefore, be called rich ; who

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* A senator was not allowed to deal in any kind of traffic.

antè dixi, divitiarum modus. Qui igitur non filias plures, sed innumerabiles cupiditates habet, quæ brevi tempore maximas copias exhaurire possint; hunc quomodo ego appellabo divitem, cum ipse etiam egere se sentiat?



Sit hic sermo, in quo Socratici maximè excellunt, lenis, minimèque pertinax. Infit in eo lepos. Nec verò, tanquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios: sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in sermone communi, vicissitudinem non iniquam putet. Ac videat in primis, quibus de rebus loquatur: feriis, severitatem adhibeat; si jocosis, leporem. In primisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus: quod maximè tum solet evenire, cum studiosè de absentibus detrahendi causâ, aut per ridiculum, aut severè, maledicè, contumeliosèque dicatur. Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de domesticis negotiis, aut de republica, aut de artium studiis atque doctrinâ. Danda igitur opera est, ut etiam si aberrare ad alia cœperit, ad hæc revocetur oratio: sed, utcunque aderunt: neque enim omnes iisdem de rebus, nec omni tempore, nec similiter delectamur.

Animad-

encore une fois, est ici la règle. Un homme qui aura donc, ne disons pas plusieurs filles, mais des passions sans nombre, capables d'absorber en peu de temps les plus amples patrimoines, est-il riche? Il ne sent que trop lui-même sa pauvreté.



Parlons avec cette douceur, qui distinguoit les disciples de Socrate. Jamais d'opiniâtreté. Toujours des grâces. Qu'on ne s'empare point de la conversation, ainsi que d'un domaine qui seroit à nous en propre: mais là, comme ailleurs, souffrons que chacun ait son tour. Paroissions graves, ou enjouez à propos, selon que la matière le demande. Prenons garde sur-tout à ne pas donner mauvaise opinion de nous: ce qui ne manque guère d'arriver à ceux qui ne ménagent pas les absens, et qui se font un plaisir, ou de faire rire à leurs dépens, ou de les censurer, de les noircir, de les mettre en pièces. Ordinairement la conversation roule, ou sur nos propres affaires, ou sur les affaires publiques, ou sur quelque point d'érudition: et quand elle s'écarte, il est bon de la ramener à quelqu'un de ces objets: mais selon l'occasion: car tout le monde n'aime pas à parler des mêmes choses; et ce qui plaît le plus dans un temps,

instead of many daughters, has appetites without number, capable of soon exhausting the greatest estate? No, he himself is sensible of his poverty.



Let * our conversation, like that in which the followers of *Socrates* excel, be free from noisy impertinence and obstinacy; let it be graceful, and full of spirit; and let us by no means exclude others from their share, as if it made part of our property: but as in other social matters so in conversation, let every one be contented to speak in his turn †. The first thing to be considered, is the subject to be spoke to: if it be serious, it should be handled with gravity; if of a merry and gay turn, with wit and pleasantry; but above all things, we must be extremely cautious, that our discourse betray no defect in our morals. This last chiefly happens, when the absent are purposely defamed, ridiculed, and their character handled with severity, contempt, and ill-nature. Now the topics of conversation are, for the most part, private and domestic concerns, the affairs of the public, or some point of learning. If therefore the discourse happens to deviate from these to something else, we should by all means endeavour to bring it back: but whatever turn the conversation

O 2

shall

* *Offic. I.* 37.

† *Vicissitude*, says the Earl of *Southern*, is a mighty law of discourse, and mightily longed for by mankind—To be obstructed therefore and manacled in conferences, and to be confined to hear orations on certain subjects, must needs give us a distaste, and render the subjects so managed, as disagreeable as the managers. Men had rather reason upon trifles, so they may reason freely, and without the imposition of authority, than on the usefulest and best subjects in the world, where they are held under a restraint and fear. See *Essay on Wit and Humour*.

Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo delectationem habeat: et, ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi modus.

temps, peut ne pas également plaire dans un autre. Ajoutons que pour ne pas ennuyer, quelque raison que l'on ait eue d'engager le discours, il faut savoir le finir.

Themistocles cum confuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi, an minus probato diviti filiam collocaret: Ego vero, inquit, malo virum, qui pecuniâ egeat, quàm pecuniam, quæ viro.

On demandoit à Themistocle, si deux hommes recherchoient sa fille; l'un pauvre, mais d'une probité reconnue; l'autre riche, mais d'une réputation équivoque, lequel il préféreroit? J'aime mieux, dit-il, un homme sans argent, que de l'argent, et point d'homme.

Præclare Socrates, hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiarium dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quod si qui simulatione, et inani ostentatione, et ficto non modò sermone, sed etiam vultu, stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices agit, atque etiam propagatur: ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam flosculi, decidunt, nec simulatum potest quidquam esse diuturnum.

Pour arriver à la gloire par le plus court chemin, appliquons nous, disoit très-bien Socrates, à être réellement ce que nous avons envie de paroître. On se trompe fort, si l'on se flatte de pouvoir constamment mériter l'estime des hommes par de vains dehors, par un masque de vertu, par un air, par un langage étudié. Tout ce qui n'est qu'apparence, dure peu: ce sont des fleurs, qui, à peine écloses, tombent de l'arbre: mais la véritable gloire tient à de profondes racines, et croit toujours.

Præclare epistola quâdam Alexandrum filium Philip-pus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum confectetur. Quæ te, malum, inquit, ratio in istam

Philippe, sur ce qu' Alexandre son fils cherchoit à gagner le cœur des Macedoniens par des largesses, lui en fit des reproches, et avec raison. Où est donc votre esprit,

shall take, (for all men are not pleased with the same things, and in such as they like, the degrees of approbation are very different, and not the same at all times) we ought to be particularly attentive, how far it may with pleasure be persisted in; and as good sense should direct us when to speak, so let moderation teach us when to leave off.



Themistocles * being asked, whether he had rather marry his daughter to a poor man with an unblemished reputation, or to a rich one whose character was not altogether so perfect: He replied, *I had rather have a man without money, than money without a man.*



It † is an admirable observation of *Socrates*, that the nearest and most compendious way to glory, was for a man to be in reality what he would have others think him. But if there are any, who think to acquire solid glory by mere ostentation and vain pretence, by a studied speech, or even a formal look, they are very much mistaken. True glory takes deep root, and is productive of fruit: whereas all fiction, like the blossom of trees, quickly falls to the ground, it being impossible for any thing of that nature to be lasting.



Philip ‡, in a letter to his son *Alexander*, takes an excellent method to reprove him, for endeavouring to gain the affections of the *Macedonians* by base prodigality. *On what grounds, says he, can you expect*

O 3

that

* *Offic. II. 20.*

† *Ibid. c. 12.*

‡ *Offic. II. 15.*

spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecuniâ corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum et præbitorem sperent fore?



Nostræ duodecim tabulæ cùm perpaucas res capite fanxissent, in his hanc quoque sancendam putaverunt, Si quis occentavisset, sive carmen condidisset, quod infamiam afferret, flagitiûmve alteri. Præclare. Judiciis enim, ac magistratuum disceptationibus legitimis propositam vitam, non poetarum ingeniis habere debemus; nec probrum audire, nisi eâ lege, ut respondere liceat, et iudicio defendere.



Velle quod non deceat, id ipsum miserrimum est: nec tam miserum est, non adipisci quod velis, quàm adipisci velle quod non oporteat.



Themistocles fertur Seriphio cuidam in iurgio respondisse, cùm ille dixisset, non eum suâ, sed patriæ gloriâ splendorem affectum: Nec Hercule, inquit, si ego Seriphius essem, nobilis: nec tu, si Atheniensis esses, clarus unquam fuisses.

Duode-

esprit, lui écrivoit-il, de croire que des hommes que vous aurez corrompus à force d'argent, vous seront fidèles? Votre dessein est-il, que les Macédoniens comptent que vous serez, non leur Roi, mais leur trésorier, leur valet?



Parmi les cas punissables de mort, que nos douze tables restreignent à un bien petit nombre, celui-ci en est un, De chanter, ou de composer des vers, soit injurieux, soit diffamatoires. Et cette loi est fort sage. Car c'est à la justice, c'est aux magistrats que nous sommes responsables de notre conduite, et non aux fantaisies d'un poète. On ne peut attaquer notre honneur que devant un tribunal où il nous soit libre de nous défendre.



On est bien malheureux, de concevoir des projets criminels: et le comble du malheur, ce n'est pas de manquer l'exécution, c'est de goûter le projet.



Un homme né dans l'île de Sérîphe, et qui avoit quelque dispute avec Thémistocle, lui reprocha qu'il devoit toute sa réputation à sa patrie. J'avoue, reprit Thémistocle, que si j'étois né dans ton île, mon nom n'eût jamais fait de bruit: mais, pour toi,

that those people will ever prove faithful to you, whom you have corrupted by bribery? Is it your intention that the Macedonians should look upon you, not as their king, but as their treasurer or steward?



Though * the laws of the twelve tables have made very few offences punishable by death; the following one, however, they thought proper to rank in that number, viz. *if any person sung, or composed, a poem tending to defame or abuse another*: And that with very good reason; for it is to courts of justice, and the lawful proceedings of magistrates, not the fancies of poets, that we ought to be accountable for our behaviour: nor is it fit we should hear ourselves defamed, unless where we are allowed to answer to the charge, and defend our reputation by a fair trial.



To † desire what is wrong, is of itself no small unhappiness; nor is it so great a misfortune, not to obtain our wishes, as to wish to obtain what is improper.



A ‡ quarrel falling out between *Themistocles* and a man of the island *Seriphos* §, who had reproached him, that he owed his renown, not to his own virtues, but the glory of his country; the former replied, *I am sensible that if I was a native of Seriphos, I should not be noble; but you, if an Athenian, would never be illustrious.*

O 4

Dionysius

* *Fragm. lib. VI. de Rep.*

† *Fragm. Hortens.*

‡ *De Senect. cap. 3.*

§ *Seriphos, a small island in the Archipelago, called at present Serfino.*

toi, quand tu aurois été Athénien, jamais tu n'aurois été connu.

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Dnodequadraginta annos tyrannos Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, cum V et XX natus annos dominatum occupavisset. Quâ pulchritudine urbem, quibus autem opibus præditam, servitute oppressam tenuit civitatem? Atqui de hoc homine à bonis auctoribus sic scriptum accepimus, summam fuisse ejus in victu temperantiam, in rebusque gerendis virum acrem et industrium, eundem tamen maleficum naturâ, et injustum. Ex quo omnibus, bene veritatem intuentibus, videri necesse est miserrimum.

Ea enim ipsa quæ concupierat, ne tum quidem, cum omnia se posse censebat, consequabatur. Qui cum esset bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus, abundaretque et æqualium familiaritatibus, et consuetudine propinquorum; credebatur eorum nemini. Sed iis, quos ex familiis locupletum servos delegerat, et quibusdam convenis, et feris barbaris corporis custodiam committebat. Ita propter injustam dominatûs cupiditatem, in carcerem quodammodo ipse se includebat. Quin etiam, n. ton-

fori

✱✱✱
Pendant trente-huit ans, et des l'âge de vingt cinq. Denys exerça un pouvoir tyrannique dans la belle et florissant ville de Syracuse, où il avoit opprimé la liberté. On sait par des écrivains dignes de foi, que ce fut un homme d'assez bonnes mœurs; propre d'ailleurs et à former et à conduire de grands desseins; mais naturellement mal-faisant, et injuste: très-éloigné, par conséquent, d'être heureux, si l'on juge sainement de lui.

Arrivé, en effet, à cette souveraine puissance, qui étoit sa passion, il ne goûtoit pas le plaisir d'y être arrivé. Quoiqu'étant de bonne famille, il eût de quoi se faire une société aimable parmi ses égaux, et dans le sein de sa parenté; au contraire, se défiant d'eux tous, il se faisoit garder par des étrangers, par de misérables barbares, par des esclaves choisis entre ceux qui se trouvoient dans les meilleurs maisons de Syracuse. Pour se conserver une domination injuste, il se condamnoit lui-même ainsi à une espèce de prison. Mais bien



Dionysius * having usurped the throne of *Syracuse* at the age of twenty-five, continued his tyrannic government for thirty-eight years. How beautiful, how opulent, the city thus enslaved by him ! Now it is related of him by authors of good credit, that he was a man of the greatest temperance with regard to diet, and in managing business, active and bold ; but withal naturally mischievous and unjust. Whence, in the eyes of all who see things in a true light, he must appear wretched to the highest degree.

Even when in possession of the sovereign power, he was far from enjoying the happiness he had so passionately coveted : For though descended of virtuous parents and an honourable family, and blessed with an extensive acquaintance among those of his own rank, yet he put no confidence in any of them ; but chose foreigners, fierce barbarians, and a certain number of slaves selected from the most wealthy families of *Syracuse*, for his life-guard. Thus he, in a manner, shut himself up in a prison, for no other reason but the lawless thirst of tyrannic power. Nay, what is still more, that he might not trust his throat to a barber, he taught his own daughters to shave ; so that these young princesses, reduced to the most fordid employment, were obliged to perform

O 5

form

* *Tuscul. V. 20, 21.*

fori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit. Ita sordido ancillarique artificio regię virgines, ut tonstriculæ, tondebant barbam et capillum patris. Et tamen ab iis ipsis, cùm jam essent adultæ, ferrum removit, instituitque, ut candentibus juglandium putaminibus barbam sibi et capillum adurerent.

Cùmque duas uxores haberet, Aristomachen, civem suam, Doridem autem Locrensem, sic noctu ad eas ventitabat, ut omnia specularetur et perscrutaretur antè. Et, cum fossam latam cubiculari lecto circumdedisset, ejusque fossæ transitum ponticulo ligneo conjunxisset; eum ipsum cùm forem cubiculi clauserat, detorquebat.

Idémque cum in communibus suggestis consistere non auderet, concionari ex turri alta solebat.

Atque is cùm pilâ ludere vellet, (studiosè enim id facitabat) tunicamque poneret, adolescentulo, quem amabat, tradidisse gladium dicitur. Hic cùm quidam familiaris jocans dixisset : *Huic quidem certè vitam tuam committis* : arripitque adolescens :

bien plus ; n'osant fier sa gorge à un barbier, il voulut que ses filles apprissent à raser : et ces jeunes princesses, réduites à une fonction si basse, faisoient la barbe et les cheveux à leur père. Quand elles furent plus avancées en âge, il ne crut pas même devoir leur souffrir du fer entre les mains ; et il leur apprit à employer des coquilles de noix brûlantes, pour faire l'office du rasoir et des ciseaux.

Il avoit deux femmes, Aristomaque, qui étoit de Syracuse, et Doris, qui étoit de Locres. Jamais il ne passoit la nuit dans leur appartement, qu'il n'eût visité auparavant, et fouillé par tout. Un large fosse, avec un petit pont de bois, entouroit la chambre où étoit le lit ; et quand le tyran étoit arrivé, il retiroit ce pont à lui, et fermoit la porte au verrouil.

Pour haranguer le peuple, comme il n'eût osé se tenir dans les tribunes ordinaires, il montoit au haut d'une tour.

Il aimoit fort la paume ; et un jour se deshabillant pour y jouer, il donna son épée à garder à un de ses jeunes favoris. Voilà donc, lui dit un de ses amis en plaisantant, quelqu'un à qui vous confiez vos jours. A ces mots, le jeune homme sourrit. Tous

form the office of barber to their father, by shaving his beard and hair. Notwithstanding all this caution, he would not trust a razor even with them, when grown up to the years of maturity ; but taught them to singe off his beard and hair with the burning coals of walnut-shells.

As he had two wives, *Aristomache* a native of *Syracuse*, and *Doris* a *Locrian*, he never visited either of them by night, without first having their apartments thoroughly searched. And as he had caused his bed-chamber to be surrounded with a broad moat, over which lay a small wooden draw-bridge ; this, on shutting the door, he drew up towards the chamber.

It was his custom to harangue the people from a high tower ; because he durst not trust himself in the places commonly used for that purpose.

One day having a mind to play at Tennis, a game he was mighty fond of ; and stripping for that purpose, he is said to have delivered his sword to a youth, who was greatly in favour with him. Upon which one of his intimate friends said by way of jest, *here then is one with whom you can trust your life ;* and the young gentleman having smiled, he commanded them both to be put to death : the one, because he had pointed out a way of dispatching him, and the other, for having by his smile approved of the hint. This action, however, gave him the most uneasiness he ever suffered in his life ;

adolescens : utrumque jussit interfici : alterum, quia viam demonstravisset interimenti sui ; alterum, quia id dictum risu approbavisset. Atque eo facto sic doluit, ut nihil gravius tulerit in vita. Quem enim vehementer amarat, occiderat. Sic distrahuntur in contrarias partes impotentium cupiditates. Cum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugnandum.

Quanquam hic quidem tyrannus ipse judicavit quàm esset beatus. Nam cum quidam ex ejus assentatoribus Damocles commemoraret in sermone copias ejus, opes, majestatem dominatûs, rerum abundantiam, magnificentiam ædium regiarum ; negaretque unquam beatiorem quemquam fuisse : *Visne igitur, inquit, ô Damocle, quoniam hæc te vita delectat, ipse eandem degustare, et fortunam experiri meam ?* Cum se ille cupere dixisset, collocari jussit hominem in aureo lecto, strato pulcherrimo, textili stragulo, magnificis operibus picto : abacôsq̃ue complures ornavit argento aurôque cælato. Tum ad mensam eximiâ forma pueros delectos jussit consistere, eosque nutum illius intuentes diligenter ministrare. Aderant unguenta, coronæ :
incende-

Tous les deux, par son ordre, furent mis à mort : l'un pour avoir indiqué un moyen de lui ôter la vie ; l'autre, pour avoir témoigné par un sourire, qu'il entendoit un tel discours. Jamais le tyran n'éprouva douleur comparable à celle d'avoir fait périr ce jeune homme qu'il avoit éperdûment aimé. Voilà comme les passions ne s'accordent guère. Vous ne satisfaites l'une qu'aux dépens de l'autre.

Preuve qu'il connoissoit bien lui même son état. Un de ses courtisans, nommé Damoclès, exaltoit son opulence, le nombre de ses troupes, l'étendue de son pouvoir, la magnificence de ses palais, ses richesses en tout genre ; et concluoit que jamais personne n'avoit été si heureux. Hé bien, puisque cela vous paroît si beau, lui dit le Tyran, seriez-vous d'humeur à en goûter un peu, et à voir par vous même quel est mon sort ? Il accepta de tout son cœur. On le place sur un lit d'or, couvert de riches carreaux, et d'un tapis, dont l'ouvrage étoit superbe. On étale sur plusieurs buffets une magnifique vaisselle d'or et d'argent. On fait venir de jeunes esclaves, tous d'une rare beauté, et qui devoient fixer les yeux sur lui pour le servir au moindre signe. On prodigue les

for he had the most tender affection for the young gentleman, whom he had thus put to death. In this manner are weak men distracted between opposite passions. If you indulge the one, you must offer violence to the other.

Was this tyrant happy? Hear his own judgment of the matter: for one of his parasites, called *Damocles*, having launched out in praise of his forces, power, sovereign majesty, riches of all kinds, and the magnificence of his palaces; and affirming, that never man was so happy: *Will you then*, says the Tyrant to *Damocles*, *taste this life you are so much delighted with, and take a trial of my lot?* Upon his replying that nothing could be more to his wish, he ordered him to be placed on a sofa of gold with most splendid coverings, that were beautified with magnificent works of embroidery; he likewise caused several buffets to be furnished with gold and silver plate of curious workmanship. Some young slaves, of incomparable beauty, were appointed to wait at table; who had orders to watch his very looks, and serve him at a nod. Nor were the choicest ointments and garlands wanting; the sweetest perfumes were burnt; and his table covered with the most exquisite viands. In a word, *Damocles* thought himself compleatly happy; when in the midst of this entertainment, the tyrant commanded a drawn sword, of the brightest polish, to be suspended from the ceiling,

incendebantur odores : mensæ conquistissimis epulis extruebantur. Fortunatus sibi Damocles videbatur. In hoc medio apparatu fulgentem gladium, è lacunari setâ equinâ aptum, demitti iussit, ut impenderet illius beati cervicibus. Itaque nec pulchros illos ministratores aspiciebat, nec plenum artis argentum : nec manum porrigebat in mensam : jam ipsæ defluebant coronæ : denique exoravit tyrannum, ut abire liceret, quod jam beatus nollet esse.



Solebat narrare Pompeius, se, cùm Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium : sed cùm audivisset eum graviter esse ægrum, quod vehementer ejus artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere : quem ut vidisset, et salutavisset, honorificisque verbis prosecutus esset, molestéque se dixisset ferre, quod eum non posset audire : at ille, *Tu verò, inquit, potes : nec committam, ut dolor corporis efficiat, ut frustra tantus vir ad me venerit.* Itaque narrabat, eum graviter et copiosè de hoc ipso, *Nihil esse bonum, nisi*

les essences, les guirlandes les parfums. On couvre la table des mets les plus exquis. Voilà Damocles qui nage dans la joie. Au milieu de cet appareil, le tyran fit suspendre au plancher un glaive étincelant, qui ne tenoit qu'à un crin de cheval, et qui donnoit juste sur la tête de cet homme si enchanté de sa fortune. A l'instant ses yeux ne virent plus, ni ces beaux esclaves qui le servoient, ni cette magnifique vaisselle : il perdit l'envie de toucher aux ragoûts : déjà ses guirlandes tomboient d'elle-mêmes : il demanda enfin au tyran la permission de se retirer : qu'il ne vouloit plus être heureux.



Pompée a souvent raconté qu'à son retour de Syrie, passant par Rhodes où étoit Posidonius, il eut dessein d'aller entendre un philosophe de cette réputation : que comme il apprit que la goutte le retenoit chez lui, il voulut aut moins lui rendre visite : et qu'après lui avoir fait toute sorte de civilité, il lui témoigna quelle peine il ressentoit de ne pouvoir l'entendre. Vous le pouvez, reprit Posidonius, et il ne fera pas dit qu'une douleur corporelle soit cause qu'un si grand homme ait inutilement pris la peine de se rendre chez moi. Pompée ajoutoit qu'ensuite ce philosophe,

ceiling, by a single horse-hair, over the head of this happy man. From this instant the beautiful attendants, and curious plate, no more charmed his eyes; the delicacies on the table were no longer sought after; the garlands fell down of themselves; in fine, he begged leave of the tyrant to retire, for that now he had no mind to be happy.



Pompey * was wont to tell, how, in his return from *Syria*, having put into *Rhodes*, he had a great desire to hear the lectures of *Posidonius*; but being told that he was extremely bad of a fit of the gout, he thought he could do no less, however, than pay a visit to so renowned a philosopher. On being introduced, he saluted him in terms of the greatest respect †, and expressed his concern, that he could not have the pleasure of hearing him. *But you may*, replied the other, *for bodily pain shall never be the cause why a man of your rank should wait of me to no purpose.* So that, though confined to bed, he entered into a grave and copious discourse on this very subject, *that nothing is good, but what is honest:*
and

* *Tuscul.* II. 25.

† *Pliny* VIII. 30. relates the following circumstance. When *Pompey* was about to enter the house of *Posidonius*, a man renowned for his profession of philosophy, he forbade the lictor to strike the door, according to custom; and he to whom the East and West had submitted, lowered his fasces to the gate of letters.

nisi quod honestum esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoventur, sæpe dixisse, Nihil agis dolor: quam-vis sis molestus, nunquam te esse confitebor malum.

phé, dans son lit, discourut gravement, et éloquemment, sur ce principe même, Qu'il n'y a de bon que ce qui est honnête: et qu'à diverses reprises, dans les momens où la douleur s'élançoit avec plus de force, Douleur, s'écrioit-il, tu as beau faire: quelque importune que tu sois, je n'avouerai jamais que tu sois un mal.

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Quotus quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vitâ constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam suam, non ostentationem scientiæ, sed legem vitæ putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis suis pareat? Videre licet alios tantâ levitate et jactatione, iis ut fuerit non didicisse melius: alios pecuniæ cupidos, gloriæ nonnullos, multos libidinum servos: ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio. Quod quidem mihi videtur esse turpissimum. Ut enim, si grammaticum se professus quispiam, barbarè loquatur, aut si absurdè canat is, qui se habere velit musicum, hoc turpior fit, quòd in eo ipso peccet, cujus profitetur scientiam: sic philosophus in ratione vitæ peccans, hoc turpior est, quod in officio cujus magister esse vult, labitur, artémque

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Trouve-t-on beaucoup de philosophes dont les mœurs, dont la façon de penser, dont la conduite soit conforme à la raison: qui fassent de leur art, non une ostentation de savoir, mais une règle de vie: qui s'obéissent à eux-mêmes, et qui mettent leurs propres maximes en pratique? On en voit quelques-uns si pleins de leur prétendu mérite, qu'il leur seroit plus avantageux de n'avoir rien appris; d'autres, avides d'argent; d'autres, de gloire; plusieurs esclaves de leur plaisirs. Il y a, entre ce qu'ils disent et ce qu'ils font, un étrange contraste. Rien, à mon avis, de plus honteux. Car enfin, qu'un grammairien parle mal, qu'un musicien chante mal, ce leur sera une honte d'autant plus grande, qu'ils péchent contre leur art. Un philosophe donc, lorsqu'il vit mal, est d'autant plus méprisable, que l'art ou il se donne

and when seized with most acute touches of pain, he often said, *pain, you but lose your labour; though you be troublesome, I shall never allow that you are an evil.*



Where * is there one philosopher of a thousand, whose manners, life and disposition, are agreeable to reason; who looks on his learning, not as a vain ostentation of science, but a rule of life; and master of his own actions, carries his doctrine into practice? Some of them are so vain and self-conceited, that it had been better they had remained in ignorance; others are avaricious, some fond of glory, and many slaves to pleasure: so that there is a strange contrariety between their life and doctrine; than which, in my opinion, nothing can be more dishonourable. For should one, who professes grammar, speak with barbarous impropriety; or one, who would be esteemed a musician, sing out of tune; such blunders, in them, are so much the more gross, as being committed against the very art they profess. In the same manner, a philosopher who leads a vicious life, is the more contemptible, as being guilty of a breach of the morality he takes upon him to teach; and though he professes the art of living virtuously, yet offends in that very respect.

Should

* Tuscul. II. 5.

artémque vitæ professus, donne pour maître, c'est l'art
delinquit in vita. de bien vivre.

✱✱✱
O Tite, si quid ego adjûro,
curâm-ve levassô,

Quæ nunc te coquit, et ver-
sat in pectore fixa,
Ecquid erit pretii?

Licet enim versibus iisdem
mihi affari te, Attice, qui-
bus affatur Flamininum

Ille vir, haud magna cum
re, sed plenu' fidei.

Quanquam certò scio, non,
ut Flamininum,

Sollicitari te, Tite, sic noc-
tisque diésque.

Novi enim moderationem
animi tui, et æquitatem:
têque non cognomen solùm
Athenis deportasse, sed hu-
manitatem et prudentiam
intelligo: et tamen suspi-
cor, iisdem rebus te, qui-
bus meipsum, interdum
graviùs commoveri: qua-
rum consolatio et major est,
et in aliud tempus differen-
da. Nunc autem mihi
visum est de senectute ali-
quid ad te scribere. Hoc
enim onere, quod mihi te-
cum commune est, aut jam
urgentis, aut certè adven-
tantis senectutis, et te, et
meipsum levare volo. Et si
te quidem id modicè ac sa-
pienter (sicut omnia) et fer-

✱✱✱
Si je puis, cher Titus, cal-
mer la violence

Des maux, dont en secret
tu te sens déchirer,
De ta reconnoissance
Quel prix dois-je espérer?

Ainsi parloit à Flamininus,

Cet homme pauvre en biens,
mais riche en probité;

et je crois, ATTICUS, pou-
voir vous tenir le même lan-
gage, quoique je vous sache
très éloigné d'être, comme
Flamininus.

Jour et nuit agité de trouble^s
et d'alarmes.

Votre ame m'est connue: rien
ne la dérange: et un surnom
n'est pas tout ce que vous a-
vez rapporté d'Athènes, mais
vous y avez appris à être
homme, et à vous servir de
votre raison. Avec tout cela
j'ai peur qu'il n'y ait des
momens où il vous arrive,
comme à moi, d'être plus
frappé qu'il ne faudroit de
certains événemens, dont en
effet il n'est pas aisé de se
consoler. Une autrefois, nous
y penserons. Quant à pré-
sent, j'ai dessein de m'entre-
tenir avec vous sur la vieil-
lesse: car déjà elle s'appe-
santit sur nous; ou du moins
nous en sentons les approches:
et je veux travailler à nous
rendre



*Should * I, my Titus, ease you of that pain;
That anxious care, which fills your soul with grief:
Say, dearest friend, would this not please you well?*

For I may address myself to you, *Atticus*, in the
verses spoken to *Flaminius*,

That man † of honour, though but small estate.

Although I know for a certain truth, that you are
not, like *Flaminius*,

Both night and day harrassed with new alarms.

For I am well acquainted with your moderation, and
evenness of temper. I am sensible, that it is not a
surname only you have brought from *Athens*, but also
humanity and prudence; and yet I cannot help sus-
pecting, that you are sometimes not a little affected
with the same events, as myself ‡. But to offer any
consolation on this head being a matter of great
difficulty, it shall be deferred to another time. At
present, I have thought proper to write you my Sen-
timents on old age. For as it, in a manner, hangs
over us, or at least is fast approaching, I am
desirous to alleviate its burthen, common to us both:
although I know for certain, that you not only bear
it,

* De Senect. cap. 1. This is the *exordium*, or preface, of the
dialogue on old age.

† *Ennius* is the person here meant. As to the application of these
verses, it is founded on this, that *Titus* was a prænomen common to
Flaminius and *Pomponius*; the latter of whom was surnamed *Atticus*,
because of the long stay he had made at *Athens*.

‡ The troubles of the commonwealth, during the civil wars be-
tween *Cæsar* and *Pompey*.

re, et laturum esse certò scio. Sed mihi, cùm de senectute aliquid vellem scribere, tu occurrebas dignus eo munere, quo uterque nostrùm communiter uteretur.

Mihi quidem ita jucunda hujus libri confectio fuit, ut non modò omnes absterferit senectutis molestias, sed effecerit mollem etiam, et jucundam senectutem. Nunquam igitur satis laudari dignè poterit philosophia, cui qui pareat, omne tempus ætatis sine molestia possit degere. Sed de cæteris et diximus multa, et sæpe dicemus. Hunc librum de senectute ad te misimus.

Omnem autem sermonem tribuimus non Tithono, ut Aristo Chius; (parum enim esset auctoritatis in fabula) sed M. Catoni seni, quò majorem auctoritatem haberet oratio. Apud quem, Lælium et Scipionem facimus admirantes, quod is tam facilè senectutem ferat, iisque eum respondentem. Qui si eruditius videbitur disputare, quàm consuevit ipse in suis libris, attribuito Græcis literis, quarum constat eum perstudiosum fuisse in senectute. Sed quid opus est plura? jam enim ipsius

Catonis

rendre ce fardeau léger. Vous êtes si modéré, si sage, que vous le portez, et continuerez à le porter sans peine. J'en suis certain. Mais voulant écrire sur ce sujet, j'ai cru qu'un ouvrage dont l'utilité nous sera commune, devoit vous être offert.

Pour moi, en le composant, j'y ai pris tant de plaisir, que non seulement la vieillesse ne me semble plus rien avoir d'affreux, mais que même elle se montre à moi avec des charmes. Quels éloges donc ne sont pas dûs à la philosophie, puisque l'homme, pour être heureux à tout âge, n'a qu'à lui obéir? J'ai relevé ailleurs les autres obligations que nous lui avons, et je les rappellerai souvent. Il s'agit de la vieillesse, dans l'écrit que je vous envoie.

Je n'y fais point parler Tithon, comme a fait en pareil cas Ariston de Chio. Un personnage fabuleux n'auroit point assez d'autorité. Pour donner plus de poids à mon discours, je le mets dans la bouche du vieux Caton, en supposant que c'est ce qu'il répond à Scipion, et à Lélius, sur l'étonnement qu'ils lui témoignent, de ce que son grand âge l'embarrasse si peu. Au cas que vous lui trouviez ici plus d'érudition, qu'il n'en fit entrer dans ses propres ouvrages, attribuez cette différence à l'étude des auteurs

Grecs,

it, as you do every thing else, with prudence and moderation ; but will continue to do so. However, as I determined to write on old age, none seemed so proper as you, to whom a work, which might be of common service to us both, could be offered.

So great was the pleasure I received in composing this treatise *, that it not only freed old age of all its ailments, but even rendered it easy and agreeable. Philosophy, then, can never be extolled enough ; since the man, who obeys its dictates, may live happily in every stage of life. As to its other advantages, I have already said, and shall hereafter say, a great deal. The book which I have at present sent you, treats of old age.

I have not, indeed, like *Aristo* † of *Chios*, put what I had to offer on my subject into the mouth of *Tithonus* ; (for there is little credit to be given to a fable) but into that of *M. Cato* the elder, thereby to add authority to it. I introduce him making answer to *Lelius* and *Scipio*, who had expressed their admiration that he bore his age with such chearfulness. If he shall appear to reason more learnedly than is usual in his own works, let it be ascribed to his knowledge of the *Grecian* literature, which he studied with close application in his old age. But what
occasion

* Hence it is evident that *Cicero* practised what he recommended to others, viz. not to compose the *exordium* till the body of the work was finished.

† A Stoic philosopher, that must not be confounded with another *Aristo* ; who was a peripatetic, and a native of the isle of *Cos*. For *Cicero's* thoughts on old age, see above, page 205, & seq.

Catonis sermo explicabit
nostram omnem de senectute
sententiam.



Cujusvis hominis est er-
rare : nullius, nisi insipien-
tis, in errore perseverare.



Quid est libertas ? Potes-
tas vivendi, ut velis. Quis
igitur vivit, ut vult, nisi qui
recta sequitur, qui gaudet
officio, cui vivendi via con-
siderata atque provisa est ?
qui legibus quidem non
propter metum paret, sed
eas sequitur atque colit,
quia id salutare maximè
esse judicat : qui nihil dicit,
nihil facit, nihil cogitat de-
nique, nisi libenter ac libe-
rè : cujus omnia consilia,
résque omnes quas gerit, ab
ipso proficiscuntur, eodém-
que referuntur : nec est ulla
res, quæ plus apud eum
polleat, quàm ipsius volun-
tas, atque judicium : cui
quidem etiam, quæ vim
habere maximam dicitur,
fortuna ipsa cedit : quæ,
sicut sapiens poeta dixit,
Suis cuique fingitur moribus.
Soli igitur, hoc contingit
sapienti, ut nihil faciat in-
vitus, nihil dolens, nihil
coactus.

*Grecs, qui, comme nous sa-
vons, fit l'occupation de ses
dernières années. Mais pour-
quoi un plus long préambule ?
Voici que Caton va lui-même
vous dire tout ce que j'ai
pensé sur ce sujet.*



*Pour se tromper, il ne faut
qu'être homme : mais pour
s'obstiner dans son erreur, il
faut être fou.*



*Qu'est-ce qu'être libre ?
Pouvoir vivre comme on
veut. Or quelqu'un vit-il
comme il veut, si ce n'est un
homme guidé par la raison ;
qui se plaît à son devoir ;
qui a son plan de vie, fait
avec réflexion ; qui obéit aux
loix, non par crainte, mais
par soumission, et avec res-
pect, parce qu'il sait que le
salut en dépend ; qui ne dit
rien, ne fait rien, n'entre-
prend rien, que de son goût,
et de son gré ; qui part tou-
jours de sa volonté, sans au-
tre but que de l'accomplir, et
sans que rien au monde soit
capable de l'engager à se
gouverner autrement qu'il ne
veut, et qu'il ne croit le de-
voir. Quelque puissante
qu'on croie la fortune, elle
n'a point d'empire sur lui :
car, comme l'a dit un poète
sensé, chacun, par son pro-
pre caractère, se fait sa for-
tune. Ainsi l'homme sage
est le seul qui ne se trouve
jamais exposé à rien faire
par force, ni à regret.*

occasion for a longer preamble? *Cato's* discourse will sufficiently explain my sentiments on old age.



Any * man may be guilty of an oversight ; but to persist in error, is the sure characteristic of a fool.



What † is liberty? The power of living as you please. Now who can be said to live in this manner, if it is not one who acts agreeably to right reason ; who takes pleasure in his duty, and lives according to a plan founded on reflection ; who obeys the laws not out of fear, but willingly and with respect, as being sensible that it is most conducive to his happiness ; who says nothing, does nothing, and thinks nothing, but with the utmost freedom and cheerfulness? All his deliberations, and every thing he undertakes, begin and terminate in himself ; nor is there any thing has so much weight with him, as his will ‡ and judgment ; even fortune itself, whose influence is said to be very great, yields to him : for as the poet wisely observes, *every man's fortune depends on his manners*. On the whole then, it is the wise man alone, who does nothing by force, or with regret.

We

* Philippic. XII. 2.

† Paradox. V. 1.

‡ Will, in the language of the Stoics, is only meant of the will when enlightened, and guided by reason : for if passion takes place, it is not the man, but rather something foreign to him that wills. See Tuscul. IV. 6.

✱✱✱
 Iratos propriè dicimus
 exisse de potestate, id est,
 de consilio, de ratione, de
 mente: horum enim po-
 testas in totum animum esse
 debet. His aut subtrahendi
 sunt ei, in quos impetum
 conantur facere, dum se ipsi
 colligant (quid est autem se
 ipsum colligere, nisi dissi-
 patas animi partes rursus
 in suum locum cogere?)
 aut rogandi, orandique sunt,
 ut, si quam habent ulcif-
 cendi vim, differant in
 tempus aliud, dum defer-
 vescat ira. Deservescere
 autem certè significat ardo-
 rem animi invitâ ratione
 excitatum. Ex quo illud
 laudatur Archytæ, qui, cum
 villico factus esset iratior.
*Quo te modo, inquit, acce-
 pisses, nisi iratus essem?*

✱✱✱
 Hippias, cum Olympiam
 venisset maxima illa quin-
 quennali celebritate ludo-
 rum, gloriatus est, cunctâ
 penè audiente Græciâ, ni-
 hil esse ulla in arte rerum
 omnium, quod ipse nesci-
 ret: nec solum has artes,
 quibus liberales doctrinæ
 atque ingenuæ contineren-
 tur,

✱✱✱
*On dit particulièrement
 d'un homme en colère, qu'il
 ne se possède plus: ce qui
 signifie qu'il n'écoute plus la
 raison; car la raison nous
 rend maîtres de nous, et c'est
 par elle qu'on se possède. On
 est obligé d'ôter de devant les
 yeux d'un homme irrité, les
 personnes à qui il en veut,
 et l'on attend qu'il se soit re-
 mis. Or, qu'est-ce que se
 remettre, si ce n'est faire que
 les parties de l'ame, qui vi-
 ennent d'être dérangées, se
 retrouvent dans leur état
 naturel? On prie, on con-
 jure cet homme irrité, de
 suspendre un peu sa vengeance,
 et de n'agir point dans les
 premiers bouillons de sa co-
 lère. Or ces bouillons, qu'est-
 ce autre chose qu'un feu vio-
 lent, qui s'est allumé dans le
 cœur, au mépris de la rai-
 son? Vous savez, à ce sujet,
 le bon mot d'Archytas, qui,
 étant irrité contre son fer-
 mier, Comme je te traite-
 rois, lui dit-il, si je n'étois
 pas en colère!*

✱✱✱
*Hippias étant allé à Olym-
 pie pour ces jeux solennels, qui
 revenoient de cinq ans en cinq
 ans, et où presque toute la
 Grèce étoit rassemblée, se van-
 ta publiquement de savoir la
 géométrie, la musique, la
 grammaire, les poètes, la
 physique, la morale, la po-
 litique; et que non-seulement
 il*



We * say very properly that angry men are beside themselves, that is, are void of prudence, reason, and reflection; which ought to give laws to all the other powers of the mind. Now it is necessary, either to remove out of their sight the persons against whom their fury is levelled, till they recollect themselves; (but what is this recollection of one's self, if it be not the restoring the disturbed parts of the soul to their natural state?) or they are to be intreated and conjured to suspend their vengeance to another time, when their anger shall have subsided: But this must certainly imply a violent perturbation raised in the mind in opposition to reason. Hence it is, that the saying of *Archytas* † is much cried up; who being highly offended at his steward, addressed him thus: *How severely should I have handled you, had I not been angry!*



Hippias ‡ having arrived at *Olympia* during the celebrating of those famous games, which are held every fifth year, made his boast, in the presence of almost all *Greece*, that there was no part of any art with which he was not perfectly acquainted. Nor

P

was

* Tusc. IV. 36.

† *Archytas* having gone from *Tarentum*, the place of his birth, to *Metapontum*, where *Pythagoras* taught his philosophy, thought of nothing during his long stay there, but to profit under so great a master. At his return he found his lands in a pitiful condition, occasioned by the negligence of his steward: and it was this made him use the expression above-mentioned. On this head, see *Valerius Maximus*, lib. IV. cap. 1. Ext. 1.

‡ De Orat. III. 32.

tur, geometriam, musicam, literarum cognitionem, et poëtarum, atque illa, quæ de naturis rerum, quæ de hominum moribus, quæ de rebus publicis dicerentur: sed annulum, quem haberet, pallium, quo amictus, foccos, quibus indutus esset, se sua manu confecisse.



Apud Græcos fertur incredibili quâdam magnitudine consilii atque ingenii Atheniensis ille fuisse Themistocles ad quem quidam doctus homo, atque in primis eruditus accessisse dicitur, eique artem memoriæ, quæ tum primum proferebatur, pollicitum esse se traditurum. Cum ille quæfisset quidnam illa ars efficere posset, dixisse illum doctorem, ut omnia meminisset: et ei Themistoclem respondisse, gratius sibi illum esse facturum, si se oblivisci quæ vellet, quàm si meminisset, docuisset.



Theophrastus moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis, et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset; hominibus, quorum maximè interfuisset, tam exigua vitam dedisset: quorum si ætas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse, ut omnibus perfectis artibus, omni doctrinâ hominum vi-

il possédoit tous les arts libéraux, mais que la bague qu'il avoit au doigt, que le manteau dont il étoit couvert, que sa chaussure même, c'étoit l'ouvrage de ses mains.



Thémistocle, ce fameux Athénien, que les Grecs regardent comme un prodige d'esprit et de bon sens, fut abordé, dit-on, par un savant du premier ordre, qui lui offrit de lui enseigner cette mémoire artificielle, dont l'invention étoit alors toute récente. Thémistocle lui ayant demandé ce que c'étoit que cet art: C'est, dit l'homme de lettres, l'art de se souvenir de tout. J'aimerois bien mieux, répondit Thémistocle, que vous pussiez m'enseigner à oublier ce que je voudrois.



Théophraste, en mourant, faisoit, dit-on, un reproche à la nature, de ce qu'elle avoit accordé un si longue vie aux cerfs et aux corneilles, qui n'en avoient nul besoin; tandis que pour nous, qui pouvions en faire un excellent usage, il y a des jours si bornés. Avec une vie plus longue, disoit il, l'homme auroit pu acquérir toutes

was it the learned and liberal arts only, as geometry, music, grammar, poetry, natural history, morality, and politics; but that the ring on his finger, the cloak on his back, and the shoes on his feet, were all his own workmanship.



Themistocles *, the famous *Athenian*, whom the *Greeks* esteemed a prodigy of good sense and prudence, was accosted by a learned man of the first rate; who proffered to teach him the art of memory †, then first reduced to a science. *Themistocles*, having asked him, what that art could do? The professor answered, it would teach him to remember every thing. On which the other replied, that he would do him a much greater favour, could he teach him to forget, rather than remember, whatever he pleased.



Theophrastus †, on his death bed, is said to have reproached nature, that she had bestowed a long life on stags and crows, who could have no occasion for it; but to mankind had given a very short one, notwithstanding that it much concerned them: for had their life been longer, they might have attained the knowledge of every science, and a perfect mastery

P 2

* De Orat. II. 74.

† See Quintilian, XI. 2.

† Tuscul. III. 28.

ta erudiretur. Querebatur igitur, se tum, cùm illa videre cœpisset, extingui.



Omnes immemorem beneficii oderunt: eámque injuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam fieri; eúmque, qui faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant.



Pythagoram Phliuntem ferunt venisse, eúmque cum Leonte, principe Phliasiorum, doctè et copiosè disserteruisse quædam. Cujus ingenium et eloquentiam cùm admiratus esset Leon, quæsisse ex eo, quâ maximè arte consideret. At illum artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse philosophum. Admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis, quæsisse, quinam essent philosophi, et quid inter eos et relinquos interesset. Pythagoram autem respondiisse, similem sibi videri vitam hominum, et mercatum eum, qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu, totius Græciæ celebritate. Nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronæ peterent: alii emendi aut vendendi quæstu et lucro ducerentur: esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque

toutes les sciences, perfectionner tous les arts. Il se plaignoit de ce qu'en commençant à savoir, il cessoit de vivre.



Un ingrat est haï de tout le monde; et comme son injustice tend à refroidir la générosité, chacun s'y croit intéressé personnellement. On le regarde comme l'ennemi commun de tous ceux qui sont dans le cas d'avoir besoin qu'on leur fasse du bien.



Pythagore étant arrivé, dit-on, à Phliunte, discourut sagement, et avec éloquence, devant Léon, chef des Phliasien, qui, charmé de ce qu'il venoit d'entendre, lui demanda quel étoit son métier. Pythagore répondit qu'il n'en savoit aucun, mais qu'il étoit philosophe. A ce mot, dont la nouveauté frappa Léon, Qu'est ce, dit-il, que des philosophes, et par où diffèrent-ils des autres hommes? Je trouve, reprit Pythagore, que ce monde-ci ressemble à ces grandes assemblées où la Grèce entière se rend pour la célébrité des jeux. Plusieurs y sont attirés par l'envie de signaler leur adresse dans les combats, et de remporter le prix: plusieurs y viennent pour trafiquer: d'autres, qui sont les plus honnêtes gens, ne cherchent ni applaudissement, ni gain, mais se trouvent-là seulement

in every art. He complained, therefore, that he was snatched away by death, when these things were but just opening to his view.



All * mankind hate an ungrateful person. They look on themselves as personally injured, in the discouragement of munificence; and esteem the guilty person, the common enemy of the needy.



Pythagoras † having gone to *Philus* ‡, is said to have held a learned and eloquent discourse with *Leon*, king of that place; who being much taken with his wit and eloquence, asked him what trade he professed? he answered that he understood no trade at all, but was a *Philosopher*. *Leon*, struck with the novelty of the term, asked what Philosophers were, and wherein consisted the difference between them and the rest of mankind? *Pythagoras* made answer, that in his opinion, human life resembled that great concourse of people conveyed from every part of *Greece* to celebrate the solemn games: for as in them, some, by bodily exercise, contend for the glory and renown of gaining the crown of victory; the only inducement of others, was to make profit by buying and selling: but besides these, there was a third sort, more noble than either of the former, who came there neither in quest

* *Offic.* II, 18.

† *Tuscul.* V. 3.

‡ A city of *Peloponnesus*.

que vel maximè ingenuum, qui nec plausum, nec lucrum quærerent, sed vivendi causâ venirent, studiosèque perspicerent quid ageretur, et quo modo: item nos quasi in mercatûs quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua, sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos; alios gloriæ servire, alios pecuniæ: raros esse quosdam, qui, cæteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis, rerum naturam studiosè intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiæ studiosos, id est enim philosophos: et ut illic liberalissimum esset, spectare, nihil sibi acquirantem, sic in vita longè omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum, cognitionémque præstare.

seulement par curiosité, et sans autre dessein que de regarder ce qui s'y passe. Tous, pour y arriver, sont partis de quelque ville. Or c'est ainsi que nous sommes partis d'une autre vie, d'une autre existence, pour arriver en ce monde, où les uns tâchent d'acquiescer de la gloire; d'autres, des richesses; quelques-uns, en petit nombre, s'appliquent à connoître la nature; et comptent tout le reste pour rien. Voilà les philosophes, c'est-à-dire, les amateurs de la sagesse: et comme le plus beau rôle dans les jeux publics, est celui de spectateur; de même la plus belle et la plus noble occupation en ce monde, c'est l'étude.

quest of gain or popular applause, but merely out of curiosity to see what passed, and how things were managed. Thus it is with mankind, they come from another life, and another state of existence*, into this world, as it were from a foreign city to some festival solemnity. Some mind glory; others riches; and a few there are, who, contemning every pursuit besides, carefully study the nature of things. These call themselves *Philosophers*, that is to say, lovers of wisdom. And as in the public games, it is most honourable to be a spectator, free from mean selfish views; so, in life, the study of natural knowledge, is by far the most excellent of all other professions.

* Here we have the famous dogma of *Pythagoras*, concerning the *metempsychosis*, or transmigration, of souls.

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